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This thesis seeks to examine the status of retail investors’ protection in the Hellenic 
legal order, under the light of EU law; focusing on investment firm failure as a result of 
tort, it investigates whether the EU and Hellenic normative systems aim at and achieve 
effective protection of retail investors. It explores in particular the issue of ex lege 
liability of compensation schemes and the issue of non-contractual liability of 
supervisory authorities.  
  
In case of intermediary failure the minimum protection is awarded by EU law in 
the form of ex lege compensation does not establish a coherent system, and the legal 
status of retail investors vis-à-vis depositors remains uncertain in many respects. The 
ECJ has denied application of the acquis on individual protection to depositors in Peter 
Paul, with regard to non-contractual liability of supervisors, but the application of its 
reasoning in the area of investment services is doubtful. The new EU finance law and 
architecture does not fundamentally affect these conclusions.  
 
On the other hand, retail investor protection may validly be considered as an 
autonomous aim of finance law in the Hellenic legal order. Despite inefficiencies 
connected also to the structure of relevant EU rules transposed, and despite the 
incoherence of the various national rules on the liquidation of financial intermediaries 
and the operation of compensation schemes –in particular with regard to claim 
verification– yet effective protection of retail investors may a priori be achieved 
through the existing national judicial mechanism.  
 
This dynamic is demonstrated by recent case-law on protection of retail 
investors in the context of ex lege compensation; yet it seems to lessen in the area of 
non-contractual liability of supervisors. Even though ex lege immunity of supervisors 
has been denied by case-law, the effectiveness of protection has been mitigated by the 
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The question of retail investor protection in the Hellenic legal order, under the light of 
EU law, originated from a number of judicial decisions mostly of the last decade which 
have considered cases relating to financial intermediary failure, especially as a result of 
fraud and misappropriation of fundsIn these disputes, claimant retail investors invoked 
applicable national and EU law in order to be compensated, filing actions against the 
competent fund which had denied compensation (on the ground that their claims were 
not proved by the books and records of the failed intermediary, or did not relate to 
covered transactions) as well as against the competent supervisory authorities which 
they considered liable for breach of their obligation to exercise their duties effectively.  
 
In proceeding to examining the legal regime of retail investor protection in the Hellenic 
legal order, under the light of EU law, it will be important to first take into account the 
sociopolitical and legal context of the question of research, in order then to define and 







LEGAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE QUESTION OF RESEARCH  
 
HELLENIC LEGAL TRADITION AND FOUNDATIONS, MAIN FEATURES OF THE 
HELLENIC LEGAL ORDER 
 
 
The Hellenic Republic was recognised as an independent, sovereign State in 1830.
1
 In 
the newly established Hellenic legal order were evident the influences of the Byzantine 
(Hellenistic-Roman) legal tradition, such as Hexabiblos by Harmenopoulos, 
contemporary French legal works, such as the Napoleonic Code of Commerce of 1807, 
and the German legal tradition of the Pandectists.
2
 
                                                 
 
1
 The first Hellenic Constitutions which were adopted during the Hellenic War of 
Independence of 1821 - 1827 (Constitution of Epidaurus, 1822; Constitution of Argos, 
1823; Constitution of Troizena, 1827) and were characterised by democratic and liberal 
ideas, aspired by the French Déclaration des droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen (1789. 
For a general overview, see ALIVIZATOS, N. (1979) Les institutions politiques de la 
Grèce à travers les crises 1922 – 1974, Paris; SPILIOTOPOULOS, E. and 
MAKRYDIMITRIS, A. (2001) Administration publique en Grèce, Athens. The new 
Hellenic State was recognised by the London Protocol of 3 February 1830. The first 
Constitution of the new Hellenic State was that of 1844, which provided for a regime of 




 In the first Hellenic Constitutions, as in the legal system operating in Hellas at the 
time, traditional notions of ancient Hellenic, as well as Hellenistic, Roman and 




The political and constitutional life of the Hellenic State has been unstable, until recent 
times.
3
 Modern history is characterised by decades of political unsteadiness and wars. 
Following the end of World War II (1939 – 1945) during which Hellas was under 
occupation by the Axis forces (1941 – 1944), and the Hellenic Civil War (1945 – 1949), 
Hellas joined the European Recovery Program (ERP, also known as the “Marshall 
Plan”)
4
 and in 1952 the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) established by the 
                                                                                                                                               
procedural rules (e.g. the lawmaking by Lycurgus of Sparta, 650 B.C., Dracon of 
Athens, 621 B.C., and Solon of Athens, 594 B.C.), recognising contractual freedom and 
a common commercial law; see YIANNOPOULOS, A. (2008), in KERAMEUS, K. and 
KOZYRIS, P. (ed.) Introduction to Greek Law, Kluwer Law International, Ant. N. 
Sakkoulas;  BISCARDI, A. (1982) Diritto Greco Antico, Milano; De ROMILLY, J. 
(2002) La loi dans la pensée grecque, 2
nd
 edition, Paris. Following the introduction of 
Roman law, the Hellenic (and Hellenistic which emerged from it) and the Roman legal 
systems coexisted, leading gradually to the development of a Hellenic-Roman law (Ius 
Graeco-Romanum), as presented e.g. in Emperor Justinian’s Novellae of 6
th
 century 
A.D. The legal tradition created was passed on to the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) 
Empire, where it was also taught in state law schools such as the Law School of 
Constantinople founded in 1045 A.D. by Emperor Constantine IX. Legal compedia and 
codifications of law were issued. The Hexabiblos by Harmenopoulos was issued in 
1345 A.D. and was still used in areas of Hellas until 1945 (upon which time HCC was 
introduced). See YIANNOPOULOS, A., op. cit., wherein further references.  
 
3
 A new Constitution was introduced in 1864 following a revolution; it was revised in 
1911 and replaced in 1927. Monarchy was abolished in 1927 but restored in 1935. See 
ALIVIZATOS, N., op. cit.  
 
4
 The ERP was prepared and organised in 1948 by the Organisation for European 
Economic Co-operation (OEEC) established in the same year. In 1961 the Organisation 





North Atlantic Treaty (1949).
5
 In the same year, a new Constitution was introduced, re-
introducing constitutional Monarchy.  
 
The Hellenic Republic became member of the Council of Europe and ratified ECHR 
and the First Additional Protocol in 1953.
6
 Further, in 1961 an Association Agreement 
was concluded between the Hellenic Republic and EEC MSs. However, another 
military dictatorship, from 1967 to 1974, abolished democracy again, and was 
accompanied by violations of human rights and freedoms, and resulted inter alia in the 
suspension of many regulations of the Association Agreement and the exit of Hellas 
from the Council of Europe (1969). Following restoration of democracy,
7
 Hellas 




                                                 
5
 See www.nato.int . 
 
6
 Law 2329/1953, BGG vol. A no. 68. 
 
7
 The fall of the 1967 – 1974 dictatorship in Hellas was accelerated by the military 
invasion in Cyprus in 1974; see United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3212 
(XXIX) of 01.11.1974 available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/3212(XXIX)&Lang=E&
Area=RESOLUTION; United Nations Security Council Resolution 365 of 13.12.1975 
available at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/365. Following the fall of the dictatorship, 
Hellas was re-admitted to the Council of Europe and applied for membership of the 
EEC in 1975.  
 
8
 For a general overview, see HRYSOGONOS, K. (2003) Constitutional Law, Athens - 
Thesaloniki: Sakkoulas; MANITAKIS, A. (2004) Hellenic Constitutional Law, Athens - 
Thesaloniki: Sakkoulas; MAVRIAS, K. (2005) Constitutional Law, 4
th
 edition, Athens - 
Komotini: Sakkoulas; PANTELIS, A. (2005) Constitutional Law, Athens : Sakkoulas; 
SPYROPOULOS, P. (1995) Constitutional Law in Hellas, The Hague - London - 
Boston : Kluwer Law International. 
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The Hellenic Republic became member of the EEC on 01.01.1981.
9
 In 2001 it was 
accepted in the Euro-area and adopted the Euro as national currency, and undertook to 
observe inter alia the Stability and Growth Pact. In 2005 the Hellenic Parliament 




The 1975 Hellenic Constitution aims at improving the separation of the executive, the 
legislature and the judicature, in particular with a view to enhance fundamental and 
individual rights’ protection; it provides for certain constitutional rules which may not 
be amended or repealed,
11
 and for an indirect horizontal control of constitutionality of 
law (in the assessment of whether any provision under examination is compatible with 
the Constitution) by all courts of law.
12
  
                                                 
 
9
 Act of Accession ratified by Law 945/1979, BGG vol. A, no. 170. See 
CHRISTIANOS, V. (2008) 'Application of Community law in Greece', in 
KERAMEUS, K. and KOZYRIS, P. (ed.) Introduction to Greek Law, Kluwer Law 
International, Ant. N. Sakkoulas; KERAMEUS, K. and KREMLIS, G. (1988) 'The 
Application of Community Law in Greece 1981 - 1987', CMLRev, vol. 25, pp. 141 - 
175; SKOURIS, V. (1985) 'Community Law in Hellenic Legislation and Court Practice. 
Basic Issues', EEmpD, vol. 5, pp. 3 - 15. 
 
10
 Draft Treaty Establishing a European Constitution, http://european-convention.eu.int ; 
Ratified by Law 3341/2005, BGG vol. A no. 115. 
 
11
 HCon, Article 110(1), providing that constitutional provisions are subject to 
amendment except for those that define the form of the regime, as presidential and 
parliamentary democracy, and the provisions on the respect and protection of human 
value, equality, freedom and the separation of powers, Article 2(1), Article 4(1), Article 
4(4), Article 4(7), Article 5(1), Article 5(3), Article 13(1), and Article 26, respectively. 
 
12
 HCon, Article 93(4). If provisions of laws are found unconstitutional, they may 




The Hellenic State is organised according to the 1975 Constitution as a representative, 
parliamentary democracy (monarchy was abolished in 1974)
13
 operating under the rule 
of law,
14
 bound to protect and respect human rights,
15




Sovereignty of the people
17
 and the parliamentary control system
18
 entail that the 
legislative power is exercised only by the legislature while the executive (the President 
                                                                                                                                               
among the supreme courts of justice, the HSSCJ is competent to decide on substantive 
constitutionality and the interpretation of acts of Parliament, and to declare a statutory 
provision as null and void on the ground of unconstitutionality, its decision being 
binding ex nunc or ex tunc and erga omnes; HCon, Article 100; Law 345/1976. See 
DAGTOGLOU, P. (1989) 'The judicial review of constitutionality of laws', European 
Review of Public Law, pp. 309 - 328; SPILIOTOPOULOS, E. (1983) 'Judicial review of 
legislative acts in Greece', Temple Law Quarterly, vol. 56, pp. 463-502; 
STATHOPOULOS, M. (1991) 'Reviewing the Constitutionality of Laws', European 
Review of Public Law, pp. 87 - 123. 
 
13
 HCon, Article 1. 
 
14
 HCon, Article 1, Article 2, Articles 4 – 25, Article 26, Article 49, Article 50, Articles 
84 – 87, Article 95 e.a.  
 
15
 HCon, Article 2(1).  
 
16
 HCon, Article 25 (1), providing that “the rights of man as an individual and as a 
member of society and the principles of the welfare state and rule of law are guaranteed 




 HCon, Article 1(2).  
 
18
 HCon, Article1, Articles 37 – 41.  
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19
 According to the HCon, the legislative power is exercised by the Parliament and the 
President of the Republic, who promulgates and publishes the acts of Parliament. 
Distinction is made between a “formal law” (i.e. a legal rule issued by the Parliament) 
and a “substantive law” (i.e. a rule issued by either the legislature or the executive, 
including all administrative authorities, which is legally binding and generally 
applicable, such as regulation). In certain cases legislative delegation is not allowed by 
the Constitution, as in the case of tax laws (HCon, Article 78). When the adoption of a 
formal law is not required, legislative delegation of power to the executive is allowed. 
Delegation is exercised by the executive in the form of regulatory acts issued by the 
Government and legal persons of public law. Relevant is the problematic of the 
constitutionality of delegating by law wide competences i.e. when legislative delegation 
is not special and specific as required by HCon, Article 43 (2) 2; see indicatively 
HSACJ (Plenary) 235/2012, Isocrates; HSACJ 4212/2013, Isocrates. Upon specific 
delegation by law or in case of framework laws, the President of the Republic may 
exercise delegated legislative power by issuing Presidential Decrees (PDs); HCon, 
Article 43 and Article 78(5); see indicatively HSACJ 2266/2013, Isocrates. Also, under 
specific strict conditions the President of the Republic may issue Acts of Legislative 
Content (ALC) even without prior legislative delegation in cases of emergent and 
unforeseen need, which are valid ab initio if ratified by the Parliament –if not submitted 
to the Parliament for ratification within the relevant time limit and not ratified they are 
valid only for the past; HCon, Article 44. In Hellenic administrative law, a legally 
binding decision of an administrative authority is considered an “administrative act”, 
and which can be the object of administrative or judicial review. Hellenic administrative 
law is based on general principles of law as developed in particular by the HSACJ, such 
as the principle of legality (the rule of law) according to which all administrative action 
has to be in conformity with the higher in hierarchy rules of law, the principles of fair 
administration, of public interest, of impartiality, of proportionality (included also in 
HCon, Article 25 following the Constitutional Amendment of 2001), of the protection 
of legitimate expectations of the individual e.a. The influence in particular of the case-
law produced by the French Conseil d’ Etat is manifested in many developments in 











The right of access to justice is recognised as a fundamental right, while courts of law 
are organized in two main branches, civil and criminal justice on the one hand and 
administrative on the other.
21
  
                                                                                                                                               
DAGTOGLOU, P. (2004) General Administrative Law, Athens-Komotini: Sakkoulas; 
GERONTAS, A., LYTRAS, S., PAVLOPOULOS, P., SIOUTI, G. and FLOGAITIS, S. 
(2004) Administrative Law, Athens – Komotini : Sakkoulas; SPILIOTOPOULOS, E. 
(2004) Droit administratif hellénique, 2
nd
 edition, Athens-Brussels; 
SPILIOTOPOULOS, E. and MAKRYDIMITRIS, A. op. cit.   
 
20
 HCon, Article 90(5). See also HSSCJ (Plenary) 114/2012, NoV (2012) 730.  
 
21
 HCon, Article 20. Courts of justice in the Hellenic legal order are organised as 
administrative, civil and criminal; HCon, Article 93. Judges serve either in the 
administrative Courts or in the civil and criminal Courts (the civil and criminal branch 
of justice being interconnected, with judges sitting in civil Courts sitting also in criminal 
ones). The HSACJ has both advisory and judicial competence as a court of annulment; 
HCon, Article 94, Article 95; PD 18/1989. The lower administrative courts of justice 
(CCFI and ACA) have only judicial competences, which however may be either 
substantive, on points of law only, or both substantive and on points of law; they are 
competent for the adjudication of remedies against administrative acts, but also for 
certain pecuniary claims against the State and public legal persons, as in the case of 
actions for compensation on grounds of State liability in tort; see e.g. Law 1406/1983, 
Law 702/1977. The HSSCJ is competent to adjudicate final appeals on points of law 
only, in both civil and criminal cases. Lower civil and criminal Courts of justice are 




In our view, the overall structure of the Hellenic legal order is characterised by a co-
existence of rules of different normative formation and legal origin, due to the influence 
historically exercised from various legal systems (such as mainly the Hellenic-Roman, 
the French and the German).  
 
Further, the distinction of Hellenic law in two main areas, of public (mainly, 
constitutional, administrative and criminal) vis-à-vis private (mainly, civil, company 
and commercial) law, is perplexed inter alia by questions regarding the nature of rules 
as of public order, which may be taken into account by national courts ex officio, 
compulsive law (ius cogens) rules, which are not subject to contract, as well as the 
distinction between procuratory and inquisitorial systems of procedure and evidence, 
which is further complicated by the interrelation of civil, criminal and administrative 




Relevant is the issue of stay of procedures and difference of prescriptive periods with 
regard to the nature of the claim and of the addressee of the claim.
23
  
                                                 
 
22
 Administrative courts of law are bound by irrevocable decisions of criminal courts as 
to the culpability of criminally accused persons; HCAP Article 5(2). Acquittal of the 
accused by the criminal courts of law is not binding for administrative courts with 
regard to administrative law issues, where the illegal behaviour constitutes both a crime 





 In the Hellenic legal order, only claims (and not rights) are not subject to prescription; 
HCC Article 247. Relevant is the problematic on preemption, meaning a time fixed for 
the exercise of a right; HCC Article 279. The rules on preemption are of public order 
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Moreover, an important issue relating to access of individuals to justice is the precision 
of remedies, in particular with regard to their factual basis. Until recently relevant 
legislation and case-law were strict in this regard.
24
 
                                                                                                                                               
and are applied by courts of law ex officio; HCC Article 280. Prescription commences 
from the day a claim may be judicially pursued, as a general rule; HCC Article 251 et 
seq. Specific rules govern suspension, interruption, accrual of prescription and relevant 
issues; HCC Article 256 et seq., Article 260 et seq., Article 272 et seq., respectively. 
Rules on prescription are ius cogens; HCC Article 277, Article 278. Prescription is 
interrupted in several ways, in practice by the filing of an action by the claimant; in 
order for the filing to be complete, process has also to be served; HCC Article 261, and 
HCCP Article 215. Hellenic law provides several prescriptive periods, depending on the 
nature of a claim: the general rule being the prescriptive period of twenty years, a 
shorter five-year prescription period is established for a number of civil law claims, 
including compensation on ground of liability for tort; HCC Article 249, Article 250. 
Further, short prescription periods are provided by specific rules. Such a rule provides 
that claims relevant to orders and transactions in securities between private parties have 
a one-year prescriptive period; the ensuing question is whether this short prescription 
encompasses not only contractual claims, but claims arising in tort as well. It has been 
rules that the prescription for claims based on capital markets contract according to Law 
3632/1928 Article 15(6) is annual: HSCCJ (Plenary) 16/2008, DEE 11/2008; HSCCJ 
(Plenary) 28/2007, DEE 3/2007. Also, that the annual prescription of Law 3632/1928 
Article 15 is not applicable on secondary transactions, such as the order to purchase or 
sell shares: HSCCJ 264/2009, DEE 2/2009; HSCCJ 1285/2012, HreDik 3/2012; HSCCJ 
1928/2006, HreDik 2/2007; Athens CCA 3377/2004, DEE 11/2004; contra HSCCJ 
(Plenary) 16/2008, DEE 1/2009, ruling that the annual prescription of Law 3632/1928 
Article 15 is applicable on main and secondary capital market transactions. Cf. Thessaly 
CCA 2855/2004, ruling that the annual prescription of Article 25(6) of Law 3632/1928 
is applicable on both main and secondary transactions. When the claim is based on tort, 
the annual prescription is not applicable; HSCCJ 1376/2011, HreDik 3/2011; Athens 




 See indicatively GRYLLI, I. (2011) 'The Vagueness of the Factual Basis of a 




In order to analyse the legal issues relating to retail investor protection in the Hellenic 
legal order Hellas under the light EU law, it is useful to first examine the context in 
which claims for compensation were brought by retail investors against compensation 
schemes and supervisory authorities.   
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE QUESTION OF RESEARCH 
 
In the 1990’s the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) saw rapid development especially in 
trading by retail investors. The “bubble effect” that was produced ended in end-1999, 
when stock prices in the ASE collapsed. During the same period, a few investment firm 
failures took place,
25




                                                                                                                                               
by Law 3394/2011 to the [HCCP]*', NoV, vol. 59, no. 7, p. 1495; MAKRIDOU, K. 
(2007) The Vague Lawsuit and the Possibility of Curing it*, Athens: Sakkoulas; 
RIGAS, V. (2011) 'The Instructing Function of the Court in Completion of the Vague 
Lawsuit, Arguments, Appeals, etc., according to Article 236 of the [HCCP], after its 
Modification by Law 3394/2011*', NoV, vol. 59, no. 8, p. 1793. See also HCtHR 
decision of 06.12.2011 in case Anastasakis v Greece (application  41959/08, nyr); 
HCtHR decision of 13.01.2011 in case Evangelou v Greece (application 44078/07, nyr); 







An important study on the “Description and assessment of the national investor 
compensation schemes established in accordance with Directive 1997/9/EC” was 
concluded by OXERA Consulting Ltd in January 2005, on appointment by the 
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European Commission. This comparative study takes into account the transposition of 
ICSD in fifteen (15) EU Member States, including the Hellenic Republic, and analyses 
in particular aspects of the national system of investor protection relating to the 
structure and operating arrangements, the funding of schemes, and the risks covered in 
each national legal order. The definition of the notion of “investor” in each national 
legal order is also taken into account, as the type of investment services covered, the 
type of loss covered, and the relevant claim procedure. Overall, the report notes that in 
most Member States there had been little or no experience of investment firm failures 
(until April/May 2004), with the exception of the United Kingdom where in the period 
from 1999 to 2003 there had been 1.609 cases of firm failures (due to the participation 
also of investment advisors in the UK scheme and the coverage also of negligent 
investment advice and investment management by it).  On the contrary, the report notes 
only 5 cases of investment firm failure in Hellas in the same period (1999 to 2003), 
while there have been no available data on the total claims, the highest number of 
claims for a failure, or the highest total payout for a failure in Hellas (ibid., p. 41). The 
report portrays the status of investor protection by national compensation schemes it 
analyses, as it was at the time of the relevant investigation, with regard to the aspects it 
mainly took into account following both a qualitative and a quantitative methodology 
(infra, note 86). 
 
26
 In certain cases the failed investment firms were found to be operating as “Ponzi” 
schemes, and more generally as a result of fraud and embezzlement committed by 
persons controlling these firms against their clients; see Tetractys and Astraia and 
Worldwide Investment Services cases, infra Ch VII.2.2. The term “Ponzi scheme” refers 
to “[…] an investment fraud that involves the payment of purported returns to existing 
investors from funds contributed by new investors.”; see SEC, at 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/ponzi.htm, where it is also noted that “Ponzi scheme 
organizers often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities 
claimed to generate high returns with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the 
fraudsters focus on attracting new money to make promised payments to earlier-stage 
investors to create the false appearance that investors are profiting from a legitimate 
business”. “Ponzi schemes” are different to “pyramid schemes”, as the latter fraudulent 
schemes usually require participants to make a payment and also act as distributors 




Such cases gave rise to judicial disputes concerning retail investor protection in the 
Hellenic legal order, and retail investors invoked ISD
27
 (then applicable) and ICSD
28
  
before the national courts, against the Hellenic ICS, the Joint Guarantee Fund (JGF), 
which had denied compensation when retail investor claims were not evidenced by the 




Furthermore, an new class of litigation also emerged from such investment firm failures 
in Hellas, as  retail investors brought action not only against investment firms (and 
persons directing or controlling them) but also against the competent Hellenic 
supervisory authority, the Hellenic Capital Markets Commission (HCMC), for failure to 
effectively execute its supervisory duties, which they claimed had in turn resulted in 
investment firms operating practically uncontrolled, allowing for torts to be perpetrated 




The Hellenic case-law that has emerged from such litigation, while still under 
formation, reveals not only the perplexity of interpretation and application of EU and 
                                                                                                                                               
More generally, with regard to “Ponzi” schemes, see FRANKEL, T. (2012) The Ponzi 
Scheme Puzzle: A History and Analysis of Con Artists and Victims, OUP. 
 
27
 Directive 93/22/EEC [1993] OJ L194/27. 
 
28
 Directive 97/9/EC [1997] OJ L84/22. 
 
29








Hellenic law in practice, but also leads to the question of the ultimate ratio and 
objectives of EU law in the area of financial markets, especially with regard to 
individual protection: a main defense raised by the HCMC against the actions for 
compensation by retail investors, is that it operates and exercises its supervisory and 
other competences exclusively in the public interest (enjoying thus ex lege immunity 
from all relevant actions for compensation) and that neither EU financial law nor 
Hellenic financial law confer justiciable rights to individual retail investors to seek 
redress in the form of compensation from the supervising authorities.  
 
The relevant problematic has in the meantime been further complicated by the onset of 
the ongoing global financial and economic crisis; the latter has not only affected the 
Hellenic social and political life, economy and legal order, but has also brought 
fundamental changes to the foundations of EU financial architecture, which directly 
affect the analysis of the question under examination.  
 
THE ONSET OF THE CURRENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS IN HELLAS 
 
While it can be argued that the ASE crisis of 1999 had rather local causes and effects, 
the current economic and financial crisis (the Crisis) which reached Hellas ten years 
later has fundamentally affected it. The effect of the Crisis on the EU, the MSs of the 
Euro-area, and Hellas in particular, has been catalytic, not only on the economic and 
social level, but also in the institutional and legal.
31
  
                                                 
 
31
 For an analysis of the causes and effects of the Crisis, see inter alia FSA (March 
2009) The Turner Review. A Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis, FSA, 




Especially in the case of Hellas, serious structural problems of the State and the 
organisation of the economy, which had become threatening before the onset of the 
                                                                                                                                               
Treasury (2008) Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure, available 
at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf; US 
Department of the Treasury, “Financial Regulatory Reform. A New Foundation: 
Rebuilding Financial Supervision and Regulation, 2009, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf; The 2012 
Liikanen Report, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/high-
level_expert_group/report_en.pdf ; further on the Liikanen Report, infra Ch II.2.2. and n 
464, 466, 469. According to the Liikanen Report analysis, the Crisis evolved through 
five interlinked phases (or “waves”), which can be summarized as follows: Wave 1: 
“subprime crisis phase” (mid-2007 to September 2008), in which investment portfolios 
collapsed. Wave 2: “systemic crisis phase” (as of September 2008), in which 
unprecedented state aid to the banking sector was required as liquidity evaporated. 
Wave 3: “economic crisis phase” (as of 2009), in which automatic stabilisers were 
connected to the recession and fiscal sustainability was imperilled through fiscal 
stimulus and state aid. Wave 4: “sovereign crisis phase” (as of 2010), in which bank-
sovereign feedback loops raised significant challenges in the context of existing 
institutional EU framework. Wave 5: “crisis of confidence in Europe phase” (current).  
See also AVGOULEAS, E. (2009) 'The global financial crisis, behavioural finance and 
financial regulation: in search of a new orthodoxy', Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 
vol. 9, no. 1, April, pp. 23-59; AVGOULEAS, E. and ARNER, D. (2013) 'The 
Eurozone Debt Crisis and the European Banking Union: A Cautionary Tail of Failure 
and Reform', October, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2347937; BEALE, L. (2010) 'In the 
Wake of the Financial Crisis', Wayne State University Law School Research Paper 
Series, vol. 10-07, July, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1681577; COFFEE, J. (2009) 'What 
went wrong? An initial inquiry into the causes of the 2008 financial crisis', Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies, vol. 9, no. 1, April, pp. 1-22;  WALKER, G.A. (2007) 'Credit 
crisis: regulatory and financial systems reform', BJIBFL, p. 568; idem, (2009) 'Credit 
contraction, financial collapse and global recession: pt 1', BJIBFL, p. 5 (including a 
useful timeline of the first stages of the Crisis at p. 10); idem, (2009) 'Credit crisis, 









 The Council had decided on 27.04.2009 that excessive deficit existed in Hellas. It then 
addressed recommendations to Hellas to correct that deficit by 2010 at the latest, in 




On 30.11.2009, the Council established, according to Article 126(8) TFEU, that Hellas 
had not taken effective action to correct excessive deficit, and on 16.02.2010 the 
Council gave notice to Hellas in accordance with Article 126(9) TFEU to take measures 
to correct the excessive deficit by 2012 at the latest, setting a time-limit of 15.10.2010 
for effective action to be taken.
34
 However, as stated in Council Decision of 
10.05.2010,
35
 worsening of economic forecasts for the Hellenic economy in 2010, as 
well as an upward revision of the Hellenic government deficit outcome for 2009, from 
an estimated 12,7 % of the GDP at the time of the Council Decision pursuant to TFEU 
Article 126(9) to 13,6 % of GDP according to the fiscal notification submitted by Hellas 
on 01.04.2010,
36
 as well as financial market concerns, reflected what was acknowledged 
                                                 
32
 A list of academic articles and policy papers of 2010 – 2012 on the Crisis in Hellas is 
available at http://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/articles1.pdf . 
 
33
 Regulation 1467/97 [1997] OJ L209/6. 
 
34









by the Council to constitute an abrupt change in the economic scenario, amounting to 
“unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable consequences for 
government finances” in the sense of Article 5(2) of Regulation No 1467/97.
37
 In the 
same Decision, the Council noted that  “[…] [t]here is an extremely urgent need for 
Greece to take decisive action, on an unprecedented scale, on its deficit and on other 
factors contributing to the increase in debt, in order to reverse the increase in the debt-
to-GDP ratio and allow it to return as soon as possible to market financing”, adding 
that “[t] the very severe deterioration of the financial situation of the Greek Government 
has led euro area [MSs] to decide to provide stability support to Greece, with a view to 
safeguarding the financial stability of the euro area as a whole, in conjunction with 




Financial support by the Euro-area MSs, in the form of bilateral (interstate) loans 
coordinated by the Commission, was decided to be conditional on compliance by Hellas 
with the Council decision, which provided for a number of measures to be implemented 
by Hellas according to the timetable set therein. This support was combined with the 
                                                                                                                                               
36
 Council Decision 2010/320/EU of 10 May 2010 refers, in this regard, only to Eurostat 
news release 55/2010, of 22 April 2010.  
 
37
 For this reason, the Council extended the time-limit for correction of the excessive 
deficit in Hellas by two years, to 2014. 
 
38
 Cf. Council Decision 2010/486/EU [2010] OJ L241/12; Council Decision 
2011/57/EU [2011] OJ L026/15, which was issued following the approval by Eurostat 
on 15.11.2010 of Hellenic Government revised deficit and debt statistics for the years 
2006 – 2009 (the government deficit-to-GDP ratio for 2009 was revised from 13,6 % of 
GDP to 15,4 % of GDP, while the debt ratio was revised from 115,1 % of GDP to 126,8 
% of GDP). See also Council Decision 2011/734/EU [2001] OJ L296/38, and Council 




financial support provided by the IMF, and a supervisory mechanism for the purposes 
of the financial programme implementation was established, constituting of the 
European Commission, the ECB and the IMF (also referred to in practice, as “the 
Troika”).  
 
The collapse of the Hellenic economy, the de facto bankruptcy of the State and the 
public sector, the rescue plans devised by the lending Euro-area States, the EU and the 
IMF, and the following developments, have been widely discussed on the economic, 
political and legal level, and are still under constant institutional, political and legal 
review.
39
   
 
At the same time, on the EU and international level, important new initiatives on 
financial architecture have been proposed and a new European financial architecture has 
                                                 
39
 The mechanism and instruments of financial assistance provided to the Hellenic 
Republic in this context falls out of the scope of the present research. For indicative 
relevant Hellenic case-law, see HSACJ (Plenary) 1283/2012, NoV (2012) 2060; HSACJ 
(Plenary) 1286/2012, NoV (2012) 2121. See also ECrHR decision of 07.05.2013 in 
Ioanna Koufadaki and ADEDY v Greece, NoV (2013) 1347. From Hellenic literature, 
see indicatively GERONTAS, A. (2010) 'The Memorandum and the Lawproducing 
Process*', EphemDD, p. 705; KATROUGALOS, G. (2010) 'Pacta sunt servanda*', 
EphemDD, vol. 2, p. 157; TZEMOS, V. (2012) 'The Binding Effect and the 
Justiciability of Fundamental Human Rights*', NoV, vol. 60, p. 32, wherein further 
references. See also STEPHANOU, C.A. and GORTSOS, C. (2012) 'Containing the 
Sovereign Crisis: European and Greek Responses', ECEFIL Working Papers No. 4; 
HARDOUVELIS, G. and GORTSOS, C. (ed.) (2011) The International Crisis, the 
Crisis in the Euro-Area and the Hellenic Financial System, Athens : Hellenic Bank 
Association; GORTSOS, C. and LIVADA, C. (2009) 'The current financial crisis: 
regulatory interventions on the international, european and national level', HreDik, vol. 




arisen from the Crisis, with a view to overcome it and to avoid its recurring in the 
future.  
 
This effort has once again brought to the fore the question of the reason to regulate and 




THE REASON TO REGULATE AND SUPERVISE THE FINANCIAL MARKET 
AND INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION 
 
 
The reason to regulate (in a wide sense) financial markets has been contested by theory. 
Often, reference is made to the need to achieve market stability (protecting the market 




                                                 
40
 For an overview, see indicatively BLAIR, M., WALKER, G.A. and PURVES, R. 
(ed.) (2009) Financial Services Law, 2
nd
 edition, Oxford: OUP; CRANSTON, R. (1997) 
Principles of Banking Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press; DALE, R. and WOLFE, S. (1998) 
'The structure of financial regulation', Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, 
vol. 6, no. 4, p. 1358; DASSESSE, M., STUART, I. and PENN, G. (1994) EC Banking 
Law, LLP; DAVIES, H. and GREEN, D. (2008) Global Financial Regulation, 
Cambridge, Polity Press; ELLINGER, E.P., LOMNICKA, E. and HOOLE R.J.A. 
(2002) Modern Banking Law, 3
rd
 edition, Oxford: OUP; GARDENER, E. (1986) UK 
Banking Supervision: Evolution, Practice and Issues, London: Allen & Unwin; 
GOODHART, C., HARTMANN, P., LLEWELLYN, D., ROJAS-SUAREZ, L. and 
WEISBROD, S. (1998) Financial Regulation - Why, How and Where Now?, London: 
Routledge; LANOO, K. (2002) 'Supervising the European Financial System', Financial 
Markets Group Special Paper No. 137; LASTRA, R. M. (1996) Central Banking and 
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Intervention in the public interest has been criticized by “public choice” theory,
42
 which 
has in turn influenced the development of new theories in favour of the need for State 
intervention (relevant to “public interest” notions).  
 
According to these “revised”
43
 public interest arguments,
44
 the main reasons for 
regulating financial markets, investment firms and transactions, relate to controlling 
                                                                                                                                               
Banking Regulation, London: LSE, Financial Markets Group; idem (2006) Legal 
Foundations of International Monetary Stability, Oxford: OUP; LLEWELLYN, D. 
(1986) The Regulation and Supervision of Financial Institutions, London: Institute of 
Bankers; idem (1999) 'The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation', FSA 
Occasional Papers in Financial Regulation; idem (6 - 7 July 2006) 'Institutional 
Structure of Financial Regulation and Supervision: The Basic Issues', World Bank 
Seminar - Aligning Supervisory Structures with Country Needs, Washington DC; 




 See, for discussion, DAVIES, H. and GREEN, D., op. cit.; KAHN, A.E. (1989) The 
Economics of Regulation - Principles and Institutions; WALKER, G.A. (2007) 
European Banking Law - Policy and Programme Construction, op. cit. 
 
42
 See POSNER, R.A. (1974) 'Theories of Economic Regulation', Journal of Economics 
and Management Science, vol. 5, p. 335; STIGLER, G. (1975) The Citizen and the 




 WALKER, G.A. (2007) European Banking Law - Policy and Programme 




systemic risk, providing financial stability to the market, and to correcting information 




The notion of “systemic risk” refers to the threat arguably presented to the financial 
system at large, in the event of a financial firm (traditionally a credit institution) 
collapse,
46
 which may have serious repercussions to the whole market. This “domino 
                                                                                                                                               
44
 See GOODHART, C. (1989) Money, Information and Uncertainty, London: 
Macmillan; GOODHART, C., HARTMANN, P., LLEWELLYN, D., ROJAS-
SUAREZ, L. and WEISBROD, op. cit.; BREYER, S. (1982) Regulation and its Reform, 
Cambridge Massachusets: Harvard University Press.  
 
45
 See DAVIES, H. and GREEN, D., op. cit., p. 15 et seq. Information asymmetry is 
regarded as inherent in the financial system, in that certain participants in the financial 
market will inevitably possess less or less important information on certain factors 
affecting the market than other participants. The issues arising from information 
asymmetry may have serious consequences for the retail participant (depositor or 
investor). Further objectives of financial law and regulation are identified by theory, 
such as consumer education, financial awareness, market competition, efficiency and 
innovation, combating financial crime; see, indicatively, WALKER G. A. (2007) 
Financial Markets and Exchanges Law, Oxford: OUP.  
 
46
 Credit institutions have been regarded as the main source of systemic risk. They are, 
in general, understood as inherently unstable, due to liquidity risks relevant to maturity 
transformation, i.e. due to the fact that banks borrow short from depositors and lend on 
a medium to long-term basis, so that massive deposit withdrawals may lead to 
exhaustion of reserves. See, among many WALKER, G.A. (2007) European Banking 
Law - Policy and Programme Construction, British Institute for International and 
Comparative Law, op. cit., Ch. 3 (n 61) and Ch. 6 (n 13). The Crisis has shown, as e.g. 
in the case of Lehman Brothers collapse, that (important) investment firms may also 
cause systemic danger, especially when the banking and investment services providers 
are closely interconnected; see for analysis in recent reports (supra, n 31). See also 
BRAITHWAITE, J.P. (2014) 'Law after Lehmans ', LSE Legal Studies Working Papers, 
vol. 11, pp. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2391148. Further, it has been considered that 
 
 67 
effect”, in which the failure of one financial institution leads to the failure of another, 
until the banking and payments system is led to collapse, has been fundamental for 





On the basis of the domino effect danger is the issue of trust by the public to the 
banking system in general, which may allegedly be affected by the failure of a credit 
institution. The size of a credit institution has also been traditionally a factor in not 
allowing it to fail, since repercussions to market stability are perceived as analogous to 




In practice, foreseeing whether the failure of one credit institution, of systemic 
importance, may lead to distortion of the whole market is difficult.
49
  
                                                                                                                                               
“shadow banking” (entities and activities involved in credit intermediation outside the 
regular banking system) may also represent a threat to market stability, depending on 
the size of relevant transactions: see FSB Report of 27.10.2011 “Shadow Banking: 
Strengthening Oversight and Regulation, available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111027a.pdf . See Commission 
Communication Shadow Banking – Addressing New Sources of Risk in the Financial 
Sector, COM(2013) 614 final, 09.04.2013. 
 
47
 A classic presentation of this argument is found in BAGEHOT, W. (1873) Lombard 
Street, London: Henry S. King & Co. See also LASTRA, R.M. (1996) Central Banking 
and Banking Regulation, op. cit. 
 
48
 See e.g. FSB (2010) 'Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important 
financial institutions', pp. FSB Report of 20.10.2010 “Reducing the moral hazard posed 






It is held that the Crisis has shown inter alia that systemic risk to the financial sector 
may be caused not only by a “bank run” and deposit withdrawal, but also by lack of 
funds on interbank markets, withdrawal of credit on money markets, speculative attacks 
on bank share prices or other share price collapses; and that banking sector stability can 




Systemic risk has only recently been defined in the EU legal order as “a risk of 
disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative 
consequences for the internal market and the real economy”,
51
 with the statement that 
“all types of financial intermediaries, markets and infrastructure may be potentially 




In the banking sector, systemic risk has until the Crisis been ultimately addressed by the 
“Lender of Last Resort” (LOLR) function usually held by the central bank of a State. 
State intervention to save a credit institution in distress, using public funds, has been 
                                                                                                                                               
49
 The protection of the financial market from systemic risk is connected to the notion of 
“financial stability”; see OSTERLOO, S. and De HAAN, J. (2004) 'Central Banks and 
Financial Stability: A Survey', Journal of Financial Stability, vol. 1, p. 257. It has been 
noted that defining financial stability is difficult; see GOODHART, C. (2004) 'Some 
New Directions for Financial Stability?', BIS, Per Jacobsson Foundation, Zurich.  
 
50
 See WALKER, G.A. (2009) 'Credit crisis, Bretton Woods II and a new global 
response: pt 2', op. cit., at p. 81.  
 
51
 Regulation 1092/2010 [2010] OJ L331/1, Article 2 point (c). Cf. Directive 
2013/36/EU Article 3 point 10.  
 
52




used as a last resort mechanism to avoid collapse of the financial sector; in such cases of 
“bail-out”, the issue of “moral hazard” in saving credit institutions from collapse 





On the other hand, a comparable “moral hazard” issue is identified when providing 
support to depositors, as well as investors, in the event of a financial intermediary 
default, in the sense that the provision of such compensation by the State or by 





The “bailing-out” of banks by use of public funds is opposed to the new, “bail-in” 
approach which demands strong private sector participation (including by depositors, as 
creditors) in the financial loss sustained to allow resolution of a failing credit 
institution.
55
 While this new mechanism a priori concerns uninsured deposits (beyond 
the minimum coverage provided), this does not affect in our view the effect such a 
                                                 
 
53
 See the FSB Report supra n 48. 
 
54
 See for discussion WALKER, G.A. (2007) European Banking Law - Policy and 
Programme Construction, British Institute for International and Comparative Law, op. 
cit., Ch 3, wherein further references. See also, THORTON, H. (1802) An Enquiry into 
the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit System of Great Britain. 
 
55
 Infra, Ch II.2.2. See also regarding recent application of a “bail-in” method in 







possibility (of removing the implicit State guarantee to depositor in general) may have 
to public confidence in the financial system and which supports market stability.  
 
While the overall causes and effects of the Crisis, as discussed by financial law theory, 
are not within the scope of this study, its impact on the analysis of the reasons to 
regulate and supervise the financial markets needs to be taken into account, in order to 





THE QUESTION OF RESEARCH 
 
 
The question of the present research focuses on the effectiveness of protection awarded 
by the Hellenic legal order to retail investors, in the event of financial intermediary 
failure, especially as a result of tortuous behaviour, under the light of EU law.  
 
INVESTIGATING THE QUESTION OF RESEARCH  
 
 
The case where a financial intermediary (for the purposes of this study, an investment 
firm or a credit institution also providing investment services) is unable to repay to a 
small, non-specialist investor (a “retail investor”, as defined infra) money belonging to 
him and entrusted to the investment firm in connection to the provision of investment 
services, or to return to him instruments entrusted to the investment firm for the same 
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purpose, offers the opportunity to examine the effectiveness of the legal protection 
awarded to the retail investor in a specific, factual in a sense, context.  
 
Thus, for the purposes of this study, the question of effectiveness arises and will be 
dealt with not in abstracto, when no specific difficulties have occurred, or on a purely 
theoretical level, but in a situation where prudential supervision has already failed, at 
least with regard to the specific retail investor who suffers financial loss. Setting the 
question of effectiveness of the available legal protection in this context allows for the 
analysis of applicable rules with a specific legal problem as starting point; in that sense, 
it is an a posteriori analysis.  
 
Indeed, evaluating the effectiveness of protection in abstracto and a priori appears 
difficult and inconclusive, as the question then becomes unavoidably large and vague 
and the mechanism of legal protection offered by EU and national law cannot be 
examined as in operation and in detail –always in legal terms.  
 
On the contrary, examining the mechanism of legal protection in operation on the basis 
of a specific claim provided by law (such as the award of compensation) allows for 
problems in the content, interpretation and application of law to be revealed, and for the 
actual results produced to be evaluated by reference to the stated objectives of law. 
Posing the question of effectiveness in this way further implies that the evaluation of the 
rules under examination will necessitate the exclusion of any presumptions as to their 
effectiveness, in order to avoid fallacies of presumption –otherwise the present exercise 
might amount to a petitio principii.
56
 





Therefore, the question of research as presented will entail not only the examination of 
consistency of legal rules provided by an instrument with regard to legal rules provided 
by other instruments in a hierarchical system,
57
 but also the examination of the inner 
consistency of legal instruments, as well as the interrelation of rules classified in 
different areas of law but which are in practice interconnected in the event of financial 
intermediary failure.  
 
Indeed, a rule (whether of legislative, administrative or judicial origin) is not produced 
in vacuum and does not produce its effects in vacuum. It belongs to a group (if not a 
corpus) of rules the interrelation and interoperability of which has to be examined, in 
order to evaluate the effectiveness of the legal protection available to retail investors by 
the legal system in toto.  
 
THE CHOICE OF THE HELLENIC LEGAL ORDER  
 
The choice of the Hellenic legal order, as a parameter of the question of research, needs 
perhaps to be explained:  
 
The EU legal order, as a system of rules of a supranational organisation, needs in certain 
aspects to be examined with regard to the national legal orders from which it has 
                                                                                                                                               
56
 Aristotle, Prior Analytics II xvi 64b28–65a26: see COOK, H.C.; TREDENNICK, H. 
(trans.) (2009) Aristotle: Categories. On interpretation. Prior Analytics, Loeb.  
 
57




originated and to which it refers –especially when the subject-matter of examination is 
the effectiveness of rules concerning the protection of individuals, being subjects both 




Secondary EU legislation produced in the form of Directives (which has been the norm 
in the case of financial law harmonisation instruments until the Crisis)
59
 intrinsically 
takes (or has to take) into account the disparity of national legal orders. Conformity of 




                                                 
 
58
 See in general, BOULOUIS, B.J. (1993) Droit institutionnel des Communautés 
Européennes, 4
th
 edition, Paris; DRUESNE, G. (1996) Droit et Politiques de la 
Communauté et de l' Union européennes, 5
th
 edition, Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France; HARTLEY, T.C. (1998) The Foundations of European Community Law, 4
th
 
edition, Oxford: OUP; Van RAEPENBUSCH, S (1998) Droit institutionnel de l' Union 
et des Communautés européennes, 2
nd
 edition, Paris: De Boeck Universite; 
WEATHERILL, S. and BEAUMONT, P. (1999) EU Law, 3
rd
 edition, London: Penguin. 
See also, indicatively, ECJ decision of 05.02.1963 in Case 26/62, NV Algemene 
Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue 
Administration [1963] ECR 1; ECJ decision of 15.07.1964 in case 6/64, Flaminio Costa 
v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 347. 
 
59
 See infra Ch II.1.  
 
60
 Apart from cases where inconformity may be established in an unambiguous manner 
(as e.g. in case of non transfer of a Directive within the relevant time limit), 
determination of non-compliance by a MS due to ineffective transposition of a Directive 
may be a complex issue. Especially in the case of Directive conform interpretation, an 
in depth analysis of the rules of the national order is necessary in order to establish what 
form the Directive conform interpretation may take and whether and which a priori 
applicable national rules may have to not be applied. See indicatively ECJ decision of 




Furthermore, the principle of subsidiarity necessitates that, in areas which do not fall 
within the exclusive competence of the EU, the EU has to act only if and in so far as the 
objectives of a proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by MSs, but can be 




Such problematic is linked to effectiveness potentially achieved by acting on EU level 




Thus, it appears that a research on the issue of effectiveness of legal rules that are 
connected to the transposition of a Directive may validly be undertaken with regard to 
any MS legal order, and may as well validly be undertaken with regard to a single MS 
legal order.  
                                                                                                                                               
Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891; ECJ decision of 14.07.1994 in Case C-
91/92, Faccini Dori [1994] ECR I-3325, para. 26; ECJ decision of 16.12.1993 in Case 
C-334/92, Wagner Miret [1993] ECR I-6911, para. 20; ECJ decision of 18.12.1997 in 
Case C-129/96, Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v Région wallonne [1997] ECR I-
07411; ECJ decision of 27.06.2000 in Joined Cases C-240/98 to C-244/98 Océano 
Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores [2000] ECR I-4941, para. 30. Also, for discussion 
of relevant issues, CRAIG, P. (2009) 'The legal effect of Directives: policy, rules and 
exceptions', ELR, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 349-377; PAPARSENIOU, P. (2002) Community 
Directives and Individuals' Rights*, Athens: Sakkoulas; TRIDIMAS, T. (1994) 
'Horizontal effect of directives: a missed opportunity', ELR, vol. 19, no. 6, p. 621; idem, 
(2002) 'Black, white, and shades of grey: horizontality of Directives revisited', YEL, vol. 
21, p. 327.  
 
61
 TEU Article 5(1), (3).  
 
62
 See e.g. relevant considerations in ECJ decision of 13.05.1997 in Case C-233/94 
Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European 




Taking the above into account, the Hellenic legal order will be examined in this study 
neither as a characteristic European legal order, nor as a case-study (paradigm) of 
transposition of European finance law with regard to retail investor protection in the 
event of investment firm failure, nor as a consequence of the specific developments in 
Hellenic law as a result of the Crisis; it will be a component of the research question on 
its own merit, as the legal order of a MS. 
  
DEFINING THE QUESTION OF RESEARCH  
 
The wide context of finance law and the series of issues related directly or indirectly to 
the question of research necessitate defining the main terms used in this study, and at 
the same time delimitating its scope. 
 
The following definitions and delimitations will apply (except if otherwise noted):  
“Bank”: the same as “credit institution”. 
“Competent authority”: competent national financial market regulatory and 
supervisory authority. 
“Credit institution”: as defined by applicable EU law.  
“Embezzlement”: the same as misappropriation of funds.  
“European law”: law issued by the EEC, the EC, or the EU, as a general term. It 
will not refer to the legal order of the ECHR.  
“EU law”: law issued by the EEC, the EC, or the EU.  
 
 76 
“Financial law”: the law relating to the activities of credit institutions and 
investment firms and the relevant sectors.
63
  
“Financial market”: the banking and investment services sectors. 
“Financial services”: banking and investment services. 
“Financial intermediary”: an intermediary in the banking and/or investment 
services sector. 
“Fraud”: Used in a wide sense, as the behaviour of consciously misrepresenting 




 “Investment firm”: as defined by applicable EU law. 
“Investment firm collapse”: the same as investment firm default. 
“Investment firm default”: the situation in which an investment firm (including a 
credit institution providing investment services) is unable to return money 
and/or instruments belonging to investors in a definite way. 
“Investment firm failure”: the same as investment firm default. 




“Regulation”: Used in a wide sense to denote rule-making, either by the 
legislature (in the EU, Council and European Parliament, or Commission 
                                                 
 
63
 The law on insurance firms does not fall within the scope of this research; insurance 
firm failures and the relevant issues regarding client protection will not be examined.  
 
64
 Not to be understood as the equivalent legal term and offence described by Hellenic 
law, or by any other legal order, except if specifically noted otherwise. 
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following legislative delegation) or by the administration (including competent 
authorities) following legislative delegation (stricto sensu regulation). 
“Securities”: the same as investment (services) titles, instruments. 




Defining “retail investor”  
 
While it is necessary to choose a term to define, for the purposes of this study, the 
person who participates in the financial market as an investor without having special 
knowledge and/or experience of investment in financial markets and of financial market 
transactions, this task becomes complicated by the relevant and in some cases 
interchangeable terms that have been used by EU and national legislation (in English 
language). Such relevant definitions used by legislation include: 




-  “Professional investor” and “institutional investors” were used in ISD.
68
 
- “Small investor”: while not defined in EU law, it appears in ICSD, and rather 
implies the non-professional and non-specialist investor.
69
  
                                                 
 
66
 Does not refer to the identical English law legal term (except if otherwise noted). 
 
67
 MiFID Preamble recital 31; Article 4(1) points 11 and 12; Annex II. 
 
68
 References to the “professional nature” of the investor, to “professional investor” and 
to “institutional investor” appeared in ISD, although no definition of these terms was 
provided by it; See ISD Preamble recital 31; Article 11(1), (3), and Article 14(4). 
 
69
 See ICSD, Preamble, recitals 4, 5, and 11.  
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Taking the above into account, the term “retail investor” will be preferred for the 
purposes of this study, and will be understood as not coinciding with any of the above 
terms, or any other similar term that may appear in other contexts, but to have a 
particular, functional meaning:  
 
The term “retail investor” will be used in this study to signify an individual (natural or 
legal person) that has no professional capacity connected to participating in the financial 
market, and no relevant knowledge or experience in participating to the financial market 
as an investor (with a view to investing his own money or other assets for gain), and 
who has either entered into transactions in the financial market (“stricto sensu investor”) 
or has deposited money or instruments with a financial intermediary with a view to 
entering into such transactions having concluded relevant contracts mandating financial 




                                                                                                                                               
 
70
 For example, the term “sophisticated investor” as opposed to “non-sophisticated 
investor” is used in the FSMA and relevant English law and regulation. 
 
71
 The lato sensu investor is further to be distinguished from the prospective investor or 
prospective client, who are persons intending to enter into transactions in the financial 
market but who have not necessarily proceeded to a relevant act (such as depositing 
money and/or instruments with a financial intermediary with a view to enter into 





DELIMITING THE QUESTION OF RESEARCH  
 
Legal protection awarded to the retail investor in the Hellenic legal order and under the 
light of EU law, as a subject of this study, will be understood to comprise protection 
provided by legislative, administrative instruments and judicial decisions in the Hellenic 
legal order.  
 
While similar issues may arise relating to tortuous liability of EU competent authorities, 
in particular in the context of the new EU financial architecture and the increased 
powers of new EU financial markets authorities, this problematic relates rather to 
individual protection under EU law than in the Hellenic legal order and will not be in 
the focus of analysis.  
 
Furthermore, protection offered in the context of extrajudicial procedures, whether 
compulsory or not, or in the context of mediation and alternative dispute resolution 
procedures will not be examined, and any relevant references will be in the margin of 
analysis of other issues.  
 
The same applies to protection offered in the context of Hellenic law of obligations, 
including rules on pre-contractual or contractual obligations and relevant contractual 
clauses, and case-law. As noted, this study will focus on issues not directly linked to 




Also, and for the same reason stated above, this research will not focus on the issue of 
retail investor protection from a consumer protection point of view, on a contractual or 
pre-contractual level (as when applying consumer protection rules, issues relating to 
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 In the Hellenic legal order see Law 2251/1994 Article 1(1), BGG vol. A, no. 191 
which states inter alia that “the rights and interests of consumers are under the 
protection of the State. On Hellenic consumer law see in general KARAKOSTAS, I. 
(2008) Consumer Protection Law- L. 2251/1994 as in force after L. 3587/2007- 
Interpretation- Case-law- Practical Application*, Athens: Nomiki Bibliothiki. It has 
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regulation and supervision nor do competent authorities have relevant powers; see 
among many FLOROS, N. (2012) The Liability of Supervisory Authorities in the 
Financial Sector*, Athens: Nomiki Bibliothiki, p. 113 - 123. For a general overview of 
the issue of investor as consumer, see indicatively ALEXANDRIDOU, E. (2001) 'The 
investor as a consumer', in MEGGLIDOU, S. (ed.) Stock Market and Investors' 
Protection. The Hellenic Institutional Context and the European and International 
Economic Area. Minutes of Conference 9-10 June 2000*, Centre for International and 
European Economic Law; ANTONOPOULOU, F. (2003) 'The limits of the protection 
of the receiver of banking services in modern consumer law (the case of financial 
derivative products contracts, after decision 8032/2001 of the [MJ-CCFI of Athens]*', 
EllDik, p. 333; AVGITIDIS, D. (2001) 'The receiver of investment services as 
consumer', EpiskED, p. 287; CHRISTIANOS, V. (2002) 'Protection of the investor as 
consumer in Community law: from the prohibition of confidential information abuse to 
the prohibition of market abuse', in MAVROS, G. (ed.) Société Anonyme and Capital 
Market - Investor Protection, 11th Panhellenic Conference of Commercial Law*; 
GOUSKOU, A. (1997) 'Issues relating to the legal protection of consumers - bank 
clients*', DEE, p. 660; KALAMBOUKA - GIANNOPOULOU, P. (2000) 'The 
protection of the consumer in the provision of financial services*', DEE, p. 12; 





Further, it will not focus on retail investor protection with regard to claims against the 
defaulting financial intermediary, the persons directing it, or any other responsible 
persons in connection to the intermediary (certain issues relevant to this problematic 
will be identified where necessary), except where necessary for its purposes. 
 
In the same direction, issues relating in general to retail investor protection which are 
connected to financial damage incurred by the retail investor but not as a result of 
intermediary failure (such as e.g. issues connected to bad or wrong execution of orders, 
bad financial advice, breach of CoB rules by the intermediary etc.) will not be 
examined.  
 
Furthermore, issues connected to protection of investors other than retail investors in 
case of intermediary failure will not be examined.  
  
In the context described, this study will examine retail investor protection (in the form 
of compensation) specifically against the relevant compensation schemes (in the 
Hellenic legal order, the HDIGF and the JGF) and the competent authorities (in the 
Hellenic legal order, in particular the HCMC). 
 
In this direction, the research will take into account developments on the greater 
international and EU level, attempting to follow and assess their dynamic, as exercised 
in the Hellenic legal order, and also take into account the particular features of the latter 
as interacting with law produced on EU level. The complicated special liquidation and 
insolvency national law issues, as intertwined with national law of EU origin (on the 
operation of compensation schemes) will be analysed, with particular attention to claim 
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verification and evidentiary matters, which are of central importance to retail investor 
protection especially in cases of intermediary failure as a result of tort.  
 
However, while taking into account relevant law and developments, this study will not 
focus on EU authorities non-contractual liability as it is a matter relevant to the issue 
under investigation but not directly related to retail investor protection in the Hellenic 
legal order.  
 
Finally, the issue of possible non-contractual liability of the HCMC regarding the 
supervision it exercises on the special liquidation organs and on the JFG will not be 
explored, as marginal, since there have been no relevant cases and arguments to our 
knowledge and, more importantly, the examination of non-contractual liability of the 
HCMC will focus on the regulation and supervision of intermediaries and the issues that 




Retail investor protection in the Hellenic legal order, under the light also of EU law, 
will be assessed on the basis of the effectiveness of the available legal system as a 
whole. 
 
First, it should be noted that the notion of effectiveness is widely used and understood 
on various levels and contexts by jurisdictions, while it also constitutes a general 
principle of EU law.
 73
  





The ECJ has recognized several principles of EU law binding on MSs,
74
 imposing on 
MSs the obligation to observe them when implementing EU law.
75
 National authorities 
                                                                                                                                               
73
 See, among many, ARNULL, A. (1990) The General Principles of EEC Law and the 
Individual, Leicester University Press; BERNITZ, U. and NERGELIUS, J. (ed.) (2005) 
General Principles of European Community Law, Lund University Press; BOULOUIS, 
B.J. (1993) Droit institutionnel des Communautés Européennes, 4
th
 edition, Paris; 
GROUSSOT, X. (2005) Creation, Development and Impact of the General Principles 
of Community Law: Towards a Jus Commune Europium, Lund University Press; 
PAPADOPOULOU, R.E. (1996) Principes Généraux du Droit et Droit 
Communautaire, Bruylant; TRIDIMAS, T. (2007) The General Principles of EU Law, 
3
rd
 edition, Oxford University; USHER, J.A. (1998) General Principles of EC Law, 
Longmans. According to Professor Tridimas, “[…] the term general principles may be 
reserved for fundamental propositions of law which underlie a legal system and from 
which concrete rules or outcomes may be derived” (op. cit.; p. 1). Various classification 
systems of general principles of European law have been suggested by theory. For 
example, Professor Boulouis classifies principles as (a) general principles common to 
the law of MSs, (b) principles inherent in every organized legal system and (c) 
principles deriving from the nature of the Communities (op. cit., p. 208 et seq.). 
Professor Papadopoulou distinguishes general principles as (a) axiomatic principles, (b) 
structural principles and (c) common principles (op. cit., p. 8). Further, Professor 
Tridimas proposes a classification of principles as (a) principles which derive from the 
rule of law, and (b) systemic principles which underlie the constitutional structure of the 
Community and define the Community legal edifice. With regard to the principle of 
effectiveness, as well as the principle of State liability in damages for breach of 
European law, according to Professor Tridimas they have been developed by the Court 
“[…] as an essential attribute to the new EU polity and were perceived in judicial 
reasoning as the meeting point between the principle of primacy and the fundamental 
right to judicial protection” (op. cit., p. 4 et seq.). 
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 See e.g. ECJ decision of 17.12.1970 in Case 11/70, Internationale 





may also be under a duty to apply general principles of national law; however, national 
authorities, when applying general principles of EU law, are bound to observe them as 





Thus, national authorities will be bound to observe two sets of general principles of law 
when implementing European law in the national legal order, i.e. general principles of 
national law as well as general principles of European law.  
 
The European law general principle of effectiveness is connected to the rules of primacy 




                                                                                                                                               
 
75
 See e.g. ECJ decision of 13.07.1989 in Case 5/88, Wachauf v Bundesamt für 
Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft [1989] ECR 2609, which refers to national measures 
implementing a regulation; ECJ decision of 10.07.2003 in Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-
64/00 Booker Aquaculture Ltd and Hydro Seafood GSP Ltd v The Scottish Minister 
[2003] ECR I-07411, which refers to national measures implementing a directive; ECJ 
decision of 04.07.2006 in Case C-212/04 Konstantinos Adeneler and Others v Ellinikos 
Organismos Galaktos (ELOG) [2006] ECR I-06057, which refers to national measures 
implementing a directive and takes into account existing national rules determining 
effectiveness of transposition.  
 
76
 See TRIDIMAS, T. (2007), op. cit., p. 38, wherein further references. The ECJ may 
refer to general principles of national law to be applied by national Courts: see e.g. ECJ 
decision of 23.03.2000 in Case C-373/97 Dionysios Diamantis v Elliniko Dimosio 
(Greek State) and Organismos Ikonomikis Anasygkrotisis Epicheiriseon AE (OAE) 







The notion of effectiveness has progressed as the European legal order evolved, the 
case-law of the ECJ having an important role in its development; 
78
 it refers not only to 
the effective protection of rights emanating from the EU legal order, but more 
specifically to the effective invoking and enforcement of EU law in national courts, thus 




                                                                                                                                               
 
77
 See e.g. ECJ decision of 05.03.1996 in Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie 
du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State for 
Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others ECR [1996] I-1029, at para. 95. 
 
78
 For a presentation of the historical evolution of the principle of effectiveness in EU 
law, see TRIDIMAS, T. (2007), op. cit., p. 420 et seq.  
 
79
 For a discussion on effective protection of rights in the EU legal order and of the 
interrelation between effective protection of rights and the general principles of EU law, 
see indicatively CURTIN, D. (1992) 'The Decentralised Enforcement of Community 
Law Rights. Judicial Snakes and Ladders', in CURTIN, D. and O'KEEFE, D. (ed.) 
Constitutional Adjudication in European Community and National Law, Butterworths; 
DOUGAN, M. (2004) National Remedies Before the European Court of Justice, Hart; 
LEWIS, C. (1996) Remedies and the Enforcement of European Community Law, Sweet 
& Maxwell; RUFFET, M. (1997) 'Rights and remedies in European Community law: a 
comparative view', CMLRev, vol. 34, p. 307; SZYSZCZAK, E. (1996) 'Making Europe 
more relevant to its citizens: effective judicial process', ELR, vol. 21, p. 351; 
TRIDIMAS, T. (2000) 'Enforcing Community Rights in National Courts: Some Recent 
Developments', in O'KEEFE, D.A. and BAVASSO, A. (ed.) Judicial Review in 
European Union Law: Liber Amicorum in honour of Lord Slynn, Kluwer; idem (2001) 
'Judicial Review and the Community Judicature: Towards a New European 
Constitutionalism?', Turku Law Journal, vol. 3, pp. 119 - 129; Van GERVEN, W. 
(1995) 'Bridging the gap between Community and national laws: towards a principle of 




The principle of effectiveness is further connected to the principle of equivalence (or 
non-discrimination), which demands that rights emanating from European law are 
equally protected in the national legal order as domestic rights. The two principles are 
interrelated, as European law is integrated into the national law of remedies.
80
 It is the 
obligation of “Community loyalty”
81
 that has been considered by ECJ as posing an 
obligation to national authorities, including national Courts, to provide full and effective 
protection of EU rights;
82
 this involves not only substantive rules but may also include 
national rules of procedure.
83
  
                                                                                                                                               
rights, remedies, and procedures', CMLRev, vol. 37, p. 501; WARD, A. (1995) 
'Effective sanctions in EC law: a moving boundary in the division of competence', ELR, 
vol. 1, p. 205; WARD, A. (2007) Judicial Review and the Rights of Private Parties in 
EU Law, 2
nd
 edition, Oxford: OUP. 
 
80
 For discussion see TRIDIMAS, T. (2007), The General Principles of EU Law, op. 
cit., p. 423.  
 
81
 TEU, Article 4(3).  
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 See e.g. ECJ decision of 19.11.1991 in Joined Cases C-6/90 and 9/90 Andrea 




 See e.g. ECJ decision of 25.07.1991 in Case C-208/90 Theresa Emmott v Minister for 
Social Welfare and Attorney General ECR [1991] I-04269; ECJ decision of 14.12.1995 
in Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v Belgian State  ECR 
[1995] I-4599; ECJ decision of 02.12.1997 in Case C-188/95 Fantask A/S and Others v 
Industriministeriet (Erhvervsministeriet) ECR [1997] I-06783; ECJ decision of 
14.12.1995 in Case C-430/93 Jeroen van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van 
Veen v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten ECR [1995] I-04705;  ECJ 
decision of 16.05.2000 in Case C-78/98 Shirley Preston and Others v Wolverhampton 





This research does not intend to explore in depth the complicated issues arising from the 
notion of effectiveness, as it has evolved through the case-law of the ECJ, and as it may 
be relevant to individual protection in the area of financial services.  
 
Instead, for the purposes of this study the criterion of effectiveness will be understood in 
a wide sense as the condition of providing for the useful effect of EU law in practice.
84
 
In this approach, effectiveness is linked as an emanation of supremacy in practice to all 
applicable rules and principles of EU law, as a legal system; in this sense, specific 
issues relating to other general principles, such as legal certainty or proportionality, may 
be identified in the course of the examination of the subject-matter of this study, but 
                                                                                                                                               
plc ECR [2000] I-3201; ECJ decision of 01.12.1998 in Case C-326/96 B.S. Levez v T.H. 
Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd ECR [1998] I-07835. For discussion see  BIONDI, A. 
(1999) 'The European Court of Justice and certain national procedural limitations: Not 
such a tough relationship', CMLRev, vol. 36, p. 1271; HIMSWORTH, C. (1997) 'Things 
fall apart: The harmonisation of Community judicial procedural protection revisited', 
ELR, vol. 22, p. 29; HOSKINS, M. (1996) 'Tilting the balance: supremacy and national 
procedural rules', ELR, vol. 21, pp. 365-377; KAKOURIS, K. (1997) 'Do the Member 
States possess judicial procedural autonomy?', CMLRev, vol. 34, p. 1389; LENEARTS, 
K. (2007) 'The rule of law and the coherence of the judicial system of the European 
Union', CMLRev, vol. 44, pp. 1625-1659; PRECHAL, S. (1998) 'Community Law in 
National Courts: The Lessons from Van Schijndel', CMLRev, vol. 35, pp. 681 - 706; 




 Cf. ECJ decision of 30.09.2003 in Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik 




they will be understood as ultimately relating to the useful interpretation and application 
of EU law. 
 
As noted, in order to proceed to this examination, it will first be necessary to identify 
the ratio and aim of applicable EU law, and its inner consistency, so as to examine in 
turn the effectiveness of Hellenic law with regard to its application.  
 
Furthermore, it is useful to note, that while in the Hellenic legal order there is no 
general principle of effectiveness per se, effectiveness in the exercise of their duties by 
State and public authorities is used as a criterion in case-law for establishing whether 




The application of effectiveness as a criterion for the evaluation of the question of 
research further relates to the methodology applied to treat it.  
 
 




The determination of research methods suitable for a specific research project depends 
not only on the nature of the research question but also on the nature of the available 
data, which ultimately determine the structuring of research.
86
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 See infra, Ch  VII.1.2. 
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 See PUNCH, K. (1998) Introduction to Social Research Quantitative and Qualitative 
Approaches, London: Sage Publishing, p. 19 et seq. The subject-matter of this study, as 




The research for this study has been carried out on the basis of official documentary 
sources issued by international organizations and fora, States, the EU and the Hellenic 
Republic. Legal and administrative documents are referred to, as officially published. 
Further, legal theory has been taken into account.  
 
This research attempts to analyse its subject matter on a normative level, from a 




It does not aspire to provide any definite understanding of its subject-matter, but only to 




                                                                                                                                               
“qualitative” or a “quantitative” research method; for the distinction, see BURNS, R. 
(1994) Introduction to Research Methods, 2
nd
 edition, Melbourne: Longman, at p. 9. A 
quantitative analysis for the purposes of this study would necessitate access to all (or at 
least an important percentage of) relevant administrative decisions especially by the 
HCMC, and to decisions of the JGF or the HDIGF (which are not published), as well as 
decisions of the organs of special liquidation of investment firms and credit institutions 
(which are also not published), as well as relevant case-law (court decisions are not 
always reported in legal journals). Beyond the practical difficulties of such an 
endeavour, quantitative analysis would probably be more appropriate to research 
focusing on effectiveness understood from a sociology of law point of view rather than 
from a doctrinal law point of view. Thus, the present study follows a qualitative 
research method.  
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 In this direction, earlier law (not in force at the time of conducting this research) is 
important for the purposes of comparison and analysis as law in force, and so it will be 





This study is organized in three main Parts:  
 
In Part A, analysis will focus on the preliminary issue of what is the purpose of EU 
finance law and how it relates to retail financial market participant protection. In 
Chapter I the development and objectives of finance law and the ratio of retail investor 
protection will be examined from an international perspective, before proceeding in 
Chapter II to the relevant discussion of the development and objectives of EU finance 
law. Part A will attempt to conclude in which degree and how effectively has retail 
investor been promoted from an economic consideration relating to market stability to 
an autonomous aim of the EU legal system.  
 
Then, in Part B this study will examine how retail investor protection has been 
perceived and organized by the EU legal order in the event of intermediary failure: the 
delineation of minimum protection awarded by relevant compensation funds will be 
examined in Chapter III, before examining in Chapter IV how has the European law 
acquis on individual protection been interpreted by the ECJ to apply in the case of 
financial services, in particular with regard to tortuous liability of competent authorities, 
and whether the Peter Paul case-law may be considered as applicable in the field of 
investment services. Part B will attempt thus to define the limits of protection awarded 
by the EU legal order to retail investors in the event of intermediary failure as formed 
until the Crisis, and to assess what the effect of the new and emerging EU finance law 
may be on such delimitation.  
 
Finally, in Part C this study will examine how EU rules interact with Hellenic law in 
case of intermediary failure, especially as a result of tort, taking into account not only 
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the national rules that transfer EU law in the Hellenic legal order but the other national 
rules as well, examining their operation in whole in order to assess their effectiveness 
with regard to retail investor protection. In this context, in Chapter V this study will 
examine the status of protection of retail investors as creditors, in general, in the context 
of the liquidation of financial intermediaries under Hellenic law; the regime of special 
liquidation of investment firms will be examined together with that of credit institutions 
(offering investment services) before taking into account also wider considerations 
relating to Hellenic insolvency law and the law on the liquidation of SAs in the Hellenic 
legal order. Then, the legal structure and operation of the relevant compensation funds 
will be examined in Chapter VI, also taking into account the distinction of schemes and 
applicable rules on the form of the financial intermediary (as investment firm or credit 
institution) and the consequences thereof. Finally, in Chapter VII this study will 
examine the issue of tortuous liability of competent authorities in the Hellenic legal 
order, taking into consideration the acquis on State and public authorities liability and 
the way it has affected the case-law on tortuous liability in particular of the HCMC, and 
the relevant criteria formulated.  
 
Therefore, this will try to assess the effectiveness of protection awarded to retail 
investors in the Hellenic legal order, taking into account the aim and normative content 
of EU law, the transposition of EU law in the Hellenic legal order, and its interrelation 
with the rules of the national legal order as a whole.  
 
Thus, it will attempt to identify and analyse causes and effects of the interaction of the 
two legal orders in the area of retail investor protection in the event of intermediary 
failure, and finally to note certain thoughts de lege ferenda.   









THE DOUBLE AIM OF PROTECTING RETAIL INVESTORS 
AND THE STABILITY OF THE MARKET: FROM ECONOMIC 













CHAPTER I.  DEVELOPMENT AND OBJECTIVES OF FINANCE LAW, 
AND THE RATIO OF RETAIL INVESTOR PROTECTION FROM AN 
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
 
As stated in the Introduction, a preliminary question to be addressed is whether retail 
investor protection constitutes a valid, autonomous aim of EU law –in order to examine 
in turn whether it is pursued effectively in the EU legal order, whether it has been 
effectively transposed into the Hellenic legal order, and which rights may be conferred 
to individual retail investors. 
 
As EU finance law is connected to initiatives and developments on the international 
level and is influenced by the work and recommendations of international organizations 
and fora, it will be first necessary to examine the issue at hand from an international 
perspective.  
 
In this direction, it will be useful to examine international initiatives and developments 
as appeared until the Crisis, and then relevant initiatives and developments in the wake 





I.1 INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES ON FINANCE LAW AND RETAIL 




 is connected to the circulation of capital, as well as of 




Many important developments in international financial law have occurred following 
international financial crises, such as the Great Depression (1928),
90
 the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods agreement (1973)
91
 or the current Crisis.  
                                                 
 
88
 The term international finance law strictly interpreted refers to legally binding 
provisions, as emanating from international, bilateral or multilateral, treaties. However, 
for the purposes of this study, important are developments on the international level 
which do not have legally binding effect, i.e. the work, proposals and recommendations 
of international organisations which are not legally binding (“soft law”) but have been 
very influential to the development of EU and national laws.  
 
89
 For the trends in “globalisation” of financial services see OBSFELD, M. and 
TAYLOR, A. (2002) 'Globalization and Capital Markets', National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 8846; DAVIES, H. and GREEN, D. (2008), op. cit., p. 15 et 
seq., and p. 59 et seq.; WALKER, G. (1996) 'The law of financial conglomerates - the 
next generation', International Lawyer, p. 57; idem (2006) European Banking Law - 
Policy and Programme Construction, BIICL. 
 
90
 The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) was established in 1930 under Swiss 






I.1.1 INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES ON BANKING LAW  
 
With regard to deposit insurance, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS)
92
 has noted the importance of deposit guarantee systems for the protection of 
market stability. 
                                                                                                                                               
 
91
 For a discussion of the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, and of the world financial 
system that it organised, providing for the establishment of capital controls and fixed 
(and adjustable) currency exchange rates, and establishing the IMF, the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the GATT see CAVANAGH, J., 
WYSHAM, D. and ARRUDA, M. (1994) Beyond Bretton Woods: Alternatives to the 
Global Economic Order, Pluto Pr; FRASER, R. and LONG, C. (1992) The World 
Financial System, Longman Harlow; HOOKE, A.W. (1982) 'The International 
Monetary Fund - Its Evolution, Organisation and Activities', IMF Pamplhet Series No. 
37; LASTRA, R. M. (2000) 'The International Monetary Fund in Historical 
Perspective', JIEL, vol. 3, p. 507. ; idem (2011) 'The Role of the IMF as a Global 
Financial Authority', European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol. 2, May,  
http://www.ssrn/abstract=1617428; WILLIAMSON, J. (1977) The Failure of World 
Monetary Reform 1971 - 1974, New York University Press.  
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 BCBS was established in 1974 by G-10 as a Committee on Banking Regulations and 
Supervisory Practices (later renamed as BCBS) operating within the framework of BIS. 
Its establishment is connected to questions relating to the responsibility for banking 
supervision especially in cross-border transactions, following the collapse in 1974 of the 
Bankhaus Herstatt Bank; for an analysis see BCBS (2004) Bank Failures in Mature 
Economies, BCBS Working Paper No. 13, available at 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp13.pdf. In 1975 BCBS issued the Concordat which related 
to the responsibilities of home and host State supervisors. One of the main aims of 
BCBS is protection from systemic risk: In this direction, BCBS has proposed rules on 
capital adequacy of financial institutions. In 1988 BCSB issued the First Basel Accord 




BCBS initiatives are relevant to individual protection, especially in the form of 
depositor compensation (also referred to as deposit insurance) in case of bank collapses, 
in order to control systemic risk. BCBS has noted that “[…] [i]n many countries, the 
framework for systemic protection includes a system of deposit insurance. Provided 
such a system is carefully designed to limit moral hazard, it can contribute to public 
confidence in the system and thus limit contagion from banks in distress […]” 
93
  
                                                                                                                                               
Amendment to the Basel Capital Accord (referred to as Market Risk Amendment, which 
related to capital adequacy in case of certain market risks arising from banks’ trading in 
certain financial instruments. These amendments proposed a capital adequacy 
methodology to be used by financial institutions (credit institutions, investment firms 
and others). The First Basel Accord was revised in 2004, after long consultations, by the 
Second Basel Accord (referred to as Basel II. Further, BCBS proposed the Third Basel 
Accord (Basel III) in December 2010, regarding capital requirements, which has been 
revised in June 2011; with regard to liquidity requirements, reform measures were 
proposed in January 2013. Basel III seeks to strengthen the regulation, supervision and 
risk management of the banking sector, mainly by proposing measures to enhance 
capital adequacy and to control excessive leveraging. See 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm. With regard to supervisory standards to be applied 
worldwide, Basel Committee has elaborated the “Core Principles of Banking 
Supervision”, adopted in 1997 and revised in 2006, available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs129.htm. Further, BCBS published in 1999 a report on 
Core Principles Methodology, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs130.htm) which 
was also updated in 2006, as part of the Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision review. Although the Basel Accords have legally non-binding character, 
they have exercised great influence on the formation and development of international 
financial law and regulation, and further to European financial law and regulation. See 
indicatively LASTRA, R. M. (2006) Legal Foundations of International Monetary 
Stability, Oxford: OUP; idem (2007) The Reform of the International Financial 






In 1999, a Study Group on Deposit Insurance was established by the FSF. The findings 
of this study were the basis of the research undertaken by the Working Group on 
Deposit Insurance established next by FSF in 2000. The efforts of this Working Group 
led to a report on deposit insurance system to FSF in 2001 and to the creation of the 




I.1.2 INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES ON INVESTMENT SERVICES LAW  
 
Important to the development of international investment services law has been the 
work of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),
95
 issuing 
proposals with a view inter alia to develop implement and promote “[…] 
internationally recognized and consistent standards of regulation, oversight and 
enforcement in order to protect investors, maintain fair, efficient and transparent 
markets, and seek to address systemic risks”.
96
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 BCSB Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (supra n 92) at para. 15. 
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 IADI (see www.iadi.org) was established under Swiss law as a non-profit 








 See http://iosco.org/about. It is noted that investor protection aims do not appear in 




In 1998, IOSCO issued a document on the “Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation”.
97
 In this, IOSCO categorises thirty principles of investment services law, 
on the basis of three objectives, stated to be the protection of investors; ensuring that 
markets are fair, efficient and transparent; and the reduction of systemic risk.
98
 IOSCO 





According to IOSCO, “[i]nvestors should be protected from misleading, manipulative 
or fraudulent practices, including insider trading, front running or trading ahead of 
customers and the misuse of clients assets”.
100
 Beyond these issues, investor protection 
                                                                                                                                               
http://www.iosco.org/annual_report_2009/generalinformation1.html; IOSCO (2008) 
Annual Report at http://www.iosco.org/annual_report_2008/generalinformation1.html .  
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 At http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD82.pdf .  
 
Cf. IOSCO (2003) Methodology for Assessing Implementation of the IOSCO Objectives 
and Principles of Securities Regulation, available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/legal/securities/IOSCOPD155.pdf With regard to 
investor protection see inter alia IOSCO Technical Committee (1993) Protecting the 
Small Investor: Combating Transnational Retail Securities and Futures Fraud; idem 
(1996) Measures Available on a Cross-Border Basis to Protect Interests and Assets of 
Defrauded Investors; idem (1996) Client Asset Protection.  
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 Ibid.  
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 Ibid., p. 1. 
 
100
 Ibid., p. 6.  
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Investment services law should aim to control the danger of intermediary failure: 
IOSCO recognizes inter alia that “[m]arket intermediaries should be required to 
comply with standards for internal organization and operational conduct that aim to 
protect the interests of clients, ensure proper management of risk, and under which 
management of the intermediary accepts primary responsibility for these matters”;
102
 
however, in case an intermediary failure is unavoidable, “[t]here should be a procedure 
for dealing with the failure of a market intermediary in order to minimize damage and 




IOSCO recognizes that “[t]he oversight of market intermediaries should primarily be 
directed to the areas where their capital, client money and public confidence may most 
be put at risk”.
104
 Regulation of intermediaries as proposed by IOSCO covers entry 
criteria (licensing), capital and prudential requirements, ongoing supervision and 
discipline of intermediaries, and the consequences of default and financial failure, 
noting the importance of segregation and identification of assets in order inter alia to 
protect from defalcation, to facilitate transfer of positions in case of severe market 
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 Principle.  
 
104




disruption, to prevent the use of clients assets for proprietary trading, and to assist in the 




As far as investor protection ex post facto is concerned, i.e. when intermediary failure 
has occurred, IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation are limited in 
stating that “[t]here must be effective and legally secure arrangements for default 
handling. This is a matter that extends beyond securities law to the insolvency 




Further, regarding investor protection in case of intermediary failure, IOSCO states that 
“[i]nvestors should have access to a neutral mechanism (such as Courts or other 
mechanisms of dispute resolution) or means of redress and compensation for improper 
behaviour”.
107
 This reference does not appear to be excluding liability of regulators in 
tort; this approach is supported by the position that “[t]he capacity of the regulator to 
act responsibly, fairly and effectively will be assisted by: […] adequate legal protection 
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 Ibid, pp. 33 – 39.  
 
106
 Ibid., p. 8. See also IOSCO notes on appropriate domestic legal framework, ibid., 
Annexure 3.  
 
107
 Ibid., p. 7. The notion of “improper behaviour” is not defined by IOSCO; a question 
is raised as to whether “improper behaviour” refers only to the defaulting intermediary, 
or may also be understood as referring to other entities, even supervisory and regulatory 
authorities. In this regard, it is interesting to note that IOSCO refers to regulatory 
accountability (which is not equivalent to liability, though), stating inter alia that “[t]he 
regulator should be […] accountable in the use of its powers and resources. […] 
Accountability implies: a regulator that operates independently of sectoral interests; a 
system of public accountability of the regulator; a system permitting judicial review of 
decisions of the regulator” (ibid., p. 11).  
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Thus, IOSCO seems to be proposing investor redress and compensation for “improper 
behaviour” on the one hand, and protection of regulators acting in bona fide on the other 
hand, without entering into further discussion of these issues.  
 
 
The 2001 Joint Forum (BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS) Report “Core Principles – 
Cross-sectoral Comparison”  
 
Relevant to the issue addressed here is the object of research conducted by the Joint 
Forum
109
 operating under the aegis of BCBS, IOSCO and IAIS, on a cross-sectoral 
comparison of the Core Principles; the first such study, conducted by the Joint Forum 
before the current international Crisis erupted, was published in 2001 under the title 




In 1999 the Joint Forum was mandated by its parent organizations to compare core 
principles of financial law in the three sectors of banking, securities and insurance, 
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 Available at http://www.bis.org/publ/joint03.pdf . The second relevant study, which 
builds upon the first, was conducted in the wake of the Crisis and was published in 
January 2010 under the title “Review on the Differentiated Nature and Scope of 
Financial Regulation – Key Issues and Recommendations”; see infra, n 166. 
 
 102 





Such comparative research was regarded as beneficial in the assessment and 
implementation of core principles; the focus was on the issue of consistency of the 
various core principles as had been developed by the relevant international 




Thus, it appears that an issue of certainty, predictability and effectiveness in 
implementation was at the origins of this Joint Forum research. The Core Principles 





The Joint Forum took into account the historical background to the Core Principles, 
referring to the creation of the organisations that have issued the respective documents, 
and noted that despite the different backgrounds, the processes followed were similar in 
many respects,
114
 and that following their issuing, Core Principles have been followed 
                                                 
 
111
 Ibid., p. 4, para. 13.  
 
112
 Ibid., p. 4, para. 12.  
 
113
 I.e. The BCBS (1997) Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, and the 
relevant BCBS (1999) Core Principles Methodology; the IAIS (2000) Insurance Core 
Principles,  and the relevant IAIS (2000) Core Principles Methodology; and the IOSCO 
(1998) Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation. However, the methodologies 
were used only as a secondary source, and other documents fell out of its scope. See 









The Joint Forum noted that bank supervisors focus only on solvency issues, and thus on 
the supervised institutions (a factor which is reflected in the structure of the Core 
Principles for banks), while on the other hand securities supervisors supervise not only 
institutions (market intermediaries), but also collective investment schemes (both 




The Joint Forum also noted that “[…] some of the similarities and differences among 
the core principles reflect, at least in part, intrinsic characteristics of the banking, 
insurance and securities sectors”;
117
 without though defining the notion of “intrinsic 
characteristics”. It does, however, observe that the boundaries between banking, 
insurance and securities sectors have been blurred, due also to the growth of financial 
conglomerates.
118
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 Ibid., p. 5. 
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 Ibid., p. 7, paras. 29 and 30.  
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 Ibid., p. 8, para. 35.  
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 Ibid., p. 8, para. 36.  
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The Joint Forum observed that one of the areas where the three sectors differ is the form 
of financial intermediation and risk transfer,
119
 and that perhaps the most difficult issue 




Analysing the “intrinsic differences” between banking, investment services and 
insurance sectors, the Joint Forum considered inter alia that while banking supervisors 
in many jurisdictions avoid or postpone public disclosure of banks’ problems, in an 
effort to maintain public confidence in the banking system,
121
 securities regulators on 
the other hand generally disclose enforcement actions, because “[…] in the securities 
sectors, supervisory transparency and accountability are linked to the maintenance of 
confidence in the markets […]”.
122
 Although no definition of supervisory transparency 
and accountability was provided by the Joint Forum, it was mentioned that transparency 
in the view of securities supervisors strengthens perceptions of supervisory 
predictability, and also that transparency contributes to supervisory accountability.
123
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 Ibid., p. 9, para. 41.  
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 Ibid., p. 11, para. 52. 
 
123
 Ibid. An indication as to how the notion of accountability is perceived by the Joint 
Forum is offered by its reference that “[…] the core principles in all three sectors 
mention the need for supervisors to be accountable to the public for their supervisory 
actions. This is achieved in part by issuing annual reports to the public”; ibid., p. 14, 
para. 62. It is submitted, however, that in our opinion publishing of reports does not 





In addition, the Joint Forum identified four features, which it considered unique to the 
investment services sector: these are the existence and role of Self-Regulatory 
Organizations (SROs), the importance of full and fair disclosure by issuers, the 
responsibility of market surveillance (including monitoring by supervisors of trading in 
listed securities), and enforcement.
124
 The reasoning of the Joint Forum as to the broad 
enforcement powers of supervisors is important, if somewhat laconic: “[i]nvestors are 
vulnerable to misconduct by intermediaries. Securities violations also can occur both 




In attempting to explain this specificity, the perception of risk in the organisation of 
securities and banking regulation and supervision, as related to individual protection, 
comes to the fore. In this aspect, the Joint Forum is clear: it maintains that although 
“[…] all three sets of core principles mention both customer (i.e. depositor, 
policyholder, investor) and systemic stability as key objectives”, IOSCO has a third 




According to the Joint Forum, IOSCO places equal weight on its three objectives. 
Further, the Joint Forum maintains that “[a]lthough all three sectors regard systemic 




 Ibid., p. 12, para. 54.  
 
125
 Ibid.  
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stability as an objective, the Basel core principles place greater emphasis on systemic 




Moreover, on the central issue of customer protection, the Joint Forum noted that 
“[c]ustomer protection is not specifically addressed in the Basel core principles, except 
to the extent that depositor protection is cited as an objective of banking 
supervision”.
128
 However, it is one of the three announced objectives of investment 
services law according to IOSCO and, as the Joint Forum observes, it includes 





The Joint Forum concluded that “[t]he comparison actually reveals a good deal more 
by way of similarity between the three sectors than initial appearances might suggest. 
On some important issues, the core principles have many common features, in respect 
of the supervisory system, the supervised entity, ongoing supervision and at least some 
aspects of prudential requirements […] Only in the area of markets and customers does 
it become difficult to establish such high-level common ground, and that is primarily 
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On the other hand, the Joint Forum also found that there are some significant 
differences, “[…] which emerge from the comparison of the core principles which are 
not readily explained either as differences of form or as intrinsic differences”. 
131
 It 
further noted that while these differences were discussed at length, there was no 
agreement as to their reasons, which it considered perhaps attributable to differences of 
choice of supervisory approach, objectives or underlying philosophy.
132
 One of the 
areas where such difficult to explain differences appear is, according to the Joint 
Forum, safeguarding of client assets; as it mentions, “[…] it is not clear what accounts 




In the approach adopted before the Crisis, this difference, beyond being described as 
attributable to the “traditional” difference of supervisory responsibility between the 
banking and the investment sector, was left essentially unexplained. 
 
As the Crisis set upon the economic order and financial architecture in particular in the 
US and the EU, the ratio of both banking and investment services law and their 
interrelation were reconsidered.  
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 Ibid., p. 24, para. 129. The Joint Forum noted that BCSB places greater emphasis on 
systemic stability and IAIS on customer protection, while IOSCO places equal 
emphasis on investor protection, fair, transparent and efficient markets, and reduction of 





I.2  INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES ON FINANCE LAW AND RETAIL 
INVESTOR PROTECTION AFTER THE CRISIS 
 
The Crisis has been a catalyst to financial law development on a global level, causing 
re-examination of the existing financial law from its foundations, re-assessing and re-
designing its structure and mechanisms, the criteria of financial regulation, the content 




Important developments have initiated from the work of international fora and 
organizations, which led to further developments in the EU and MSs legal orders. It is 
for that reason important to briefly examine developments on the international level on 
the wake of the Crisis.  
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 See indicatively BLACK, J. (2010) 'Risk-based regulation: choices, practices and 
lessons learnt', in OECD Risk and Regulatory Policy: Improving the Governance of 
Risk, Paris: OECD; idem (2010)  'The role of risk in regulatory processes', in 
BALDWIN, R., CAVE, M. and LODGE, M. (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Regulation, 
New York: Oxford University Press; LASTRA, R.M. and LOUIS, J.V. (2013) 
'European Economic and Monetary Union: History, Trends and Prospects', Yearbook of 
European Law, pp. 1 - 150; WYMEERSCH, E., HOPT, K.J. and FERRANINI, G. (ed.) 







I.2.1 G-20 DECLARATIONS AND INITIATIVES  
 
 
Some of the fundamental issues raised by the Crisis were addressed on political level at 
international conferences held mainly by the G-20,
135
 the G-10, and the G-7.
136
 The 
series of frequent meetings of the G-20 on the matter, especially in the first years of the 
Crisis, have been accompanied by relevant Statements, Declarations and Communiqués, 
aiming at important financial regulation reform with a view to enhancing effectiveness 
of regulation and supervision.
137
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 The “Group of Twenty” (G-20) is an international forum for cooperation on 





 of November 2008, where its member-States discussed the Crisis 
and agreed to an action plan to control it. Its stated objectives include “policy 
coordination between its members in order to achieve global economic stability, 
sustainable growth”; “promoting financial regulations that reduce risks and prevent 
future financial crises”; “modernising international financial architecture”. See 
www.g20.org .  
 
136
 See http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/groups.htm#G7 
 
137
 Initially, a G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bankers’ meeting was held on 11 and 
12 October 2008; its discussions were continued in the G-20 summit held in 
Washington on 14 and 15 November 2008, called New Bretton Woods or Bretton 
Woods II, since the structure and operation of the international monetary and financial 
system were to be discussed again. Further G-20 summits were held in London on 2 
April 2009 (see G-20 “Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System – London, 2 




It is interesting to note, that in their Declaration of November 15, 2008 following the 
Washington Summit, G-20 refer to the root causes of the Crisis mentioning inter alia 
that “[p]olicy-makers, regulators and supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not 
adequately appreciate and address the risks building up in financial markets, keep pace 
with financial innovation, or take into account the systemic ramifications of domestic 
regulatory actions”.
138
 Referring to common principles for reform of financial markets, 
G-20 notes that while “[…] regulation is first and foremost the responsibility of 
national regulators who constitute the first line defense against market instability”, 
intensified international cooperation among regulators and strengthening standards and 
                                                                                                                                               
http://www.g20.org/Documents/Fin_Deps_Fin_Reg_Annex_020409_-_1615_final.pdf; 
see also G-20 “The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform, 2 April 2009”, available at 
www.g20.org/Documents/final-communique.pdf ), in Pittsurgh on 24 and 25 September 
2009 (see G-20 “Leaders’ Statement, The Pittsburgh Summit, September 24-25, 2009” 
available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf), in 
Toronto on 26 and 27 June 2010 (see G-20 “The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration, 
June 26-27, 2010” available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents/g20_declaration_en.pdf), in Seoul on 11 and 12 
November 2010 (see G-20 “The G20 Seoul Summit Leaders’ Declaration, November 
11-12, 2010” available at 
http://www.g20.org/Documents2010/11/seoulsummit_declaration.pdf), in Cannes, 
November 4, 2011 (available as a draft at www.g20.org; in this summit, FSB was asked 
to prepare a report on the Legal Entity Identifier for Financial Markets project, which 
was published by FSB on 08.06.2012; available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120608.pdf), in Los Cabos, June 
19, 2012 (available at www.g20.org), in St Petersburg, September 4-5, 2013 (available 
at https://www.g20.org/about_g20/past_summits/2013_st_petersburg), and programmed 
to take place in Brisbane, Queensland, on November 15 – 16, 2014.   
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 Regarding the promotion of integrity in financial 
markets, G-20 announce their commitment to protect the integrity of the world’s 





Further, an “Action Plan to Implement Principles for Reform” was agreed by the G-20 
at the Washington Summit.
141
 Regarding the principle of enhancing sound resolution, 
G-20 called for a review of “[t]he differentiated nature of regulation on the banking, 
securities and insurance sectors and provide a report outlining the issue and making 
recommendations on needed improvements”.
142
 It further noted that national and 
regional authorities should review resolution regimes and bankruptcy laws, to ensure 
that they permit an orderly wind-down of large complex cross-border financial 
institutions.
143
 Also, regarding the principle of promoting integrity of financial markets, 
G-20 asked as an immediate action to be taken by March 31, 2009, for national and 
regional authorities to “[…] review business conduct rules to protect markets and 
investors, especially against market manipulation and fraud […]”.
144
 Similarly, 
regarding the principle of reinforcing international cooperation, G-20 asked for the 
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collection of information on the status of convergence in regulatory practices in various 




In the Communiqué of the London Summit of April 2, 2009, G-20 stressed inter alia 
that [r]egulators and supervisors must protect consumers and investors, support market 
discipline, avoid adverse impacts on other countries, reduce the scope of regulatory 
arbitrage, support competition and dynamism, and keep pace with innovation in the 
marketplace”. In their respective Declaration of 2 April 2009, the G-20 decided that the 
FSF should be expanded having its mandate broadened and its institutional basis and 
capacity enhanced, being renamed as the Financial Stability Board (FSB), and should 





I.2.2 FSB, BCSB AND IADI REPORTS AND PROPOSALS  
 
On the basis of the above G-20 decision, FSB published on 25.09.2009 a Report to G-
20 on “Improving Financial Regulation”.
147
 Among other issues, FSB stressed the need 
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 Available at www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_090925.pdf  
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Further, BCBS and IADI published in 2009 the Core Principles for Effective Deposit 
Insurance Systems.
149
 One of the positions advanced in this document is that, “In order 
to be credible, and to avoid distortions that may result in moral hazard, a deposit 
insurance system needs to be part of a well-constructed financial system safety net, 
properly designed and well implemented. A financial safety net usually includes 
prudential regulation and supervision, a lender of last resort and deposit insurance. 
The distribution of powers and responsibilities between the financial safety-net 





According to this report by the BCBS and IADI, depositor protection appears rather as a 
prerequisite of systemic stability than as an autonomous aim of financial regulation;
151
 
despite the disparity in the various depositor protection regimes in the world there is a 
general implicit expectation of the public for banks to be rescued
152
 (connected to the 
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 This report has taken into account inter alia the BCBS (2006) Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision, the FSF (2001) Final Report of the Working Group on 
Deposit Insurance, and the IADI (2005) Key Conclusions of the APEC Policy Dialogue 
on Deposit Insurance and IADI Guidance Points.  
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 See BCBS and IADI (2009) Core Principles, op. cit., at para. 4.  
 
151
 According to BCBS and IADI “[t]he principal objectives for deposit insurance 
systems are to contribute to the stability of the financial system and protect depositors”; 
ibid., Principle 1 – Public Policy Objectives.  
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 Depositor protection may be classified as “explicit” vs “implicit”, where explicit 
refers to a system of rules on depositor protection provided by law, and implicit refers 
to an expectation formulated by factors others than law: BCBS and IADI state that 
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economic and political risk of bank runs) yet the expectation of using public funds to 




As BCBS and IADI published their Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance 
Systems,
154
 FSB published in February 2012 a Peer Review Report on “Thematic 
Review on Deposit Insurance Systems”
155
 which examines the adaptation of 
jurisdictions to deposit insurance as necessitated by the Crisis and forwards certain 
proposals to achieve effective protection of market stability and depositors.  
 
Also, the FSB published an important report on the “Key Attributes of Effective 




                                                                                                                                               
“[i]mplicit deposit protection arises when the public, including depositors and perhaps 
other creditors, expect some form of protection in the event of a bank failure. This 
expectation usually arises because of the governments past behaviour or statements 
made by officials. Implicit protection is, by definition, never formally specified. There 
are no statutory rules regarding the eligibility of bank liabilities, the level of protection 
provided or the form which reimbursement will take. Funding is discretionary and often 
depends on the government’s ability to access public funds.”; ibid., p. 6, n 2.  
 
153
 BCSB and IADI note in this regard that “[b]lanket guarantees can have a number of 
adverse effects if retained too long, notably moral hazard.”; ibid. 
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 Supra, n 149. 
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 Available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_120208.pdf . 
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Furthermore, BCSB proceeded in June 2010 to publishing its updated Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation,
157
 which do not bring important changes to its 1998 
Objectives and Principles with regard to investor protection. 
  
 
The 2010 Joint Forum (BCBS, IOSCO, IAIS) Report “Review on the 
Differentiated Nature and Scope of Financial Regulation – Key Issues and 
Recommendations” 
 
Mandated by the G-20, the Joint Forum of BCBS, IOSCO
158
 and IAIS, published in 
January 2010 a “Review on the Differentiated Nature and Scope of Financial 
Regulation – Key Issues and Recommendations”.
159
 As the Joint Forum noted, the 
purpose of its Report was “to help identify potential areas where systemic risks may not 
be fully captured in the current regulatory framework”
160
 and to make relevant 
recommendations.  
 
One of the main areas on which the research by the Joint Forum focused were the key 
regulatory differences across the banking, insurance, and securities sectors.  
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Law School, Legal Studies Paper No. 268, March, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025115. 
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One of the “Guiding Principles” used by the Joint Forum in its research is that 
“[s]imilar activities, products, and markets should be subject to similar minimum 
supervision and regulation”.
161
 Another such “Guiding Principle” referred to by the 
Joint Forum in the same context is that “[c]onsistency in regulation across sectors is 
necessary; however, legitimate differences can exist across the three sectors”
162
 –the 
question then in whether differentiation of the protection awarded in the case above is 
legitimate; and according to which criteria.  
 
The Joint Forum accepted that international financial law is sector-specific (banking, 
investment services and insurance), which explains the development of sector-specific 
regulatory standards (core principles) in each of these sectors.
163
 This sector-specific 
approach entails dangers of regulatory gaps, which in turn may cause supervisory 
challenges and allow for regulatory arbitrage.
164
 The Joint Forum research built on the 
premise that “[t]he core principles reflect the main characteristics of the respective 
sector and the nature of the financial institutions supervised under each framework”,
165
 
and focused of an update of its relevant work in 2001.
166
 According to the Joint Forum, 
despite the different format, content and language used, there are substantial 
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 Ibid., p. 5.  
 
166




commonalities across sectors –a fact which also reveals the converging nature of 
business in the three sectors.
167
 At the same time, there are differences among core 
principles, which always according to the Joint Forum, “[…] reflect –at least in part– 




Although certain differences may be objectively justified, according to the Joint Forum 
research, as related to the nature of the persons or business regulated, it is concluded 
that certain differences cannot be objectively justified.
169
 One of the areas where 
regulatory differences are identified by the Joint Forum is “the extent to which 






Interim Concluding Remarks 
 
Retail investor protection is understood, according to analysis elaborated by 
international financial organisations and fora, as part of the double aim of financial law, 
to protect financial market participants and (through also achieving their confidence in 
the financial system) the stability of the financial market.  
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Although relevant considerations and criteria have been expressed through economic 
and financial research and analysis, on the basis mainly of the criterion of risk 
understood to be connected to the “intrinsic characteristics” of each sector and activity 
of the financial market, their expression in legal terms and rules has proven challenging.  
 
Financial services (banking, investment and insurance) law has been differentiated per 
sector of financial activity on the basis of an unclearly defined criterion of risk which 
has been further reflected in an uncertain differentiation in the legal status and the level 
of protection of depositors vis-à-vis retail investors.  
 
The Crisis has led to a re-assessment of perceptions as to the ratio and modus operandi 
of financial law, including the sources of systemic risk and the reasons as to the 
differentiation in the treatment of depositors vis-à-vis retail investors. 
 
However, retail market participant protection appears to be still connected primarily to 







CHAPTER II. DEVELOPMENT AND OBJECTIVES OF EU FINANCE 
LAW, AND RETAIL INVESTOR PROTECTION 
 
 
EU finance (banking and investment services) law is part of the greater system of rules 
that compose EU internal market law, and has to be examined and taken into account 
also in this perspective.  
 
In this respect, EU finance law followed the difficulties faced in creating a single 
European market, as planned by the EEC Treaty in 1952,
171
 from its initial stages to the 
                                                 
 
171
 For an account of the evolution of EU finance law see indicatively LASTRA, R. and 
LOUIS, J.-V. (2013) 'European Economic and Monetary Union: History, Trends, and 
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period introduced by the 1985 Commission White Paper
172
 and the Cassis and Keck 
case-law and the mutual recognition mechanism.
173
  
                                                                                                                                               
 
172
 Commission (1985) Completing the Internal Market – White Paper from the 
Commission to the European Council COM(85) 310 final, 14 June 1985. This White 
Paper did not refer to the investment services market, but only to banking and insurance 
markets, in which inter-State provision of services was more developed at the time.  It 
further refers to mutual recognition as a general principle which should be approved 
under certain conditions (ibid., paras 58 et seq.).  
 
173
 See in general ORTINO, M. (2007) 'The role and functioning of mutual recognition 
in the European market of financial services', ICLQ, p. 309. The principle of mutual 
recognition introduced by the 1985 White Paper had already been used (although not 
expressly referred to) in the ECJ decision of 20.02.1979 in Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral 
AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. For an analysis of 
the case, including consumer groups response to it, see WALKER G. A. (2006) 
European Banking Law – Policy and Programme Construction, op. cit. pp. 120 et seq., 
wherein further references. The Cassis ruling was relevant to the ECJ decision of 
11.07.1974 in Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville [1974] 
ECR 837, relating to the notion of national measures having an equivalent effect to 
trade restrictions. For discussion of Dassonville and relevant case-law see 
WEATHERILL, S. and BEAUMONT, P. (1999) EU Law, op. cit., p. 532 et seq. Cassis 
case-law was partly re-examined by the ECJ decision of 24.11.1993 in Cases C-267/91 
and 268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard [1993] 
ECR I-06097. For an analysis and discussion of this ‘post-Keck’ line of case law, see 
CHALMERS, D. (1994) 'Repackaging the internal market - the ramifications of the 
Keck judgment', ELR, p. 385; GROMLEY, L. (1994) 'Reasoning renounced? The 
remarkable judgment in Keck & Mithouard', EBLR, p. 63; JOLIET, R. (1995) 'The free 
circulation of goods: The Keck and Mithouard decision and the new directions in the 
case law', CJEL, vol. 1, p. 436; MADURO, M. P. (2002) 'Harmony and Dissonance in 
Free Movement', in ANDENAS, M. and ROTH, W.-H. (ed.) Services and Free 
Movement in EU Law, Oxford: OUP; WEATHERILL, S. (1996) 'After Keck: Some 





With regard to the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, the 
ECJ recognized the direct effect of the relevant Treaty provisions.
174
 Establishment is to 
be distinguished from provision of services on the basis of ‘periodicity, continuity and 




In the area of financial services, the principle of equivalence as expressed by the rule of 
mutual recognition entails that financial market participants are to be allowed to provide 
financial services in any MS, provided they had received authorisation in the MS of 
origin (home-MS) by the competent national authorities and according to national law 
which (correctly) incorporates requirements of EU law (“passporting”).
176
 Such 
authorisation entails that other MSs are unable to impose additional licensing 
requirements, as these would amount to measures having equivalent effect to 
restrictions and thus to protectionist measures, except where such (non-discriminatory 
with regard to nationality) restrictions relate to imperative national reasons in areas 
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services', JBL, p. 195;   BIBLIOGRAPHY  \l 1033  LOMNICKA, E. (2000) 'The home 







where national laws have not been harmonised, or fall within the permitted by primary 
EU law derogations in areas where harmonisation has been achieved.  
 
According to the philosophy of the Commission’s 1985 White Paper approach, financial 
markets integration would be achieved on the basis of mutual recognition, minimum 
harmonisation as well as home-MS control, while host-MS control would be exercised 
in parallel with regard to CoB rules in the sake of public interest and general good 
considerations. Considering the effect of non-discriminatory national measures on the 
exercise of such freedoms, the ECJ developed relevant criteria which take into account 
the effects of the national restrictive measure and its possible justification under the 
“imperative reasons” doctrine announced in Cassis and the following formulation of 




                                                 
 
177
 see e.g. ECJ decision of 03.12.1974 in Case 33/74 Johannes Henricus Maria van 
Binsbergen v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid [1974] ECR 
01279; ECJ decision of 18.01.1979 in Joined Cases 110/78 to 111/78 Ministère public 
and "Chambre syndicale des agents artistiques et impresarii de Belgique" ASBL v Willy 
van Wesemael and others [1979] ECR 35; ECJ decision of 18.03.1980 in Case 62/79 SA 
Compagnie générale pour la diffusion de la télévision, Coditel, and others v Ciné Vog 
Films and others ECR [1980] 881; ECJ decision of 17.12.1981 in Case 279/80 Criminal 
proceedings against Alfred John Webb [1981] ECR 3305; ECJ decision of 25.07.1991 
in Case C-76/90 Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer & Co Ltd [1990] ECR I-422; ECJ 
decision of 25.07.1991 in Case C-288/89 Stichting collective Antennevoorziening 
Gouda and others v Commissariaat voor de Media [1991] ECR I-4007; ECJ decision of 
31.03.1993 in Case C-19/92 Dieter Kraus v Land Baden-Württemberg [1993] ECR I-
1663. See also DASHWOOD, A. and WYATT, D. (ed.) (2011) European Union Law, 




It might be argued in this sense, that integration has evolved by adapting to national 




Discrepancies in the integration of the European financial market through this process 
led to the 1997 European Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)
179
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 See evaluation of the home-MS principle in financial integration law by the ECJ in 
Case C-233/94, Germany v European Parliament and Council (supra n 62), at para. 64, 
and the relevant Opinion of AG Léger, points 126 – 129. The ECJ, concurring with the 
Advocate General, ruled that while this principle has been the guiding principle in the 
harmonization of the financial services sector, the Community authorities are entitled to 




 Despite the new mutual recognition approach the completion of the single European 
financial market had not been achieved at the end of the 20
th
 century, and the financial 
market remained fragmented. In an effort to address this issue, the Commission issued 
in 1997 a Communication to the European Council on an Action Plan for the Single 
Market (CSE(97) 1 final, 04 June 1997 and in 1998  a Communication on Financial 
Services: Building a Framework for Action (COM(1998) 625 final, 28 Oct. 1998 which 
were followed in 1999 by the Commission Communication of 11 May 1999 Financial 
Service: Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan (FSAP) 
(COM(1999) 232) which provided a framework for action and a timetable to achieve 
establishment of a single market in wholesale financial services, increasing investor 
protection and transparency in retail markets, and strengthening prudential supervision.  
 
180
 In 2000, the Council appointed an expert Committee chaired by Baron A. 
Lamfalussy, to assess the progress of financial markets integration in the EU. The 
Committee issued an Initial Report in 2000 and in 2001 the Final Report of the 
Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of the European Securities Markets 




The Lamfalussy process illustrates the lengthy effort of the EU institutions and of MSs 
to establish a single Market in the area of financial services, which has followed the 




                                                                                                                                               
formation and implementation of measures to achieve the internal financial market, and 
proposed a series of measures to achieve the FSAP. The Lamfalussy Report, endorsed 
by the Stockholm Council and by the European Parliament in 2001, proposed the 
adoption of a new normative structure for achieving the internal financial market. 
Initially the Lamfalussy Report recommendations referred to the securities sector, but 
were subsequently extended also in the banking and insurance sector. The Report 
proposed as new normative structure (a) a principle-based legislation adopted on the 
basis of the co-decision procedure (“Level 1”), (b) implementing measures, adopted by 
the Commission under powers conferred by Level 1 measures, which is to be assisted 
by the Committee of European Securities Regulation (CESR) and the European 
Securities Committee (ESC) (“Level 2”), (c) enhanced cooperation between members of 
CESR in order to achieve implementation of Level 1 and Level 2 measures (“Level 3”), 
and (d) effective enforcement of compliance by the Commission (“Level 4”). See in 
general MOLONEY, N. (2003) 'II. The Lamfalussy legislative model: A new era for the 
EC securities and investment services regime', ICLQ, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 509-520. The 
influence of the Lamfalussy Report has been important, in terms of legislative 
production. However, the division of responsibilities between home-MS and host-MS, 
according to the Lamfalussy process, raised concerns: see e.g. CESR (2007) The 
Passport under MiFID; Commission (2007) Supervision of Branches under MiFID.  
 
181
 With regard to market integration achieved in the EU before the Crisis, see inter alia 
Commission Staff Working Document, “Financial Integration Monitor 2006”, 
SEC(2006) 1057, 26.07.2006; Commission, White Paper, “Financial Services Policy 
2005 – 2010, COM(2005) 629 final, available at 





During this process, the political and legal machinery of integration moved from 
maximum harmonisation to minimum harmonisation and mutual recognition, and then 





In order to examine the ratio of EU finance law in particular with regard to retail 
investor protection, and how it interrelated to depositor protection, it will be necessary 
to take into account certain main features of EU finance law as it developed until the 
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 For an assessment of the Lamfalussy process, see EP Communication of 9 October 
2008 with recommendations to the Commission (OJ C 9 E, 15.1.2010, p. 48). For an 
overview, see FERRAN, E. and GREEN, D. (2008) 'Are the Lamfalussy Regulatory 
Networks Working Successfully?', in Forum, E.P. Joining-up Europe's Regulators; 
LASTRA, R.M. (2003) 'Regulating European Securities Markets: Beyond the 
Lamfalussy Report', in ANDENAS, M. and AVGERINOS, Y. (ed.) Financial Markets 







II.1 DEVELOPMENT OF EU FINANCE LAW UNTIL THE CRISIS, AND 
RETAIL INVESTOR PROTECTION  
 
 
The development of EU finance law until the Crisis will be briefly examined, taking 
into account main features of the evolution of EU banking and investment services law, 
focusing mainly on ISD and MiFID, as they are closely related to retail investor 
protection issues, and on their transposition into the Hellenic legal order, as related to 
the issue under consideration.  
 
II.1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF EU BANKING LAW UNTIL THE CRISIS  
 
The EEC Treaty did not refer to the banking sector, except for providing that necessary 
measures had to be adopted on the basis of unanimity, and in line with the liberalisation 
of capital movements,
183
 efforts were made to achieve approximation of national rules 
in the area of banking on the basis of general Treaty provisions on freedom of 
establishment and freedom to provide services.
184
  
                                                 
 
183
 EEC Treaty Article 61.  
 
184
 For an overview see DASSESSE, M., STUART, I. and PENN, G. (1994) EC 
Banking Law, LLP; ELLINGER, E.P., LOMNICKA, E. and HOOLEY, R.J.A. (2002) 
Modern Banking Law, 3
rd




Such important initiatives were reflected in the Banking Directives, providing the 
context for the operation of credit institutions in the EEC. The gradual liberalisation of 
capital movement permitted the first efforts to harmonize banking activities throughout 
the EEC. The First Banking Directive,
185
 adopted in 1977, provided the basic rules for 
authorization of credit institutions, taking into account BCBS recommendations. The 
Second Banking Directive,
186
 adopted in 1989, introduced principles of home-MS 





The definition of a credit institution in both the First and the Second Banking Directives 
is that of an institution “[…] whose business is to receive deposits or other repayable 
funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account”.
188
  
                                                                                                                                               




 Directive 77/780/EEC [1977] OJ L322/30. 
 
186
 Directive 89/646/EEC [1989] OJ L386/1. Consolidated in Directive 2006/48/EC 
(recast) [2006] OJ L177/1. Repealed by Directive 2013/36/EU [2013] OJ L176/338.  
 
187
 Cf. Commission Interpretative Communication (1997) Freedom to provide services 
and the interests of the general good in the Second Banking Directive (OJ 97/C 219/04. 
See also Dassesse, M. (1997) 'The European Commission's interpretative 
communication on freedom of services and the general good in the Second Banking 
Directive', YIFEL, p. 45. 
 
188
 First Banking Directive, Article 1; Second Banking Directive, Article 1(1). 




The First Banking Directive (applicable in the context of the case before the ECJ) did 




The gradual regulation of the banking sector by harmonisation through the EEC was 
effected inter alia by the adoption of the Own Funds Directive,
190
 the Solvency Ratio 
Directive,
191
 both adopted in 1989, later the Large Exposures Directive,
192
 adopted in 
                                                                                                                                               
C-366/97 Criminal Proceedings against Massimo Romanelli and Paolo Romanelli  
[1999] ECR I-00855. 
 
189
 See ECJ decision of 09.07.1997 in Case C-222/95 Société Civile Immobilière Parodi 
v Banque Albert de Bary [1997] ECR 3899, where the ECJ examined the issue of 
additional authorisation to provide banking services in the host-MS taking into account 
consumer protection considerations; the ECJ took into account that it is necessary to 
protect consumers against the harm that they would suffer through banking transactions 
effected by institutions not complying with the requirements relating to solvency and 
whose managers do not have the necessary professional qualifications or integrity,
189
 
and accepted the existence of certain imperative reasons in the banking sector which 
related to the public interest that could justify measures adopted by the host-MS 
imposing additional authorisation requirements to credit institutions operating in its 
territory (ibid., paras. 25 – 26). Furthermore, the ECJ referred expressly to consumer 
protection issues which are connected to individual protection (such as contractual 
terms and conflicts of interest) rather than control of the systemic risk. For a critical 
review of Parodi see WALKER, G.A. (2006) European Banking Law, op. cit., p. 176 .  
 
190
 Directive 89/299/EEC [1989] OJ L124/16. Consolidated in Directive 2006/49/EC 
(recast) [2006] OJ L177/201. Repealed by Directive 2013/36/EU. 
 
191
 Directive 89/647/EEC 1989] OJ L386/14. Consolidated in Directive 2006/49/EC, 





1992, and the Capital Adequacy Directive,
193
 adopted in 1993, and then the Capital 
Adequacy II Directive,
194
 adopted in 1998, which sought to harmonise prudential 
standards for credit institutions, in order to control systemic risk. The influence of the 
relevant BCBS proposals is noted. Consolidated supervision of banking groups was 
introduced by the First Consolidated Supervision Directive,
195
 adopted in 1983, which 
was later replaced by the Second Consolidated Supervision Directive,
196
 adopted in 
1992. Further, another step on the difficult issue of supervising groups of financial 





While general EU law in the area of insolvency has been limited to an essential 
coordination of insolvency proceedings, in the context of judicial cooperation in civil 
                                                                                                                                               
 
192
 Directive 92/121/EEC [1992] OJ L29/1. Consolidated in Directive 2006/49/EC, and 
repealed by Directive 2013/36/EU. 
 
193
 Directive 93/6/EEC [1993] OJ L141/1. Consolidated in Directive 2006/49/EC, and 
repealed by Directive 2013/36/EU. 
 
194
 Directive 98/31/EC [1998] OJ L204/13. Consolidated in Directive 2006/49/EC, and 
repealed by Directive 2013/36/EU. 
 
195
 Directive 83/350/EEC [1983] OJ L193/18.  
 
196
 Council Directive 92/30/EEC [1992] OJ L 110/52.  
 
197 Directive 2002/87/EC [2002] OJ L035/1. Amended by Directive 2013/36/EU. See 
also Judgment of the EFTA Court of 18 October 2010 in Case E-3/10 — EFTA 






 minimum harmonization measures were introduced before the Crisis with 
regard to the reorganization and winding-up of credit institutions which should briefly 
be examined.  
                                                 
 
198
 The main EU law instrument is the “Insolvency Regulation” (Council Regulation 
1346/2000 [2000] OJ L160/1, which has  
 
been updated a number of times through implementing Regulations with regard to the 
proceedings and persons falling within its field of application, the most recent being 
Council Regulation 583/2011 [2011] OJ L160/52. The Insolvency Regulation aims to 
achieve efficient and effective operation of cross-border insolvency proceedings, and to 
control forum shopping, which is a requirement to the proper functioning of the internal 
market (Regulation 1346/2000 Preamble recitals 2 and 4). As substantive bankruptcy 
laws widely differ among MSs, the Regulation does not introduce insolvency 
proceedings with universal scope in the EU (ibid., recital 11); it enables the main 
insolvency proceedings to be opened in the MS where the debtor has the centre of his 
main interests (ibid., recital 12, and Article 3) and provides for the immediate 
recognition of judgments concerning the opening, conduct and closure of insolvency 
proceedings which fall within its scope and of judgments handed down in direct 
connection with such insolvency proceedings (ibid., recital 22, and Articles 16 – 26).
 
.
Following the opening of main proceedings, secondary insolvency proceedings may be 
opened in another MS without the debtor’s insolvency being examined in that other 
State (ibid., Article 27). However, insolvency proceedings concerning insurance 
undertakings, credit institutions, investment undertakings which provide services 
involving the holding of funds or securities for third parties, or to collective investment 
undertakings, do not fall within the scope of application of Regulation 1346/2000 (ibid., 
Article 1(2)). The law applicable to insolvency proceedings and their effects is the law 
of the MS within the territory of which such proceedings are opened (ibid., Article 4. 
See also Article 5 regarding third parties’ rights in rem). With regard to claim 
verification rules, Regulation 1346/2000 refers to applicable national law without 






Winding-Up Directive  
 
The insolvency of credit institutions, as a sectoral and important issue, was treated in 
the EU before the Crisis by the introduction of Directive 2001/24/EC,
199
 an instrument 
of minimum harmonization in specific issues, aiming at mutual recognition of 
reorganisation and winding up procedures between MSs, while the application of 
(unharmonised) national law remained and remains the norm.  
 
While the single-passport regime meant that supervision of a credit institution (and its 
branches) was provided by the competent authorities of the State where authorisation 
was granted, according to Directive 2000/12/EC, the same did not apply to 
reorganisation measures or open winding-up procedures.
200
 In this context, mutual 
recognition of measures adopted by one MS with regard to the reorganization of a credit 
institution should be acceptable and effective in all MSs.
201
 Furthermore, the principle 
                                                 
 
199
 Directive 2001/24/EC [2001] OJ L125/15. Proposed to be amended; see 
COM(2012)0280 final. The original proposal of the Commission for the adoption of this 
Directive was issued in 1985 ([1998]  OJ C356/55 and [1998] OJ  C36/1, the opinion of 
the EESC on the proposal was issued in 1986 ([1986] OJ C263/13, while the opinion of 
the European Monetary Institute was issued in 1998 ([1998] OJ C332/13. The Directive 
entered into force on 04.04.2001 and the time limit for its transposition was 05.05.2004 
(Directive 2001/24/EC, Articles 34 and 35). In the Hellenic legal order it was 
transferred by Law 3458/2006 (BGG vol. A, no. 94); see infra Ch V.1.2. 
 
200





of equal treatment between creditors entails that creditors in the host-MS must be able 
to exercise their rights to take action within the applicable time limit;
202
 it also requires 
that the credit institution is wound up according to the principles of unity (i.e. that the 
competent administrative and judicial authorities of the home-MS have sole 
jurisdiction) and universality (i.e. that the decisions of said competent authorities of the 





Winding-up proceedings are defined by the Directive as “collective proceedings opened 
and monitored by the administrative or judicial authorities of a [MS] with the aim of 
realising assets under the supervision of those authorities, including where the 
proceedings are terminated by a composition or other, similar measure”,
204
 governed 





                                                                                                                                               
 
201
 Ibid., recitals 5 to 7.  
 
202
 Ibid., recital 12.  
 
203
 Ibid., recital 16.  
 
204
 Ibid., Directive 2001/24/EC Article 2.  
 
205
 In particular, the law of the home-MS determines: “(a) […];(f) the claims which are 
to be lodged against the credit institution and the treatment of claims arising after the 
opening of winding-up proceedings;(g) the rules governing the lodging, verification and 




While the above issues are left to national law, the Directive provides that any creditor 
who has his domicile, normal place of residence or head office in a MS other than the 
home-MS, including MSs' public authorities, shall have the right to lodge claims or to 
submit written observations relating to claims, further providing that the claims of 
creditors in other MSs than the home-MS shall be treated in the same way and accorded 




Also, while the lodging, verification and admission of claims is governed by national 
law,
207
 the Directive provides that a creditor “[…] shall send copies of supporting 
documents, if any, and shall indicate the nature of the claim, the date on which it arose 
and its amount, as well as whether he alleges preference, security in re or reservation of 




Thus, it may be considered that the corpus of European banking legislation has 
historically sought to control systemic risk in the banking sector, while creating a level 
playing field for banks to compete, aiming to achieve a single European market for the 
banking sector.  
                                                 
 
206
 Ibid., Article 16 (1), (2).  
 
207
 Ibid., Article 10(2) (g).  
 
208




II.1.2 DEVELOPMENT OF EU INVESTMENT SERVICES LAW UNTIL THE CRISIS, 
AND RETAIL INVESTOR PROTECTION. THE INTRODUCTION OF ISD AND 
MIFID. 
 
EU investment services law
209
 states that its aim is dual: the protection of investors and 




In the event of an investment firm failure, the damage sustained by the affected 
investors may also affect the financial market at large –if not as a signal causing 





                                                 
 
209
 For an overview, see BLAIR, M., WALKER, G.A. and PURVES, R. (ed.) (2009) 
Financial Services Law, 2
nd
 edition, Oxford: OUP; FERRAN, E. (2004) Building an EU 
Securities Market, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; KERN, A. and 
MOLONEY, N. (ed.) (2011) Law Reform and Financial Markets, Elgar; TRIDIMAS, 
T. (2010) 'EU Financial Regulation: From Harmonisation to the Birth of EU Federal 
Financial Law', in BIRKINSHAW, P. and VARNEY, M. (ed.) The European Union 
Legal Order after Lisbon, Kluwer; idem (2011) 'EU Financial Regulation: 
Federalization, Crisis Management, and Law Reform', in CRAIG, P. and De BURCA, 
G. The Evolution of EU Law, 2
nd
 edition, Oxford: OUP. 
 
210
 See Communication from the Commission, “The application of conduct of business 
rules under Article 11 of the investment services directive (93/22/EEC, 
COM(2000)0722 final; MiFID, Preamble recitals 26, 31, 44, 61, 71.  
 
211




Harmonisation of investment services law followed the model which had been used in 
the banking sector, applying the “passporting” regime to investment firms, to be 




 While the development of relevant secondary European financial legislation on free 
movement
213
 is in general connected to investor protection considerations (since every 
measure protecting market transparency, efficiency and stability protects participants’ 
legitimate interests), it is not directly connected to the issue of retail investor protection 
in the event of an investment firm failure. While an in depth examination of all relevant 
European law instruments falls out of the scope of this study,
214
 it will be important to 
briefly examine certain features of ISD and MIFID, especially with regard to the notion 
of investment services and supervisory and competent authorities’ responsibilities as 





                                                 
 
212
 See indicatively AVGERINOS, Y. (2003) Regulating and Supervising Investment 
Services in the European Union, New York: Palgrave Macmillan; DASSESSE, M. 
(1992) 'European Community financial regulation: investment services', JIBL, p. 41. 
 
213
 For an overview see ANDENAS, M. and ROTH, W.-H. (2002) Services and Free 
Movement in EU Law, Oxford: OUP. 
 
214
 Such development includes the introduction, as part of the FSAP, of the Markets 
Abuse Directive: Council Directive 2003/6 [2003] OJ L96/16; the Prospectus Directive: 
Council Directive 2003/71 [2003] OJ L345/31; the Transparency Directive: Council 






Investment Services Directive  
  
ISD, adopted in 1992, built on the experience of harmonisation in the banking sector. 
Numerous references to investor protection are made in the preamble to ISD, which has 




                                                 
 
215
 The Preamble to ISD stated inter alia that “[…] firms that provide the investment 
services covered by [ISD] must be subject to authorisation by their home Member States 
in order to protect investors and the stability of the financial system” (Preamble, recital 
2); that “[…] it is necessary, for the protection of investors, to guarantee the internal 
supervision of every firm, either by means of two-man management or, where that is not 
required by [ISD], by other mechanisms that ensure an equivalent result” (Preamble, 
recital 5); that “[…] in order to protect investors an investor's ownership and other 
similar rights in respect of securities and his rights in respect of funds entrusted to a 
firm should in particular be protected by being kept distinct from those of the firm” 
(Preamble, recital 29); that “[…] one of the objectives of [ISD] is to protect investors; 
[…] it is therefore appropriate to take account of the different requirements for 
protection of various categories of investors and of their levels of professional 
expertise” (Preamble, recital 32); and that “[…] with the two-fold aim of protecting 
investors and ensuring the smooth operation of the markets in transferable securities, it 
is necessary to ensure that transparency of transactions is achieved and that the rules 
laid down for that purpose in [ISD] for regulated markets apply both to investment 
firms and to credit institutions when they operate on the market” (Preamble, recital 42). 
See also, however, ECJ decision of 21.11.2002 in Case C-356/00, Antonio Testa and 
Lido Lazzeri v Commissione Nazionale per la Società e la Borsa (Consob) [2002] ECR 





ISD defined an investment firm as “[…] any legal person the regular occupation or 
business of which is the provision of investment services for third parties on a 
professional basis”.
216
   
 
Thus, the ISD definition of an investment firm for the purpose of its application was 
based on a functional criterion, according to which a firm fell within its field of 
application if it wished to provide at least one of the investment services listed in 
Section A of the Annex to ISD, in which case it had to achieve specific licensing for the 
specific investment service to be provided.  
 
ISD provided for certain obligations of national competent authorities as conditions for 
providing authorisation to investment firms, which has to specify the investment 
services they are licensed to provide:
217
 national competent authorities had to verify 
inter alia that an investment firm had sufficient initial capital in accordance with the 
rules of CAD
218
 having regard to the nature of the investment service in question, and 
that the direction of the investment firm’s business is decided by at least two persons 
(the “four eye rule”) who are of sufficiently good repute and are sufficiently 
experienced.
219
 The latter requirement being very broad, it was left to national 
                                                 
 
216
 ISD, Article 1(2). Investment services were defined as “any of the services listed in 
Section A of the Annex relating to any of the instruments listed in Section B of the Annex 
that are provided for a third party”: ibid., Article 1(1).  
 
217
 Ibid., Article 3(1).  
 
218
 Supra, n 193.  
 
219




supervisory authorities to regulate on the conditions for this crucial criterion, of “fit and 
proper” management of an investment firm, to be satisfied.  
 
ISD provided certain further obligations that investment firms had to comply with, on 
an ongoing basis, and under the supervision of competent national authorities. Such 
prudential requirement were relevant to administrative and accounting procedures, 
control and safeguard arrangements for electronic data processing, internal control 
mechanisms, safeguarding ownership rights of investors especially in the event of the 
investment firm’s insolvency, prevention of use of investors’ instruments by the 
investment firm for its own account, record keeping of transactions executed, and 




Furthermore, ISD introduced a specific supervisory regime with regard to Conduct of 
Business (CoB) rules, which departed from the principle of home-MS regulation and 
supervision of investment firms and provided that both the home-MS and the host-MS 
were competent for issuing and enforcement of CoB rules.
221
 The introduction of this 
rule may be regarded as relevant to the Cassis rule of host-State competence where 
national rules adopted in the general good are applicable. The reasoning of such 
supervisory competence allocation is connected to general good (protection of 
investors) considerations of the MS where services were provided.
222
  
                                                 
 
220
 Ibid., Article 10.  
 
221
 See in general ANDENAS, M. (1994) 'Rules of conduct and the principle of 
subsidiarity', Company Lawyer, p. 60;   WOUTERS, J. (1993) 'Rules of conduct, 






ISD provided that CoB rules should be applied taking into account of the professional 
nature of the person for whom the service is provided.
223
 However, ISD did not provide 
any definition of such professional nature, nor did it provide any criteria under which a 
person might be characterised as professional for the purpose of CoB rules application.  
 
The issue of conduct of business rules specifically in the area of financial services, and 
in the context of consumer protection as a public interest restriction on the free 
provision of services in the securities sector,
224




                                                                                                                                               
 
222
 See 1997 Commission Interpretative Communication (supra, n 187). 
 
223
 ISD Article 11(1). 
 
224
 With regard to public interest concerns in the area of insurance, see ECJ decision of 
04.12.1986 in Case 220/83 Commission v French Republic [1986] ECR 3663; ECJ 
decision of 04.12.1986 in Case 252/83 Commission v Kingdom of Denmark [1976] ECR 
3713; ECJ decision of 04.12.1986 in Case 205/84 Commission v Federal Republic of 
Germany [1986] ECR 3755; ECJ decision of 04.12.1986 in Case 206/84 Commission v 
Ireland [1986] ECR 3817 (the “Co-insurance Cases”). While a discussion of this case-
law is not within the scope of this study, it is interesting to note that the ECJ took into 
account, as a factor of the sensitivity of the insurance market with regard to consumer 
protection and public interest national rules, the nature of the service provided 
(uncertainty of the occurrence of events at the time of conclusion of the insurance 
contract) and the difficulty for consumers to foresee whether they would receive 
payment with regard to insurer’s future financial position, as well as the great number of 
consumers such contracts concerned; cf. Case 220/83 (supra), at para. 30. 
 
225
 See ECJ decision of 10.05.1995 in Case C-384/93 Alpine Investments BV v Minister 




The ECJ accepted that the need to protect the reputation of the financial markets and 
investors could constitute imperative reasons of public interest justifying certain 




It is interesting to note in this regard that the protection of investors was taken into 
consideration by the ECJ mainly in the context of the protection of the trust of investors 
to the financial market; in that sense, the protection of the integrity of financial markets 




While ISD was provided certain rules relevant to retail investor protection, it did not 
achieve full market integration.
228
 ISD was replaced by MiFID, adopted in the context 
of the Lamfalussy process.  
 
It is necessary to examine carefully certain aspects of MIFiD, which are important to 
this study. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
‘Investment Services: Cross Border Cold Calling and the Right to Provide Services’, 
Company Lawyer, p. 249. See also HATZOPOULOS, V. (1995) ‘Case C-384/93 Alpine 
Investments BV v Minister van Financiën, Judgment of 10 May 1999, NYR (1995)” 32 
CMLRev 1427.  
 
226
 Alpine Investments, para. 47.  
 
227
 Ibid., paras. 42-43.    
 
228
 See also Commission Communication (2000) “Upgrading the Investment Services 





Markets in Financial Instruments Directive  
 
The introduction of MiFID,
229
 as ISD before it, aimed at protecting both the stability of 
the financial market and investors.
230
 MiFID entered into force on 30.04.2004, 
providing for a transposition period which ended on 31.01.2007, i.e. a short time before 
the occurrence of the Crisis;
231
 since its publication it has undergone several 
amendments.
232
 By MiFID, EU financial law took a new dimension, in an effort “to 
encompass the full range of investor oriented activities”;
233
 many ISD provisions were 
amended by MiFID, new rules were introduced, and ISD was repealed.
234
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 Directive 2004/39/EC [2004] OJ L145/1. See in general AUBRY, N. and McKEE, 
M. (2007) ‘MiFID: Where did it come fro, where is it taking us’, JIBLR, vol. 22, no. 4, 
pp. 177 – 186; CESR (2007) ‘The Passport inder MiFID’.  
  
230
 MiFID, Preamble, recitals 17, 31, 44, 71. 
 
231
 MiFID Article 70.  
 
232
 For a consolidated version of MiFID, see http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2004L0039:20110104:EN:H
TML .  
 
233
 MiFID, Preamble, recital 2.  
 
234
 See in general AVGOULEAS, E. (2004) 'The new EC financial markets legislation 
and the emerging regime for capital markets', YEL, vol. 23, p. 321; ESME (2008) 
'Differences between the Definitions of "Qualified Investor" in the Prospectus Directive 
and "Professional Client" and "Eligible Counterparty" in MiFID - Is Alignment 
Needed?';   FERRANINI, G. and WYMEERSCH, E. (ed.) (2006) Investor Protection in 





The field of application of MIFiD is wider of that of ISD: 
 
Ratione materiae, it includes also investment advice as an investment service, taking 
into account “the increasing dependence of investors on personal recommendations”.
235
 
Furthermore, commodities and other derivatives were introduced in the list of financial 





Ratione personae it encompasses also regulated markets
237
 and alternative trading 
systems (Multilateral Trading Facilities, MTFs).
238
 Authorised credit institutions, when 
providing investment services to their clients, fall within the scope of application of 
MiFID, without need for further licensing under MiFID;
239
 furthermore, investment 
firms providing investment services for which they are not licensed under MiFID, do 
not need additional authorisation for the provision of such services, if they provide them 
on a non-regular basis.
240
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 MiFID, Preamble, recital 3.  
 
236
 Ibid., recital 4.  
 
237
 MiFID, Articles 36 – 47. With regard to the criteria of MiFID regarding a regulated 
market, see ECJ judgment of 22.03.2012 in case C-248/11, Criminal proceedings 
against Rareş Doralin Nilaş and Others (nyr).  
 
238
 MiFID, in particular Articles 14, 29, 30, 35.  
 
239
 MiFID, Preamble, recital 18; Article 1.  
 
240




With regard to the definition of investment firm and investment service, MiFID follows 
the same normative structure as ISD,
241
 and is completed by implementing Directive 
2006/73/EC.
242
   
 
The normative system introduced by MiFID provides for more detailed conditions and 
procedures for authorisation of investment firms than ISD.
243
 With regard to the “fit and 
proper” requirement regarding the persons who effectively direct the business of the 
investment firm, MiFID provides broad criteria, not different in essence from those 
provided by ISD: The “four eye rule” being a priori applicable, 
244
 MSs have to require 
that such persons are “[…] of sufficiently good repute and sufficiently experience as to 
ensure the sound and prudent management of the investment firm”.
245
 Further, the 
competent national authority has to refuse authorisation not only if it is not satisfied that 
the persons who will effectively direct the business of the investment firm are of 
sufficiently good repute or sufficiently experienced, but also “[…] if there are objective 




 See MiFID, Article 4.  
 
242
 Commission Directive 2006/73/EC [2006] OJ L241/26. The time limit for the 
application in the national legal orders of the provisions transposing this Directive was 
01.11.2007; ibid., Article 53(2).  
 
243
 MiFID, Chapter I.  
 
244
 Ibid., Article 9(4).  
 
245




and demonstrable grounds for believing that proposed changes to the management of 




Other organisational requirements are provided by MiFID for investment firms, the 
home-MS being responsible for achieving compliance. Such organisational 
requirements are set out by MiFID also on a general level; inter alia an investment firm 
“[…] shall establish adequate policies and procedures sufficient to ensure compliance 
[…]”,
247
 “shall maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative 
arrangements with a view to taking all reasonable steps designed to prevent conflicts of 
interest […]”,
248
 “[…] shall take reasonable steps to ensure continuity and regularity in 
the performance of investment services and activities […]”,
249
 “[…]  shall have sound 
administrative and accounting procedures, internal control mechanisms, effective 
procedures for risk assessment, and effective control and safeguard arrangements for 
information processing systems”,
250
 “[…] shall arrange for records to be kept of all 
services and transactions undertaken by it which shall be sufficient to enable the 
competent authority to monitor compliance […]”,
251
 “[…] shall […] make adequate 
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 Ibid., Article 9(3).  
 
247
 Ibid., Article 13(2). 
 
248
 Ibid., Article 13(3); Article 18. Cf. Directive 2006/73/EC Article 21.  
 
249
 Ibid., Article 13(4). 
 
250
 Ibid., Article 13(5). 
251
 Ibid., Article 13(6). Directive 2006/73/EC provides with regard to record-keeping 
inter alia that MSs shall require investment firms to retain all records required under 
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arrangements so as to safeguard clients' ownership rights, especially in the event of the 




Taking into account the above general context of MiFID rules on retail investor 
protection, as specified also by implementing Directive 2006/73/EC, it is useful to 
examine the rules provided by the latter with regard to safeguarding of clients assets, 
depositing of client financial instruments and depositing of client funds.  
 
Furthermore, a licensed investment firm must comply at all times with the conditions 
for its initial authorisation
253
 and MSs are under an obligation to ensure that national 




                                                                                                                                               
MiFID for at least five years. See Directive 2006/73/EC Article 51. See also MiFID 
Implementing Regulation 1287/2006 [2006] OJ L241/1. Moreover, Directive 
2006/73/EC provides for MSs to require that investment firms, for the purposes of 
safeguarding clients’ rights in relation to financial instruments and funds belonging to 
them, shall inter alia keep such records and accounts as are necessary to enable them at 
any time and without delay to distinguish assets held for one client from assets held for 
any other client, and from their own assets, in order to protect clients’ assets from a 
number of risks, including misuse of the assets, fraud, poor administration, inadequate 
record-keeping or negligence (Directive 2006/73/EC Article 16).  
252
 MiFID, Article 13(7), (8).  
 
253
 MiFID, Article 16(1). 
 
254





With regard to te level of investor protection,
255
 MiFID proceeds to a differentiation of 
the status of protection by distinguishing investors in three categories: retail investors 
(clients), professional investors (clients), and counterparties.
256
 MiFID defines as 
“client” any natural or legal person to whom an investment firm provides investment 
and/or ancillary services.
257
 A “retail client” is defined as a client who is not a 
professional client,
258
 and a “professional client” is one meeting the criteria laid down in 
Annex II of the Directive.
259
 Professional clients are entities required to be authorised or 
regulated to operate in the financial markets and other institutional investors whose 
main activity is to invest in financial instruments.
260
 These entities are defined ex lege as 
professional investors (clients). However, they are allowed to request non-professional 
treatment in order to enjoy a higher level of protection, and following a written 
agreement with the investment firm to that effect, in which the particular services or 
transactions to which it applies has to be specified.
261
 Furthermore, MiFID provides for 
a particular sub-category of retail investors (clients), who although being categorised 
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 Regarding market transparency and integrity protection, see MiFID, Articles 25 – 30.  
 
256
 MiFID Preamble recital 31. 
 
257
 Ibid., Annex I(1) point 10.  
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 Ibid., Annex I (1) point 12.  
 
259
 Ibid., Annex I(1) point 11.  
 
260
 Ibid., Annex II, Article I(1).  
 
261




according to the terms of the Directive as non-professional, may be treated as 
professional investors on request.
262
 However, even if treated as professional investors, 
such persons may not be presumed to possess market knowledge and experience 
comparable to that of professional investors, and waiver of the protection afforded to 




In this way, despite providing for enhanced retail investors protection especially by CoB 
rules, and by reference to the ICSD regime,
264
 MiFID allows for exceptions from this 
regime on a voluntary basis and according to a procedure taking place between the 
interested investor and the investment firm.  
 
Directive 2006/73/EC, implementing MiFID, provides with regard to the level of 
protection awarded by MSs, that they “[…] may retain or impose requirements 
additional to those in this Directive only in those exceptional cases where such 
requirements are objectively justified and proportionate so as to address specific risks 
to investor protection or to market integrity that are not adequately addressed by this 
Directive […]”,
265
 and provided that either the specific risks are of particular 
importance in the circumstances of the market structure of that MS or the additional 
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 Ibid., Annex II, Article 2.  
 
263
 Ibid., Annex II, Article 2(2).  
 
264
 Ibid., Article 11. 
 
265




requirement addresses risks that emerge or become  evident after the date of the 




With regard to CoB rules, MiFID provides for an obligation of MSs to require that in 
the provision of investment services, an investment firm acts “honestly, fairly and 
professionally in accordance with the best interests of its clients […],
267
 complying in 
particular with relevant principles regarding fair, clear and not misleading transmission 
of information,
268
 provision of appropriate information about the investment firm and its 
services, financial instruments and proposed investment strategies,
269
 execution venues 
and costs and associated charges,
270
 presented so as to enable clients to understand the 











 MiFID, Article 19(1). Cf. Directive 2006/73/EC Article 26 regarding inducements.  
 
268
 MiFID, Article 19(2). Cf. Directive 2006/73/EC Article 27. 
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 Cf. Directive 2006/73/EC Article 31. 
 
270
 MiFID, Article 19(3). See also Directive 2006/73/EC, Articles 28, 29, 30, and 31. 
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 MiFID, Article 19. See also with regard to execution of orders “in the best interest” 
of the client, ibid., Article 21. 
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Furthermore, the investment firm must keep a record of documents agreed with the 
client, and must provide the client with adequate reports on the service provided and the 




More generally, regarding CoB rules, MiFID has attempted to resolve the problems that 
had emerged under the ISD regime, mainly by introducing the sole competence of 
home-MS on CoB rules; however, services provided by a branch of an investment firm 





The rules on requirements regarding initial authorisation and on-going supervision of 
investment firms, as well as the CoB rules, provide a framework which is relevant to 
investor protection, although mostly in terms of ex ante protection (before the failure of 
an investment firm). However, it is also relevant to the question of supervisory liability 
in tort, since the initial authorisation and the on-going supervision of an investment firm 
by the competent authorities is closely related to retail investor protection 
considerations. In this context, it is useful to briefly examine the obligations of national 
competent authorities as provided by MiFID.  
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 Ibid., Article 19(8). 
 
273
 See CESR (2007) Recommendations for the implementation of the Directive 
2004/39/EC and Statement on practical arrangements regarding the late transposition 




MiFID provides that “[e]ach [MS] shall designate the competent authorities which are 
to carry out each of the duties provided for in this Directive”.
274
 There is no specific 
requirement as to the legal nature of competent authorities, beyond that they have to be 
public authorities, with the option of delegating tasks to other entities where permitted 
and under the conditions provided by MiFID.
275
 The criterion set by MiFID, for MSs to 
allow such delegation, is connected to effectiveness: MSs have to require that 
competent authorities take all reasonable steps to ensure that the delegate has the 




MiFID provides that competent authorities have to be given with all-encompassing 
supervisory and investigatory powers, according to national law.
277
 Regarding the 
powers that competent authorities must have, as a minimum, MiFID provides a list of 
competences, which relate to (a) collecting information (accessing documents,
278
 




 carrying out of in-site 
inspections,
281
 requiring existing telephone and data traffic records,
282
 requiring auditors 
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 Ibid.  
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 Ibid., Article 50(1).  
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 Ibid., Article 50(2) point (a).  
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 Ibid., point (b) 
 
280
 Ibid., point (h). 
 
281
 Ibid., point (c). 
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to provide information, allowing auditors or experts to carry out verifications or 
investigations),
283
 (b) taking provisional and permanent measures to control any illegal 
practice (requiring the cessation of any such practice,
284
 requesting the temporary 
prohibition of professional activity
285
 or the suspension of trading in a financial 
instruments,
286
 or the removal of such instrument from trading),
287
 (c) taking measures 
to protect pecuniary claims (requesting freezing and/or sequestration of assets),
288
 (d) 
referring matters for criminal prosecution,
289
 and (e) in general, adopting “[…] any type 





This minimum harmonisation approach of MiFID leaves unspecified how each 
competence is to exercised by national competent authorities, which has to be 
determined by national law with a view to achieve the aim of the Directive.   
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 Ibid., point (d). 
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 Ibid., point (e). 
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 Ibid., point (g). 
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 Ibid., point (j). 
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 Ibid., point (k).  
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 Ibid., point (f). 
 
289
 Ibid., point (l). 
 
290





Further rules are provided with regard to the powers of host-MS to take precautionary 
measures in order to control the illegal activity of an investment firm (or a regulated 
market or an MTF)
291
 operating in their territory if despite having notified the 
competent authorities of the home-MS the investment firm fails to comply with its 
obligations, or where the measures taken by the competent authorities of the home-MS 
“prove inadequate”.
292
 Such action by the host-MS competent authorities is justified 
when the investment firm acts “in a manner that is clearly prejudicial to the interests of 
host [MS] investors or the orderly functioning of the markets”
293
 and the host-MS must 
take “all the appropriate measures needed in order to protect investors and the proper 




The provisions of MiFID regarding the adoption of administrative measures and the 
imposition of administrative sanctions by MSs are also very broad;
295
 MSs are called to 
ensure that such measures are effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
296
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SL and Comercial Hostelera de Grandes Vinos SL v Bankinter SA and Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya Argentaria SA (nyr). The ECJ considered inter alia that, although Article 51 of 




On the other hand, it is interesting to note that MiFID provides for locus standi of 
bodies (public bodies, consumer organizations and professional organizations), which 
may take action “in the interest of consumers”
297
 before the national courts or 
competent administrative bodies “to ensure that the national provisions for the 
implementation of [MiFID] are applied”.
298
 While there is no reference as to the nature 
of the remedy or the claim such action may have, this provision connects the interests of 
consumers with application of national law implementing MiFID. And as it refers to 
national law to regulate this matter (not only on the procedural but also on the 
substantive level), it may entail, under the conditions provided by national law and case-
law, that action may be brought by such bodies against competent authorities, for failure 
to exercise their duties according to national law implementing MiFID. This issue is 
connected to the wider problematic of supervisory authorities’ liability under EU law, 
and relates to the question of whether national law may provide for such liability even if 
EU law does not.  
                                                                                                                                               
parties responsible for non-compliance with the provisions adopted pursuant to it, it 
does not state either that MSs must provide for contractual consequences in the event of 
contracts being concluded which do not comply with the obligations under national 
legal provisions transposing Article 19(4) and (5) of MiFID, or what those 
consequences might be; and that in the absence of EU legislation on the point, it is for 
the internal legal order of each MS to determine the contractual consequences of non-
compliance with those obligations, subject to observance of the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness (para. 57 and case-law cited).  
 
297
 The term “consumer” is not defined in MiFID. On the relevant problematic of the 
legal status of investors, see also MOLONEY, N. (2012) 'The investor model 
underlying the EU's investor protection regime: consumers or investors?', European 
Business Organization Law Review, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 169. 
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In the context of the changes brought to EU financial legislation by the onset of the 





II.1.3 TRANSPOSITION OF ISD AND MIFID INTO THE HELLENIC LEGAL 
ORDER 
 
After Hellas became Member of the EEC, and before the transposition of ISD 
investment services were regulated mainly through Law 1806/1988,
300
 according to 
which authorisation of investment firms was subject to certain capital requirements and 
licensing by the HCMC.
301
 Following licensing, if the HCMC considered that 
conditions for granting of the license no longer existed, it had to submit a relevant 
recommendation to the competent Minister who was only competent to revoke the 
authorisation. Investor protection was not mentioned in Law 1806/1988.  
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 COM(2011) 656.  
 
300
 BGG vol. A, no. 207.  
 
301
 Law 1806/1988 Article 4(1). According to the relevant provision, in order for such 
licensing to be granted, HCMC had to take into consideration “such factors as the 
organisation, the technical and financial means of the company, the reliability and 
expertise of its directors, as well as the suitability of the shareholders, who own more 




Hellenic investment services law further developed by the introduction of Law 
1969/1991
302





 and securities exchanges,
305
 modifying 
and updating national legislation. HCMC was competent to grant and revoke 




ISD was incorporated in the Hellenic legal order by Law 2396/1996.
307
 It is useful to 
briefly examine Law 2396/2996, not only for reasons of normative analysis, but also 
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 Law 1969/1991, Articles 1 – 16. 
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 Ibid., Articles 17 – 49.  
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 Ibid., Articles 50 – 77.  
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 With regard to licensing of Portfolio Investment Companies, HCMC granted 
authorisation upon assessment of the “organisation, technical and financial means of 
the company, reliability and expertise of directors, and the suitability of its founders, in 
order to ensure the sound management of the company”; Law 1969/1991 Article 2(2). 
Authorisation could be revoked if at least one of the following conditions applied: (a) 
when the conditions for providing authorization were no longer satisfied, (b) when the 
company hindered in any way the control effected by the competent authority, or (c) 
when the company was infringing applicable law, HCMC decisions and regulations, or 
its statutes; Law 1969/1991 Article 15. 
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 BGG, vol. A, no 73. Articles 1 – 31 of Law 2396/1996 were repealed on 01.11.2007 
by Article 85 of Law 3606/2007. For an overview see GORTSOS, C. (1996) ‘EPEY 
[Investment Firms]. Operation and supervision*’, DEE, p. 1026; POLITIS, E. (1998) 




because it was the applicable law interpreted by case-law, in many cases relevant to the 




In general, Law 2396/1996 followed the normative structure and repeated to some 
extent the rules of ISD.  
 
Core investment services were defined by Law 2396/1996 as: “a. (i): the reception and 
transmission for the account of investors of orders for the conclusion of transactions on 
one or more of the following financial instruments: aa. transferable securities and units 
in collective investment undertakings.bb. money market instruments.cc. financial - 
futures contracts, including equivalent cash-settled instruments.dd. forward interest 
rate agreements (FRAs).ee. interest rate, currency and equity swaps. ff. options to 
acquire or dispose of any of the instruments listed above, including equivalent cash-
settled instruments, and in particular currency and interest rate options. (ii) execution 
of those trades and orders, other than for own account. b. Dealing in any of the above 
instruments for own account. c. Managing portfolios of investments in accordance with 
mandates given by investors, where such portfolios include one or more of the 
instruments listed under a(i).  d. Underwriting, total or partial, in respect of issues of 
any of the instruments listed under a(i) and/or placing such issues.”
309
 Furthermore, 
non-core investment services included “a. Safekeeping and administration in relation to 
one or more of the instruments listed under section a(i); b. safe custody services; c. 
                                                 
 
308
 Infra, Ch VI.1 and VII.2.  
 
309
 Law 2396/1996 Article 2(1). The translation of this provision of Law 2396/1996 
from the original in the Hellenic language is not verbatim in order for certain terms and 




granting credits or loans to investors to allow them to carry out transactions in any of 
the instruments listed under paragraph 1 of this article, provided that the firm granting 
the loan or the credit is involved in the transactions […]; d. offer of advice to 
enterprises regarding capital structure […]; e. underwriting services; offer of 
investment advice on one or several of the instruments listed under paragraph 1 a(i) of 




The scope of application of Law 2396/1996, with regard to rules and obligations of 
investment firms, the competence of regulatory and supervisory authorities, the 
provision of investment services by credit institutions, and capital adequacy of 
investment firms and credit institutions
311
 encompasses both investment firms and credit 




According to Law 2396/1996, “the unconditional provision of investment services on a 
professional basis is only permitted to investment services firms, according to the 
provisions of the present law”,
313
 i.e. it is only permitted to investment firms holding the 
relevant license and according to operation and CoB rules.
314
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 Law 2396/1996 Article 2(2).  
 
311




 Law 2396/1996, Article 3(1), and Article 2(3), (4). Furthermore, special provisions 
referred to Securities Exchange Investment Firms (“Anonymh Hrematisteriake Etaireia 
Parohes Ependytikon Yperesion”, AHEPEY), and Portfolio Management Investment 
Firms (“Anonyme Etaireia Diaheirises Ependytikon Hartofylakion”, AEDEH): Law 
2396/1996, Articles 23 – 31.   
 
313




An important exception to the authorisation requirement concerned firms having as 
business only the receipt and transmission of transaction orders,
315
 and not the provision 




With regard to asset separation, Law 2396/1996 provided that (a) investment firms, 
except for credit institutions, “are not allowed to use for their own account cash of their 
investors-clients that has come under their possession”, and (b) that investment firms 
“are not allowed to use for their own account securities of their investors-clients that 
have come under their possession”.
317
  
                                                                                                                                               
 
314
 The Hellenic “Code of Deontology of Investment Firms”, regulating CoB rules for 
investment firms (EPEYs but also ELDEs) in the Hellenic legal order, was issued on the 
basis of Article 7(1) of Law 2396/1996, by Ministerial Decision 12263/B. 
500/11.04.1997, BGG vol. B, no. 340 / 24.04.1997.  Replaced by the new Hellenic 
“Code of Behaviour of Investment Firms” (HCMC decision 1 / 452 / 01.11.2007, BGG 
vol. B, bo. 2136 / 01.11.2007).  
 
315
 “Société Anonyme for the Receipt and Transmission of Orders” (“Anonyme Etaireia 
Lepses kai Diavivases Entolon”, AELDE): Law 2396/1996, Article 3(1), ninth indent.  
 
316
 For licensing regulation under Law 1806/1988 and Law 2396/1996 see HCMC 
decision 6161/86/15.10.1996, BGG vol. B, no. 1008. Repealed by HCMC decision 
4/461/24.01.2008 (BGG vol. B, no. 283) regulating the licensing of AEPEYs. See also 
HCMC decision 5/461/24.01.2008 (BGG vol. B, no. 283) regulating the licensing of 
AELDEs.    
 
317
 See HCMC decision 6162/86/15.10.1996 (BGG vol. B, no. 1008) on the data 
provided by EPEYs on the use of own and third parties’ funds and titles; replaced by 
HCMC decision 1844/2001 (BGG, vol. B, no. 745). For the regulation of record 
keeping obligations by investment firms see HCMC decision 6160/15.10.1996 (BGG 




Law 2396/1996 also introduced a qualitative criterion, as to the classification of 
receivers of investment services, providing that in the implementation of CoB rules the 
level of knowledge regarding investment services, as related to the professional nature 
of the receiver or the services, has to be taken into account.
318
 Further, that investment 
firms “inform themselves of the financial situation, investment experience and 





Throughout Law 2396/1996, several references were made to the need to protect 
investors
320
 or investors’ interests
321
  or to the obligation to act in their best interests,
322
 
although without explicit reference to their status as retail investors or not (subject to 
the qualitative criterion referred above). Moreover, reference was made to rules relevant 
to the protection of the “general interest”,
323
 which however was not defined.  
                                                                                                                                               
1554); for the regulation of record keeping obligations by members of the Athens 
Derivatives Exchange and the ADECH, see HCMC decision 9763/1999 (BGG vol. B, 
no. 741) and HCMC decision 5/196/28.07/2000 (BGG vol. B, no. 1002), both replaced 
by HCMC decision 1/452/01.11.2007 (BGG vol. B, no. 2136). 
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Article 23(1), Article 24(1) indent (c), Article 30(4).  
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 Law 2396/1996, Article 7(3) indents (a) and (g).  
 
323




MiFID was transposed into the Hellenic legal order by Law 3606/2007.
324
 Law 
3606/2007 closely follows the rules provided by MiFID, proceeding to specifying rules 
on the national level in certain areas, and leaving many issues to be regulated by the 
HCMC.
325
   
 
A “retail client” is defined by Law 3606/2007 as “a client who is not a professional 
client”,
326
 and a “professional client” is defined as “a client who possesses the 
experience, knowledge and expertise to make his own investment decisions and properly 
assess the risks that he incurs and who meets the criteria laid down in Article 6”,
327
 i.e. 
entities that “should be regarded as professionals in all investment services and 
activities and financial instruments for the purposes of this law” (such as credit 
institutions, investment firms, other authorised or regulated financial institutions, 
insurance companies, collective investment schemes and management of such schemes, 
pension funds and management companies of such funds, commodity and commodity 
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 BGG vol. A, no. 195. An official translation of this law in English is available at the 




 For an overview, see indicatively GORTSOS, C., STAIKOURAS, P. and LIVADA, 
C. (2007) The Institutional and Regulatory Framework of the Capital Market*, Athens: 
Hellenic Bank Association – Hellenic Banking Institute; TSIMPANOULIS, D, (2007) 
‘Farewell to finance law – the Impact of Directive 2004/39/EC ‘on markets in Financial 
Instruments’ in the Hellenic Capital Market Law*’, DEE, vol. 1, p. 35.  
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 Law 3606/2007, Article 2, indent 6. 
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derivatives dealers, local enterprises, other institutional investors, large undertakings as 
specified therein, national and regional governments and public bodies that manage 




Law 3606/2007, following MiFID, also introduces a category of “clients who may be 
treated as professionals”, other than those falling within the definition of “professional 
clients”, in the sense that such quasi-professional clients may be treated as professionals 
on the basis of certain criteria, which would mean that they would be allowed “to waive 
some of the protection afforded by conduct of business rules”.
329
   
 
The field of application of Law 3606/2007 encompasses investment firms,
330
 regulated 
markets and market operators,
331
 as well as specific forms of financial market 
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 Ibid., Article 6.  
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 For such a waiver to be allowed, at least two of the following criteria have to be met: 
(a) important size of transactions in a certain frequency, (b) important size of portfolio, 
(c) professional experience in the financial sector and relevant knowledge. If such 
criteria are met, and certain other procedural criteria are met (request of clients for 
waiver in writing, clear written warning by investment firm regarding waiving 
protection and investor compensation rights, written statement by clients that they are 
aware of the consequences), private individual investors could be treated as 
“professional clients”; ibid. See VELENTZAS, I. (2009) ‘The classification of investors 
in the provision of investment services (after Law 3606/2007)*’ ETrAxHrD, p. 385.  
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 and –to a certain extent– credit institutions when providing 
investment services or performing investment activities,
333




Incorporating the relevant provisions of MiFID, investment services and activities 
according to Law 3606/2007 are enumerated (numerus clausus) as: (a) reception and 
transmission of orders (on behalf of clients, for transactions in financial instruments), 
(b) execution of orders on behalf of clients (acting to conclude agreements to act or sell 
financial instruments on behalf of clients), (c) dealing on own account, (d) portfolio 
management, (e) investment advice, (f) underwriting of financial instruments or placing 
of financial instruments on a firm commitment basis, (g) placing of financial 
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provide only reception and transmission of orders services as well as investment advice, 
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AEEDs, as well as to the provisional suspension and the withdrawal of their 
authorisation are similar to those of AEPEYS; earlier legislation provided for AELDEs 
which were also allowed only to receive and transmit orders, but not to provide 
investment advice, nor to hold client’s assets, and which were however not prudentially 
regulated and supervised by the HCMC; see supra, n 316. It is interesting to note that 
Law 3606/2007, further to providing for the competence of the HCMC to regulate and 
supervise AEEDs and to allowing provision of investment advice by AEEDs (perhaps 
thus legitimizing an existing practice), specifically delegated the HCMC to “[…] 
determine the books and records kept and issued by AEEDs in relation to the investment 
services they provide, the content of mandatory entries in such books and records and 
any other technical matter and necessary detail”; ibid., Article 40.   
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 Law 3606/2007, Article 3(2).  
 
334
  “Anonyme Etaireia Diaheirises Amoivaion Kefalaion”, AEDAK: Law 3606/2007, 




instruments without a firm commitment order, and (h) operation of Multilateral Trading 
Facilities (MTFs).
335
 Furthermore, a number of ancillary services are defined.
336
 
Financial instruments are further defined according to MiFID, covering a wide range of 
instruments used in financial practice, including derivative contracts relating to 
commodities (under certain conditions), derivative instruments for the transfer of credit 




Further rules are provided governing in particular the authorisation and operating 
conditions of investment firms (AEPEYs),
338
 the “protection of investors”,
339
 the “rights 
                                                 
 
335
 Law 3606/2007, Article 4(1).  
 
336
 Ibid., Article 4(2).  
 
337
 Ibid., Article 5. 
 
338
 Ibid., Articles 9 – 24. 
 
339
 Ibid., Articles 25 – 30. The rules provided relate mostly to CoB obligations of 
investment firms, the provision of services through another investment firm, execution 
of orders “in the best interest” of the client, client handling rules, tied agents and 
transactions executed with eligible counterparties. They provide inter alia that “AEPEYs 
must establish a record that includes the document or documents agreed between the 
firm and the client that set out the rights and obligations of the parties, and the other 
terms on which the firm will provide services to the client. […]”; Article 25(7). Also, 
that “[t]he client must receive from the AEPEY adequate reports on the service provide 
to its clients. […]”; Article 25(8). See in general KOULORIDAS, A. (2009) ‘The 
Government Bond Market in Greece after MiFID: Issues that Occur Regarding 
Structure, Transparency, Liquidity and Effectiveness of Execution*’ HreDik, vol. 2, p. 
251; idem (2009) ‘The Obligation of Best Execution of Orders by [Investment Firms] 
under Law 3606/2007: From the Theory of Efficient Markets to Alternative Places of 





 as well as on the authorisation and operation of other 
intermediaries,
341
 on regulated markets,
342
 on market transparency and integrity,
343
 on 
powers of cooperation between authorities,
344




Regarding the authorisation and operating conditions for investment firms (AEPEYs), 
Law 3606/2007 provides inter alia that “[…] the [HCMC] shall not grant authorisation 
unless and until such time as it is fully satisfied that the applicant complies with all 
requirements […]”;
346
 “the founders or shareholders of the AEPEY shall provide all 
information necessary to enable the [HCMC] to satisfy itself that the AEPEY has 





Law 3606/2007 further states a number of requirements to be satisfied on an on-going 
basis by investment firms, relating to internal compliance procedures and organizational 
                                                                                                                                               
 
340
 Ibid., Articles 31 – 35.  
 
341
 Ibid., Articles 36 – 40.  
 
342
 Ibid., Articles 41 – 48.  
 
343
 Ibid., Articles 49 – 58.   
 
344
 Ibid., Articles 59 – 64. 
 
345
 Ibid., Articles 65 – 70. 
 
346
 Ibid., Article 11(1).  
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arrangements, conflicts of interests, continuity and regularity in the provision of 
services, risk assessment and avoidance procedures,
348
 record keeping “of all services 
and transactions undertaken by it which shall be sufficient to enable the [HCMC] to 
monitor compliance”,
349
 and safeguarding of client assets “especially in the event of 
insolvency”.
350
 Furthermore, it provides that investment firms “[…] shall not seize or 
confiscate its clients’ assets, including but not limited to assets in the form of cash 
deposited in client bank accounts in the name of the [investment] firm or financial 
instruments, provided that such clients are the beneficiaries, according to the books 
kept by the firm and any other means of evidence”.
351
 In particular with regard to means 
of evidence regarding clients’ assets entrusted with the investment firm, Law 3606/2007 
further provides that financial instruments which cannot be seized or confiscated by an 
AEPEY shall include those held by the AEPEY directly or indirectly in its name and on 
behalf of the client, “[…] whose effective beneficiary is a client, according to the books 
kept by the firm and any other means of evidence, irrespective of whether or not such 
financial instruments are recorded in the register of the depository or other instrument 
recording system in the beneficiary client”.
352
  Thus, Law 3606/2007 allows for any 
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 Ibid., Article 12.  
 
349
 Ibid., Article 12(7). 
 
350
 Ibid., Article 12(8). 
 
351
 Ibid., Article 12(10). 
 
352




means of evidence to be used in order to achieve retail investor protection in a wider 




Regarding reporting of transactions and keeping of records, Law 3606/2007 provides 
specific rules, according to which “AEPEYs shall keep at the disposal of the [HCMC], 
for at least five (5) years, the relevant data relating to all transactions in financial 
instruments which they have carried out, whether or own account or on behalf of a 
client […]”;
354
 and that “AEPEYs based in Greece or operat[ing] a branch in Greece 
and execut[ing] transactions in any financial instruments admitted to trading on a 
regulated market shall report details of such transactions to the [HCMC] as quickly as 
possible, and no later than the close of the working day. This obligation shall apply 
whether or not such transactions were carried out on a regulated market”.
355
 It is 
further specified that such reports “[…] shall, in particular, include details of the names 
and numbers of the instruments bought or sold, the quantity, the dates and times of 
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 Cf. rules on permissible means of evidence in the context of special liquidation, 
liquidation and compensation schemes procedures in the Hellenic legal order; infra, Ch 
V and VI.  
 
354
 Law 3606/2007, Article 40(1). 
 
355
 Ibid., Article 40(2). 
 
356
 Ibid., Article 40(4). From the interpretation of Articles 12 and 40 of Law 3606/2007, 
it emerges in our view that HCMC may have a central role in cases of disputes relating 
to ownership of assets held by an investment firm, taking into account that it has direct 




The above operational and organisational requirements for investment firms or credit 





Prudential requirements regarding the persons directing an investment firm, its staff, 
and persons having a qualifying holding in it, Law 3606/2007 provides certain general 




In relation to persons directing investment firms, Law 3606/2007 requires that “[t]he 
members of the board of directors of the AEPEY shall be of sufficiently good repute and 
sufficiently experienced as to ensure the sound and prudent management of the 
AEPEY”;
359
 avoiding a formalistic approach, it specifies that HCMC may refuse 
authorisation (or reject proposed changes in management) if it is not satisfied that “[…] 
the persons who will effectively direct the AEPEY are of sufficiently good repute or 
sufficiently experienced, or if there are any objective and demonstrable grounds for 
believing that the management of the AEPEY pose a threat to its sound and prudent 
                                                                                                                                               
liquidation of investment firms and the relevant procedure by compensation schemes 
(infra Ch V and VI).  
 
357
 Ibid., Article 12(12). In the case of credit institutions providing investment services 
relevant regulation is issued by the Bank of Greece. 
 
358
 Ibid., Articles 14, 16(7), 17(6). For constitutionality issues relating to the extent of 
delegation, see supra n 19.  
 
359






 Further, Law 3606/2007 provides that the management of the 
investment firm must be undertaken by at least two persons of sufficiently good repute 
and of sufficient experience, who also hold professional competence certificates;
361
 
however, such certificates are to be issued by the HCMC according to criteria set by 
it,
362
 so that ultimately “fit and proper” requirements are set and their fulfilment 
controlled only by the HCMC.  
 
Further, rules are provided regarding AEPEY register, share capital, granting of 
authorisation procedure, trading process and finalization of transactions in an MTF, and 





Thus, the content of Hellenic legislation on the authorisation and supervision of 
investment firms, initially and on an ongoing basis, generally reflects relevant EU law, 
initially ISD and now MiFID, following closely the content of EU instruments 
transposed into the national legal order.  
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Relevant legislation delegates authority on all critical issues to be specified and 












Together with initiatives and efforts on the international level, by fora and organisations 
such as the World Bank, IMF, BCBS, IOSCO, and others, and by important new 
programmes by States with developed financial markets, as in particular the USA,
365
  
                                                 
 
364
 See also, infra Ch VII.2.1. 
 
365
 Although non-EU law is not within the scope of this research, a reference to 
developments in the USA following the Crisis is useful, due to their importance with 
regard to overall evolution of financial law after the Crisis. The US effort to respond to 
the Crisis has been particularly important, as it has involved a fundamental review of its 
financial architecture and reform of its financial law. Among the critical features of the 
US reform were the enhancement of the deposit insurance regime (see infra, note 507), 
the introduction of restrictions on proprietary trading by depositary banks and the 
separation of retail and investment banking. See in general US Department of the 
Treasury (2008), “Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure”; 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), enacted following the (US) Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110 – 343), also known as “Paulson 
Plan”; see also, WEBEL, B. (2013), “Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP): 
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the EU has been undergoing fundamental changes to its financial architecture and law, 
                                                                                                                                               
Implementation and Status” Congressional Research Service, available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41427.pdf ; US Department of the Treasury (2009) 
“Financial Regulatory Reform. A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial Supervision 
and Regulation” (also known as “Obama Financial Reform Plan”). With regard to the 
separation of retail and investment banking activities, initially the US Banking Act of 
1933 (48 Stat. 162), known as “The Glass-Steagall Act”, inter alia prohibited 
commercial banks from engaging in investment activities, and controlled affiliations 
between commercial banks and investment firms. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was 
repealed by Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (P.L. 106 – 102, 113 Stat. 
1338), also known as “The Gramm – Leach – Bliley Act”. Following the Crisis, main 
elements of the “Obama Plan” was  the consolidation of regulatory agencies and the 
creation of a new supervisory authority to control systemic risk, the comprehensive 
regulation of financial markets (including increased transparency of derivatives), 
consumer protection reforms (including a new consumer protection agency) and 
strengthened investor protection, tools for financial crises, including a resolution regime 
complementing the federal deposit insurance fund (FDIC) to allow for orderly winding 
down of failing institutions, and a series of measures to increase international standards 
and cooperation related to accounting issues and credit rating agencies. This was 
followed by the “Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” of 
2010 (P. L. 101 – 203, H.R. 4173), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf . The "Bank and Savings 
Association Holding Company and Depository Institution Regulatory Improvements 
Act” of 2010 (H.R. 4173, § 601), also known as “Volcker Rule”, as part of the Dodd-
Frank Act, aims to control speculative investments by banks (insured depositary 
institutions, companies controlling them and such company’s affiliates and 
subsidiaries), banks not being permitted to own more than 3% of the total ownership 
interest in hedge funds or private equity funds, and being in such cases under disclosure 
obligations and conflict of interest tests (the “Volcker Rule” is expected to enter into 
force on April 1, 2014). The “Volcker Rule” proposes a different approach to “ring-
fencing” than the “Vickers Report” in the UK; for the latter, see infra note 367. See also 
IMF, “Making banks safer: Can Volcker and Vickers do it?”, IMF Working Paper, 




which are directly relevant to the issue under examination and have to be briefly 
addressed.  
 
In is interesting for the purposes of this study to take into consideration the gradual 
development of EU initiatives in this area, how it has evolved and to which extent it has 
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 For an overview, see AVGOULEAS, E. (2009) 'The global financial crisis, 
behavioural finance and financial regulation: in search of a new orthodoxy', Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies, vol. 9, no. 1, April, pp. 23-59; FERRAN, E. (2012) 'Crisis-
Driven EU Financial Regulatory Reform ', Legal Studies Research Paper Series, vol. 6, 
March , pp. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2028003; GORTSOS, C. and LIVADA, C. (2009) 
'The current financial crisis: regulatory interventions on the international, european and 
national level*', HreDik, vol. 1, p. 70; HARDOUVELIS, G. and GORTSOS, C. (ed.) 
(2011) The International Crisis, the Crisis in the Euro-Area and the Hellenic Financial 
System*': Hellenic Bank Association; MOLONEY, N. (2010) 'EU financial market 
regulation after the global financial crisis: "more Europe" or more risks?', CMLRev, vol. 
47, no. 5, pp. 1317-1383; idem (2012) 'Supervision in the wake of the financial crisis: 
achieving effective 'law in action' - a challenge for the EU', in WYMEERSCH, E., 
HOPT, K.J. and FERRANINI, G. (ed.) Financial Regulation and Supervision: a Post-
Crisis Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press; idem (2012) 'The legacy effects of the 
financial crisis on regulatory design in the EU', in FERRAN, E., HILL, J., MOLONEY, 
N. and COFFEE, J. (ed.) The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; TRIDIMAS, T. (2011) 'EU Financial 
Regulation: Federalization, Crisis Management, and Law Reform', in CRAIG, P. and 
De BURCA, G. The Evolution of EU Law, 2
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II.2.1 THE NEW EUROPEAN FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE  
 
Following the disruption of European economies and financial markets as a result of the 
Crisis and in order to establish an effective European system of supervision in the area 
of financial markets, the Commission mandated a group of experts (de Larosière High-
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 During the same period, in the UK an Independent Commission on Banking chaired 
by Sir J. Vickers was mandated to investigate the causes of the Crisis and to propose 
measures for a reform of the regulation and supervision of the financial sector in the 
UK. In September 2010, the Vickers Commission issued a Paper outlining its 
preliminary views. In April 2011 it published its Interim Report, and in September 2011 
its final report (“the Vickers Report”), available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/research/briefing-papers/SN06171/the-
independent-commission-on-banking-the-vickers-report-the-parliamentary-commission-
on-banking-standards. The Vickers Report recommended the “ring fencing” of retail 
banking activities, differentiating between “mandated services” (services that only 
authorised banks would be allowed to provide, due to their systemic importance, such as 
deposit taking from and the provision of overdrafts to individuals and SMEs), 
“prohibited services” (services that retail, “ring-fenced” credit institutions should be 
prohibited to provide, such as any service that would result in a requirement to hold 
regulatory capital against market risk, or the purchase or origination of derivatives or 
other contracts which would result in a requirement to hold regulatory capital against 
counterparty credit risk), and “ancillary activities” (relating to non prohibited services 
provided by a “ring fenced” credit institution in order for its efficient operation, such as 
employing staff or procuring operational infrastructure). Many of the recommendations 
of the Vickers Report were endorsed in the (UK) Financial Services (Banking Reform) 






The de Larosière Report 
 
The de Larosière Group of Experts submitted a report in February 2009,
368
 by which it 
presented its conclusions on the reasons of the Crisis and proposed thirty one (31) 
recommendations, in order for financial services supervision to be effective on a pan-
EU level and to avoid future systemic crises.  
 
In this direction, it recommended the strengthening of the supervisory framework, the 
reforming of the structure of supervision of the financial sector in EU by inter alia 
establishing a European System of Financial Supervisors consisting of three European 
Supervisory Authorities (one for the banking sector, one for the securities sector and 
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 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf 
 
369
 During the same period, a Report on “The Future of EU Regulation and Supervision” 
was prepared by the European Union Committee of the (UK) House of Lords, published 







The European Supervisory Authorities, the European Systemic Risk Board 
and the European System of Financial Supervision  
 
Following the de Larosière Report, the Commission presented its proposals on a new 





 The Commission proposed to transform the European supervisory 
committees
372
 into European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), becoming the European 
Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA), and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA); 
further to establish a European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), which would 
consist of national supervisors and the new European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), 
working together. This system would allow for adequate supervision on a pan-European 
level, having also input on a micro-prudential level by national regulators. Also, the 
Commission proposed to establish a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in order to 
monitor and assess dangers to financial stability emerging from macro-economic 
developments, and developments within the whole financial system. The Commission 
noted that “[e]xperience of the financial crisis has exposed important failures in 
financial supervision, both in particular cases and in relation to the financial system as 
                                                 
 
370
 COM(2009) 114.  
 
371
 COM (2009) 252 final, p. 2. 
 
372 
I.e. the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), the Committee of 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors (CEIOPS) and the 





 According to the Commission’s proposals, the ESAs would contribute to 
“[...] (i) improving the functioning of the internal market, including in particular a high, 
effective and consistent level of regulation and supervision, (ii) protecting depositors, 
investors, policyholders and other beneficiaries, (iii) ensuring the integrity, efficiency 
and orderly functioning of financial markets, (iv) safeguarding the stability of the 
financial system, and (v) strengthening international supervisory coordination. For this 
purpose, each ESA shall contribute to ensuring the coherent, efficient and effective 




Thus, the need to enhance protection of individual market participants (including 
depositors and retail investors) was stated by the Commission as a parameter of the 
reasoning in establishing a new European financial architecture.  
 
The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was established in 2010 by Regulation 
1092/2010,
375
 in the context of the new system for macro-prudential oversight in the 
EU, as part of the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) also established by 
the same Regulation.  
 
As stated in its Preamble of Regulation 1092/2010, “[g]iven the integration of 
international financial markets and the contagion risk of financial crises, there is a 
need for a strong commitment on the part of the Union at the global level. The ESRB 
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 See COM(2009) 501 final, 23.09.2009.  
 
374
 Ibid., para. 6.1, p. 4.  
 
375




should […] take on all the global responsibilities required in order to ensure that the 
voice of the Union is heard on issues relating to financial stability, in particular by 
cooperating closely with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB), which are expected to provide early warnings of macro-




Also, that “[t]he ESRB should contribute, inter alia, towards implementing the 





The ESFS comprises of the ESRB, the EBA, the EIOPA, the ESMA, the Joint 
Committee of the ESAs,
378
 and the competent or supervisory authorities of the MSs, as 
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 Ibid., Preamble, recital 7.  
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 Ibid., Preamble, recital 8.  
 
378
 For an overview see AVLONITIS, X. and PAPAIKONOMOU, V. (2011) 'The 
European Securities and Markets Authority', HreDik, vol. 1, p. 49; MOLONEY, N. 
(2011) 'The European Securities and Markets Authority and Institutional Design for the 
EU Financial Market - A tale of two competences: part (2) rules in action', European 
Business Organization Law Review, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 177-225; idem (2011) 'The 
European Securities and Markets Authority and institutional design for the EU financial 
market: a tale of two competences: part (1) rule-making', European Business 
Organization Law Review, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 41-86; GORTSOS, C. (2011) ' The 
European Banking Authority within the "European System of Financial Supervision" ', 
HreDik, vol. 1, p. 56; idem  (2013) 'The 'single supervisory mechanism': a major 
building block towards a European Banking Union (the full Europeanisation of the 
'bank safety net')', HreDik, vol. 1, p. 5. 
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specified in applicable EU law;
379
 it is responsible for the macro-prudential oversight of 
the financial system within the EU in order to contribute to the prevention or mitigation 
of systemic risk, inter alia by determining, collecting and analysing information, 
identifying and prioritising systemic risks, issuing warnings and recommendations for 
remedial action, issuing a confidential warning addressed to the Council under 
conditions specified and providing the Council with an assessment of the situation, 
cooperating closely with all other parties to the EFSF,
380
 and coordinating its actions 




With regard to the objectives of the EBA, established by Regulation 1093/2010,
382
 it is 
stated that EBA should act with a view to “improving the functioning of the internal 
market, in particular by ensuring a high, effective and consistent level of regulation and 
supervision taking account of the varying interests of all [MSs] and the different nature 
                                                 
 
379
 Regulation 1092/2010., Article 3(1). 
 
380
 The EFSF contitues to support the Hellenic economy, while the ESM Treaty has 
been signed.  Available at  http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582311/05-
tesm2.en12.pdf . See also ECJ decision of 27.11.2012 in Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v 
Governemt of Ireland, Ireland and The Attorney General (nyr). 
 
381
 Regulation 1092/2010, Article 3.  
 
382
 Regulation 1093/2010 [2010] OJ L331/12. The EBA was established on 01.01.2011 
(Article 82 of Regulation 1093/2010). Regulation 1093/2010 has been amended by 






 It is also stated inter alia that EBA “[…] should protect 
public values such as the stability of the financial system, the transparency of markets 
and financial products, and the protection of depositors and investors”.
384
 Regulation 
1093/2010 provides that the EBA shall act with regard to both credit and financial 
institutions
385
 and the competent authorities that supervise them, and that it will act in 
the fields of activities of credit institutions, financial conglomerates, investment firms, 
payment and e-money institutions in relation to matters not directly covered by said acts 
which delimitate its competence, including matters of corporate governance, auditing 





Regulation 1093/2010 further established ESFS,
387







 the Joint Committee of the ESAs,
391
 and the 
competent authorities of MSs.
392
  
                                                 
 
383
 Regulation 1093/2010, Preamble, recital 11.  
 
384
 Ibid.  
 
385
 According to Regulation 1093/2010, Article 4, "financial institutions" means "credit 
institutions" as defined in Article 4(1) of Directive 2006/48/EC, "investment firms" as 
defined in Article 3(1)(b) of Directive 2006/49/EC, and "financial conglomerates" as 
defined in Article 2(14) of Directive 2002/87/EC, save that, with regard to Directive 
2005/60/EC, "financial institutions" means credit institutions and financial institutions 
as defined in Article 3(1) and (2) of that Directive. 
 
386
 Regulation 1093/2010, Article 1(2), (3).  
 
387




With regard to accountability of the ESRB, the EBA, the EIOPA, and the ESMA, it 
provides that they “[…] shall be accountable to the European Parliament and the 
Council”.
393
 It is also provided that the ECB shall be accountable to the European 
Parliament and to the Council with regard to the exercise of the supervisory tasks 




According to Regulation 1093/2010, “[t]he objective of the [EBA] shall be to protect 
the public interest by contributing to the short, medium and long-term stability and 
effectiveness of the financial system, for the Union economy, its citizens and 
businesses”,
395
 and that in carrying out its tasks, the EBA “[…] shall act independently, 
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 Regulation 1092/2010. 
 
389
 Regulation 1094/2010. 
 
390
 Regulation 1095/2010. 
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 Regulation 1094/2010 and Regulation 1095/2010. 
 
392
 Regulation 1093/2010, Article 2(2).  
 
393
 Regulation 1093/2010, Article 3. Cf. Preamble to the Regulation, where stated inter 
alia that the ESAs should be accountable to the EP and the Council (recital 10), i.e. on 
an institutional level; cf. ibid., recital 31.  
 
394




 Regulation 1093/2010, Article 1(5).  
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objectively and in a non-discriminatory manner, in the interests of the Union as a 
whole”.
396
 It is also provided that “[t]he [EBA] shall contribute to […] enhancing 
customer protection”.
397
 Its tasks include inter alia contributing to the establishment of 
high-quality common regulatory and supervisory standards and practices, maintaining a 
European supervisory handbook, contributing to the consistent application of legally 
binding EU acts, preventing regulatory arbitrage, mediating and settling disagreements 
between competent authorities, ensuring effective and consistent supervision of 
financial institutions, ensuring a coherent functioning of colleges of supervisors and 
taking actions in emergency situations.
398
 Among its tasks is stated “to foster depositor 
and investor protection”,
399
 and to “[…] promote the consistent and coherent 
functioning of colleges of supervisors, the monitoring, assessment and measurement of 
systemic risk, the development and coordination of recovery and resolution plans, 
providing a high level of protection to depositors and investors throughout the Union 
and developing methods for the resolution of failing financial institutions and an 
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 Regulation 1093/2010, Article 1(5), as amended by Regulation 1022/2013. In its 
initial form, the same indent provided that EBA “[…] shall act independently and 
objectively and in the interest of the Union alone”.  With regard to independence, see 
also Regulation 1093/2010, Articles 42, 46, 49, 52 and 59.  
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 Regulation 1093/2010, Article 8(1), as amended by Regulation 1022/2013.  
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 Ibid., Article 1(5), indent h. 
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The notion of “consumer protection” appears to be differentiated in the Regulation from 
the notions of depositor or investor protection. Indeed, the Regulation provides a 
specific provision regarding tasks of the EBA related to consumer protection and 
financial services.
401
   
 
Further, Regulation 1093/2010 provides a detailed system of rules regarding the 
development of draft regulatory technical standards by the EBA, to be submitted to the 
Commission, where the European Parliament and the Council have delegated power to 
the Commission to adopt regulatory technical standards (TFEU Article 290);
402
 further, 
it is provided that EBA may develop implementing technical standards by implementing 




Important powers are conferred on EBA with regard to initiating proceedings against 
competent authorities that appear to act in breach of EU law, “[…] in particular by 





 following a structured procedure, the EBA may adopt an 
individual decision addressed to a financial institutions requiring the necessary action to 
be taken (including cessation of any practice) upon failure of competent national 
                                                 
 
401
 Regulation 1093/2010, Article 9.  
 
402
 Ibid., Articles 10 – 14. 
 
403
 Ibid., Article 15.  
 
404
 Ibid., Article 17(1).  
 
405
 Ibid., Article 17. 
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authorities to comply with EBA’s decisions (formal opinion),
406
 such an individual 
decision prevailing over any previous decision adopted by the national competent 




By this system of monitoring and investigation, EBA is allowed, in close cooperation 
with the Commission, to achieve compliance by financial institutions with their 
obligations under EU law, in order to protect market stability and integrity. Should 
national competent authorities prove inefficient, the EBA may proceed to addressing 
directly applicable individual decisions to financial institutions (where allowed by 
applicable EU law), overriding possible national authorities decisions or objections on 
the same matter.
408
 Rules on hearing of the addressee of the individual decisions issued 
by the EBA, on the reasoning and on the publication of such decisions are also 
provided.
409
 Further, a system for settlement of disagreements between competent 
authorities in cross-border situations,
410
 as well as a system for settlement of 
disagreements between competent authorities across sectors,
411
 is provided.  
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 In case of emergency the EBA has enhanced powers; see ibid., Regulation 1093/2010  
Article 18.  
 
409
 Ibid., Article 39.  
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 Ibid., Article 19.  
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Control of systemic risk is fundamental to the aim of EBA;
412
 among other 
competences, EBA may conduct an inquiry into a particular type of financial institution 
or type of product or type of conduct in order to assess potential threats to the stability 
of the financial system and make appropriate recommendations for action to the 
competent authorities concerned.
413
 It is provided, that the financial institutions that 
may pose a systemic risk shall be subject to strengthened supervision, and where 
necessary, to recovery and resolution procedures.
414
 In developing the criteria for the 
identification and measurement of systemic risk posed by financial institutions, the 





Furthermore, the EBA is competent to ensure the correct application of DGSD, with the 
aim of ensuring that national deposit guarantee schemes are adequately funded, and to 
provide “[…] a high level of protection to all depositors in a harmonised framework 
throughout the Union, which leaves the stabilising safeguard role of mutual guarantee 
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A system of remedies is provided by Regulation 1093/2010, for filing appeals against 
EBA decisions,
417
 and for bringing proceedings before the ECJ against its decisions 
(following the stage of appeal, where applicable).
418
 Locus standi of individuals, natural 




Furthermore, it appears that the EBA, which has been established to operate in the 
public interest, has not been awarded total immunity nor has it been exempted from 
non-contractual liability; according to Regulation 1093/2010, “[i]n the case of non-
contractual liability, the [EBA] shall, in accordance with the general principles 
common to the laws of the [MSs], make good any damage caused by it or by its staff in 
the performance of their duties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have 




ESMA was also established in 2010, by Regulation 1095/2010,
421
 having as objective 
(as in the case of EBA) the protection of public interest, “[…] by contributing to the 
short, medium and long-term stability and effectiveness of the financial system, for the 
Union economy, its citizens and businesses”.
422
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The normative structure of Regulation 1095/2010 establishing ESMA is identical to that 
of Regulation 1093/2010 establishing the EBA. Its normative content also follows 




It emerges in our view, that EU law has taken a clear stance with regard to the 
eventuality of national competent authorities exercising their duties ineffectively and 
thus failing to protect the EU financial market –the ESAs are to take direct control of 
the situation and exercise directly if need be supervision and enforcement on individual 
investment firms. Beyond the sense of mistrust as to the efficiency –or to the 
willingness to exercised pressure on national investments firms– of national competent 
authorities that is caused by this development, institutional issues are raised relating to 
this new federalized normative structure.
424
 Moreover, in our view, relating to non-
contractual liability issues, it is possible that causality issues will become even more 
complicated and difficult to prove, especially for retail investors, since the factors of an 
eventual failure of a financial intermediary as related to regulatory and supervisory acts 
and omissions will be multiplied and causes may be further distanced from effects.  
 
 
                                                 
 
423
 Therefore, and in order to avoid repetition, the comments made regarding Regulation 
1093/2010 setting up EBA apply equally to Regulation 1095/2010 setting up ESMA.   
 
424
 See indicatively, TRIDIMAS, T. (2011) 'EU Financial Regulation: Federalization, 




II.2.2 PROPOSALS FOR AN NEW EU LAW ON BANK RECOVERY AND 
RESOLUTION  
 
Further, in order to address the concerns regarding systemic stability, the Commission 
sumbitted in mid-2010 a Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
ECSC and the ECB, on “Bank Resolution Funds”.
425
 This Communication followed the 
G-20 meeting of September 2009 in Pittsburgh,
426
 which had been politically supported 
by the EU,
427
 that bank losses should not be covered by the taxpayers (as in traditional 
“bail-outs”).  
 
In this direction, the Commission proposed two complementary ways of treating credit 
institutions’ failure: by the provision of better supervision, corporate governance, and 
                                                 
 
425
 COM(2010) 254 final, 26.05.2010. See also the Council (ECOFIN) conclusions 
(17006/1/10) calling for an EU framework for crisis prevention, management and 
resolution, aiming at “[…] preserving financial stability by protecting public and 
market confidence; putting prevention and preparation first; providing credible 
resolution tools; enabling fast and decisive action; reducing moral hazard and 
minimising to the fullest possible extent the overall costs to public funds, by ensuring 
fair burden sharing among the financial institutions' stakeholders; contributing to a 
smooth resolution of cross border groups; ensuring legal certainty; and, limiting 
distortions of competition."  
 
426
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regulation on the one hand, and by an appropriate mechanism for orderly and timely 




In the latter case, the Commission supported through its Communication, “[...] the 
establishment of ex ante resolution funds, funded by a levy on banks [including 
investment firms for the purposes of its Communication] to facilitate the resolution of 
failing banks in ways which avoid contagion, allow the bank to be wound down in an 
orderly manner and in a timeframe which avoids the "fire sale" of assets ("principe de 
prevoyance")”.
429
  The Commission also recalled the “polluter pays” principle, noting 
that political support for its application also in the financial sector is growing, in the 
sense that those responsible for causing a crisis will (have to) pay for the relevant costs 
(without however clarifying how responsibility is to be defined and attributed).
430
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 For an overview see indicatively BABIS, V. (2012) ‘EU Recovery and Resolution 
Framework: Financial Assistance between Banking Group Members’, University of 
Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Papers, vol. 15, June, 
http:ssrn.com/abstract=2091194; SCHILLIG, M. (2012) ‘Bank Resolution Regimes in 
Europe I- Recovery and Resolution Planning, Early Intervention’, April 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2136101; idem (2012) ‘Bank Resolution Regimes in Europe II- 
Resolution Tools and Powers’. August, http://ssrn.com/abstract=236084.  
 
429
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430
 Ibid. In our view, the issue of “responsibility” for causing a financial crisis is very 
wide and may extend from a micro-analysis point of view of financial firms 
responsibility (as in the case of unfit management of systemic financial institutions) to 
creditor responsibility (as for example in the case of professional investors supporting 
high-risk portfolio management) to regulatory and supervisory authorities responsibility 
(as in the case of not duly exercising their powers) to political responsibility (for not 




The Commission further took into account moral hazard concerns, noting in particular 
that “[...] this is a major concern which needs to be addressed by making it clear and 
unambiguous that shareholders (up to the value of their investment) and creditors 
(excluding depositors which are guaranteed by deposit guarantee schemes) must be the 
first to face the consequences of a bank failure and that resolution funds must not be 





In this way, the Commission proposed in this Communication, (a) that bank resolution 
funds should be used in connection to (all) bank failures, the aim of financial law being 
not to avert bank failures (at any cost) but to control bank failures, and (b) that creditors 
are responsible to bear the consequences of a bank failure (depositors being protected 
up to the limit of applicable deposit guarantee). Thus, already in mid-2010 the 
Commission had proposed a change in the policy of implicit total deposit guarantee 
(entailing bank rescues by use of public funds), without entering into detailed analysis 
regarding the constant concern of financial law to protect the trust to the financial 
system.  
 
According to the Commission, the bank resolution funds regime should be addressed on 
EU level, in the context of establishing wider integrated crisis management and 
supervisory arrangements, forming part of a range of measures to address the Crisis, 
                                                                                                                                               
market and participants). Each category of responsibility may be connected to a final 
negative result (a financial crisis) but the intensity of causality differs.  
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By its Communication of 20.10.2010 “An EU Framework for Crisis Management in the 
Financial Sector”,
433
 the Commission addressed a number of pertinent issues and 
proposed a European framework for controlling the Crisis.  
Noting that EU MSs had committed at the time aid to rescuing banks amounting to 
around 30% of EU GDP (while the aid used amounted at the time to 13%), and that 
such public interventions also had a significant impact on the level playing field within 
the internal market, it referred to its two earlier Communications on crisis management 
and resolution,
434
 and to a relevant report by the EP,
435
 and taking into account the work 
of the FSB and the G-20, the Commission stated that “[t]he overriding objective of a 
European resolution framework should be that ailing institutions of any type and size, 
and in particular systemically important institutions, can be allowed to fail without risk 
to financial stability whilst avoiding costs to taxpayers”.  
With regard to the scope of such framework, the Commission explained that both credit 
institutions and systemically important investment firms should fall within it. According 
                                                 
 
432
 This Commission initiative was followed by a Commission proposal in 2012 for a 
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive; COM(2012) 280. See infra, n 443. 
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434
 COM(2009) 561 and COM(2010) 254.  
 
435
 European Parliament, A7-0000/2010, Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 




to the Commission, such a framework might present a realistic alternative to “bailing 
out” financial institutions. The Commission described three classes of measures in this 
direction: preparatory and preventative measures; early supervisory intervention; and 
resolution tools and powers.
436
 According to the Commission’s proposal, national DGSs 
may be a competent authority for resolution, under applicable national law (as well as 
the Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank), taking into account national arrangements.   
 
According to the Commission, the general rule should be that failing credit institutions 
should be liquidated under ordinary insolvency proceedings (taking into account, 
however, that in general ordinary insolvency proceedings have not been applied to 
failing financial institutions and particularly those of systemic importance). When 
liquidation of a credit institution is not feasible (in the public interest and for reasons of 
financial stability), the Commission noted that winding down through resolution will be 
necessary.  
 
Since such intervention mechanisms may entail interference with the rights of 
shareholders and creditors of financial institutions, the Commission proposed 
safeguards and mechanisms for compensation should be provided in this direction 
according to the “no creditor worse off” principle (i.e. that affected stakeholders should 
suffer no greater loss than they would have suffered if the institution had been wound 
up under the applicable insolvency regime).  
                                                 
 
436
 Specifically with regard to early intervention measures, the Commission proposed 
inter alia the appointment of a special manager for a limited period of time to take over 
the management (or assist existing management) of an ailing financial institutions, 
noting however that such appointment “should not imply a state guarantee or expose 





The Commission further proposed oversight of the proposed crisis management 
framework by ESA (and ESMA where appropriate) and ex ante funding by deposit 
guarantee schemes. On the institutional level, the Commission expressed its preference 
for a single EU fund, in order to achieve an efficient EU resolution regime, and also for 




Interesting comments were made to this Commission Communication by the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC). In its Opinion of 16.06.2011,
438
 the EESC 
shared the view that the support of failing financial institutions at the costs of public 
finances and the level playing field within the internal market is no longer acceptable in 
the future and supported in principle the proposed comprehensive EU framework, 
recommending that the Commission renders compulsory for all MSs the IMF/World 
Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programmes as also proposed by the De Larosière 
Report.  
 
It noted inter alia that the Commission's Communication proposes a crisis management 
framework for “all cross-border and domestic credit institutions and some investment 
firms” without clear definition of proposed application as to investment firms, 
encouraging the Commission also to assess whether the resolution tools and powers 
suggested its Communication would be sufficient to address adequately all specific 
problems related to the failure of an investment firm. With regard to “bail-in”, EESC 
posed a series of questions as to the proportional allocation of losses and the criteria for 
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including creditors among contributors, asking when, and to what extent, one specific 
creditor is to be called to bear the losses, and whether there should be a distinction 
between "guilty" or "imprudent" creditors and others; and, on what basis, and under 
what circumstances, would the losses be covered by the whole banking industry.
439
 
Further the EESC expressed the hope that the options proposed by the Commission for 
financial institution resolution “[…] would not be misused in political, economic and 
social emergencies but will be taken advantage of in order to ensure flexibility in 
adapting the national rules to the European legislation and promote effective 
coordination and cooperation of cross-border crisis management and resolution for all 
types of credit institutions irrespective of their size and interconnectedness”. With 
regard to the enhanced supervision proposed by the Commission, the EESC noted that 
“[…] supervisors are required to introduce reinforced supervision, to assess and 
supervise recovery and resolution planning, to adopt preventive measures […], to 
intervene in the resolution of a firm in cooperation with, resolution authorities, etc. In 




As the Crisis progressed and deepened, the Commission issued its Communication “A 
roadmap to stability and growth”
441
 in which it noted that “[t]he crisis threatens to 
become systemic”, emphasizing that “[a] solution to break the vicious circle between 
doubts over the sustainability of sovereign debt, the stability of the banking system and 
the EU's growth prospects is more necessary than ever”, and proposed elements of such 
a solution. It considered strengthening the banking system as fundamental to this effort, 
                                                 
 
439






 COM(2011) 669 final, 12.10.2011.  
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by means of bank recapitalisation. Among measures to this aim, the Commission 
proposed inter alia that “[b]anks should first use private sources of capital, including 
through restructuring and conversion of debt to equity instruments”. Also, a new 
system of regulation for the financial sector (including reinforced rules on credit rating 
agencies, transparency and market conduct, market abuse, and a European framework 





The proposed Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive  
 
As a measure to further enhance the creation of a Banking Union, the Commission 
proposed in June 2012 a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and 
investment firms (the proposed Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive, BRRD),
443
 
the adoption of which will entail a fundamental change in the structure of EU finance 
law, affecting also the regime of retail investor and depositor protection.  
 
The BRRD proposal built on the 2010 Commission Communication “An EU 
Framework for Crisis Management in the Financial Sector”
444
 and followed G-20 






 COM(2012) 280 final. On 12.12.2013, an agreement was reached between the 
European Parliament and the MSs of the EU for the adoption of the proposed BRRD. 
See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-1140_en.htm?locale=en.  
 
444




political decisions in the context of which the FSB “Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions”
445
 were also endorsed. It also took into 





By this proposal, the Commission appears to have altered its position with regard to the 
legal context of bank resolution, explaining that, while in case of failures banks should 
be wound down according to the usual insolvency procedures, the systemic risk posed 
by banks (in case of a domino effect as a result of loss of confidence in the financial 
system) and the important economic function of the financial institutions necessitates a 
special framework for the management of bank failures; and that where no public 





Further, the Commission observed that “[…] by removing the implicit certainty of a 
publicly-funded bail out for institutions, the option of resolution should encourage 
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 See http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/index_en.htm . The Commission 
prepared also an impact assessment (available at the same site) according to which the 
proposed resolution framework “will achieve the objectives of enhancing financial 
stability, reducing moral hazard, protecting depositors and critical banking services, 
saving public money and protecting the internal market for financial institutions” while 
“[t]he costs of the framework derive from a possible increase in funding costs for 
institutions due to the removal of the implicit certainty of state support, and from the 
costs related to resolution funds. […]”; ibid.  
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uninsured creditors to better assess the risk associated with their investments”.
448
 As 
uninsured creditors include depositors (for the amount of their deposit beyond deposit 
guarantee protecion), it appears that the Commission regards such depositors as making 
an investment decision when selecting a credit institution to entrust it with their money.  
 
Moreover, according to the Commission proposal, while losses are to be allocated 
between the shareholders and the creditors of the financial institution according to 
national insolvency law, the following principles for the allocation of losses should 
apply irrespective of national insolvency law: (a) that the losses should first be allocated 
in full to the shareholders and then to the creditors and (b) that creditors of the same 
class might be treated differently if it is justified by reasons of public interest and in 
particular in order to underpin financial stability.
449
 These principles are complemented 
by the “no creditor worse off” principle.
450
 The proposal noted that national authorities 
will be able to retain specific national tools and powers to deal with failing institutions 
(under condition of combatibility with EU law and if they to not impede effective group 





Especially with regard to the “bail-in” tool, the Commission proposed that resolution 
authorities will be able to write down the claims of unsecured creditors and convert debt 
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claims to equity, and to implement a business restoration plan, having removed the 
management responsible for the problems.
452
 It further proposed that the hierarchy of 
claims subject to the “bail-in” power will supersede the relevant hierarchy according to 
national insolvency law, and that in principle shareholders’ claims should be exhausted 
before the claims of subordinated creditors, but under certain circumstances creditors’ 
rights could be affected without exhaustion of shareholders’ claims.
453
 Also, that 
resolution operations should be facilitated by temporary stay of rights to enforce claims 
by counterparties and creditors,
454
 as well as by restriction on judicial proceedings 
against the resolution authorities (that will be liable only for paying compensation for 
the damages suffered by affected persons) and against the financial institution under 
resolution.
455
    
 
Regarding the funding of the resolution mechanism, Commission proposed the setting 
up of financial arrangements in MSs, involving a combination of ex ante and ex post 
contributions and where indispensable borrowing facilities from financial institutions or 
the central bank. National deposit guarantee schemes should also contribute, according 
to the Commission, to the funding of the resolution mechanism, by ensuring access to 
covered deposits (compensating retail depositors as if insolvency had taken place and 
then being subrogated to them in liquidation proceedings, ranking pari passu with 
unsecured non-preferred claims) and by providing also supplementary funding (beyond 
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covered deposits) should MSs opt for such a financing arrangement (i.e. using the 




The proposed introduction of the resolution mechanism for credit institutions and 
investment firms will entail a necessary adaptation inter alia of Directive 2001/24/EC 




On 12.09.2012 the Commission issued a Communication to the European Parliament 
and the Council, titled “A Roadmap towards a Banking Union” on the future steps 




By this Communication, the Commission urged the co-legislators to take the necessary 
action to strengthen the single market, the unity and integrity of which must not be 
compromised by the banking union. Further steps proposed by the Commission in order 
to achieve banking crisis management include a single resolution mechanism (instead of 
a network of national resolution authorities), once agreement on the proposed new 
DGSD
459
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The proposed Bank Recovery and Resolution Regulation 
 
In July 2013 the Commission proposed the adoption of a Regulation on bank recovery 
and resolution (the proposed Bank Recovery and Resolution Regulation, BRRR) to 
establish uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions 
and certain investment firms, in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism 




Following its proposals to create a banking union in the EU, on the basis of an 
integrated financial framework, and after its proposals for the adoption of the BRRD 
(based on a network of national authorities and resolution funds to resolve banks), the 
Commission proposed the introduction of SRM, with a central decision-making body, 
and of the Fund, arguing that such a structure would provide key benefits for MSs, 
taxpayers, banks and financial and economic stability for the EU, as central decision-
making will allow for effective and quick response to crises, and a centralised fund will 
pool significant resources. Moreover, according to the Commission, the introduction of 
the SRM within the EU legal and institutional framework would protect the democratic 
and institutional order of the EU, avoiding the deployment of ad hoc inter-governmental 
instruments. The Commission noted that the SRM will apply the “single Rulebook on 
bank resolution” (the proposed BRRD), and will follow uniform rules and procedures, 
together with the Commission and the resolution authorities of the participating MSs 
(for entities and groups established only within the SRM participating MSs, the SRM 
will replace the resolution colleges provided in the BRRD). Pursuant to the BBRR 
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proposal, resolution will take place according to a process in which ECB will notify the 
Commission, the Resolution Board and relevant national authorities that a bank is 
failing, then the Resolution Board will assess whether systematic threat is posed, and if 
so will recommend to the Commission to initiate resolution, following which the 
Commission will initiate the resolution and indicate to the SRB the resolution 
framework to apply; the Resolution Board will then adopt a resolution scheme and the 
national resolution authorities will be instructed to execute it according to national law, 
failing which the Resolution Board may supersede the national resolution authorities 
and address certain decisions for the implementation of the resolution measures directly 
to the banks. The proposal further suggests that each component of the SRM will be 
(politically) accountable, so that the Resolution Board will be accountable for its 
decisions to the EP and the Council and will have to respond to national Parliaments. 
Furthermore, the proposed Fund will have as aim “to ensure financial stability, rather 
than to absorb losses or provide capital to an institution under resolution”. As the 
Commission clearly states, the Fund “should not be considered as a bailout fund”.
461
 Its 
ability to pool the resources is expected to serve as a Euro-area insurance mechanism in 
banking crises, since a common European private backstop mechanism will be more 
effective than national funds in absorbing shocks through ex ante and if necessary ex 
post contributions from the whole Euro-area banking industry, and is expected to be 
more effective in resolving the interdependence banks and sovereigns.
462
  






 Ibid. Financing the Fund will be provided ex ante, as proposed, by the banking 
industry. Additional ex post contributions and further support from financial institutions 
(and third parties, including public funds) may be available under conditions, this 




The proposed BRRR, building on BRRD proposal, reflects a fundamental change in the 
way EU policymakers perceive financial integration and protection from systemic 
danger. Since the Hellenic Republic is a member of the Euro-area, the BRRR (if 





The Liikanen Report 
 
On 02.10.2012, shortly after the publication of the “Roadmap towards a Banking 
Union” Commission Communication, the High Level Expert Group on reforming the 
structure of the EU banking sector, which was established by the Commission in 





 With a view to consider whether there is need for structural reforms in the EU banking 
sector or not, and to make relevant proposals as appropriate, in order to establish a 
stable and efficient banking system, the Report took into account aggregate EU bank 
                                                                                                                                               




 See proposed BRRR, Article 4. With regard to the effect of proposed recovery and 
resolution measures regarding retail investor protection, see infra Ch III.2.3. 
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sector developments, the diversity of bank business models in Europe,
465
 existing and 




 The Liikanen Report, taking into account international initiatives regarding financial 
markets structural reforms, examined in particular two structural reform avenues that 
may be useful in order to further limit the likelihood of bank failures, to improve 
resolvability of banks, and to reduce use of public funds to rescue banks. These two 
avenues are (a) the introduction of non-risk weighted capital buffer for trading activities 
                                                 
 
465
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and financial crises', Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 373-386. 
 
466
 Specifically with regard to recovery, resolution and “bail-in” instruments, the 
Liikanen Report observed inter alia that during the period of October 2008 to end 2010, 
European governments used a total of 1.6 trillion Euros of state aid to support the 
banking sector, in the form of guarantees and liquidity support, recapitalisation and 
asset relief measures, noting that the available evidence suggests that the transfer of 
resources from the government to the banking system through implicit subsidies has 
been significant, and that 90% of all implicit subsidies were channelled to the largest 
institutions. As the Report noted, such subsidisation causes distortions, in terms of 
competitiveness (banks benefiting from implicit subsidy vis-à-vis banks not benefiting 
from it), excessive risk taking, and misallocation of resources. Further, that due to the 
lack of an adequate crisis management mechanism in the EU, only a few liquidations of 




and contingent functional separation of significant trading activities,
467
 and (b) the 
introduction of immediate functional separation of significant trading activities.
468
 






II.2.3 THE NEW EU RULES ON LICENSING AND PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION OF 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 
 
On 27.06.2013, the EU took a further important step forward in order to achieve 
effective operation of the financial market, in the direction of unifying prudential 
requirements and supervisory mechanisms for credit institutions and investment firms, 
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 Among such measures, it was proposed by the Liikanen Report that proprietary 
trading and other significant trading activities should be assigned to a separate legal 
entity if the activities to be separated amount to a significant share of a bank’s business, 
or if the volume of such activities can be considered significant in terms of financial 
stability. As a consequence, the Report stated, deposits and the explicit and implicit 
guarantee they carry, would no longer directly support risk trading activities. In 
particular, the Report concluded that it is necessary to require legal separation of certain 
risky financial activities from deposit-taking banks within a banking group; the 
activities to be separated should include proprietary trading of securities and derivates, 
and activities closely linked with securities and derivatives markets. If further supported 
inter alia drawing up and maintaining effective and realistic recovery and resolution 
plans, and that the use of designated bail-in instruments should be supported and banks 
should have a large quantity of debt to be used in case of bail-in. Ibid., p. 99 et seq.  
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since both have proven to be prone to systemic dangers, by the adoption of Regulation 
575/2013
470





The European Single Rule Book  
 
Regulation 575/2013 on the prudential requirements for credit institutions and 
investment firms explicitly refers in its preamble to the G-20 Declaration of 02.04.2009 
and the following international initiatives,
472
 as well as to the de Larosière Report 
which stressed the need to establish a “European Single Rule Book” applicable to all 




While Regulation 575/2013 mainly provides the (micro)prudential requirements for 
financial institutions that relate strictly to the functioning of banking and financial 
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definition of an investment firm for the purposes of the same Regulation, ibid., Article 





 Directive 2013/36/EU contains rules on the access to the activity of 




Together, Regulation 575/2013 and Directive 2013/36/EU aim to form the legal 
framework for the access to the activity, the supervisory framework and the prudential 
rules for all financial institutions,
476
 thus envisaging to establish a coherent and 
transparent “single rulebook”. The creation of such a single rulebook was considered 
necessary for reasons of legal certainty and in order to create a level playing field for all 
participants in the financial market within the EU.
477
 In this direction, maximum 
harmonisation was preferred with regard to minimum prudential requirements,
478
 so that 
those requirements will be directly applicable in the national legal orders.
479
 The effort 
to achieve balance between the requirements for legal certainty and flexibility aims at 
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 Ibid., Regulation 575/2013 recital 9.  
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It is interesting that the new EU law on financial institution endorses a clear and critical 
position with regard to the role of banking activities, noting that “[c]onsidering the 
devastating effects of the latest financial crisis the overall objectives of this Regulation 
[575/2013] are to encourage economically useful banking activities that serve the 
general interest and discourage unsustainable financial speculation without real added 
value. This implies a comprehensive reform of the way savings are channeled into 
productive investments”.
481
 In this regard, financial requirements for financial 




Taking over Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC,
483
 Regulation 575/2013 
incorporates the EU law provisions applying the Basel II and Basel III frameworks with 
regard to financial institutions’ capital measurement and capital requirements, taking 
into account the relevant risk profile of the financial institutions.
484
 Disclosure 
requirements for financial institutions are connected by Regulation 575/2013 to the 
purposes of strengthening market discipline and enhancing financial stability which are 
further connected in order “[…] to ensure that investors and depositors are sufficiently 
well informed about the solvency of institutions”.
485
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While Regulation 575/2013 illustrates a reform of EU banking law to the direction of 
ensuring that credit institutions provide vital services to the real economy,
486
 it does not 
proceed to a structural separation of retail and investment banking activities within a 
banking group, which however it allows for national legislation while requiring the 
Commission to analyse the issue.
487
 In the same direction, and with a view to protecting 
depositors and preserving financial stability, the Regulation allows for home MSs to 
require credit institutions to reduce exposures to different legal entities depending on 
their activities, but only following a future legal act harmonising such measures.
488
 
Regulation 575/2013 provides (micro)prudential  rules of a highly technical nature for 
financial institutions, with a view to gradually providing relevant uniform rules within 
the EU;
489
 it is necessary to examine in turn the main features of Directive 2013/36/EU 
which provides the new EU framework for the authorisation, operation and supervision 
of financial institutions.   
 
Directive 2013/36/EU is a measure adopted with a view to ensure a coherent application 
of the EU law on the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and on 
the capital adequacy of financial institutions;
490
 it provides rules for the authorisation of 
                                                 
 
486
 Ibid., recital 122; cf. ibid. recital 32.  
 
487
 Ibid., recital 122.  
 
488
 Ibid., recital 123.  
 
489
 Ibid., Article 521. 
 
490
 Directive 2013/36/EU, Preamble, recital 1.  
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the business, the acquisition of qualifying holdings, the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment and of the freedom to provide services, the powers of supervisory 
authorities of home and host-MSs in this regard and the provisions governing the initial 




It is interesting that the Directive takes into account that the scope of relevant measures 
should be as broad as possible “[…] covering all institutions whose business is to 
receive repayable funds from the public, whether in the form of deposits or in other 
forms such as the continuing issue of bonds and other comparable securities and to 




Furthermore, while the principles of mutual recognition of authorisation and of 
prudential supervision systems are to be respected, they are understood by Directive 
2013/36 in conjunction to a requirement of effectiveness, in the sense that authorisation 
should not be granted or should be withdrawn in cases of regulatory arbitrage
493
 or 





                                                                                                                                               
 
491
 Ibid., recital 2. See also ibid., Article 1.  
 
492
 Ibid., recital 14.  
 
493
 Ibid., recital 16.  
 
494




The requirement for supervision to be effective further necessitates that supervision on a 
consolidated basis should be applied to all banking groups, its aim being “to protect the 
interests of depositors and investors of institutions and to ensure the stability of the 
financial system”,
495
 while it is acknowledged by the Directive that illegal behaviour 
(such as fraud) is liable to affect the stability and integrity of the financial system.
496
 
Moreover, the Directive has taken into account that “[…] weaknesses in corporate 
governance […] have contributed to excessive and imprudent risk taking in the banking 
sector which has led to the failure of individual institutions and systemic problems in 
[MSs] and globally. […] The unclear role of the competent authorities in overseeing 
corporate governance systems in institutions did not allow for sufficient supervision of 




Directive 2013/36/EU does not apply to the access to the activity of investment firms 




However, it provides a new, enhanced framework for the powers of competent 
authorities in connection to its scope: MSs are under the obligation to ensure that 
competent authorities monitor the activities of financial institutions, so as to assess 
compliance with Regulation 575/2013, and to ensure that appropriate measures are in 
                                                 
 
495
 Ibid., recital 47.  
 
496
 Ibid., recital 30.  
 
497
 Ibid., recital 53.  
 
498
 Ibid., Article 2(5)(1). The terms “credit institution” and “investment firm” are 
defined as in Article 4 of Regulation 575/2013; see Article 3 of Directive 2013/36/EU.  
 
 209 
place to enable competent authorities to obtain information to investigate breaches of 
applicable requirements, and to carry out their functions.
499
 MSs are more specifically 
obliged to ensure that financial institutions register all their transactions and document 
systems and processes, which are subject to Directive 2013/36/EU and Regulation 
575/2013 in such a manner that the competent authorities are able to examine 




With regard especially to prudential supervision, Directive 2013/36/EU provides for 
enhanced supervisory measures and powers, already at an early stage, to address 
problems regarding fulfilment of requirements of said Directive or Regulation 
575/2013.
501
 Furthermore, for the purpose of satisfying prudential requirements of 
Regulation 575/2013, competent authorities are provided by Directive 2013/36/EU with 
an array of important powers (which may be further enhanced by MSs) and which 
include inter alia requiring financial institutions to hold extra own funds, to reinforce 
internal arrangements, processes, mechanisms etc., to restrict or limit their business, 





                                                 
 
499
 Directive 2013/36/EU, Article 4.  
 
500
 Ibid., Article 4(6).  
 
501
 Ibid., Article 102.  
 
502




Furthermore, according to Directive 2013/36/EU, competent authorities are inter alia 
under the obligation to publish not only the legal instruments, administrative rules and 
general guidance adopted in their legal order in the field of prudential regulation, but 
also to proceed to disclosure with regard to a number of features relevant to the exercise 





The proposal for a new MiFID and MiFIR 
 
Further, as part of the reforms in EU financial law necessitated by the Crisis, the 
Commission proposed the replacement of MiFID by a new Directive on markets in 
financial instruments, with a view to enhance existing rules.
504
 As the Commission 
                                                 
 
503
 Ibid., Article 143. Furthermore, specific disclosure requirements are provided; ibid., 
Directive 2013/36/EU Article 144.  
 
504
 COM(2011) 656 final, 20.10.2011. This proposal relates to requirements on the 
provision of investment services, the scope of exemptions from MiFID, organisational 
and CoB requirements for investment firms, organisational requirements for trading 
venues, powers available to competent authorities, sanctions, and rules applicable to 
third-country firms operating via a branch. It is complementary to the proposal for a 
new Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation (MiFIR) to establish uniform and 
directly applicable requirements in relation to disclosure of trade transparency data to 
the public and transaction data to competent authorities, removing barriers to non-
discriminatory access to clearing facilities, mandatory trading of derivatives on 
organised venues, specific supervisory actions regarding financial instruments and 
positions in derivatives and the provision of services by third-country firms without a 
branch; see COM(2011) 652 final. See also MOLONEY, N. and FERRANINI, G. 
(2012) ‘Reshaping order execution in the EU and the role of interest groups under 
MiFIID II’ European Business Organization Law Review, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 557-597.  
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notes, “[w]hile largely vindicated amid the experience of the financial crisis, the 





The proposals for new rules include inter alia provisions to strengthen the framework 
for the provision of investment advice and portfolio management, and to clarify the 
conditions for minimum protection awarded by investment firms to investors with 
regard to transactions in non-complex financial instruments. Furthermore, the 
requirements for the handling of funds or instruments belonging to clients by 
investment firms are proposed to be strengthened. According to the new proposal, the 






Interim Concluding Remarks  
 
According to the general perception before the Crisis on the sources of systemic risk, 
EU financial law focused on market efficiency and integration, initially developing 
banking sector harmonization measures before progressing to the harmonization of 
investment services. In this context, depositor and retail investor protection by 
fragmented rules of national origin constituted a potential impediment to market 
integration requiring harmonization of important normative areas.  
                                                                                                                                               
 
505








The adoption of the ISD, as a minimum harmonization directive, and later of MiFID, as 
a more detailed harmonization measure, related to provision of investment services, the 
operation of financial markets and the powers of national competent authorities –they 
were designed to address issues relating to the provision of investment services, while 
the problematic of retail participants and market protection in the event of intermediary 
failure was considered as perhaps marginal. In this direction, competence issues 
regarding CoB rules have been treated extensively (as relevant rules reflect national 
“imperative reasons” considerations) while EU insolvency law remains largely 
unharmonised and fragmented.  
 
In the same direction, regulation and supervision of financial markets and intermediaries 
remained until the Crisis a national competence, and only coordination between national 
competent authorities, to the extent necessary to address issues in particular regarding 
the application of free movement and CoB rules, was provided.  
 
This equilibrium, which lasted for a long time in the EU, was upset by the Crisis which 
demonstrated the dangers associated with the lack of an EU mechanism to regulate, 
supervise, and protect in extreme conditions the whole European financial market. The 
new EU financial law and architecture is characterized by the concentration of 
competences by the new European competent authorities, if not by mistrust to the 
effectiveness of regulating and supervising financial markets on the national level (and 
by national authorities).  
 
The new rules on allocation of competences, powers and responsibility between the 
central EU authorities and the national authorities have yet to be refined; it appears safe 
though to consider that the era of hesitation and distancing of EU law from the direct 
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regulatory and supervisory control of the financial markets and the intermediaries has 
passed.  
 
The fundamental changes to policy perceptions and priorities resulting from the Crisis, 
and the unprecedented public funding of the banking sector by public funds it entailed, 
have led to a new impetus to complete the EU financial market and federalize its 
regulation and supervision. In this context, the new substantive financial rules attempt 
to achieve predictability and uniformity, while the new financial architecture allows for 
exercise of full powers by the European competent authorities, with full political 
accountability and legal responsibility. This brings to the fore once more the question of 
rights conferred by EU law to individual market participants as well as the connected 
issue of competent authorities’ tortuous liability for breach of EU law.  
 
Further, and as the Crisis appears to be losing its impetus in the EU, the severe 
sovereign debt crisis that has threatened most MSs has led to the decision to disallow 
any further “bail-outs” in the future, in particular by the use of public funds.  
 
In the framework of the new proposed recovery and resolution regime, which is still 
characterized by ambiguity in many aspects, the protection awarded to retail market 
participants is re-calibrated and the discussion on the legal status of depositors vis-à-vis 
retail investors reopened.  
 
It is important then to examine in turn the delineation by EU law of retail investor 
protection in the event of intermediary default, as formulated before the Crisis and as 
reconsidered following the Crisis, as well as the legal status of retail investors under EU 











DELINEATING RETAIL INVESTOR PROTECTION IN THE EVENT OF 
INTERMEDIARY DEFAULT AND THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE ON 








CHAPTER III.  THE DELINEATION OF MINIMUM RETAIL 
INVESTOR PROTECTION BY EU LAW IN THE EVENT OF 
INTERMEDIARY FAILURE  
 
 
Having examined the general development of EU finance law, it is now necessary to 
examine more specifically the protection awarded by EU law to individual financial 
market participants in the event of intermediary failure, and the effect of the Crisis on 
this regime.  
 
In line with the distinction of EU financial law in banking and investment services law, 
according to a criterion of sectoral risk, the protection of individual financial markets 
participants followed the same pattern, by the introduction of DGSD for the minimum 
protection of depositors and of ICSD for the minimum protection of investors.  
 
For systematic reasons, it will be useful to analyse each of these EU law instruments per 
se and then in comparison to each other, before examining the effect of the new 






III.1  RETAIL INVESTOR PROTECTION AS DELIMITED BY EU 
LAW BEFORE THE CRISIS, AND THE DISTINCTION OF 
DEPOSITORS VIS-A-VIS RETAIL INVESTORS 
 
 
The ex post protection of individual participants in the financial market, in the form of a 
minimum compensation payable in the event of intermediary failure, was organised in 
normative terms by the drawing of a distinction between depositors and investors.  
 
III.1.1 THE DEPOSIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES DIRECTIVE  
 
EU law regulated minimum protection guaranteed to depositors only in 1994,
507
 by the 
introduction of the DGSD.
508
  
                                                 
 
507
 In the US, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was established in 
1933, with a view to protect depositors following the bank failures during the Great 
Depression. Since then, it has intervened in many bank failures; for a historical 
perspective in US deposit protection see 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/index.html. The US Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
(12 United States Code 1811 et seq.), which constitutes the main legal framework for 
the operation of the FDIC (see http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/1000-
100.html), provides inter alia that the FDIC may accept applications by banks to be 
admitted to the Federal Deposit Insurance scheme, which thus become “insured 
depository institutions” (Sec. 5 of FDI Act). FDIC has important powers to monitor 
insured banks, to impose regulation relevant to deposit insurance, and to withdraw 
insurance, under certain conditions; see Sec. 8 and 18 of FDI Act. The deposit insurance 




DGSD was adopted as a minimum harmonisation measure 
509
 with a view to address 
competition issues between credit institutions, caused by the disparity of deposit 
guarantee protection awarded to their clients before harmonisation,
510
 to protect 
depositor confidence in the soundness of the banking system,
511




                                                                                                                                               
demands of its depositors; according to FDI Act, Sec. 11(b), this is “in any case in 
which it has been closed for the purpose of liquidation without adequate provision 
being made for payment of its depositors”. Payment of insured deposits by FDIC is 
made “as soon as possible” and either by cash or by making available to each depositor 
a transferred deposit in a new insured depository institution in an amount equal to the 
insured deposit; see Sec. 11(f)(1) of FDI Act. The FIDC may, in its discretion, require 
proof of claims to be filed and may approve or reject such claims for insured deposits 
(sec. 11(f)(2) of FDI Act). The FDIC is subject to important auditing and reporting 
obligations (sec. 17 of FDI Act.). A Deposit Insurance Fund operates within the context 
of FDIC. See also FDIC (2011) “The orderly liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holding 
Inc. under the Dodd-Frank Act”. 
 
508
 Directive 94/19/EC [1994] OJ L135/5. The legal basis for the adoption of the DGSD 
was EC Treaty Article 57(2), as a market integration measure. For the relevant 
legislative procedure see Commission Recommendation [1987] OJ L33/16; 
Commission Proposal [1992] C163/6; Commission Proposal [1993] C115/91; 
Commission Amended Proposal [1993] C178/14; Decision of the Common Position 
[1994] OJ C91/85. For analysis of relevant ECJ case-law see infra, Ch IV. 
 
509
 DGSD, Preamble, 8
th















 recital. Cf. 15
th





The ratio of DGSD is to provide to depositors access to funds as soon as a credit 
institution was unable to repay them;
513
 and while deposits made by credit institutions 
on their own behalf and for their own account are not protected by DGSD, it provides 





The scope of DGSD encompasses deposits in credit institutions established in MSs, 
deposits being defined as “any credit balance which results from funds left in an 
account or from temporary situations deriving from normal banking transactions and 
which a credit institution must repay under the legal and contractual conditions 
applicable, and any debt evinced by a certificate issued by a credit institution”,
515
 while 




Except for a limited number of exclusions (deposits from credit institutions on their own 
account, instruments constituting own funds, deposits arising out of transactions in 
connection to which there has been a criminal conviction for money laundering),
517
 all 
other deposits are a priori covered by the DGSD, while MSs may provide that certain 










 recital. However, DGSD does not provide any directions as to how this 
option could be exercised by MSs. 
 
515
 Ibid., Article 1(1) point 1.   
 
516
 Ibid., Article 1(1) point 4.  
 
517




depositors or deposits shall be excluded from guarantee or shall be granted a lower level 
of guarantee –such optional exclusions being also numerus clausus.
518
 Deposits held by 





It is interesting to note that questions regarding the notion of “deposit” under DGSD 
were brought before the EFTA Court in case E-17/11, for an advisory opinion.
520
 The 
questions related to whether interbank loans may be considered as deposits for the 
purposes of DGSD, and whether deposits of credit institutions with other credit 
institutions may be protected under DGSD. In particular, the first question submitted to 
the EFTA Court asked, as rearticulated by said court, whether loans made by one credit 
institution to another “[…] are to be considered deposits within the meaning of Article 
1(1) of DGSD, even though (i) the funds were not entered as deposits in the borrower 
bank’s books; (ii) nor were they placed in a special account in the lender banks’ name; 
(iii) no special documents recording the receipt of the funds were issued, and (iv) no 
premiums to the [national deposit and investor guarantee scheme] were paid in respect 
of the funds”.
521
 The EFTA Court answered the question in the affirmative,
522
 noting 
                                                 
 
518
 Ibid., Article 7(2) and Annex I.  
 
519
 Ibid., Article 5.  
 
520
 EFTA Court decision of 22.11.2012 in Case E-17/11, Aresbank SA and 
Landsbankinn hf., Fjármálaeftiritið (the Financial Supervisory Authority) and the 
Icelandic State (nyr).  
 
521
 Ibid., para. 47.  
 
522
 Ibid., para. 63. 
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that while such deposits fall within the notion of deposit under DGSD they do not 
constitute covered deposits.
523
 The EFTA Court took into account inter alia that the 
requirements for funds to be treated as deposit under Article 1(1) of DGSD are not 
cumulative, and that the concept of credit balance is not explained in DGSD. In this 
regard, the EFTA Court noted that “[…] it can be of no relevance that the funds have 
not been entered as a deposit in the borrowing bank’s books. It would be contrary to the 
purpose of [DGSD] if protection were to be dependent on the characterization given by 
the credit institution receiving the funds”.
524
 Furthermore, the EFTA Court, concurring 
with the position of the Commission which submitted written observations,
525
 proposed 
a distinction between a “functional” definition of eligible deposits under DGSD and a 
“technical” definition also including deposits not covered by DGSD for repayment.
526
 
Thus, the EFTA Court held in our view that the effectiveness of the protection in 
principle awarded by DGSD should not depend on the characterization of a transaction 
by the interested parties or by their behaviour (as in the case of not entering it in the 
relevant books and records).  
 
The main obligation of MSs emanating from DGSD is to ensure that within their 
territory one or more deposit-guarantee systems are introduced and officially 
                                                 
 
523
 Ibid., para. 64.  
 
524
 Ibid., para. 56.  
 
525
 Ibid., para. 49.  
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recognised, while credit institutions authorised in MSs may not take deposits unless it is 




DGSD provides minimum rules regarding the relation between the national deposit 
guarantee scheme(s) and the competent national authorities for the supervision and 
regulation of financial markets. Relevant rules regulate the initiation of depositor 
payment proceedings by national deposit guarantee schemes, following determination 
of unavailability of deposits by a credit institution,
528
 the obligation of national 
competent authorities to prohibit taking of deposits by credit institutions that are not 
members of a deposit guarantee scheme
529
 and to impose sanctions on a credit 
institution which do not comply with obligations regarding membership deposit 
guarantee scheme,
530
 and the discretionary power of national competent authorities to 





DGSD provides for a minimum amount of deposits to be protected per depositor per 
credit institution,
532
 while MSs may limit the protection, for moral hazard reasons,
533
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 DGSD, Article 3.  
 
528
 DGSD, Article 1(3). 
 
529
 Ibid., Article 3(1). 
 
530
 Ibid., Articles 3(2), 4(4). 
 
531





but not to less than 90% of the protected amount of (aggregate) deposits per depositor 




The (national) DGSs have to be in a position to pay duly verified claims by depositors 
within twenty (20) working days of the date on which the competent authorities 
determine the unavailability of deposits.
535
 Under exceptional circumstances, a short 




No further substantive or procedural rules are provided by DGSD with regard to the 
conditions for payment to be made by national DGSs to depositors, including rules on 
claim verification. DGSD provides in this direction only that “[…] the documents 
relating to the conditions to be fulfilled and the formalities to be completed to be 
eligible for a payment under the guarantee […] shall be drawn up in detail in the 
manner prescribed by national law in the official language or languages of the [MS] in 
which the guaranteed deposit is located”.
537
 Following the amendments introduced by 
                                                                                                                                               
 
532
 Ibid., Article 7(1a), after 01.01.2011, as the relevant provision was introduced by 
Directive 2009/14/EC [2009] OJ L68/3. While the current guarantee level is 100 000 
Euros, the relevant amount in the initial form of the relevant provision was 20 000 Ecus.  
 
533
 DGSD, Article 7(1), (3).  
 
534
 Ibid., Article 7(4).  
 
535
 Ibid, Article 10(1), as amended by Directive 2009/14/EC. The initial time limit was 










 it is provided that the time limit for payment of covered 
depositor claims (i.e. twenty working days) includes “the collection and transmission of 





However, such time limits may not be invoked by the guarantee scheme against a 




The European deposit guarantee system as designed at the time of introduction of the 
DGSD has remained unaltered in its substance for almost two decades, despite the 
Crisis. When the Crisis had reached Europe, it was urgently modified by Directive 
2009/14/EC, but only with regard to technical features such as coverage level and 
payout delay.  
 
Taking into account the development of deposit protection in the EU legal order in the 
event of intermediary failure, it appears that it may be attributed, in our view, to three 
main factors:  
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 Ibid., Article 10(4). 
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 Supra n 532. 
 
539
 DGSD, Article 10(1), as amended by Directive 2009/14/EC. 
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First, the need to protect the stability of the financial system which would be 
endangered in case of loss of depositor confidence (to avoid “bank runs” which cause 
systemic risk).  
 
Secondly, the need to achieve minimum harmonisation in deposit insurance regimes 
between MSs, a factor connected to intra-bank competition.  
 
Thirdly, it may be argued that the gradual enhancement of the powers of the EP, since 
the SEA of 1986, and relevant national considerations, built political impetus for 
protecting “consumers” of financial services, such as depositors.  
 
Depositor protection was thus an element of European policy in the banking sector, 
aiming primarily at avoidance of systemic danger by enhancing confidence in order to 
achieve market stability. In this sense, depositor protection per se has been an economic 
“externality”
541
 which was treated by legal means mainly for systemic protection 
reasons, on the basis of a minimum harmonization approach. 
 
                                                 
 
541
 The potential threat to financial stability presented by uncontrolled damage sustained 
by individual participants may be perceived as an “externality” in economic terms (for 
the notion of “externality” or “external diseconomy” see e.g. BANOCK, G., BAXTER, 
R.E. and DAVIS, E. (1987) The Penguin Dictionary of Economics, Penguin) to 
financial market stability, i.e. an external factor which could negatively affect the 
financial market and which thus has to be taken into account in the regulation of this 




Following the Crisis, a fundamental amendment of the DGSD has been proposed, in the 
context of the new EU financial architecture and financial law, and will be examined 










 has been characterised as “one of the pillars of the European Framework for a 
Single Market in the financial services field”.
544
 As DGSD, it is also an instrument of 
minimum harmonisation of national compensation systems, its adoption necessitated by 




                                                 
 
542
 Infra, Ch III.2.1.  
 
543
 Its legal basis is (ex) Article 47(2) EC Treaty and it was issued on the co-decision 
procedure of (ex) Article 251 EC Treaty. For the legislative procedure leading to its 
adoption, see EP opinion [1994] OJ C128/85), Council common position [1995] OJ 




 See Commission report on the application of the export prohibition clause: 
COM(2000)0081 final, 3.  
 
545




Its aim, as announced in its Preamble, is the “protection of investors and the 
maintenance of confidence in the financial system”
546
 as an “important aspect of the 
completion and proper functioning of the internal market”,
547
 especially taking into 
account that “no system of supervision can provide complete protection, particularly 
where acts of fraud are committed”.
548
 Thus, it was deemed “[…] essential that each 
[MS] should have an [ICS] that guarantees a harmonized minimum level of protection 
at least for the small investor in the event of an investment firm being unable to meet its 




An important question that arises is whether the protection of the “small investors” 
which is considered essential aims (a) to the protection of “small investors” per se, as an 
autonomous aim of EU law, or (b) to the protection of participants’ confidence in the 
financial market, as a mechanism to protect the stability of financial markets, or (c) a 




                                                 
 
546
 ICSD, Preamble, recital 3. 
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 Ibid., recital 3. 
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 Ibid., recital 4.  
 
549
 Ibid., recital 4. The reference to “small investors” in recital 4, as well as in recitals 5 
and 11, is not repeated in the articles of the Directive; nor does it correspond to any 
definition provided by ISD or any other Directive.   
 
550
 This problematic is similar to that in case C-233/94 (supra n 62), where the question 
of whether depositor (consumer) protection is an aim of DGSD, and of what nature, was 




The Preamble of ICSD appears to attach importance mainly to competition issues and to 
the protection of small investor confidence in the market. Indeed, it states that minimum 
harmonisation of investor compensation schemes will entail that “[…] small investors 
will […] be able to purchase investment services from branches of Community 
investment firms or on the basis of the cross-border provision of services as confidently 
as from domestic investment firms”,
551
 while “[…] in the absence of such minimum 
harmonization, a host [MS] might consider itself justified, by considerations of investor 
protection, in requiring membership of its compensation scheme”
552
 by an investment 
firm established and licensed by another MS, “[…] whereas such a requirement might 
prejudice the operation of the internal market”.
553
 Thus, the imposition of restrictive 
measures on investment firms licensed in another MS, by invoking reasons of general 
interest relevant to the protection of investors in the event of investment firm failure, 
has been perceived as a potential impediment to the completion of the internal financial 
market necessitating harmonisation of protective measures on the EU level.  
 
Further, the disparity of national investor compensation schemes might lead “[…] to 
disparities in competition and unequal conditions of competition between national 
investment firms and branches of firms from other [MSs]”
554
 and “market 
disturbances”,
555
 necessitating the introduction of specific provisions with regard to 
                                                 
 
551
 ICSD, Preamble, recital 5; cf. ibid., recital 21.  
 
552
 Ibid., recital 6. 
 
553
 Ibid., recital 6; cf. ibid., recital 25.  
 
554
 Ibid., recital 15.  
 
555
 Ibid., recital 16.  
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branch participation in host-MS ICSs, since “[…] it is not appropriate that the level or 
scope of cover offered by compensation schemes should become an instrument of 
competition”.
556
 In this regard, ICSD was introduced as an instrument to achieve equal 
access to the market for competing financial firms, as also confirmed by its legal basis.  
 
The field of application of ICSD encompasses a wide range of investment services 
offered by investment firms to small investors, leaving however the exact delimitation 
of its scope to the MSs. Specifically, the definition of “investment firm” for the 
purposes of ICSD encompasses investment firms as defined in MiFID which are 
authorised in accordance with ISD and then MiFID
557
 or authorised as credit institution 
in accordance with Directive 2000/12/EC,
558
 the authorisation of which covers one or 
more of the investment services (or activities) listed in Section A of the Annex I relating 
to any of the instruments listed in Section C of Annex I of MiFID.
559
 Further, ICSD 
defines “investor”, for the purposes of its application, as “[…] any person who has 
entrusted money or instruments to an investment firm in connection with investment 
business”.
560
 Furthermore, it defines “investment business” as any investment service as 
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 Ibid.  
 
557
 ICSD, Article 1(1); in its original form, this article referred to the relevant provisions 
of ISD (i.e. to Article 1(2) and Article 2), which was replaced and repealed by MiFID; 
see MiFID, Article 69.  
 
558
 ICSD, Article (1), referring to Directive 2000/12/EC.  
 
559
 MiFID, Article 4(1) point 2; the original reference by ICSD was to investments 







 plus “safekeeping and administration” in relation to one or more of 




Apart from the general differences between the scope and definitions of ICSD, due to 
the corresponding differences of MiFID with regard to ISD, it is important to note what 
appears to be a crucial element in the definition of “investor” for the purposes of ICSD: 
“investor” is defined by ICSD as a person who has entrusted money or instruments to an 
investment firm “in connection” with investment business.
563
 The wording “in 
connection” appears to be implying, in our view, the general context of the relation of 
the “investor” with the investment firm, covering all stages of the relation between a 
person interested in investing and the investment firm. If this is correct, it may imply a 
                                                                                                                                               
 
560
 ICSD, Article 1(4) referring to Article 4(1) point 2 of MiFID. 
 
561
 ICSD, Article 1; reference in the text of the Directive is to the relevant provisions of 
ISD (i.e. to Article 1(1), and Annex section C point 1) which was replaced and repealed 
by MiFID; see MiFID, article 69.  
 
562
 Ibid.; reference in the text of the Directive is to section B of ISD which has been 
replaced by Section C of MiFID.  
 
563
 Cf. ICSD, Preamble, recital 8: “[…] each scheme must cover money and instruments 
held by an investment firm in connection with an investor's investment operations 
which, where an investment firm is unable to meet its obligations to its investor clients, 
cannot be returned to the investor”. Further, according to Directive ICSD, “[…] [c]over 
shall be provided for claims arising out of an investment firm's inability to […] repay 
money owed to or belonging to investors and held on their behalf in connection with 
investment business, or […] return to investors any instruments belonging to them and 
held, administered or managed on their behalf in connection with investment business, 




wider field of application of ICSD than with regard only to financial transactions that 
had already been entered into or executed at the time of the occurrence of unavailability 
of funds or instruments by the financial intermediary, covering both “stricto sensu 
investors” and “lato sensu investors”.
564
 It is necessary then to explore whether such an 
interpretation may be valid.  
 
Literal interpretation of the provision in other official languages of the EU appears to be 




Furthermore, this interpretation, based on the wording of the provision under 
examination,
566
 appears to be in harmony with the generally stated obligation of MSs to 
have in operation an investor compensation scheme compensating investors where a 
decision or ruling has been issued “[…]which has the effect of suspending investors' 
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565
 In the French version of the provision, “dans le cadre d’opérations 
d’investissement”; in the Spanish version, “en el marco des operaciones de inversión”; 
in the Italian version, “nell’ambito di operazioni d’investimento”; in the Hellenic 
version, “[in the context of investment services transactions]”. According to settled 
case-law of the ECJ, the various language versions of a text of EU law must be given a 
uniform interpretation and hence, in the case of divergence between the language 
versions, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and 
general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part; see e.g. ECJ decision of 








ability to make claims against [the investment firm]”.
567
 The reference of the latter 
provision to “investors’ ability to make claims” does not specify the cause of the claims, 
i.e. whether it is outstanding obligations on the basis of executed transactions in the 
financial market or whether it can also be the deposit of funds and/or instruments just 
with the intention to enter into transactions in the financial market.   
 
Thus, literal interpretation does not resolve the issue of whether depositing of funds or 
instruments with an investment firm falls per se within the ambit of ICSD, and two 
different interpretations are a priori possible: (a) that only stricto sensu investors are 
covered by the ICSD, or (b) that also lato sensu investors may be covered by it.  
 
Exclusion of lato sensu investors from the protective field of application of ICSD would 
have important legal consequences, as this category of market participants would fall 
out of the scope of DGSD as well, revealing an important lacuna in the ambit of 
protection offered by EU law: Lato sensu investors would be left totally unprotected, in 
particular in case of fraud perpetrated against them by the failing investment firm, an 
result which in our view manifestly ultimately contravenes the ratio of ICSD – which is 




In this direction, the teleological interpretation that lato sensu investors are also covered 
by ICSD appears de lege lata to be in accordance with the aim of the latter to provide 
protection also in cases where (prudential) supervision has failed and damage is 
                                                 
 
567
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incurred by the investor as a result of an act that is a priori extraneous to the operation 
of the financial marked under normal conditions, such as and particularly “where acts of 
fraud are committed”
569
 –i.e. in the case of an externality to (normal) financial market 
operations.  
 
Indeed, it is not necessary that an act of fraud against the lato sensu investor will be 
committed at a specific point in time; on the contrary, an act of fraud may be committed 
at any time. Although this is evident, ICSD does not provide any rule clearly 
differentiating the case of unavailability of funds or instruments occurring after or in 
connection to the execution of transactions from the case of such unavailability 
occurring before or independently of the execution of transactions.
570
 The absence of 
any such clear rule advocates for the treatment of both cases as equivalent by the ICSD; 
this would entail that both cases fall within its field of application also on the basis of an 
argument a majore ad minus, since the first case certainly falls within its field of 
application.  
 
Furthermore, an argument in support of the interpretation that the field of application of 
ICSD encompasses not only stricto sensu investors but also lato sensu investors persons 
may be derived from the rule of ICSD providing that “[a] [MS] may […] exempt a 
credit institution to which this Directive applies from the obligation to belong to an 
investor-compensation scheme where that credit institution is already exempt under 
Article 3 (1) of [DGSD] from the obligation to belong to a desposit-guarantee scheme, 










provided that the protection and information given to depositors are also given to 
investors on the same terms and investors thus enjoy protection at least equivalent to 
that afforded by an investor-compensation scheme.”
571
 The condition that the protection 
awarded to depositors is provided to investors on the same terms may be interpreted as 
including the case of funds deposited by a person with a financial conglomerate with a 
view to conduct transactions in the financial market. This assumption is reinforced by 
the rule of ICSD that “[a]ny claim […] on a credit institution which, in a given [MS], 
would be subject both to this Directive and to [DGSD] shall be directed by that [MS] to 
a scheme under one or other of those Directives as that [MS] shall consider 
appropriate”,
572
 and that “no claim shall be eligible for compensation more than once 
under those Directives”.
573
  For a claim to be eligible under DGSD, it must be (a) a duly 
verified claim by a depositor in respect of unavailable deposit,
574
 deposit meaning as 
noted inter alia “[…] any credit balance which results from funds left in an account 
[…]”
575
 and (b) not a claim exempted from the field of application of said Directive, 
according to either EU law
576
 or national law.
577
 Thus, if a person that has deposited 
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 DGSD, Article 10(1).  
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 Ibid., Article 1, point 1. Cf. for a definition of “unavailable deposit” ibid., point 3. 
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 Ibid., Article 2. 
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funds with a financial conglomerate is to be protected on the same terms by a national 
depositor guarantee scheme or a national ICS, then the simple depositing of funds with 
a financial intermediary with a view to proceed to transactions in the financial market 
should be covered by ICSD.
578
 However, de lege lata the answer is not clear.  
 
Another argument to the same direction may be derived from the rule of ICSD that a 
MS may limit the cover provided to a specified percentage of an investor's claim, in 
order “[…] to encourage investors to take due care in their choice of investment firms 
[…]”.
579
 This option of MSs may be interpreted as leading to two (concurrent) 
conclusions: (a) that ICSD law is compatible with national measures designed to 
prevent or reduce moral hazard , preventing incentives to retail investors to make 
careful and informed choices of investment firms as financial intermediaries; however, 
there is no indication as to how retail investors are to evaluate and select investment 
firms to contract with; (b) that ICSD does not allow for total transfer of risk (market, 
counterparty, etc.) to retail investors, in particular in the case of financial intermediary 
failure, but only to a very small degree and under specific conditions, in order to satisfy 
moral hazard considerations. MSs are a priori not allowed to provide that no 
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covered by [DGSD] and money held in connection with investment business; […] [MSs] 
should be allowed to determine which Directive shall apply to such claims.”. 
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 ICSD, Preamble, recital 13; Cf. DGSD, Preamble, recital 19, according to which 
“[…] in certain Member States, in order to encourage depositors to look carefully at the 
quality of credit institutions, unavailable deposits are not fully reimbursed; whereas 
such practices should be limited in respect of deposits falling below the minimum 




compensation at all will be paid to retail investors, which would imply that counterparty 




This implies that a priori ICSD does not allow for a national system of law transferring 
the risk of investment firm failure to retail investors, especially in case where failure 
occurs as a result of fraud. According to the wording and the spirit of ICSD, stricto 
sensu investors may be compensated by national compensation schemes even in the 
case where of investors’ unwise or uninformed decisions regarding the choice of 
financial intermediary.  
 
However, the reasoning leading to the conclusion that lato sensu investors are protected 
under ICSD is not unquestionable. There are certain indications that the opposite 
conclusion might as well be sound, for different reasons: 
Indeed, the above initial conclusion appears incompatible the ICSD rule providing that 
                                                 
 
580
 The discretion of MSs to exclude retail investors from compensation schemes or to 
grant lower level of cover than that provided by ICSD is strictly delimited; see ICSD, 
Article 4(2); Annex I. Cf. however ICSD, Article 8(1). With regard to retail investors 
not connected to the failing investment firm (see categories of connected persons in 
ICSD, Annex I, points 4 and 5) MSs are allowed to exclude or grant smaller 
compensation only to “[i]nvestors who have any responsibility for or have taken 
advantage of certain facts relating to an investment firm which gave rise to the firm's 
financial difficulties or contributed to the deterioration of its financial situation” or 
claims connected to money laundering (ICSD, Annex I, point 7); these exceptions from 
protection being specific and numerus clausus,  they must be interpreted strictly. For the 
established case-law of the ECJ regarding strict interpretation of exclusions; see e.g. 
ECJ decision of 17.06.1981 in case 113/80, Commission v Ireland [1981] ECR 1625, 




“[a]fter the withdrawal of an investment firm's authorization, cover […] shall continue to 





The reference to transactions concluded up to the time of the withdrawal of an 
investment firms’ authorisation –and which would be connected to the unavailability of 
investors’ funds and/or instruments– may provide an argument to the direction that only 
obligations outstanding at the time of investment firm failure as a result of investment 
services transactions are covered by ICSD, thus excluding the simple deposit of funds 
and/or instruments from its field of application.  
 
The same problem is posed by the ICSD rule providing with regard to investment firm 
branch exclusion from the investor compensation scheme of a host-MS inter alia that 
“[i]nvestment business transacted before the date of exclusion shall continue to be 





It emerges in our opinion that legal certainty and predictability are not achieved by the 
above ICSD rules, in particular when an investment firm fails as a result of fraud (or in 
connection to other tortuous behaviour); this in turn affects the effectiveness awarded bu 
EU law to retail investors in whole.  
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Further, ICSD, as an instrument of minimum harmonisation, does not provide detailed 
rules on the structure and operation of national investor compensation schemes; it does, 
however, impose to MSs a series of minimum obligations, regarding inter alia the basic 
obligation of MSs is to ensure that one or more ICSs are introduced and officially 
recognised within their territory and to ensure that no investment firm authorised in 
their jurisdiction may provide investment services unless it belongs to an ICS.
583
 
However, ICSD does not provide for the legal status of the ICSs, leaving this to the 
discretion of MSs.
584
 The obligation of MSs to have in place one or more ICSs 
(belonging to their public or private sector) appears to be an “obligation de résultat”, in 
the sense that this obligation of MSs would be void of meaning if national ICSs do not 




Furthermore, ICSD provides rules for the relation between investor compensation 
schemes and competent authorities of MSs for the supervision and regulation of 
financial markets only on specific issues.
586
 The role of ICSs as outlined by ICSD is 
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 Cf. ibid., recital 24, providing that “[…] this Directive may not result in the Member 
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complementary to the role of supervisory authorities, since “no system of supervision 
can provide complete protection, particularly where acts of fraud are committed”.
587
 In 
our view, since the introduction and operation of ICSs in MSs is considered essential for 
the single market in financial services, and especially since these schemes may not 
belong to the public sector of MSs, minimum rules on the regulation and supervision of 
ICSs by the competent national authorities should be provided on EU level. However, 
no such rule has been provided by ICSD.   
 
The above observations reveal a deficiency, in our view, in the normative structure of 
ICSD: despite the minimum harmonisation approach adopted, the existing normative 
structure appears unclear and ambiguous in terms of the relation between national 
competent authorities and investor compensation schemes, thus leading to further 
uncertainty as to the respective obligations and possible liability of national competent 
authorities in case of deficient supervision of ICSs.  
 
Moreover, while the basic obligation of investor compensation schemes as provided by 
ICSD is to provide compensation for investors in the delay set by law following 
establishment of the eligibility and the amount of their claim,
588
 ICSD does not provide 
specific rules either for establishing the eligibility of the claim or for establishing the 
                                                                                                                                               
between the competent authorities and the investor compensation scheme in case an 
investment firm does not meet its obligations as member of the scheme: ibid., Article 5; 
and the right of  an ICS “in wholly exceptional circumstances and in special cases” to  
apply to the competent authorities for an extension of the time limit to compensate 
investors: ibid., Article 9(1), (2). 
 
587
 ICSD, Preamble, recital 3.  
 
588
 Ibid., Article 2(2); Article 4(1); Article 9(2).  
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amount of the claim.
589
 More specifically, ICSD provides that “the amount of an 
investor’s claim shall be calculated in accordance with the legal and contractual 
conditions, in particular those concerning set off and counterclaims, that are applicable 
to the assessment, on the date of the determination or ruling [on investment firm’s 
inability to fulfil its obligations], of the amount of the money or the value, determined 
where possible by reference to the market value, of the instruments belonging to the 
investor which the investment firm is unable to repay or return”, therefore in 




However, this minimum harmonisation approach by the Directive in our view leaves 
unregulated certain important issues, which affects in turn the effectiveness of 
protection awarded. In absence of harmonisation of insolvency law in the EU legal 
order, eligibility of an investors claim under national law may be governed either by 
rules specific to investor compensation schemes and/or by general or special rules on 
insolvency and winding-up of financial institutions.
591
 The risk of multiple verification 
procedures under national law and the ensuing legal uncertainty as well as the 
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is entirely without prejudice to the rules and procedures applicable in each [MS] as 
regards the decisions to be taken in the event of the insolvency or winding-up of an 
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591
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possibility of lengthy and inconclusive proceedings
592
 may affect the useful effect of the 
ICSD. 
 
Furthermore, it is for the MS to choose the appropriate national measures to achieve 
fulfilment by the investor compensation scheme of its obligations, in light of their 
obligation to effectively transpose and apply the Directive. Thus, in case national law 
provides for a complex system of investor’s claim verification and calculation, it is for 
the MSs and the competent public authorities of the MSs to ensure that effective 
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In this direction, and in order for the protection awarded by MSs and national investor 
compensation schemes to retail investors to be effective, MSs are required inter alia to 
regulate and ensure the payment of minimum compensation following prompt and 
simple claim verification and calculation procedures according to national law, covering 
not only stricto sensu investors but also lato sensu investors in case of investment firm 





III.2 THE PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE EU LAW REGIME ON RETAIL 
INVESTOR PROTECTION AFTER THE CRISIS: THE 





In the context of the new EU financial architecture and law, proposals by the 
Commission have been advanced in the direction of amending DGSD and ICSD so as to 
bring it in line with the new envisaged recovery and resolution regime for financial 
institutions. It is therefore necessary to examine the proposed modifications, before 
proceeding to a brief examination of the new proposed BRRR and how it relates to 








III.2.1 THE PROPOSED REVISION OF DEPOSIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES 
DIRECTIVE  
 
As the Crisis had already escalated to a critical point, in mid-2010 the Commission 
submitted, among an array of other proposed measures,
594
 a proposal for a Directive of 




The proposal is based on the consideration that “[…] the existing, fragmented [deposit 
guarantee schemes] system has not delivered on the objectives set by [DGSD], in terms 
of maintaining depositors’ confidence and financial stability in times of economic 
stress”.
596
 While certain urgent measures (decrease of time limit for payment of 
depositor claims and increase of coverage level) have been introduced by Directive 
2009/14/EC, the broader review of DGSD remains outstanding.  
 
The 2010 Commission proposal focuses mainly on the simplification and harmonisation 
of the DGSD, in particular with regard to the scope of coverage and the payout 
mechanism, the further reduction of the time limit for payment of depositors, the 
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 COM(2010) 368 final, 12.07.2010. On 18.02.2014 the Council provided its 








information of deposit guarantee schemes about their members, the financing of deposit 
guarantee schemes and the introduction of a mutual borrowing facility between deposit 




Certain of the proposed amendments that are relevant to the issues examined in this 
study are the following:  
 
The proposal supports that the scope of the DGSD should be extended, to encompass all 
credit institutions and all schemes, without distinction. Furthermore, it proposes that 
institutional protection schemes should be allowed to be recognised as deposit guarantee 




More importantly, it proposes that deposits be defined more strictly, so that structured 
products, certificates or bonds will not be considered as deposits for its purposes, 
distancing the risk associated with investment services.
599
 According to proposed 
definition, “deposit means any credit balance which results from funds left in an 
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account or from temporary situations deriving from normal banking transactions and 
which a credit institution must repay under the legal and contractual conditions 
applicable”.
600
 Specifically, it is proposed that an instrument whose existence can only 
be proven by a certificate other than a statement of account, or an intrument whose 
principal is not repayable at par, or whose principal is only repayable at par under a 
particular guarantee or agreement provided by the credit institution or by a third party, 




In this direction, important amendments are proposed with regard to the eligibility 
criteria for deposits to be protected under DGSD. According to the proposal, beyond 
deposits already excluded under the DGSD as in force (i.e. deposits made by other 
credit institutions on their own behalf and for their own account, own funds, and 
deposits connected with money laundering), all deposits made by financial institutions, 
investment firms, insurance undertakings, collective investment undertakings, pension 
and retirement funds, as well as deposits the holder of which has not been identified 
when they become unavailable, and debt securities issued by credit institutions, 





In the same direction, the proposal specifies that rules on the determination of the 
repayable amount have to be simplified and claridied, including payment of interest due 
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but not credited at the time of unavailability, deposits in currencies other than the Euro, 




Further, rules on the supervision of deposit guarantee schemes by competent national 
authorities are proposed to be enhanced. According to the relevant proposed provision, 
“[a]ll Deposit Guarantee Schemes […] shall be supervised by the competent authorities 
on an ongoing basis as to their compliance with [DGSD]”.
604
 An obligation of MSs to 
ensure that deposit guarantee schemes perform stress tests and that competent 
authorities inform them when problems in a credit institution that may cause the 




The 2010 Commission proposal is characterised, in our view, by the intention to clarify 
the field of application of the DGSD, by clearly distinguishing deposits in a strict sense 
by any other form of transaction by financial market participants with credit institutions. 
In this regard, the 2010 Commission proposal aims at enhancing legal certainty and 
predictability, at improving the payout mechanism, and at reducing the risk to deposit 
guarantee schemes that may be connected with investment services. In the historical 
context of the problematic on bank rescue without recourse to public funding, it further 
proposes the use of deposit guarantee schemes, under certain conditions, as facilities to 
avert credit institution failure, although it does not propose specific rules to this 
direction.  
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The position of the EP, adopted at first reading in 2012,
606
 on the 2010 Commission 
proposal for the revision of DGSD, reflects the new initiatives of the EU that emerged 
in the meantime, especially with regard to the bank recovery and resolution regime 
under discussion, but also adopts a differentiated stance to that of the Commission with 
regard to certain important issues, including the delimitation of the field of application 
of the DGSD.  
 
In adopting its position, the EP has taken into account the fact that during the Crisis, 
uncoordinated increases in the coverage levels in deposit guarantee schemes in the EU 
led to shifting of deposits to MSs where deposit guarantees were higher (and thus 
causing liquidity problems to the credit institutions from which it was moved),
607
 and to 
the fact that existing deposit guarantee schemes “proved unable” to carry all losses in 




The EP’s position is connected to the requirement, as stated, to create sufficient 
flexibility to enable DGSs to implement prevention and support measures,
609
 including 
“[…] (iii) imposing conditions to limit the volume of deposits guaranteed or wholly or 
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introduced by Amendment 19.  
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partly to limit certain business operations […] (v) an agreement regarding the 




In this direction, the EP position interconnects depositor protection to the possibility of 
preventing failure of credit institutions by means of appropriate measures,
611
 which is in 
line with the reasoning of the bank recovery and resolution proposals, and which 
introduces a spectrum of powers of deposit guarantee schemes, ranging from only 
providing reimbursement (“pay box function”)
612
 to building early warning systems 
regarding the status of credit institutions,
613
 to deciding on support measures or to using 
their resources for the purposes of orderly winding-up of failing credit institutions.
614
 
However, the EP notes that the establishment of a European mechanism to resolve 
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Taking into account the wide range of powers of DGSs, as proposed, the EP position 
introduces a new description of the aim of the DGSD, which “[…] lays down rules 
concerning the functioning of the European scheme for national deposit-guarantee 
schemes […] intended to provide depositors in the Union with a common safety net 




With regard to the scope of DGSD, the EP position attempts a new delineation of the 
ambit of deposit guarantee as it confirms that certain financial products with an 
investment character should not be covered,
617
 while certain others should be 
protected,
618





According to this position, a deposit is proposed to be defined as “(i) any credit balance 
which results from funds left in an account or from temporary situations deriving from 
normal banking transactions, including fixed-term deposits, savings deposits and 
registered deposits, and which a credit institution must repay under the legal and 
contractual conditions applicable, or (ii) any debt evidenced by a certificate issued by 
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 Yet, if such certificate (other than a statement of account) is 
the only means of proving the existence of the debt and it is made to the holder (and not 





By this proposal on the definition of “deposits” and on the scope of DGSD the 
European Parliament attempts, in our view, to achieve an equilibrium between 
predictability and flexibility in deposit protection under EU, while differentiating 
deposit taking as a traditional banking activity from investment services.  
 
Finally, with regard to State and competent authorities’ liability relating to the operation 
of DGSs, it is noted that in the Preamble of DGSD, the EP has added that “it is 
possible” that DGSD does not result in such liability if MSs have ensured that “one or 
more schemes guaranteeing deposits or credit institutions themselves” have been 
introduced and officially recognised, “ensuring the compensation or protection of 




The new form deposit guarantee will assume in the EU, if the proposed revision of the 
DGSD is adopted, will be essentially different from the current one. Beyond the 
implication of deposit guarantee schemes in the mechanism of the new bank recovery 
and resolution regime, the protected deposit-taking function of credit institutions will be 
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more clearly defined and thus depositors will be clearly defined with regard to (retail) 
investors.  
   
 
III.2.2 THE PROPOSED REVISION OF INVESTOR COMPENSATION SCHEMES 
DIRECTIVE  
 
Together with it proposal for a revision of DGSD, the Commission submitted in mid-




The proposal refers to the need to review ICSD, which was adopted, as it notes, as a 
complement to ISD, not only to take account of the developments relating to the 
introduction of MiFID and of the new EU legislation adopted as a response to the 
Crisis, but also to address lacunae in the regulatory and supervisory system, which have 
led to “numerous investor complaints about the application of the ICSD in a number of 
important cases involving large investor losses”.
624
 According to the Commission, the 
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proposal aims “[…] at improving the practical functioning of the ICSD, at clarifying the 
scope of the ICSD […], at reducing gaps in the regulatory system and disparities 




The Commission stresses that the different underlying objectives of DGSD and ICSD 
have to be taken into account, stating that while the first “has a prevailing bank stability 
objective because banks are susceptible to the risk of a run if depositors believe that 
their deposits are not safe and try to withdraw them at the same time” the latter 
“protects investors against the risk of frauds or administrative malpractices or 
operational errors making the investment firm unable to return assets to clients”,
626
 




In terms of alignment of ICSD with MiFID, the proposal notes that the scope of MiFiD 
is broader than that of ISD and therefore adaptation of the scope of ICSD to that of 
MiFID is required. In this direction, the Commission has proposed a number of 
amendments to adapt ICSD to MiFID, including inter alia a new definition of 
“investment business” which shall mean “investment business and activities as defined 
in Article 4(1)(2) of [MiFID] and the ancillary service referred to in point 1 of Section 
B of the Annex I to [MiFID] […]”.
628
 With regard to the classification of clients of an 
                                                                                                                                               
 
625
 Ibid., p. 4. 
 
626
 Ibid., p. 5. 
 
627
 Ibid. The ECB has also noted that it considers it important “that the Union 
regulatory framework continues to be based on the assumption of different risk profiles 




investment firm, it proposed that while the ICSD is potentially applicable to all 
categories of investors, national legislation may provide that “professional investors” 
and “institutional investors” (according to the definitions provided by ISD) can be 
excluded from coverage of ICSD.
629
 However, as the it further notes, this classification 
does not coincide with the one under MiFID, so that problems in providing protection 
may arise, as “clients classified as professionals for the provision of services may not 
correspond to the clients which may be excluded from coverage according to the 
ICSD”.
630
 In order to ensure legal certainty and more effective protection (especially for 
medium-sized enterprises that may be excluded from protection under ICSD but are 
classified as retail investors under ICSD), the Commission has proposed the correlation 
of ICSD with the definition of investors provided by MiFID.  
 
More importantly, the proposal notes that one of the issues that have arisen is the 
coverage of firms depending on the scope of their authorisation –relating to whether an 
investment firm is authorised to hold client assets or not.  
 
In our view, this issue is central to the problematic that is relevant to the notion and 
legal nature of depositors vis-à-vis investors, and to the interrelation between the legal 
nature of credit institutions vis-à-vis investment firms, and the legal consequences this 
distinction entails.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
628
 Ibid., Article 1(1)(a) of the proposed Directive. 
 
629
 See ICSD, Article 4(2) and Annex 1.  
 
630
 COM(2010) 371 final, p. 5 – 7.  
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In this respect, a fundamental, in our view, rule is advanced by the proposal: that all 
investment services and activities covered under MiFID should be subject to the ICSD 
and that “[…] if firms de facto hold client assets (irrespective of restrictions on their 
authorisation or the nature of their investment service) then clients should be entitled to 




In the same direction, the proposal notes that the right of clients to compensation in 
such a case “would be irrespective of whether the firm is doing so [i.e. holding clients 
assets] in contravention of any limitation on its authorisation (e.g. preventing it from 
holding client assets or from dealing with retail clients) and irrespective of the nature of 
the investment service it provides […]”.
632
 According to the proposal, “[…] this will 
enable retail investors to assume that they are covered by the ICSD without checking 
detailed conditions on a firm’s authorisation. It will also result in more consistency 





In this respect, the proposed new Preamble to ICSD states that “[i]nvestors may not be 
aware of any limits of investment firms' authorisations, thus it is necessary to protect 
them in situations in which investment firms act in breach of their authorisation notably 
by holding client assets or providing services to a particular type of client contrary to 
the conditions of their authorisation. Therefore, schemes should cover clients' assets 
                                                 
 
631














Thus, with regard to coverage of investment services and compensation payable to 
investors, the new rules propose the introduction of a provision with the following 
content:  
“2a. The coverage […] shall be provided in accordance with the legal and 
contractual conditions applicable for claims arising out of an investment firm's 
inability to perform either of the following: 
(a) repay money owed to or belonging to investors and held on their behalf 
in connection with investment business; 
(b) return to investors any instruments belonging to them and held, 
administered or managed on their behalf in connection with investment 
business. 
[MSs] shall ensure that the schemes provide coverage where financial 
instruments or monies are held, administered or managed for or on behalf of an 
investor, irrespective of the type of investment business being carried on by the 
firm and of whether or not the firm is acting in accordance with any restriction 




Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the Commission proposes the introduction of 
these provisions regarding the coverage of clients’ assets which are de facto held by 
investment firms not as a new rule, but as a clarification of the existing rule, which 
                                                 
 
634
 Ibid., proposed new recital 5 
 
635
 Ibid., Article 1(2)(c) of proposed Directive. 
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signifies in our view that the Commission considers an interpretation of rules in force to 
this direction (i.e. covering lato sensu investors) as valid in the context of applicable 
law. Specifically, the Commission notes that “the proposed amendment clarifies that 





Another critical feature of the proposal, which signifies in our view the new approach of 
the Commission regarding the status of investors, is that the “co-insurance principle”, 
according to which MSs are allowed to limit coverage of compensation (by up to 10%) 
of an investors claim,
637
 as measure to address moral hazard and to raise investor 
awareness regarding the selection of investment firms. Following the experience of the 
Crisis, the Commission notes that “[…] arguably it is unrealistic to expect retail 
investors to be able to identify which firms are more or less likely to be affected by 
fraud or systems failures”, proposing that investors should no longer have to bear part 




With regard to payment of compensation, beyond a proposal to increase the level of 
compensation,
639
 the Commission notes that “[i]n the case of credit institutions doubts 
                                                 
 
636
 Ibid., p. 5. 
 
637
 ICSD, Article 4(4); cf. ICSD, Preamble, recital 13. Cf. the co-insurance principle in 
DGSD, supra n 534. 
 
638






may arise as to the coverage under the ICSD rather than the DGSD of monies deposited 
in a bank in the context of the provision of investment services. To deal with situations 
of possible uncertainty due to the specific nature of banks which may provide both 
banking activity and investment services, the Article 2(3) of the ICSD is being amended 
to specify that in cases of doubt the investor is to be compensated under the DGSD 




This new rules, as proposed, signifies acknowledgment by the Commission that in 
certain cases the same person may be characterised both as depositor and as a retail 
investor –thus accepting in our view that legal uncertainty is not resolved even by the 
new proposed rules. In this direction, the Commission proposes a new “in dubio pro 
reo” rule, that in case of doubt compensation is to be the higher one provided by DGSD.  
While this is proposal is protective for retail investors (since in case of doubt a higher 
level of compensation is awarded) yet it does not offer a solution regarding the problem 
of classification, so that legal uncertainty remains. This further affects cases where 
differentiation of retail investors vis-à-vis depositors may be significant (as in the case 
of tortuous liability of competent authorities), affecting in turn the effectiveness of the 
relevant protective rules.  
 
Furthermore, the Commission proposal takes into consideration the particular 
characteristics of investment firm failure as a result of fraud, proposing that the delay of 
                                                                                                                                               
 
639
 To a fixed amount of EUR 50 000; ibid., p. 8; proposed Article 1(4). Further new 
rules are proposed with regard to the funding of ICSs and borrowing mechanisms 
between ICSs; ibid, p. 9 – 10, proposed recitals 13 – 19, proposed Article 1(5).  
 
640




twenty working days for payment of compensation (as in the case of DGSD) is not 
suitable for the purposes of ICSD, since the underlying situations of fraud (or 
malpractices or operational problems, according to the proposal) make necessary a 
longer delay “in order to reconstruct the position of single investors”, and thus a 
mechanism of partial initial payment and further payment following reconstruction and 
of the position and clarification of the claim is proposed.
641
 This important, in our view, 
initiative by the Commission proposes the amendment of the ICSD mechanism on 
payment of compensation, in connection to claim verification.  
 
Regarding the critical issue of eligibility of claims and on the verification of claims, the 
proposal advances two new rules, which confirm in our view that the current normative 
structure of EU law on investor compensation is problematic:  
 
The first proposed rule states that “[MSs] shall ensure that compensation schemes may 
participate in insolvency or judicial procedures that may be relevant in establishing the 
eligibility and the amount of a claim”.
642
 Certainly, MSs are not prohibited, under the 
ICSD as in force, to provide that compensation schemes may participate in such 
procedures. What appears as a clarification, in the Commission proposal, does not 
provide in our view useful directions as to how insolvency or judicial procedures are to 
                                                 
 
641
 Ibid., p. 12 and proposed Article 1(7). The proposal provides that the investor 
compensation scheme must be in a position to pay an investor's claim as soon as 
possible and at the latest within three months of the establishment of the eligibility and 
the amount of the claim (extension of delay and partial compensation payment provided 
under conditions).  
 
642
 Ibid., proposed Article 1(7) introducing new Article 9 to ICSD; cf. new proposed 




be correlated in the national legal order to verification of claims procedures under EU 
and national law on investor compensation. While this may be attributable to 
considerations relevant to the institutional autonomy of MSs, including rules on the 
organisation of justice and on procedural law matters, it is not clear in our view how the 
investor compensation regime may be harmonised on the European level, if the law on 
verification of claims remains a secluded national domain. 
 
The second proposed rule states that the rule above “[…] shall be without prejudice to 
schemes being able to adopt other methods to determine the eligibility or amount of a 
claim”.
643
This rule appears to add to ambiguity, since it confirms that (at least) two sets 
of national rules on claim verification may be validly applicable for the purposes of 
investor protection (i.e. one set of rules regarding national judicial procedures in 
general, as in the context of tortuous liability, and/or one set of rules regarding national 
insolvency proceedings, which may be governed by general insolvency law or by 
specific insolvency law for investment firms, plus one set of rules applicable 
specifically by ICSs).  
 
In our opinion, the interrelation of the two proposed provisions and the envisaged useful 
effect thereof is not evident; while the first rule clarifies the MSs have to allow for 
investor schemes to participate in insolvency or judicial procedures relevant to claim 
verification, the second proposed rule adds that such schemes may adopt other claim 
verification rules, causing further legal uncertainty and concerns with regard to their 
effectiveness when applied in practice by a MS.  
 






Perhaps with a view to avoid such a negative result, the proposal further adds that the 
Commission shall adopt by means of delegated acts “[…] measures to determine the 
procedure to deal with investors’ claims and the technical criteria to calculate the loss 
of value of a UCITS […]”.
644
 While this provision is also unclear, in our view, it appears 
to be in a practically useful direction, as claim verification rules should be set by 
uniformly applicable and detailed rules.   
 
The position of the EP adopted at first reading regarding the Commission proposal for 
the amendment of ICSD,
645
 taking inter alia into account the reasoned opinions of the 
Swedish Parliament and the UK House of Commons, according to which the proposal 
contravenes the principle of subsidiarity.
646
 
                                                 
 
644
 Ibid., referring to Article 1(10) of the same draft legislation, which introduces new 
Articles 13a, 13b and 13c to ICSD; cf. new proposed recital 23. 
 
645
 [2013] OJ C033E/328. 
 
646
 Ibid. The UK House of Commons has issued a reasoned opinion, pursuant to Article 
6 of Protocol (No 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality, according to which the Commission proposal to amend ICSD is not 
compatible with said principle, as regards the borrowing last resort mechanism between 
national schemes in proposed new Article 4b of ICSD. Available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/pagefiles/54364/Reasoned%20Opinion%2025.10.10.pdf .  
The Commission replied that it has already taken into account the concerns expressed 
by the House of Commons in its proposal: see 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/docs/united_kin




The amendments introduced by the EP at first reading of the draft legislation do not in 





III.2.3 THE PROPOSED BANK RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION REGULATION, 
BAIL-IN, AND RETAIL FINANCIAL MARKET PARTICIPANT PROTECTION  
 
As discussed, the proposal to adopt BRRR
648
 is connected to a long political and 
institutional process in the wake of the Crisis with a view to establish a specific regime 
                                                 
 
647
 In the context of the present study, some of the more important amendments 
introduced by the European Parliament include in our view the broadening of the 
definition of “investor” encompassing any natural or legal person, including micro-
entities, non-profit organisations and public local authorities (proposed Article 
1(1)(a)4), the broadening of the conditions for failure of investment firm to apply 
including beyond fraud, malpractice or operational error, as per the Commission 
proposal, also bad advice, regarding CoB obligations when providing investment 
services to clients (proposed Article 1(2)(b), amendment 20), the provision of an 
obligation for investment firms to disclose on their websites all information concerning 
the terms and conditions regarding the coverage and the steps to be taken to receive 
compensation under ICSD (proposed amendment 58), and the proposal that following 
the entry into force of the revised ICSD the Commission shall, after an open 
consultation with the stakeholders, submit to the EP and Council a report analysing the 
advantages and disadvantages of introducing a system of insurance contracts as a 
complement or replacement of existing ICS (proposed Article 2a). With regard to the 
issues concerning claim eligibility and verification rules, the EP position does not 





for the orderly winding down of systematically important financial institutions in the 




According to the proposed Regulation, the SRB will be established as an EU agency, 
having legal personality and enjoying the most extensive legal capacity of legal persons 
under national law,
650




                                                                                                                                               
 
648
 COM(2013) 520 final. Supra, n 460. Its proposed legal basis is Article 114 TFEU, as 
an approximation of national provisions instrument, aiming at the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market; see proposed BRRR, p. 6. 
 
649
 The operation of the resolution procedure is organised by the proposed BRRR both 
in terms of (basic) substantive rules and in terms of (basic) procedural rules. Following 
resolution planning (proposed BRRR Articles 7, 9) and assessment of resolvability of a 
financial institution (ibid., Article 8) and having set minimum requirements for own 
funds and eligible liabilities per institution (ibid., Article 10), the competent European 
and national authorities will exercise their powers in order to avoid the disorderly 
failure of an institution (early intervention, Article 11) and to achieve its orderly 
resolution (Articles 12 – 26). While the protection of depositors (covered by DGSD) as 
well as investors (covered by ICSD) is expressly stated as one of the four resolution 
objectives (ibid., Article 12(2)) the exact operation of this mechanism as a whole needs 
to be defined.   
 
650
 Ibid., Article 38.  
 
651
 Ibid., Article 64. The proposed Regulation does not provide whether the Fund will 




The scope of the proposed BRRR is wide: Ratione materiae it encompasses the 
resolution of all financial institutions falling within its field of application established in 
participating MSs (Euro-area MSs and others wishing to participate), providing uniform 
rules and a uniform procedure to be applied by the SRM established by it, and with the 
support of the Fund.
652
 Ratione personae it applies to all credit institutions established 
in participating MSs, to parent undertakings established in one of the participating MSs  
when subject to consolidated supervision, and to investment firms and financial 
institutions, as defined therein,
653





The proposed BRRR further provides that where the Commission or the SRB exercise 
tasks or powers which under the proposed BRRD are to be exercised by the national 
resolution authority, the SRB shall be considered to be the relevant national resolution 
authority.
655
 Furthermore, the national resolution authorities shall act according to 
                                                 
 
652
 Ibid., Article 1. 
 
653
 The proposed BRRR applies to systemically important investment firms, ‘investment 
firm’ being defined for its purposes as those referred to in point (2) of Article 4(1) of 
Regulation 575/2013 that are subject to the initial capital requirement specified in 
Article 9 of that Regulation . COM(2013) 520 final, proposed Article 3(8).  
 
654
 Ibid., Article 2. For the obligation of non-discrimination against inter alia depositors, 
investors and other creditors on grounds of nationality, see ibid., Article 6. 
 
655









Especially with regard to the resolution procedure, which is relevant to the subject-
matter of this study, the proposed Regulation introduces a series of “resolution 
objectives”, which reflect effectiveness and proportionality considerations.
657
 Among 
these announced resolution objectives, public interest considerations (such as the 
continuity of critical functions, the protection of financial stability and the protection of 
public funds)
658
 and individual property considerations (such as the protection of 
depositors covered by DGSD and of investors covered by ICSD).
659
  Shareholders of 
the institution under resolution are to bear first losses, while creditors bear losses after 
the shareholders in accordance with the order of priority of their claims; “the creditor no 
worse off principle” also applies.
660
 
                                                 
 
656
 Ibid., Article 5(3). 
 
657
 Ibid., Article 12.  
 
658
 Ibid., Article 12(2). 
 
659
 Ibid.  
 
660
 Ibid., Article 13 (1). A general principle governing the treatment of creditors of the 
institution under resolution, as proposed, is that creditors will bear losses after 
shareholders, in the following order of priority of claims: claims related to eligible 
deposits and claims from DGSs, then unsecured non preferred claims, then claims 
subordinated (others than the following), then claims from senior executives and 
directors, then claims related to additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments (as per 




According to the proposed BRRR, the particular resolution scheme to be implemented 
with regard to a particular ailing institution will be decided by the SRB, including the 
resolution measures to be applied (sale of business, bridge institution, asset separation, 
bail-in, or combination thereof), and the use of the Fund in this context,
661
 while the 
implementation of such resolution scheme by national resolution authorities is to be 
closely monitored by the SRB.
662
 National resolution authorities are to use their powers 
under national law transposing the European bank recovery and resolution rules taking 
all necessary action, implementing the decisions of the SRB, exercising control over 
failing intermediaries and applying relevant safeguards. 
663
 Should, however, national 
resolution authorities fail to effectively implement the resolution decision of the SRB, 
the latter shall have the power to directly order the institution under resolution to 
proceed to the necessary action,
664
 and both the institution under resolution and national 




                                                                                                                                               
instruments (as per applicable capital adequacy rules); see proposed BRRR, Article 
13(1) point b, and Article 15.  
 
661
 Ibid., Article 20.  
 
662
 Ibid., Article 25. 
 
663
 Ibid., Article 26. 
 
664
 Ibid., Article 26(2). 
 
665




The financing of the Fund is envisaged by the proposed BRRR as based upon 
contributions by credit institutions,
666
 i.e. indirectly by depositors. The EU budget may 
not be held liable for expenses or losses of the Fund,
667
 while public funding is not 
excluded in case the funding raised by ex ante and ex post contributions by the 
institutions falling within the field of application of the proposed BRRR are not 
immediately accessible or sufficient to cover expenses,
668





While the Fund may not at all burden the EU budget and may not in principle use public 
funds, the SRB may invest the amounts held by the Fund “in obligations of the 
participating [MSs] or intergovernmental organisations, or in highly liquid assets of 
high credit worthiness”,
670
 the Commission being empowered to adopt acts on the rules 
for the administration of the Fund.
671
 The use of the Fund by the SRB, as proposed by 
                                                 
 
666
 Ibid., Articles 65 – 67.   
 
667
 Ibid., Article 64(2).  
 
668
 Ibid., Article 69(1).  
 
669
 Ibid., Article 69(2).  
 
670
 Ibid., Article 70(3).  
 
671
 Ibid., Article 70(4). While the administration of the property of the Fund is relates 
rather to policy and financial considerations, than legal, it is not evident how the 
amounts deposited with this Fund will be readily available or sufficient in case of abrupt 
distress in the EU financial markets, especially in connection to sovereign debt issues, if 
such amounts are invested in MSs’ sovereign debt. In our view, a new form of negative 
interconnectedness, between sovereign debt and Fund creditworthiness, might emerge 
in this way.  
 
 266 
the Commission, is connected to the aim served also by the national DGSs (and the 
ICSs): according to the proposed BRRR, the mission of the Fund will inter alia include 
“[…] to pay compensation to shareholders or creditors if […] they have received less, 
in payment of their credits, than what they would have received […] in a winding up 




Furthermore, in application of the “no creditor worse off principle”, the proposed 
BRRR provides that MSs participating in the SRM shall ensure that “[…] when the 
[SRB] takes resolution actions, and provided that these actions ensure that depositors 
continue having access to their deposits, the deposit guarantee scheme to which the 
institution is affiliated shall be liable for the amounts specified [in the proposed 
BRRD]”.
673
 According to said provisions of the proposed BRRD, the national DGS (to 
which the failing institution is affiliated) will be liable, up to the amount of covered 
deposits, for the amount of losses that it would have had to bear if the institution had 
been wound up under normal insolvency proceedings,
674
 and this contribution by the 




In this way, through the proposed BRRR, which will be directly applicable if adopted in 
the national legal orders of EU MSs, national DGSs will be used for the purposes of the 
SRM. The result envisaged in our opinion by the proposed BRRR is that the 
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 Ibid., Article 71(1).  
 
673
 Ibid., Article 73(1).  
 
674
 Ibid., Article 99(1).  
 
675




particularities of each national legal order, regarding the legal form of the national DGS, 
the supervision exercised by national supervisory authorities on the scheme, and the 
nexus of national law provisions, or even practical funding difficulties, may not hinder 




While the proposed BRRR will be applicable under conditions to investment firms,
677
 
and although its aim is to protect investors (as creditors),
678
 no specific provision is 
made with regard to the funding of the SRM in connection to national ICSs. The only 
relevant reference is on the level of general principles applicable to recovery and 
resolution, according to which the Commission and the SRB, when making decisions or 
taking action which may have impact in more than one participating MS, will take into 
account inter alia the impact of any decision or action or inaction on the financial 




                                                 
 
676
 The proposed BRRR Article 71(4) provides that “[i]n the event resources of a [DGS] 
are not sufficient to cover the payments to be made to depositors, and other resources 
are not immediately available from the relevant participating [MS], the Fund may lend 
the necessary resources to that [DGS] provided that all the conditions under Article 10 
of [DGSD] are met”.  
 
677
 COM(2013) 520 final, Article 2 point (c) and Article 3(8). 
 
678
 Ibid., Article 6(1) and Article 12(2) point (d).  
 
679
 Ibid., Article 6(2) point (a). In our view, and taking into account the legal uncertainty 
prevailing in many issues relating the status of financial market participants, a clear 
reference of retail investor position in the order of priority of claims should be included 
in relevant legislation.  
 
 268 
In particular with regard to application of the bail-in resolution tool, it is proposed that a 
number of liabilities of the institution under resolution will not be subject to write down 
and conversion. Among such exceptions are proposed to be covered deposits, secured 
liabilities including covered bonds, and any liability that arises by virtue of the 
institution under resolution of client assets or money, or a fiduciary relationship 
between such institution (as fiduciary) and another person (as beneficiary), provided 
that such client or beneficiary is protected under the applicable insolvency or civil 
law.
680
 For the bail-in tool to be applied, the resolution scheme must establish in 
particular the aggregate amount by which elibigle liabilities must be reduced or 
converted, the liabilities to be excluded, and the objectives and minimum content of the 




From these proposals, taking also into account considerations on the ability of retail 
financial market participants to identify risks, legal uncertaintly remains, in our view, 
                                                 
 
680
 Ibid., Articles 15, 16, 19, 20, 24(3).  
 
681
 Ibid., Article 24(1). The proposed BRRR also provides that in exceptional 
circumstances, certain liabilities may be wholly or partially excluded from writing-
down or conversion, in which case the writing-down or conversion of applied to other 
eligible liabilitis may have to be increased. If in such a case the losses that would be 
borne by excluded liabilities have not be passed on fully to other creditors, it is 
proposed that a contribution may be made by the Fund to the failing institution, under 
certain conditions. Such contribution by the Fund may be financed by its own resources, 
or ex post contributions, or from alternative sources only after –among other 
conditions– all unsecured, non-preferred liabilities other than eligible deposits have 
been written down or converted in full.  
 
 269 
regarding the differentiation in protection awarded to depositors vis-à-vis investors, also 
under the proposed BRRR. 
 
While retail investor claim verification rules are left by ICSD to MSs to provide, 
according to national law, the valuation of assets and liabilities of a failing financial 
institution is regulated in a rather detailed way by the proposed BRRR. The proposed 
rules provide inter alia that valuation must be performed by a person independent from 
any public authority, the resolution authority, and the institution concerned;
682





 and that it may be either definitive or provisional 
(depending on the circumstances of each case and the urgency of the situation).
685
 The 
objective of the valuation, as proposed, is to assess said assets and liabilities,
686
 the 
valuation having no legal effect but being a procedural step preparing for the 
recommendation of the SRB to apply a resolution tool or exercise a resolution power.
687
 
Furthermore, the valuation is connected to the treatment of the failing institution’s 
creditors: It is proposed, to this direction, that the valuation shall indicate the 
subdivision of creditors in classes, and shall indicate an estimate of the treatment of 
                                                 
 
682
 Ibid., Article 17(1).  
 
683
 Ibid., Article 17(6).  
 
684
 Ibid., Article 17(8).  
 
685
 Ibid., Article 17(2), (3), (10), (11).  
 
686
 Ibid., Article 17(4).   
 
687









Whether the valuation process is used to determine the resolution tools and powers to be 
exercised upon a failing institution by the competent authorities, or to protect creditors 
of the failing institution, relevant proper information is sine qua non for the valuation to 
be valid and effective; if information on the quantity and quality of assets and liabilities 
of the failing institution is inaccurate –as in the case of fraudulent operation of a 
financial intermediary– then valuation of its financial position and protection of its 
creditors is ex hypothesi gravely affected as well. In order to collect valid information 
for the purposes of effecting valuation of the assets and liabilities of the failing 
institution, the proposed BRRR provides for a series of investigative powers of the 
SRB.
689
 Such powers include requests for information from the failing institution, its 
employees, and third parties to whom the failing institution has outsourced functions or 
activities,
690
 general investigations of any such person established or located in a 
participating MS,
691
 on-site inspections at the business premises of such persons,
692
 
                                                 
 
688
 Ibid., Article 17(9), (16), (17), (18).   
 
689
 Ibid., Article 32(1). The investigatory powers of the SRB may also be applied for the 
purposes of exercising its main tasks (resolution planning, assessment of resolvability of 
a failing institution, applying early intervention measures, applying the resolution 
procedure and also effecting valuation of the assets and liabilities of the failing 
institution (ibid.).  
 
690
 Ibid Article 32(1).  
 
691




subject to prior notification to the national resolution authorities concerned, but “where 
the proper conduct and efficiency of the inspection so require” even without prior 
announcement to such persons (failing institutions, their personel etc.).
693
 Regarding on-
site inspections, MSs must provide assistance.
694
 The judicial authorities of MSs may 
provide authorisation for such measures where required under national law, but 
examination of the relevant application for authorisation will be limited to control of the 
authenticity of the decision of the SRB and to control that the coercive measures 
envisaged are neither arbitrary nor excessive having regard to the subject matter of the 
inspection; however, the national judicial authority “[…] shall not review the necessity 
for the inspection or demand to be provided with the information on the SRB file”, the 




The general investigations performed by the SRB for the purposes of resolution include 
requiring submission of documents, examination of books and records of the failing 
institution, its employees and third persons to whom it has outsourced functions or 
activities, obtaining of written or oral explanations from such persons, or their 
representatives or staff, and interviewing of any other (consenting) person.
696
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 Ibid., Article 34.  
 
693
 Ibid., Article 34(1). 
 
694
 Ibid., Article 34(4).  
 
695
 Ibid., Article 35. Regarding to the (political) accountability of the SRB, see ibid. 
Article 41.  
 
696




It emerges from the above that the investigatory powers of the SRB are essential in 
order for important information to be found for the purposes of resolution proceedings. 
The relevant proceedings are a priori independent of national law and authorities, since 
the SRB may directly proceed to exercising the necessary investigative powers, while 
national resolution authorities are only notified thereof, and national judicial authorities 
may not question the necessity of such proceedings nor demand to review the relevant 
file –at least as the relevant proposal stands.  
 
Beyond issues raised that are relevant to the procedural autonomy of MSs and the 
fundamental right of defence, as applied in each national legal order, it appears in our 
view that the effectiveness of such measures is also –although indirectly– connected to 
applicable national law on claim verification and evaluation to the extent that there is no 
uniform European law on this matter. This may further lead, in our view, not only to 
difficulties in establishing whether there is a valid claim by a creditor against the failing 
financial institution, especially in case of fraudulent behaviour by such institution, but 
may also lead the European single resolution regime in fragmentation in case where it 
will be practically difficult to apply various national claim verification and evaluation 
rules in complex situations.   
 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the proposed BRRR expressly provides not 
only for the SRB’s contractual liability,
697
 but also for its non-contractual liability.
698
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The conditions for such non-contractual liability to attach will be provided by the 
general principles common to the laws concerning the liability of public authorities of 
the MSs,
699
 and if found liable the SRB will have to make good any damage caused by 
it (or by its staff) in the performance of its duties.  
 
Furthermore, the proposed BRRR provides that the SRB will compensate national 
resolution authorities for the damages to which the latter has been condemned by a 
national court, which are the consequences of an act or omission committed by that 
national resolution authority in the course of any resolution under the proposed 
Regulation (unless such act or omission constituted a violation of EU law, the proposed 
BRRR, a Decision of the Commission or a Decision of the SRB, or constituted a 




In this way, a quasi-guarantor function seems to be proposed, in our view, to be 
attributed to the SRB, to cover damages payable by national resolution authorities 
resulting from the application of its resolution decisions. It appears, in our opinion, that 
this proposal seeks to address possible opposition by national resolution authorities on 
ground of liability in tort.  
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While the lack of immunity from liability in tort of a European agency such as the SRB 
is in line with European acquis on EU institutions liability in tort
701
 and reflects wider 
accountalibility considerations, it brings to the fore the problematic regarding the locus 
standi of individuals and the justicialibity of relevant rights, the conditions for such 
liability to attach, and the competent forum to abjudicate such actions.  
 
The proposed BRRR provides a clear rule only with regard to the last issue, stating that 
disputes relating to non-contractual liability of the SRB and disputes relating to its 
responsibility to compensate national resolution authorities will be examined only by 
the ECJ.
702
 With regard to conditions for liability to attach, the proposed BRRR 
provides only for a five year prescription period, “from the occurrence of the event 
giving rise thereto”;
703
 no further rules regarding prescription are provided (such as 
whether it commences from the occurrence of the event stricto sensu or whether 
knowlegde of such occurrence is relevant, whether it is taken into account by the ECJ ex 
officio, whether and how it may be interrupted, etc.). In absence of European law 
thereto, the ECJ is referred to apply “the general principles common to the laws 
concerning the liability of public authorities of the [MSs]”. The emerging uncertainty is 
enhanced by the intrinsic complexity of crises in financial markets.
704
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The above considerations demonstrate in our view that while a priori liability in tort of 
the SRB is asserted by the proposed BRRR, the application of the relevant rules –as 
proposed at the present stage– appears to be problematic.  
 
Most importantly, however, the proposal for the BRRR reveals the definite recognition 
by EU institutions that EU financial market authorities in the new EU financial 






Interim Concluding Remarks 
 
 
While retail investor protection has been announced by EU law as one of the aims of 
financial regulation, in the event of intermediary default the protection offered to retail 
investors by EU law has been limited to the payment of minimum ex lege 
compensation.  
 
DGSD and ICSD were introduced in the EU legal order as instruments of minimum 
harmonisation aiming primarily at the avoidance of distortions in the competition 
among financial institutions and thus at the completion of the internal financial market. 
In parallel, they aim at enhancing confidence in the financial market by providing 






However, examined per se and in conjunction to each other, they do not constitute a 
coherent system of law providing protection in a coherent way; in particular in case of 
failure of a financial institution as a result of fraud, the retail financial market 
participant is exposed to an advanced degree of risk as a result of legal uncertainty and 
lacunae in the available mechanism of protection.  
 
It is reasonable that these normative inefficiencies of EU law in this area may be further 
reflected in national implementation measures, at the cost of the coherence and 
effectiveness of the latter.  
 
The proposals to revise DGSD and ICSD attempt to address these issues, establishing a 
more predictable and coherent system of EU rules with a view also to achieve effective 
protection of retail financial market participants.  
 
In this direction, it is important that considerations regarding the lack of effectiveness of 
the regime in force appear to have been endorsed by the Commission, which has 
proposed new, more functional and clear definitions of depositors and investors, and has 
further proposed that in dubio the higher protection should be awarded.  
 
However, this proposal to improve the system of DGSD and ICSD rules has to be 
examined in in conjunction with the new proposed recovery and resolution regime for 







One central issue characterized by uncertainty, in the pending proposals, is the role and 
function of the recovery and resolution mechanism with regard to ICSs and more 
general in relation to retail investor protection.  
 
Furthermore, critical parameters of the system to protect retail investors in the event of 
intermediary default –as in particular claim verification and evaluation rules– remain 
unregulated and unharmonised under the emerging new EU law.   
 
It is evident though that should the proposals for the new recovery and resolution 
regime be endorsed, national arrangements for the operation of DGS and ICSs will be 
greatly affected, leading to an ab initio re-assessment of the role and function of the 
latter.  
 
In this context, it will be necessary inter alia to consider the legal status of retail 
participants in the financial market under EU law; whether there may be any 
differentiation of depositors vis-à-vis retail investors in this regard; and ultimately 
whether the preoccupation to protect the stability of the market, as a concern in the 
general good, may validly outweigh any individual interest, under the light of the acquis 













Following the examination of the development and ratio of EU financial law, and the 
mechanism created to provide minimum protection to retail financial market 
participants in the event of intermediary failure, it is necessary to examine in turn 
whether it is valid to consider that a right of retail investors to be protected may be 
recognised to exist under EU law. 
 
Exploring this issue needs taking into account the EU law acquis in the area of 
individual protection, as well as the relevant case-law of the ECJ which will be analysed 







IV.1  THE ACQUIS ON INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION IN EU LAW AND 
COMPETENT AUTHORITIES’ LIABILITY IN TORT  
 
The recognition of justiciable individual rights is a precondition for the effective 




In the EU legal order is closely linked with the impetus provided to European 
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The EU legal order has gradually evolved from the initial recognition by the ECJ of the 
legal status of individuals in this particular legal order, to the recognition of the 
conditions for rights considered to be conferred by EU law to individuals, and further to 
the recognition of liability in tort of both MSs and EU institutions for breach of EU law 
causing damage to individuals, under conditions.
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According to the well-established case law of the ECJ, State liability for damage caused 
to individuals because of breach of EU law, and for which public authorities are 
responsible, is a principle of EU law intrinsic to the system created by the Treaty, which 
creates obligations of MSs.  
 
Therefore, State liability to compensate individuals in case of tort committed in breach 
of EU rights is based directly upon EU law. According to the case law of the ECJ, there 
are three conditions for State liability in tort for breach of EU law to attach: (a) that the 
rule breached confers rights upon individuals, (b) that the breach of the rule is 
sufficiently serious, (c) that there is direct causation (causal link) between the breach of 
the rule by the State and the damage suffered by the individual.
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MSs may not deny their responsibility for redress in such case by invoking their internal 
distribution of competences and responsibilities between authorities existing in the 
national legal order or by claiming that the national authority, which committed the 
breach of EU law, did not possess the necessary competence, knowledge or means. It is 
for the MS to ensure that individuals can achieve redress of the damage caused to them 
by breach of EU law, irrespective of the public authority that committed the breach and 
independently of which national authority is a priori responsible for redress according 






IV.2 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS IN THE ECJ CASE-
LAW IN THE AREA OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
 
Out of the abundant case-law of the ECJ connected to individual protection, only a few 
relate directly to individual protection in the area of financial markets: The ruling of the 
                                                                                                                                               
392/93, British Telecommunications [1996] ECR Ι-1631, point 38; ECJ decision of 
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ECJ in cases C-233/94 Germany v European Parliament and Council 
710
 and C-222/02 
Peter Paul
711
 merit particular attention and analysis. 
 
IV.2.1 THE ECJ DECISION IN CASE C-233/94 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
V EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COUNCIL 
 
The critical issue of European finance law objectives was examined by the ECJ in case 
C-233/94 Germany v EP and Council,
712
 which related to depositor protection under 
DGSD, and is one of the few cases in which the ECJ had the opportunity to rule on 




The case concerned an action by Germany against the European legislators for the 
annulment of DGSD, on the grounds that its legal basis (Article 57(2) of EC Treaty) 
was inadequate and also on the ground that DGSD does not state the reasons on which it 
is based (as required by Article 190 of EC Treaty). In the alternative, the application 
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 284 
asked for the annulment of the DGSD provisions (a) on the ‘export prohibition’ rule 
(Article 4 (1) of DGSD), and (b) on the obligation of MSs whose DGS exceeds the level 
or scope of cover provided in another MS to establish a DGS which branches of banks 
authorised in such other MS may join in order to supplement their guarantee (Article 4 
(2) of DGSD), and (c) on the obligation of banks to join a DGS (Art. 3(1) second 
sentence of first subparagraph of DGSD).  
 
The German DGS provided a high level of protection to depositors, having the 
following essential characteristics at the time of the facts of the case: although banks 
having their head office in Germany were not obliged by law to be members of a DGS, 
most banks participated in such a scheme (except for five out of three hundred, while 
the ratio of unprotected to protected deposits amounted to approximately one in a 
thousand).
714
 The Federal Association of German Banks operated such a scheme, as a 
self-regulated and voluntary insurance body not under State control. However, any bank 
not belonging to a deposit guarantee scheme was under obligation to inform its 
customers thereof before an account was opened; further, the German supervisory 
authorities could prohibit a bank from receiving payments if it did not belong to a DGS 
and if there was danger of insolvency. Furthermore, the deposit guarantee fund of the 
Federal Association of German Banks had been authorised by its members to obtain all 
necessary information from the Federal Supervisory Agency for Credit Institutions and 
from the Federal Bank of Germany, as well as to have access and examine member 
bank documents. Moreover, banks had to provide the national supervisory authorities 
with the verification reports drawn up by the deposit guarantee schemes they belonged 
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 This system, while voluntary, was characterised as “particularly effective”, since 





As AG Léger noted, the DGSD was the first result of the conciliation process provided 
by the co-decision procedure of Article 189B of EC Treaty.
717
 Examining the principal 
claim of the action for annulment, the Advocate General first considered the position of 
Germany, that Article 57(2) of EC Treaty could not constitute the sole basis for DGSD, 
because the aim of the latter was “[…] rather to strengthen protection for depositors 
than to allow the completion of the single banking market”,
718
 and therefore that the 
adoption of the Directive could only be achieved on the basis of the unanimity required 
by Article 235 of EC Treaty.
719
 The European institutions, on the other hand, supported 
that the main purpose of the DGSD was to strengthen the stability of the banking system 
and to establish equal competition, “[…] whereas consumer protection is only an 
incidental effect, inherent in that purpose”.
720
 In this regard, it is interesting to note that 
                                                 
 
715
 Ibid., points 18 – 23.  
 
716
 Ibid., point 24.  
 
717
 Ibid., points 7, 9.  
 
718
 Ibid., point 27. 
 
719




 Ibid., point 29.  
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not only the Commission and the Council, but also the EP, considered depositor 
(consumer) protection to be only incidental in the DGSD.  
 
However, as ensues from the long political process that preceded the adoption of DGSD 
and from the positions advanced by the European Parliament during this process,
721
 the 
latter considered the introduction of DGSD as important for depositor protection and 




Taking the above into account, it might be argued that while the European Parliament 
participated in the DGSD process with a view to achieve depositor protection as an aim 
of greater or equal importance to harmonisation, when the issue of the correct legal 
basis arose before the ECJ the European Parliament concurred with the Council and the 
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Commission in characterising DGSD as a banking sector integration and stability 
measure.    
 
A G Léger, in order to opine on the correct legal basis for the adoption of the DGSD, 
referred to the constant case-law of the ECJ according to which the choice of legal basis 
for a measure must be based on objective factors which are amenable to judicial review, 
such as the aim and content of the measure.
723
 Recapping the case-law of the ECJ on the 
correct legal base of a harmonisation measure having a dual objective, the Advocate 
General distinguished between European measures in which the two aims pursued are 
“indissociable”, and measures in which one aim must be considered incidental to the 
other.
724
 Considering that the two objectives of DGSD are, on the one hand, freedom of 
establishment and freedom to provide services in the banking sector, and, on the other 
hand, “the stability of the banking system and protection for savers”,
725
 AG Léger 
proceeded in examining whether these aims are equally pursued by the DGSD or 
whether one is incidental to the other.
726
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protection of market stability and creation of a level playing field between banks 
achievable through harmonization, on the one hand, and depositor protection, on the 
other hand (regarding which the effectiveness of DGSD was seriously contested by the 




AG Léger based this categorisation of DGSD aims on the wording of the first recital in 
its Preamble,
727
 and moved on to examine which of the two aims prevails
728
 –thus 
treating as resolved the dilemma of whether the two aims are equal or whether one is 
incidental only to the other. However, said recital states that “[…] the harmonious 
development of the activities of credit institutions throughout the Community should be 
promoted through the elimination of all restrictions on the right of establishment and 
the freedom to provide services, while increasing the stability of the banking system and 
protection for savers”: nothing in this wording appears to be subjecting one aim to the 
other. AG Léger, noting correctly that both aims are referred in numerous recitals, 




Proceeding further to examine the content of DGSD, AG Léger noted the difficulty in 
establishing a hierarchy between the two aims, as “[…] the very purpose of a large 
number of the principles laid down by rules aimed at harmonizing bank deposit-
guarantee schemes is to protect depositors”.
730
 Again, it is not clear why a hierarchy 
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between the two aims had to be established, since there appears to be no evident reason 
not to consider them “indissociable” or of equal importance.  
 
Recognising that “at first glance” the two aims of DGSD may be considered as equal,
731
 
AG Léger explained why in his opinion the aim of harmonisation should be considered 
as prevailing.
732
 The arguments forwarded by the Advocate General in this direction are 
interesting:  
 
First, the general objective of establishing an internal market was noted; then, however, 
AG Léger presented a series of provisions of DGSD which “[…] were dictated by 
considerations extraneous to or even, in fact, in conflict with any concern for consumer 
protection”.
733
 Such provisions are, according to the Advocate General, for example 
those on the level of guarantee provided by Article 7(1 of DGSD,
734
 on the ‘export 
prohibition’ of Article 4(1) second subparagraph of DGSD,
735
 on the rule of Article 4(2) 
of DGSD providing for the exclusive competence of the host-MS to organise a 
guarantee scheme which a branch of a bank may join to supplement the level of 
protection available to depositors in the home State,
736
 and on the rule of Article 8 
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restricting the level of guarantee available by providing for guarantee per depositor per 
bank (whatever the number of deposits) and not per depositor per deposit per bank.
737
 
All of these provisions, according to AG Léger, are relevant to considerations 
extraneous, if not contrary, to depositor (consumer) protection –in other words, 
depositor protection was an externality to achieving harmonisation of national 





However, AG Léger considered that while certain provisions of DGSD were dictated by 
considerations extraneous to or even in conflict with any concern for consumer 
protection, yet on the contrary “[…] every provision in the Directive favourable to 
depositors can be related to the initial objective of harmonization with a view to 
completing the internal market”,
739
 moving on to provide certain examples of that.
740
 In 
the opinion of the Advocate General, all articles which were invoked by the applicant to 
show that the main objective of DGSD was protection provided rules “[…] without 
which no measure of harmonization aiming to establish the internal market could be 
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 In this respect, the provisions of DGSD referred to as examples of this are 
those on compulsory introduction of at least one DGS in each MS (Article 3), on 
minimum guarantee provided (Article 7), on the obligations of banks to inform (Article 
9), and on the setting of a common time-limit for payment of depositors’ claims (Article 
10). However, in our view, in this selective reference to certain provisions of DGSD 
several other, important provisions appear to have been omitted – such as those on the 
ability of MSs to retain or adopt provisions offering a higher or more comprehensive 
cover for deposits (Article 7(3) of DGSD) or those providing for the right of depositors 
to take legal action against the national DGS, which do not seem to be indispensable to 
harmonization.  
 
Having concluded that the aim of DGSD was the harmonisation of national rules on 
bank deposit guarantee schemes, the Advocate General considered that should a second 
legal basis be necessary for DGSD to be lawful, it would have to be Article 129a(1)(b) 
of the EC Treaty and that since the Article 189b EC Treaty procedure used to adopt 
DGSD is the same as that of Article 129a, the omission of any reference to the latter is a 
formal defect (since consultation of the EESC required by Article 129a had taken place) 
so that DGSD was not null and void.
742
 Therefore, AG Léger proposed that the plea of 
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Following the proposal to dismiss the claim of lack of correct legal basis, the Opinion of 
AG Léger examined in turn the other grounds for annulment,
743
 which he also proposed 
to be dismissed.  
 
The ECJ followed in general the reasoning of AG Léger, and dismissed the application: 
Regarding the plea of illegality of DGSD on the ground that it was adopted on the 
wrong legal basis, following a presentation of certain relevant arguments of the German 
Government and of relevant provisions of primary European law and case law,
744
 the 
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ECJ forthwith concluded that “[t]he effect of the machinery established by [DGSD] is to 
prevent the [MSs] from invoking depositor protection in order to impede activities of 
credit institutions authorized in other [MSs]. Accordingly, it is clear that the Directive 





With regard to the plea of incompatibility with the objective of a high level of consumer 
protection (Articles 3(s) and 129a of EC Treaty), the ECJ ruled that DGSD “[…] aims 
to promote the right of establishment and the freedom to provide services in the banking 
sector. […] The reduction in the level of protection which may […] result in certain 
cases through the application of the second subparagraph of Article 4(1) of [DGSD] 
does not call into question the general result which the Directive seeks to achieve, 
namely a considerably improvement in the protection of depositors within the 
Community”.
746
 In this wording, the ECJ appears to be supporting that the aim of DGSD 
is depositor protection –by means of harmonising national rules on DGSs which may in 
some cases entail lessening of the level of protection for an interim period, in order for 
harmonisation to be achieved smoothly (as in the case of the temporary ‘export 
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Then, however, it is difficult to see how depositor protection is not an aim of DGSD or 
is not an aim equal to achievement of market integration through freedom of 
establishment and freedom to provide services.  
 
Case C-233/94 is important, with regard to the reasoning both of the ECJ and of the 
Advocate General, as it led to an examination by the ECJ of the ratio and objective of 
DGSD.  
 
The political disagreement of Germany to DGSD was transformed in legal terms into an 
argument that since DGSD was a depositor (consumer) protection measure its adoption 
required unanimity (on the basis of Article 235 EC Treaty) in which case DGSD could 
not have been adopted given the disagreement of Germany.  
 
The decision of the ECJ may be considered, in our view, as unsatisfactory in terms of 
legal certainty: By dismissing the plea of wrong legal basis ruling that that it is “clear” 
that DGSD abolishes obstacles to market integration, the ECJ appears to have avoided 
entering into an in-depth discussion of the objective of the DGSD with regard to 
depositor protection, which might have led to a judicial examination of the wider issue 











IV.2.2 THE ECJ DECISION IN CASE C-222/02 PETER PAUL  
 
 
The decision of ECJ in Peter Paul is fundamental with regard to the issue of whether 
EU law, and in particular DGSD, confers justiciable rights on individual depositors.
747
 It 
is then necessary to proceed to a critical analysis of Peter Paul,
748
 with a view to 
determine inter alia whether it may also be applicable in the field of investment 
services.  
 
In Peter Paul the ECJ considered a preliminary reference by the German Federal 
Supreme Court of Justice on questions relevant to the interpretation of EU law on 
deposit guarantee schemes as well as on credit institutions, insurance undertakings and 
investment firms, and ruled that, if the compensation of depositors prescribed by DGSD 
is ensured, DGSD (as well as the First Banking Directive, the Own Funds Directive and 
the Second Banking Directive) cannot be interpreted as precluding a national rule to the 
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 See, among others, BINDER, J. – H. (2004) 'The Advocate-General's Opinion in 
Paul and Others v. Germany - Cutting back state liability for regulatory negligence?', 
EBLR, p. 463; BOUVERESSE, A. (2004) 'Responsabilité des Etats membres', Europe, 
vol. 12, p. 393; CARRA, M. (2005) 'La (ir)responsibilità dello Stato per omessa 
vigilanza bancarisa', Giornale di diritto amministrativo, p. 1175; MITSOU, A. (2006) 
'Civil Liability of Supervisory Authorities in the Sector of Capital Markets to Investors 
under the Scope of ECJ Decision in Case Peter Paul*', DEE, vol. 10, p. 999; 
PROCTOR, C. (2005) 'Regulatory liability for bank failures: The Peter Paul case', 
Euredia, p. 73; TISON, M. (2005) 'Do not attack the watchdog! Banking supervisor's 
liability after Peter Paul', CMLRev, vol. 42, pp. 639-675. 
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 Supra, n 711. 
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effect that the functions of the national authority responsible for supervising credit 
institutions are to be fulfilled only in the public interest, which under national law 
precludes individuals from claiming compensation for damage resulting from defective 
supervision on the part of that authority.  
 
Specifically, the questions referred by the German Federal Court of Justice to the ECJ 
were relevant to the interpretation of Articles 3 and 7 of DGSD, as well as to a number 
of provisions of Directives on credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment 
firms.
749
 The case in the main proceedings before the referring national court concerned 
three individuals who had opened term deposits accounts and had deposited money with 
a credit institution in Germany. The deposits took place while the transposition delay 
for DGSD had not yet lapsed (i.e. before 01.07.1995).
750
 The credit institution had been 
licensed by the national competent authorities but was not a member of a DGS, having 
unsuccessfully applied for admission such a scheme. When the license (authorisation) 
of the credit institution was revoked, the claimants were not covered by any deposit 
guarantee scheme (due to the non-participation of the particular credit institution to any 
such scheme), as well as the non-transposition of DGSD into the German legal order at 
the time of the events, DGSD being transferred in 1998).
751
  Thus they did not receive 
any compensation for the loss of their deposits. The depositors brought proceedings 
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 The Directives that the preliminary reference referred to were the First Banking 
Directive, the Own Funds Directive, the Second Banking Directive, the Second 
Consolidated Supervision Directive, CAD, ISD, and Directive 95/26/EC (the Post-
BCCI Directive).  
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before the competent German Court of first instance against the German State asking 
for compensation in respect of the losses of their deposits, arguing that if DGSD had 
been transposed in time then “[…] Bundesaufsichtsamt [the competent national 
supervisory authority] would have taken supervisory measures vis-à-vis the […] Bank 




Thus, the claimants did not seek compensation on the basis of supervisory authorities’ 
liability for breach of a duty to effectively exercise their competence, but on the ground 




Summoned upon an appeal on a point of law, the German Federal Supreme Court of 
Justice considered that the decisive legal issue in case before it was whether a national 
rule, such as the German rule which is limiting liability for breach of official duty by the 
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Ibid., para. 14. It seems that the claimants maintained that in this way they had been 
denied the opportunity not to deposit their money in the credit institution in the first 
place and thus not to have to suffer damage as a result of the failure of the institution. 
This point is not elucidated in the Court decision and, in general, there is some difficulty 
in understanding how the failure of the German State to transfer the Directive in time 
relates to the financial damage suffered by the claimants as a result of competent 
national authorities misconduct, i.e. as a result of the latters’ failure to perform their 
supervisory duties effectively. The causal link between the breach of law (by the 
German State and by the competent supervisory authority) and the incurring of damage 
by the claimants is not evident; however, probably neither the German Courts nor the 
Court insisted on this point. The latter considered that the questions referred were not 
hypothetical but real and necessary for the referring national Court, and proceeded to 
answering them; see ibid., para. 24. 
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competent national authorities by imposing to them obligations only in the public 
interest, is compatible with applicable EC law.
754
 It appears that it considered that for 
such a rule to be incompatible with EC law, the ECJ would have to rule that EC law 
imposed an obligation on national supervisory authorities to act not only in favour of 
the public interest, but also in favour of the individuals falling within the ambit of the 
Directive, i.e. of depositors, linking such an obligation to a right of the depositors “[…] 




The reaction ECJ to this preliminary reference was to rearticulate the relevant questions 
posed by the national court.
756
 Having rearticulated the questions, the ECJ ruled that 
DGSD does not confer rights on the individuals. In specific: 
 
The first preliminary question, as submitted, asked: (a) Whether the provisions of 
Articles 3 and 7 of DGSD confer on the individuals the “[…] right to require that the 
competent authorities avail themselves of the measures mentioned […]” in Article 3(2) 
to (5), in addition to the right to be compensated by a deposit guarantee scheme,
757
 and 
(b) whether, if such a right is conferred on the individual, it also includes the right to 
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claim compensation for damage resulting from the misconduct of the competent 




The ECJ rearticulated the question, considering that “[…] the Bundesgerichtshof seeks 
essentially to ascertain whether [DGSD] […] precludes a national rule to the effect that 
the functions of the national authority responsible for supervising credit institutions are 
to be fulfilled only in the public interest, which under national law precludes individuals 
from claiming compensation for damage resulting from defective supervision on the 




This alteration of the question does not lead to a safe conclusion, in our view, as to 
whether the Court wished, in this way, to distinguish the notion of exercising 
supervisory competence not only in the public interest from the notion of the individuals 
having a right to require the competent supervisory authorities to act in their interest, or 
whether the ECJ intended to provide an interpretation of applicable EC law specifically 
with regard to the issue of exercising supervisory competence only in the public 
interest.  
 
In order to answer the first question as rearticulated, the ECJ proceeded to examining 
Articles 6 and 7 of the DGSD, then Article 3 (2) to (5), and then Preamble recital 24. 
The ECJ found that as long as payment of compensation is ensured by the national 
DGS(s), Article 3 of DGSD does not confer on depositors a right to have the competent 
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authorities take supervisory measures in their interest.
760
 From this consideration, the ECJ 
reached the general conclusion that DGSD does not preclude a national rule to the effect 
that the functions of the national authority responsible for supervising credit institutions 
are to be fulfilled only in the public interest.  
 
It may be argued, however, in our opinion, that several long steps appear to have been 
taken in this line of reasoning by the ECJ: Indeed, one statement does not seem to lead 
necessarily to the next. The ECJ does not explain which is the legal situation in case the 
compensation of depositors by a deposit guarantee scheme is not ensured; furthermore, 
it does not explain why a depositor who suffered damage while the compensation 
system provided by DGSD was not ensured (as e.g. in the case of breach of the 
obligation to transpose DGSD in due time, within the applicable time limit) does not 
have a right under EU law to claim compensation –not from national supervisory 
authorities but from the MS, as in the case at hand.  
 
In order to support its reasoning, the ECJ referred specifically to DGSD Preamble 
recital 24;
761
 however, the ECJ does not seem to have taken into account all other 
recitals, of DGSD and the other Directives mentioned in the questions of the referring 
national court, and did not make particular references to its case-law on individual 
protection in case of breach of EU law. 
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The second question referred to the ECJ by the German Federal Supreme Court related 
to the issue of the ratio, scope and aim of EC law with regard to individual protection in 
the fields of banking, finance and insurance law. More specifically, question 2 sub-
question (a) referred to the relevant Directives with a view to discover whether they 
“[…] confer on the saver and investor rights to the effect that the competent authorities 
of the [MSs] must take prudential supervisory measures, with which they are charged 
by those directives, in the interests of that category of persons and must incur liability 
for any misconduct […]” or whether “[…] [DGSD] contain[s] an exhaustive set of 




Thus, it seems that there is a difference between the scope and content of this question 
and of the first question referred by the national Court: the first question asked whether 
applicable EC law confers on depositors a “right to require that the competent 
authorities avail themselves of the measures mentioned” in the law, whereas part (a) of 
the second question asked whether EC law confers on depositors and investors “rights” 
which the competent national authorities are liable to protect. This sub-question was 
evidently wider in scope than the first, as it considered not only the case of depositors, 
but also the case of investors as individuals falling within the general ambit of EC law 
in the field of banking and finance. Moreover, in part (b) of its second question, the 
Bundesgerichtshof sought to find whether certain recitals of the second Consolidated 
Supervision Directive, CAD and ISD “[…] provide assistance with interpretation for the 
purpose of answering the [question], regardless of whether they otherwise contain law 
applicable in the present case”.
763
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In this sense, it appears that the national court was implying the existence of a common 
ratio, at least to some extent, in the EU law with regard to investor protection; indeed, 
the referring court appears to have argued that, although the various Directives to which 
it referred in its second question “[…] do not contain any express reference to the 
protection of depositors […]”,
764
 yet they form part of an overall scheme of banking 
supervision rules which “[…] would be denied practical effectiveness if the national 




Despite the importance of the effet utile criterion as underlined by the national court, its 
position that banking Directives do not contain any express reference to the protection 
of depositors was not accurate in our view; in fact, taking into account only the 
provisions to which it explicitly referred in its question 2(a), several references are made 
to depositor protection expressis verbis.
766
 Furthermore, express reference to the 
protection of depositors and/or investors is made several times in the recitals to which 
the Bundesgerichtshof referred in part (b) of its second question.
767
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 Specifically, in the First Banking Directive: Preamble, recitals 4 and 12; Article 6(1); 
in the Second Banking Directive: Preamble, recital 11; Article 3. In Own Funds 
Directive no explicit reference to depositor protection is made in Articles 2 – 7 to which 
the German court referred; however, reference is made in Preamble recital 1, which was 






The ECJ did not provide any answer to this general second question of the national 
court, with regard to issues or provisions not directly related to banking Directives; nor 
did the ECJ explain the reasons of its silence on this matter. In fact, the only reference 
the ECJ made in general to part (b) of the second question, which also referred to 
investors’ protection, was that “[i]n a number of the recitals in the preambles to the 
directives referred to in the second question, parts (a) and (b), it is stated in a general 
manner that one of the objectives of the planned harmonisation is to protect 
depositors”.
768
 It is not clear, in our view, what is signified by the reference of the ECJ to 
the “general manner” of the statement of the objective to protect depositors in the 
recitals it referred to.
769
 It is possible that the ECJ indirectly referred to the case-law, 
according to which the interpretation of a Directive may not be conducted only by 
reference to its recitals.
770
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 Specifically: In the Second Consolidated Supervision Directive, Preamble, recital 11. 
It is not clear why the German Federal Court did not place this reference in the context 
of part (a) of its second question. In CAD: Preamble, recital 8. In ISD: Preamble, 
recitals 2, 5, 29, 32, 41, and 42. It is not clear, however, why the national Court referred 
only to recitals in the Preamble of ISD and not also to articles of the same Directive, 
which explicitly refer to investor protection, or which are closely connected to it. 
Indeed, numerous provisions of ISD explicitly referred to investor protection: Article 
1(2); Article 10; Article 11(3); Article 12; Article 14(4); Article 17(3); Article 19(8), 
(9); Article 21(1)-(3).  
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Thus, although the recitals in these Directives refer not only to the objective of 
protecting depositors, but also to that of protecting investors, the ECJ narrowed the 
focus of its reasoning to the issue of depositor protection, tacitly excluding all analysis 
on investor protection and its interrelation to depositor protection. 
 
In responding thus only to second question, part (a), and by referring to the “general 
manner” of the statement of the objective of depositor protection in the Preamble of 
cited Directives and to the various supervisory obligations imposed by the same 
Directives upon the national competent authorities with regard to credit institutions,
772
 
the ECJ ruled that “[…] it does not necessarily follow either from the existence of such 
obligations or from the fact that the objectives pursued by those directives also include 
the protection of depositors that those directives seek to confer rights on depositors in 
the event that their deposits are unavailable as a result of defective supervision on the 
part of the competent national authorities”.
773
 Explaining this conclusion, the ECJ noted 
that “[…] it should first be observed that Directives 77/780, 89/299 and 89/646 do not 
contain any express rule granting such rights to depositors”.
774
 The ECJ further referred 
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 Ibid, para. 41.  
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to essential harmonization and mutual recognition considerations,
775
 also referring to 
recitals 1 and 4 in the Preamble of the Second Banking Directive, and considering the 
conclusion to be drawn from these as “clear”.
776
 It also considered the necessity to 
coordinate national rules on liability in the event of defective supervision,
777
 noting that 
“[…] it is not possible in a number of [MSs] for the national authorities responsible for 





Thus, it might be argued that instead of considering whether a national rule precluding 
claims of individuals for compensation by competent authorities is compatible with EU 





The above reasoning of the ECJ led to the negative answering of the third question of 
the preliminary reference, which was relevant to State liability issues for breach of EU 
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law in the context of the case at hand, and particularly in the event of defective 




Thus, the ECJ, in providing its ruling and in explaining its ratio decidendi, appears to 
have meticulously avoided making any reference to field of investment services, despite 
the relevant direct and precise questions asked by the referring national court. 
 
The issue that inevitably arises is whether this omission is an implicit way for the ECJ 
to state that the two relevant fields of law, i.e. EU banking and EU investment services 
law, have to be treated as distinct with regard to their ratio, scope and aim, at least with 
regard to the existence and nature of rights of depositors and (retail) investors, as a 
priori protected by EU law.  
 
In this regard, it appears in our view that the examination of Peter Paul in its own merit, 
as well as taking into account the problematic of the interrelation of depositor and 
investor protection regime as provided by the relevant Directives, does not lead to any 
safe conclusions as to whether the ratio decidendi of the ECJ in Peter Paul may be 
extended to investment services in the context of EU law until the Crisis;
781
 indeed, 
arguments may be presented both in favour and against such an approach: 
 
If it is considered that the ratio and aim of EU banking law and EU investment services 
law, with regard to individual (depositor or retail investor) protection, is the same or 
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similar, then Peter Paul may be applicable in investment services. If on the other hand it 
is considered that the ratio and aim of EU banking law with regard to individual 
(depositor) protection differs significantly from the respective ratio and aim of EU 
investment services law with regard to individual (retail investor) protection, according 
to the intrinsic characteristics of each sector especially in connection to risk, then Peter 
Paul should not be extended to apply in investment services.  
 
While this dilemma may be more difficult to resolve in the context of EU law as in 
force pre-Crisis, the evolution of EU finance law since the Crisis may offer a solution to 
this ambiguity (at least de lege ferenda). As noted, the fundamental changes in EU 
financial architecture, the creation of new central EU regulatory and supervisory 
authorities, and the proposals for new recovery and resolution rules cannot easily be 
reconciled with a regime of total immunity of competent authorities from tortuous 
liability.  
 
In this new context, even if their competence is to be exercised in the public interest 
(but not “only” in the public interest), this does not appear adequate to a priori preclude 
tortuous liability where the competent authorities have the authority and powers to 
regulate and supervise financial markets and intermediaries. Retail investors, accepting 
an increased degree of risk by their participation in investment transactions, have the 
animus to conclude such transactions also because they have confidence in the financial 
system, a central position in which is held by the competent authorities –not only from a 







Thus, effectiveness of the new EU finance law, which is closely connected to protection 
of confidence in the financial market system, has to be examined in our view in 
conjunction to effective protection of individuals: beyond the problematic on the 
differentiation of depositors vis-à-vis retail investors, it would be very difficult in our 
opinion to support the application of Peter Paul in the area of investment services. 
 
While the ECJ ruling in Peter Paul did not take such considerations under account, it 
suffices in our view to consider that this ruling referred only to the EU finance law 
regime before the Crisis, so that it is not applicable to the new and emerging EU finance 
law regime, and at least to the new EU investment services law with regard to retail 
investor protection. Certainly, a preliminary reference on such issues by a national court 
of law would prove useful.  
 
Such an opportunity arised in the Three Rivers case, which should also be taken into 
account for the purposes of this study, in particular since ad hoc ECJ case-law is scarce.  
 
 
The Three Rivers case in the UK 
 
In the Three Rivers case,
782
 the House of Lords (UK) considered the question of whether 
EU law may be interpreted as conferring rights on individual depositors.  
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BCCI had been established in 1972. The activities   of the BCCI group of companies 
raised suspicions of supervisors. A report produced in 1991 by the auditors appointed 
by the Bank of England, in order to protect depositors’ interests, revealed that BCCI 
was connected to international financial crime, including money laundering, and was 
involved in fraudulent activities.  
 
Following evaluation of the report, the competent authorities terminated the operation 
of BCCI in 1991, affecting a large number of depositors. In the UK, an “Inquiry into the 
Supervision of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International” was issued on 
22.10.1992 chaired by LJ Bingham
783
 giving rise to claims on the ground liability in tort 
                                                                                                                                               
House of Lords’, Euredia, p. 407; FAIRGRIEVE, D. (2003) State Liability in Tort - A 
Comparative Law Study, Oxford: OUP; GRAY, J. (2006) 'Court Castigates BCCI 
Liquidators' Claim against Bank of England, Legal and Regulatory Commentary', 
JFRC, vol. 4, p. 411; idem (2008) 'Lessons from BCCI Saga for the Current 
Accountability Debate Surrounding Northern Rock', JIBLR, p. 37; WALKER, G.A. 
(2006) European Banking Law - Policy and Programme Construction: 6 (Sir Joseph 
Gold Memorial), op. cit., p. 205 et seq., wherein further references. Although relevant 
English law issues arising fall out of the scope of this study, this case is significant as 
the House of Lords proceeded to an extensive analysis and interpretation of applicable 
European law, and in particular of the First Banking Directive, with a view to determine 
whether breach of rights conferred to depositors by European legislation had occurred 
by the alleged omission of the Bank of England to effectively supervise and withdraw in 
time the authorisation of the Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCCI). 
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 Available at http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/hc9293/hc01/0198/0198.pdf. LJ Bingham noted inter alia 
that “[t]he problem of fraud is one to which explicit reference has not been made in the 
Basle Concordats of 1975 and 1983, or in the Community Directives, or in the Banking 
Act 1979”; ibid., paragraph 1.45, p. 17. Having investigated the facts of the case, LJ 
Bingham concluded with regard to the supervision as conducted by the Bank of England 
 
 310 
of the Bank of England
784
 to compensate the claimant depositors who incurred financial 




                                                                                                                                               
(at the time of the facts competent for the supervision of banks) inter alia that “[p]rime 
responsibility of course rests with those who devised, directed and implemented the 
frauds which were practiced. Whether the frauds could and should have been 
discovered by the auditors earlier is an issue I have not been asked to investigate. The 
history, however, makes clear that fraudulent management were able to exploit the 
structure of the group to facilitate and disguise the frauds. This might have been in part 
prevented, or brought to a head, much earlier, had strong and resolute action been 
taken to insist on structural change as a condition of continued authorisation and to 
impose on the group the supervisory regime it was known to require. […]The Bank did 
not pursue the truth about BCCI with the rigour which BCCI’s market reputation 
justified. In later stages the Bank came to rely to an excessive extent, in my opinion, on 
the auditors: under the British system of supervision the auditors have a crucial role to 
play but the duty to supervise is placed on the Bank and it is a duty which cannot be 
delegated. It is the Bank, not the auditor, which is the supervisor. In these respects the 
Bank’s supervisory approach to BCCI was in my opinion deficient. How different the 
course of events would have been had these deficiencies not existed, one can only 
speculate”; ibid., para. 2.484, p. 149-150). The Inquiry included a number of important 
recommendations; ibid., Chapter 3, p. 181 et seq.  
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Before entering the investigation of the facts of the case, LJ Bingham made certain 
general but important comments, which appear pertinent in all cases of intermediary 




In order to decide on the case, the House of Lords took into account the relevant 
European law, and specifically the issue of whether EC banking law Directives 
conferred rights to individual depositors, concluding that no such rights were conferred 
to individuals (so that the first condition of Francovich case-law was not met according 
to the House of Lords). Lord Hope considered, taking into account the legislative 
background and the terms of the First Banking Directive, as well as the case-law of the 
ECJ, that the First Banking Directive was an instrument of harmonisation (having to 
achieve both objectives, of protecting deposits and of creating conditions of equal 
competition between banks operating in more than one states) which did not necessitate 
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 “No one reading the history of BCCI and its supervision today can do so without 
knowledge of what happened in the end. But that is knowledge which no one had until 
the last week or so of the bank’s active existence. It would not be fair to judge the 
actions or decisions of supervisors involved at any particular time on the basis of 
knowledge which they did not have and could not reasonably have had. Nor would it be 
fair to judge the actions or decisions of supervisors on the basis of supervisory 
principles or practices which had yet to take shape or gain acceptance at the relevant 
time […]”; ibid., paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3, p. 29. The parameter of actual knowledge 
possessed by supervisors at the critical time to proceed to taking action, in order for 
supervision to be effective, is critical and indeed is difficult to assess ex post facto (but 
not impossible). Furthermore, knowledge of facts or indications will require the ability 
on the part of supervisors to collect, combine and analyse information in meaningful 
ways, in order to assess the behaviour of a supervised entity (which may also be a group 
of companies). Especially in the case of fraud, and in general financial crime, 





the conferral of rights by the Directive to individual depositors; no provisions of the 
Directive conferring rights to individuals were thus identified by Lord Hope.  
 
It is interesting to note, that while the House of Lords as supreme national court of 
justice is under the obligation to refer preliminary questions on the interpretation of 
European law to ECJ (under the terms provided by Article 234 TFEU, then Article 177 
EC Treaty), it was considered that no such reference was necessary since the issue was 
acte clair and as unanimity was reached by the House of Lords.
787
   
 
Relevant to the problematic under examination is also the EFTA Court decision of 2013 in 
case E-16/11, EFTA Supervisory Authority v Iceland, which distinguished Peter Paul from 
relevant cases on retail financial market participants’ protection and State liability issues 
and which also has to be taken into account.  
 
 
The EFTA Court decision in case E-16/11, EFTA Supervisory Authority v Iceland 
 
While Peter Paul referred to the EU finance law regime as developed before the Crisis, the 
reasoning of the ECJ in this case was taken into account in a recent case brought before the 
EFTA Court, relating to the interpretation of DGSD in the context of European Economic 
Area (EEA) Agreement, following the collapse of the Icelandic banking sector during the 
Crisis.  
 
                                                 
 
787
 The competent Court of Appeals had not considered the issue as acte claire but had 




In case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland,
788
 the EFTA Court was asked 
to declare that by failure to ensure payment of the minimum amount of compensation to 
Icesave (a branch of Landsbanki ĺslands hf, a credit institution established in Iceland) in 
the Netherlands and the UK, within the relevant time limits, Iceland had failed to 
comply with its obligations resulting from the Agreement on the EEA relating to the 
transposition of DGSD.
789
 Taking into account the preamble to DGSD,
790
 as well as the 
provisions of DGSD, 
791
 as well as the relevant national Icelandic legislation,
792
 the 
EFTA Court considered three pleas of the applicant EFTA Surveillance Authority 
(ESA), the first being that Iceland was under an “obligation of result” to ensure that a 
deposit guarantee scheme is set up capable of guaranteeing that in the event of deposits 
being unavailable the aggregate deposits of each depositors are covered in all 
circumstances to the amount provided by Article 7(1) of DGSD, and to ensure that duly 
verified claims by depositors are paid within the time limit laid down by Article 10 of 
                                                 
 
788
 EFTA Court decision of 28.01.2013 in case E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. 
Iceland (nyr).  See also BABIS, V. (2013) ‘Bank Failures, State Liability, and 
Protection of Depositors in Foreign Branches: EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland’, 




 Point 19a of Annex IX to the EEA Agreement.  
 
790
 And in particular recitals 1, 2, 3 , 4 , 7, 16, 23, 24, and 25 thereof.  
 
791
 And in particular Articles 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, and 10 thereof.  
 
792
 I.e. Act No. 98/1999 (of the Republic of Iceland) on a Deposit Guarantee and 






 In particular, the applicant contented that Iceland had not fulfilled its 
obligations simply by transposing DGSD into national law, and setting up and 
recognising a deposit guarantee scheme without any regard as to whether the 
compensation of depositors was in fact ensured under the conditions prescribed by 
DGSD.
794
 In this regard, ESA argued that if follows from Peter Paul “[…] that the ECJ 
considers Articles 7 and 10 of [DGSD] to require a clear and precise result to be 
achieved”.
795
 The Commission, intervening in support of ESA, concurred that DGSD 
imposes said obligation of result,
796
  to ensure capability of the deposit guarantee 
scheme to repay covered deposits, noting that any other interpretation would render the 
provision ineffective to ensure the objective of DGSD,
797
 and agreed on the 
interpretation of Peter Paul by ESA.
798
 Moreover, the Commission noted that State 
liability vis-à-vis individual depositors would have to be established by national 
courts.
799
 On the contrary, Iceland submitted that DGSD imposes no obligation of result 
on an (EEA) State to use its own resources in order to guarantee the pay-out of a deposit 
                                                 
 
793
 EFTA Court decision E-16/11, paras. 75-76.  
 
794
 Ibid., para. 77.  
 
795
 Ibid., para. 78. ESA referred specifically to paras. 26, 27 and 30 of Peter Paul. 
 
796
 Ibid., paras. 86-87. 
 
797
 Ibid., para. 88.  
 
798
 Ibid., para. 89.  
 
799






 and that DGSD places an obligation upon the State “[…] to set up 
and supervise a deposit-guarantee scheme, but there is no suggestion whatsoever that it 
must pay compensation”.
801
 In particular, Iceland emphasised that “[t]he sole purpose of 
recital 24 in the preamble to [DGSD] is to exclude State liability if the compensation of 
depositors is ensured […]”.
802
 Among other intervening parties, Lichtenstein argued 
that DGSD was not intended to deal with the collapse of an entire banking system (as in 
the case of Iceland),
803
 while the UK argued that DGSD imposes an obligation on EEA 





The EFTA Court noted that “[…] there is a general obligation on the EEA States to 
ensure that the provisions of a directive are fully effective”,
805
 further referring to the 
various degrees of detail in the rules provided by various directives.
806
  Considering that 
the question of State liability is not within the scope of the proceedings before it,
807
 the 
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 Ibid., para. 96. 
 
801
 Ibid., para. 97.  
 
802
 Ibid., para. 100.  
 
803
 Ibid., para. 110. 
 
804
 Ibid., para. 114.  
 
805
 Ibid., para. 120. 
 
806
 Ibid., para. 121.  
 
807
 Ibid., para. 123. 
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EFTA Court proceeded in interpreting DGSD. In this context, noting the duality of the 
aims pursued by DGSD,
808
 the EFTA Court considered that the obligation of an EFTA 
State under the EEA is to ensure that within its territory one or more deposit guarantee 
schemes are introduced and officially recognised, 
809
 and that the depositor’s right to 
compensation may be subject of an action by the depositor against the DGS,
810
 and 
therefore that DGSD does not lay down an obligation on an EFTA State and its 
authorities to ensure compensation if a deposit guarantee scheme is unable to cope with 




Furthermore, the EFTA Court consider that the alleged obligation of result cannot be 
derived from Peter Paul,
812
 without providing in our view any reasoning as to this 
conclusion (except from that the case it examined should be distinguished from Peter 




                                                                                                                                               
 
808
 Ibid, para. 125, referring also to the Opinion of AG Léger in case C-233/94 (supra n 
62), at para. 19.  
 
809
 Ibid., paras 126 – 130.  
 
810
 Ibid., paras 131 – 143. 
 
811
 Ibid., paras. 144 and 178.  
 
812
 Ibid., para. 145. 
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While the ruling of the EFTA Court does not constitute binding interpretation of DGSD 
for EU MSs, case E-16/11 is important with regard to the issues that were treated by the 
Court and the parties, including the European Commission which took a clear position 
that the ECJ in Peter Paul acknowledged an obligation of result imposed on the MSs.  
 
While in our opinion the EFTA Court provided a very narrow interpretation of DGSD 
for the purposes of EEA, its judgment took into account various aspects of the relevant 
problematic especially when examined in the context of a systemic banking crisis, in 
which as it noted a severe financial crisis may turn into sovereign default if DGSs are 
underwritten by States.  
 
In this regard, stating that, “[h]ow to proceed in a case where the guarantee scheme is 
unable to cope with its payment obligations remains largely unanswered by 
[DGSD]”,
815
 the EFTA Court appears to have considered that avoidance of public 
interest considerations, as expressed in disallowing the financing of depositors’ 
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 The other two pleas related to discrimination contrary to DGSD and to Article 4 of 
the EEA; ibid., paras. 186 – 227.  
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Interim Concluding Remarks 
 
Beyond payment of minimum ex lege compensation to retail investors in the event of 
intermediary default, EU law has proven –at least until the Crisis– tacit if not hesitant to 
recognize the application of the acquis on individual protection in the area of secondary 
EU financial legislation.  
 
If a definitive answer was required as to whether the ratio decidendi of Paul may 
validly be applied to investment services and investor protection, it may be argued in 
our view that it may be construed to this effect only to the extent that the legal status of 
a (retail) investor is the same or very similar to that of a depositor; and to the extent that 
EU law in the area of banking and investment services has the same ratio and aim.  
 
While such an interpretative approach may be consistent with the treatment of both 
categories of financial market participants by EU law and case-law until the Crisis, the 
same is not evident in the new EU financial architecture that emerges from the Crisis; 
the new developments in EU financial law rather lead to the opposite conclusion. 
 
Thus, and despite the uncertainties caused by the new proposed regime for the recovery 
and resolution of financial institutions regarding the legal status of depositors vis-à-vis 
retail investors, in our opinion even EU law is to be interpreted as not allowing for 
tortuous liability of supervisory authorities in the sector of banking, as ruled by the ECJ 
in Peter Paul, such interpretation may not be extended de lege lata to investment 










RETAIL INVESTOR PROTECION IN THE HELLENIC LEGAL ORDER: 
APPLICATION OF NATIONAL LAW IN THE EVENT OF INTERMEDIARY 








CHAPTER V.  PROTECTION OF RETAIL INVESTORS IN THE 
HELLENIC LEGAL ORDER AS CREDITORS IN THE CONTEXT OF 
LIQUIDATION OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 
 
 
Hellenic law provides for two double sets of rules regarding retail investor protection 
(in the form of compensation) in case of an intermediary failure: One set of rules applies 
to claims against the firm under liquidation,
816
 while the other to the verification of 
claims and payment of compensation by the relevant funds. These sets of rules are 
further subdivided into two distinct set of rules, one on investment firms, and the other 
on credit institutions (providing investment services). Furthermore, common liquidation 
law is applicable to investment firms (after completion of the stage of special 
liquidation).  
 
Thus, in order to answer examine whether effective protection is provided by the 
Hellenic legal order to retail investors in the event of investment firm failure (especially 
as a result of tort), it will be necessary to examine first the rules on protection of retail 
investors in the context of liquidation of financial intermediaries, in order to assess  
whether these rules constitute a coherent and effective normative system.  
                                                 
 
816





V.1 RETAIL INVESTOR PROTECTION AND THE SPECIAL 
LIQUIDATION OF INVESTMENT FIRMS  
 
 
The protection of retail investors in the event of intermediary failure is differentiated in 
the Hellenic legal order depending on the legal form of the financial intermediary, i.e. 
on whether the financial intermediary is incorporated and authorised as an investment 
firm or as a credit institution (also authorised to provide investment services). This 
duality in the protection regime merits analysis.  
 
V.1.1 THE SPECIAL LIQUIDATION OF INVESTMENT FIRMS  
 
At about the same time as ICSD was transposed into the Hellenic legal order,
817
 new 
rules on the special liquidation of investment firms were issued by a modification of 
Law 1806/1988.
818
 For the purposes of research, the analysis of the special liquidation 
of investment firms should not be limited to law as in force (Law 3606/2007) but should 
also take into account its original content (as in Law 1806/1988, at the time when ICSD 
                                                 
 
817
 Law 2533/1997 transposing ICSD entered into force on 11.11.1997.  
818
 By Article 12 of Law 2561/1998 a new Article 4a was added to Law 1806/1988, 
entering into force on 03.11.1998 (i.e. at a time when Law 2533/1997 had already 
entered into force). The rules on special liquidation were further modified by 




was transferred into the Hellenic legal order), allowing for a wider evaluation of the 
development of relevant rules as well as of relevant case-law.  
 
After the withdrawal of the authorisation of an investment firm by the HCMC, the 
ministerial decision which authorising the setting up of the investment firm and 
approving its articles of association was also withdrawn, following which the 




An important legal consequence of the commencement of the special liquidation 
procedure was that while it lasts, and for a period of six (6) months from the completion 
of the procedure of clients' assets recovery
820
 the investment firm cannot be declared 
bankrupt, and for the same period of time individual prosecution and any mandatory 





While said provisions refer to “suspension” of individual prosecution and mandatory 
enforcement, relevant case-law has considered this stay of proceedings as an absolute 
bar to even submitting claims by retail investors against the investment firm under 
special liquidation, such claims been considered as inadmissible.
822
 As a result, retail 
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 Law 1806/1988, Article 4a.  
 
820
 Which took place according to Law 1806/1988, Article 4a (5) – (7). 
 
821







investors have to revert from exercising any remedies against the investment firm under 
special liquidation, until the completion of the relevant procedure, which entails 




Moreover, this compulsory stay of civil proceedings against the investment firm due to 
its entry into special liquidation does not extend to civil proceedings against other 
persons connected to it,
824
 as especially the persons in its direction. As a result, during 
the same period that legal action against the investment firm under special liquidation is 
not allowed, final decisions may be issued by competent civil courts of law regarding 





In our opinion, the strict and extensive interpretation of the provision entailing 
suspension of individual prosecution and mandatory enforcement against the investment 
firm during the stage special liquidation, as adopted by case-law, goes beyond what is 
required by the aim of this provision and is not compatible even with the wording of 
                                                                                                                                               
 
822
 See indicatively Athens MJ-CCFI 1725/2008 (nyr); Athens MJ-CCCI 4842/2008 
(nyr); Athens MJ-CCFI 5249/2008 (nyr); Athens SJ-CCFI 3006/2007 (nyr); Athens MJ-
CCFI 1593/2007 (nyr); Athens MJ-CCCI 7913/2007 (nyr). 
 
823
 For example, in the case of Worldwide Investment Services (see infra n 1141), the 
special liquidation procedure commenced in 2003 and has not yet been completed.  
 
824
 The wording of the provision of Law 1806/1988, Article 4a, referred explicitly 
suspension of prosecution and enforcement against the AEPEY under special 
liquidation only. The same provision is repeated in Law 3606/2007, Article 22, which 
replaced the relevant provision of Law 1806/1988.  
 
825
 See case-law cited supra n 822.  
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said provision. Indeed, the aim of the provision is to protect the assets examined under 
special liquidation procedure from individual claims and attachment; this aim may be 
served, in our view, merely by a suspension of enforcement of decisions, and not by 
absolute inadmissibility of claims filed against the investment firm during the period of 
special liquidation.  
 
In this sense, the rule on suspension of individual prosecution should in our view be 
interpreted strictly, entailing that either individual claims are not adjudicated (but may 
be filed) until the completion of the special liquidation procedure, or that even if such 
claims are adjudicated, the competent court of law will issue a decision which will not 
be enforceable until the completion of the special liquidation procedure.  
 
Thus, in our view the strict approach of existing case-law considering inadmissible all 
claims filed during the special liquidation procedure is not compatible with the 
teleological and the literal interpretation of relevant provisions.  Moreover, there is no 
apparent reason in our view why actions requesting only the judicial recognition of 
claims,
826
 or applications for interim measures, may not be exercised or should be 




                                                 
 
826
 Under Hellenic procedural law, a claimant may request the competent court of law 
only to recognise the existence of his claim or: see Articles 69 – 72 and 223 of HCCP, 
and Articles 71 – 73 of HAPC.  
 
827
 In this regard, it is interesting to note that the provision of Article 4a of Law 
1806/1988 (and now the relevant provision of Article 22 of Law 3606/2007) refers 




The organs of the special liquidation procedure (as provided by Law 1806/1988 and 
now by Law 3606/2007)
828
 are the Overseer of the liquidation and the Liquidator. The 
Overseer of the liquidation is appointed by decision of the HCMC,
829
 and may with the 
approval of the HCMC retain the advisory services of a natural or legal person 
specializing in AEPEY operation.
830
 The Liquidator is appointed by decision of the 




After his appointment, the Overseer has inter alia to create an inventory and separate 
the assets of the investors from those of the firm,
832
 and then inform the JGF as to the 
claims that were not satisfied and to provide it with all necessary information in order 
for payment of compensation to be effected by the latter, according to applicable 
                                                 
 
828
 The translation of Law 3606/2007 in English, as referred here, is that provided by 
HCMC at www.hcmc.gr .  
 
829
 Law 1806/1988, Article 4a(2); Law 3606/2007, Article 22(2). While the appointment 
of the Overseer is regulated by this provision, there is no specific provision regarding 
the dismissal or replacement of the Overseer; cf. Article 20(5) of Law 3606/2007 
regarding the replacement of the “provisional trustee” by decision of the HCMC (infra n 
838). The Overseer and the Liquidator enjoy immunity from civil and criminal 
responsibility with regard to the investment firm’s obligations created before their 
appointment; Law 3606/2007, Article 22(12) (replacing  Article 4a(11) of Law 
1806/1988, according to initial enumeration); this provision was originally introduced 
by Article 18 of Law 2733/1999, having retrospective effect.  
 
830
 Law 3606/2007, Article 22(2).  
 
831
 Law 1806/1988, Article 4a(3). 
 
832






 Upon completion of the special liquidation procedure, the common 
liquidation procedure of the investment firm commences (according to common 




Law 1806/1988 further provided that the special liquidation procedure is supervised by 
the HCMC.
835
 Law 3606/2007 provides that HCMC issues the decision appointing the 
Overseer, by which it also determines his remuneration and regulates general matters 
relating to the special liquidation process,
836
 while the Overseer reports to the HCMC as 




 While it is clear, in our view, that the special liquidation procedure is under the 
auspices and the supervision of the HCMC,
838
 no specific rules are provided regarding 
                                                 
 
833
 Ibid.  
 
834
 Law 3606/2007, Article 22(9) and (10). Infra, Ch V.2.2. 
 
835
 Law 1806/1988, Article 4a (3).  
 
836
 Law 3606/2007, Article 22(2). 
 
837
 Ibid., Article 22(3) and (9).  
 
838
 Cf. Article 20(3) and (4) of Law 3606/2007 regarding the provisional suspension of 
an investment firm’s authorisation which provides that the HCMC may appoint a 
“provisional trustee” (according to the term used in the available official translation, 
supra n 828) who “[…] shall be subject to the control and supervision of the [HCMC] 
and his duties shall continue as long as the firm is under provisional suspension […]”. 
It is reasonable in our view to consider that since the “provisional trustee” (whose tasks 
are relevant to safeguarding the investment firm clients’ interests) is placed explicitly 
under the control and supervision of the HCMC, the same applies to the Overseer in the 
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the nature, mode and extent of cooperation between the latter and the Overseer, as well 
as any procedural and substantive rules to resolve any issues or differences arising in 




More generally, the legal framework on the relation between the HCMC, the JGF, and 
the organs of the special liquidation procedure is not coherent and does not achieve 
legal certainty, in our opinion. While certain new rules have been introduced by Law 
3606/2007 regarding the remuneration of the Overseer and the Liquidator,
840
 providing 
inter alia that the JGF may be asked to cover relevant expenses,
841
 the legislative 
framework as has been developed does not lead, in our view, to a safe conclusion as to 
whether the JGF procedure and the special liquidation procedure are to be understood as 
components of such a single, wider procedure, aiming at the protection of investment 
firm’s creditors.
842
 The emerging uncertainty is intensified by provisions referring on 
                                                                                                                                               
context of the special liquidation procedure. Moreover, it should be noted that the term 
“provisional trustee” as appearing in said official translation is not accurate in the 
context of the Hellenic legal order (which does not know the notion of trusts and 




 No important improvements resulted in this direction from the introduction of Law 
3606/2007, which did not materially modify the relevant provisions of Article 4a of 
Law 1806/1988 (see also n 818).   
 
840
 Law 3606/2007, Article 22(2).  
 
841
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842
 Cf. Law 3606/2007, Article 23(1) according to which payments by the investment 




the one hand to the HCMC regulating general matters of the liquidation process,
843
 and 
on the other hand to the JGF entering into agreements with the Overseer as to “the 




According to the provisions of Law 1806/1988, as repeated by Law 3606/2006,
845
 
regarding verification of claims in the context of the special liquidation procedure, 
  
 “Right after his appointment, the Overseer shall make an inventory and shall 
separate from the other assets of the firm the assets, cash and securities of the 
firm, as well as the assets, cash and securities of third parties which are 
connected to the provision of investment services by the company […] which are 
held by the firm or have been delivered thereby to the Central Security 
Depository or Banks for safekeeping. The Overseer, within ten (10) days of his 
appointment, shall invite the beneficiaries of any claims, by notices published 
[…] to announce their claims along all required documentation within three (3) 
months of the last publication. […]”.
846
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 See also n 836. 
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 Law 3606/2007, Article 22(2), last indent.   
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] for claims relating to the delivery of cash or securities [
848
] 
held by the firm and associated [
849
] to the provision of investment services 
thereby […], the liquidator [
850
] shall verify the claims on the basis of entries in 
the books and records of the firm within three (3) months”.
851
  
“Within a period not exceeding two (2) months of the said verification of claims, 
the liquidator shall deliver [
852
] the cash and financial instruments of third 
parties held by the firm and associated with [
853
] the provision of investment 
services thereby […]. More particularly, the liquidator shall commensurably 
satisfy the beneficiaries of unregistered instruments and cash, where existing 
unregistered financial instruments and cash held by the AEPEY on behalf of its 
                                                 
 
847
 The original version of this provision in the Hellenic language refers to 




 The original version of this provision in the Hellenic language refers to delivery of 
cash or financial instruments “in naturam”, which has not been repeated in the official 
translation provided by the HCMC.  
 
849
 The exact translation of the original is in our opinion “connected to” (instead of 
“associated with”).  
 
850
 The relevant provision of Article 4a(6) of Law 1806/1988 provided that the 
verification of claims is effected by the Overseer.  
 
851
 Law 3606/2007, Article 22(6) (replacing Article 4a(6) of Law 1806/1988).  
 
852
 See n 848. 
 
853






] are not sufficient to satisfy the beneficiaries of unregistered 
instruments or cash, respectively”. 
855
   
 
Thus, according to the clear wording of the above provision, the verification of claims is 
effected by the Liquidator “on the basis of entries in the books and records of the 
firm”.
856
 Beyond doubts raised in our opinion as to the effectiveness of the protection 
awarded to creditors of the failed investment firm (including retail investors) by 
application of this claim verification rule –especially where failure and withdrawal of 
the authorisation of the firm is connected to unlawful book and record keeping–
857
 
further discrepancies arise due to the lack of uniformity of this rule even in the context 
of the special liquidation procedure: According to another rule provided by the same 
law, financial instruments and cash belonging to the clients of the investment firm under 
special liquidation, as separated by the assets of the firm in order to be distributed, “[…] 
shall include, in addition to financial instruments and monetary amounts belonging to 
the clients of the AEPEY pursuant to the rules of contract law [
858
], financial means in 
                                                 
 
854
 In the original version in the Hellenic language: “third parties”. 
 
855
 Law 3606/2007, Article 22(7) (replacing Article 4a(7) of Law 1806/1988).  
 
856
 Supra, n 851. 
 
857
 This has also been noted as a general remark on the claim verification rules in such 
cases by the 2005 OXERA study (supra, n 25), pp. 47 – 48.  
 
858
 The text of the original version of Law 1806/1988, Article 4b(4) in the Hellenic 
language, as published in the GG, refers to “rules of property law”; the same applies to 
the corresponding provision of Law 3606/2007, Article 23(4). However, the official 
translation of provided by the HCMC refers to “rules of contract law”. It has been 
preferred here to refer to “property” and not “contract” law, since the first relates to 
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materialized or dematerialized form, and monetary amounts held, directly or indirectly, 
by the AEPEY on behalf of its clients”,
859
 in which case the claim of the clients is also 





Thus, it appears that the same law provides for two different rules on the verification of 
claims in the context of the special liquidation procedure: one rule provides that 
verification of claims is effected on the basis of entries in the books and records of the 
firm (only), while the other that (general) contract law rules relating to proof of 




                                                                                                                                               
contracts in rem (real covenants in English law) whereas the latter relating to contracts 
in personam (personal covenants in English law). The reference by this provision to 
ownership according to the rules of property law may be relevant to the general rule of 
Hellenic civil law that ownership of mobile property is transferred by relevant 
agreement (personal covenant in English law) without need for a contract concluded 
before a notary (by deed in English law). 
  
859
 Law 3606/2007, Article 23(4), replacing Article 4b(4) of Law 1806/1988. 
 
860
 Ibid.  
 
861
 The literal, methodological or teleological interpretation of the relevant provisions 
does not help in resolving this contradiction: while the first provision relates 
“particularly” to claims for in naturam delivery of cash or financial instruments held by 
the investment firm in connection to the provision of investment services, the other 
refers also to claims for cash or financial instruments held by the investment firm and 
belonging to clients “pursuant to the rules of property law”. Further, there appears to be 






Beyond considerations connected to lack of any requirement of proof in writing 
according to general Hellenic contract law for ownership of movable property to be 
proven, the lack of certainty and predictability emerging from the conjunction of the 
above two rules on claim verification is apparent. Thus, the effectiveness of the 
protection awarded to retail investors by these rules on claim verification is 
questionable, especially in the event of investment firm failure as a result of tort:  
 
If retail investor claim verification is effected only on the basis of entries in the books 
and records of the investment firm, then it is practically impossible for a retail investor’s 
claim to be verified in the context of the special liquidation procedure when fraud has 
been perpetrated against him by the investment firm; it is hardly to be expected that 
fraudulent transactions or embezzlement of investor’s assets will have been entered in 
the books and records of the firm.  
 
This inefficiency may be mitigated by second rule, as noted above, that claim 
verification may be effected on the basis of any other evidence in writing, as well. 
However, it is difficult to reconcile the two rules in our view, and to understand the 
envisaged field of application of each of them (if differing). Under the second, wider 
rule, claimant investors are allowed to produce and invoke of all written evidence they 
may possess with regard to their claim against the investment firm. While such evidence 
may include –especially in case of firm failure as a result of fraud– documents a priori 
invalid with regard to the legal relation they refer to (such as forged certificates of 
depositing, forged orders or certificates of transactions etc.) it may be important per se 
 
 333 
in proving the relation of the investor with the investment firm. Or, it may constitute an 




The ensuing contradiction of the provisions on claim verification affects the cohesion, 
certainty and overall effectiveness of the special liquidation procedure, and 
demonstrates the ambiguity that characterises the rules on investor protection in the 
event of investment firm failure, especially for reasons connected to fraud.  
 
The conclusion of the special liquidation procedure follows the compensation procedure 
by the JGF and is decided by the competent court of law:
863
  
                                                 
 
862
 On proof by documents in civil proceedings, see HCCP, Articles 432 – 465. On 
proof by documents in administrative proceedings (in cases of pecuniary claims) see 
HAPC, Articles 169 – 176. 
863
 The relevant ruled was introduced by Article 48(2) of Law 3282/2004, (BGG vol. A 
no. 210 of 02.11.2004) which replaced Article 4a(9) of Law 1806/1988, and is now 
replaced by Article 22(9) of Law 3606/2007. This amendment was necessary since the 
conclusion of the special liquidation procedure was not previously regulated in a 
definite way. However, it actually allows for the persons in control of the investment 
firm before its failure to be placed back at its direction should the general meeting of the 
investment firm’s shareholders convened by the Overseer and the Liquidator so decide. 
The issues arising were treated by a further modification to the above rule (addition of a 
new paragraph 10 to Article 4a of Law 1806/1988 by Article 43(2) of Law 3371/2005, 
BGG vol. A, no. 178, 14.07.2005) which provided that said rule is not applicable and 
the liquidation of the investment firm continues by the Overseer and the Liquidator in 
case a civil action has been filed by investment firm under special liquidation against 
members of the (ex) BoD of the investment firm, or against its shareholders, or in case a 
criminal action has been filed against the same persons or if a criminal process has been 
commenced against them, or if they have already been criminally convicted. Further, by 




After the provision of information by the Overseer to the JGF regarding investor claims 
that were not satisfied in the context of the special liquidation procedure, the JGF has to 
decide “[…] having received all necessary information from the Overseer all necessary 
information from the records of the firm”
864
 whether it is obliged to pay compensation 
under applicable legislation,
865
 and to compensate investors accordingly “without being 
obligated to observe any additional procedure or notification”.
866
 Lack of clarity and of 
predictability characterizes in our view the applicable provisions, especially when 
examined en bloc. 
 
Moreover, while the insertion of a provision relating to the payment of compensation by 
the JGF in the law governing the special liquidation procedure is not understandable in 
our opinion, from a systematic point of view,
867
 it is also important to note that 
                                                                                                                                               
effect retrospectively, as of the time of entry into force of Law 3283/2004, obviously 
with a view to cover all issues which had appeared in the meanwhile. However, it is 
interesting to note that this provision is not repeated in Law 3606/2007, which repealed 
Law 1806/1988; it is not certain in our view whether this omission was intended yet the 
relevant law as it stands cannot be freely interpreted as incorporating this provision 
which was part of earlier law that was repealed.  
 
864
 Law 3606/2007, Article 22(5).  
 
865
 I.e. Article 67 of Law 2533/1997.  
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 Law 3606/2007, Article 22(5), replacing Article 4a(8) of Law 1806/1988. 
 
867
 Since conditions for payment of compensation by the JGF are governed by Law 
2533/1997, to which said provision refers, and which sets different applicable criteria. 




according to this provision the source of information regarding investors’ claims is 
common, for both the organs of the special liquidation procedure and the JGF.  
 
Following the payment of compensation by the JGF, the special liquidation procedure is 
concluded, by judgment of the competent court
868
 which also orders the organs of the 
special liquidation to convene a general meeting of the shareholders of the investment 
firm under liquidation, who have to elect (new) liquidators to continue the liquidation 





V.1.2 THE SPECIAL LIQUIDATION OF CREDIT INSTITUTIONS  
 
The reorganisation and liquidation of credit institutions in Hellas is governed by Law 
3458/2006,
870
 which transfers Directive 2001/24/EC into the Hellenic legal order.
871
   
                                                 
 
868
 Law 3606/2007, Article 22(9). If the firm is completely deprived of assets, the court 
may declare cease of the liquidation and order the de-registration of the firm from the 
register of societés anonymes: Law 3606/2007, Article 22(10). 
 
869
 I.e. according to Article 49 of Law 2190/1920; infra Ch V.2.2. While the special 
liquidation lasts, the common liquidation may not commence: see indicatively LCS 
Opinion 322/2007, Nomos (436980). 
 
870
 BGG vol. A, no. 94, 08.05.2006.  
 
871
 See in general KALAMBOUKA - GIANNOPOULOU, P. (2007) 'The operation of 
European and non-European credit institutions and measure taking after L. 3458/2006*', 
DEE, p. 428.  For earlier law, before the introduction of Law 3458/2006 on the special 




Within the field of application of Law 3458/2006 fall credit institutions having their 
statutory seat in Hellas as well as their branches in EU MSs, with the exception of credit 




Law 3458/2006 generally follows the structure and content of Directive 2001/24/EC 
and set the general framework for the reorganization
873





The competent national authorities for deciding the opening of liquidation procedures, 




With regard to the national rules applicable on the liquidation of credit institutions, Law 
3458/2006 closely follows the respective provisions of Directive 2001/24/EC
876
; 
                                                                                                                                               
(446830); BOTOPOULOS, K. (1996) The Liquidation of Banks: an Incomplete 
Institution*, DEE, p. 675.  
 
872
 Law 3458/2006, Article 2.  
 
873
 Ibid., Articles 4 – 10.  
 
874
 Ibid., Articles 11 – 20.  
 
875
 Ibid., Articles 3 and 10. Regarding withdrawal of credit institution’s authorisation by 
the Bank of Greece and public interest considerations, see indicatively HSACJ 
(Injunctions Committee) 453/2012, Nomos 594505; HSACJ (Injunctions Committee) 
488/2012, Nomos 595416. 
 
876
 See Article 11 of Law 3458/2006 and Article 9 of the Directive. Thus, for example, 
Article 11(2) of said Law inter alia provides that “[…] the law of the home Member 
 
 337 
without specifying how national rules governing the liquidation of credit institutions 
operate as normative system, it states that “according to Hellenic law, liquidation 
procedures are: (a) the entering of a credit institution into liquidation procedure, as 
provided by the provisions of Article 9 of [Compulsory] Law 1665/1951 [
877
] in 
conjunction with Currency Committee decision 975/1/12.7.1956 [
878
] […] and the 
provision of Article 1(1) of Law 2330/1995 [
879
]; (b) the insolvency procedure 
according to the provisions of Articles 525 to 707 of [Royal Decree] 19.4/11.5.1835 and 
according to Articles 1 to 21 of [CompL] 635/1937; [
880
] (c) any collective procedure 
which is opened and controlled by the Hellenic administrative or judicial authority, 
                                                                                                                                               
State shall determine in particular: […] (f) the claims which are to be lodged against 
the credit institution and the treatment of claims arising after the opening of the 
liquidation proceedings; (g) the rules governing the lodging, verification and 
admissions of claims […]”.  
 
877
 CompL1665/1951 (BGG, vol. A, no. 31) was repealed by Article 92(4) of Law 
3601/2007. Article 9 of Law 1665/1951 provided that, following issuing of decision by 
the Currency Committee of the Bank of Greece on the commencement of liquidation 
proceedings and the appointment of liquidators, who are responsible for the 
administration of the credit institution under the supervision of the Currency 
Committee, the credit institution may not accept deposits and may not be declared 
insolvent. See, indicatively, HSCCJ 1007/2013, Nomos.  
 
878
 Repealed by Article 8(1) of the Regulation on the Special Liquidation of Credit 
Institutions (see infra n 883). 
 
879
 Article 1(1) of Law 2330/1995 provides that a credit institution under liquidation 
may set up a credit institution by transferring to it assets and liabilities, according to 
specified therein rules.   
 
880
 Articles 525 – 707 of RD 19.4/11.5.1835 (HComL) and CompL 635/1937 were 




[having as] content that of the ‘liquidation procedures’ as defined above”.
881
 Thus, Law 
3458/2006 refers to the general legal framework governing the insolvency of credit 
institutions under Hellenic law.  
 
Further, the liquidation of credit institutions is also governed by Law 3601/2007, which 
provides for rules of the same normative content as those of Law 3458/2006, to which it 





On the basis of this delegation provided by Law 3601/2007, the Credit and Insurance 
Committee of the Bank of Greece issued the Regulation on the Special Liquidation of 
Credit Institutions,
883
 which merits closer examination as it is applicable in the case of 
special liquidation of credit institutions providing also investment services.  
 
According to said Regulation, its aim is to introduce rules to supplement HIC where 
necessary and not to establish an autonomous system of rules for the special liquidation 
of credit institutions which would govern relevant matters without need to apply HIC.
884
 
Instruments of the special liquidation are the special liquidator and the Bank of Greece, 
while the competent court adjudicates claims relating to the special liquidation 
                                                 
 
881
 Law 3458/2006, Article 3.  
 
882
 Law 3601/2007, Article 68.  
 
883
 Bank of Greece Decision 21/2/4.11.2011, BGG vol. B, no. 2498, 04.11.2011. 
 
884




according to ex parte proceedings.
885
 The competence and powers of the special 
liquidator are determined by reference also to relevant provisions of HIC (regarding 





Following relevant public announcement by the special liquidator, all claimants are 
called to submit their claims; the notice of claims must be in writing, has the content 
provided by the relevant rule of HIC,
887
 and must be supplemented “by the documents 
proving the claim”.
888
 A specific remedy is provided for the verification of claims which 
were announced out of time,
889
 while the special liquidator includes in the table of 





                                                 
 
885
 Ibid., Article 1(1).  
 
886
 Ibid., Article 1(3) – (5).  
 
887
 Reference to Article 91(2) of HIC, which provides that “[t]he creditor states the 
nature and cause of his claim, the time it arose, the amount, as well as whether his 
claim has or does not have a privileged nature or security in rem and the assets which 




 Decision 21/2/4.11.2011 (supra, n 883), Article 3(2), as modified by Bank of Greece 
Decision 55/23.11.2012 (BGG vol. B, no. 3399). 
 
889
 Ibid., Article 3(3).  
 
890




Claim verification is effected by the special liquidator in writing, without presence of 
the claimants, in a time limit set by the Bank of Greece (not exceeding three months 




The verification of claims is effected by comparison of the documents of the claimant to 
the books “and other documents” of the credit institution, while the special liquidator 
presents objections against the claims that are not verified and submits a report of the 




Furthermore, other creditors and the credit institution may present to the special 
liquidator objections against announced claims.
893
 All objections are introduced in total 
by the special liquidator to the competent court which rules according to ex parte 
proceedings;
894




Beyond the rules on special liquidation, it is useful to also take into account generally 
applicable rules of the Hellenic legal order on insolvency law and the liquidation of 
sociétés anonymes, since after completion of the special liquidation the latter regime 
applies in the final stage of the liquidation of a failed financial institution in Hellas.   
                                                 
 
891
 Ibid., Article 4(1).  
 
892
 Ibid.  
 
893
 Ibid.; Cf. ibid. Article 6(3).  
 
894
 Ibid., referring to HIC, Article 95(2).  
 
895






V.2 RETAIL INVESTOR PROTECTION, HELLENIC COMMON 




The liquidation of sociétés anonymes under Hellenic law is governed by the provisions 
of Law 2190/1920, as codified.
896
 Before a brief examination of the relevant provisions 
Law 2190/1920 for the purposes of the present study, it will be useful to examine basic 
provisions of general Hellenic insolvency law, to which especially the law on 
liquidation of credit institutions refers,
897
 in order to have a more complete view of the 
issue discussed.  
 
 
V.2.1 HELLENIC INSOLVENCY LAW  
 
Hellenic insolvency law is understood systematically as a branch of commercial law, 
being applicable only to merchants.
898
 HIC provides, as a general rule, that insolvency 
                                                 
 
896
 Infra, n 930. 
 
897
 Supra, Ch V.1.2.  
 
898
 Hellenic insolvency law is codified in HIC (Law 3588/2007, BGG, vol. A, no. 153), 
which entered into force on 16 Sept. 2007 (ibid., Article 180). Before the introduction 
of HIC, Hellenic insolvency law was organised in the context of the HComL (Articles 
525 et seq. of RD 19.4/11.5.1835, repealed by HIC, Article 181). 
 
 342 
aims at the collective satisfaction of the bankrupt’s creditors by the liquidation of his 
property (or by other means that may be provided in plans for the reorganisation of its 
business, and especially by the continuation of the latter). HIC inter alia provides that 
legal persons of public law (such as the HCMC), local administration authorities, and 
public organisations may never be declared bankrupt.
899
 Insolvency organs are the 
competent Court, the Receiver, the Juge-rapporteur, the assembly of creditors, and the 
creditors’ committee.
900
 Creditors recognised by the HIC are those having against the 
debtor an existent and judiciable monetary claim at the time of declaration of 
insolvency,
901
 and are categorised as unsecured creditors, “privileged” creditors 
(creditors whose claims are satisfied preferentially according to applicable Hellenic law 




As a rule of public order, the declaration of insolvency entails the ex lege suspension of 
all individual enforcement measures by creditors other than secured creditors,
903
 which 
                                                 
 
899
 HIC, Article 1(2).  
 
900
 HIC, Article 52 et seq. The Juge-rapporteur is a Judge serving at a CFI: HIC, Article 
58.   
 
901
 Claims which have not become mature at the time of declaration of insolvency are 
considered mature for the purposes of insolvency: HIC, Article 23(1). 
 
902
 HIC, Article 21(1).  
 
903
 Secured creditors may proceed to the satisfaction of their secured claims: HIC, 




if pursued are null and void.
904
 The prohibition is wide and encompasses all remedies, 




However, creditors and interested parties are able to seek judicial protection against 
actions of the Juge-rapporteur, by filing a relevant petition before the competent 
Court;
906




Creditors have to announce their claims before the competent Court, following 
declaration of the insolvency.
908
 Claims which have been duly announced are verified 
by the Receiver in a procedure before the Juge-rapporteur and which is open for 
creditors having verified claims to attend.
909
  
                                                 
 
904
 See indicatively, HSCCL 808/1990, EEmpD (1991) 712.  
 
905
 HIC, Articles 25 and 26.  Cf. suspension of enforcement in the context of special 
liquidation proceedings, supra Ch V.1. 
 
906
 In the context of the special liquidation procedure, while the Liquidator is also 
appointed by Court (pursuant to Articles 739 et seq. of the HCCP), so that he may be 
replaced according to the same procedure, the Overseer is appointed only by decision of 
the HCMC; supra, n 829. 
 
907
 HIC, Article 60.  
 
908
 HIC, Articles 89 – 92. Cf. HIC, Articles 162 – 163. 
  
909
 HIC, Article 93.  
 
 344 
Decisions on the verification or not of announced claims may be challenged before the 
competent Court by interested parties.
910
 Also, claims that were not announced on time 




The rules of HIC on claim verification are laconic: “[claim] verification is performed by 
the comparison of creditor’s documents to the [commercial] books and other documents 
of the debtor”.
912
 No specific rule is provided by HIC as to which documents are 
considered as “creditor’s documents” acceptable into the verification of claims 
procedure, nor according to which criteria such assessment is performed. Further, the 
“other documents of the debtor” are not specified.
913
 Moreover, it is interesting to note 
that judicial review of the verification of claims is performed pursuant to the non-
adversarial procedure
914
 in the context of which the court has power to “[…] order also 
by own motion for any measure to be taken which is suitable for verifying true facts, 
                                                 
 
910
 HIC, Article 94.  
 
911
 HIC, Article 92. Earlier law provided for such a right until the end of distribution: 




 HIC, Article 93(3). The receiver may always, at the request of any interested person 
or ex officio, request the disclosure of the creditor’s books or of an official excerpt 
thereof, as evidence: HIC, Article 94(3). 
 
913
 However, the former requirement for the proof of a creditor’s claim by documents 
“of certain date” has been repealed by HIC, which in our view implies that documentary 
evidence is allowed by documents in general, as the latter are defined by the general 
provision of HCCP, Article 443.  
 
914
 HCCP, Articles 739 et seq.  
 
 345 
even regarding those which have not been proposed and in particular of facts which 





It is difficult in our view to reconcile the rule of HIC regarding documentary evidence 
with this procedural rule; and it is not clear in our opinion whether one rule prevails 
over the other (as lex specialis, or on other grounds). Furthermore, it is not clear in our 
view how the requirement for documentary evidence under examination is to be 





Relevant considerations are also reflected in the area of criminal law, where it is 
specifically provided that the competent criminal court decides freely on the existence 
or not of a claim which has been announced for verification (and attested by oath, under 
previously applicable law)
917
 independently of civil justice decisions on the matter, 
which are taken into account only as evidence.
918
  
                                                 
 
915
 HCCP, Article 744.  
 
916
 According to one opinion, proof by witness may be acceptable for creditors’ claim 
verification under the HIC and in any case the court will examine whether it may be 
allowed on grounds of its importance and according to the general practice in relevant 
transactions: see BECHRI - KECHAGIOGLOU, G. (2008) 'The Importance of Assets 
and Liabilities in Bankruptcy*', EEmpD, p. 8.   
 
917
 Oath has been repealed as a form of evidence in civil proceedings; Law 2915/2001, 




However, in common insolvency proceedings, the Juge-rapporteur draws a report on 
the verification of claims, in which a brief description of documents produced in 
evidence is included.
919
 This report is considered full evidence on the verification of 




In an effort to clarify which means of proof may be acceptable in the context of 
insolvency proceedings for the verification of creditors’ claims, it may be useful to also 
briefly take into account –for the benefit of analysis– other relevant rules of the Hellenic 
legal order, such as the rules and relevant case-law on creditor claim verification before 
the introduction of the HIC the rules of the HIC on the examination of the insolvency 
estate by the receiver; and the rules and relevant case-law on creditor claim verification 





                                                                                                                                               
 
918
 See indicatively HSCCJ 935/1998, Nomos 275068, EEmpD (2000) 557, Poinika 
Chronika (1999) 536.  
 
919
 HIC, Article 93(5). 
 
920
 See indicatively, HSSCJ 225/2010, EEmpD (2010) 703; HSCCL 1779/2007 DEE 
(2007) 593; HSCCL 443/1976, NoV (1976) 958; HSCCL (Plenary) 82/1964, NoV 




Rules on creditor claim verification before the introduction of the HIC  
 
Before the introduction of the HIC, the relevant rule of HCL on verification of claims 
initially provided a rule similar to that as currently in force, i.e. that “[claim] verification 
is performed before the Juge-rapporteur and in the presence of the creditor or his 
attorney and the receivers and by comparing the [creditor’s] documents of title to the 
[commercial] books and other documents of the debtor”.
921
 This rule was subsequently 
complemented by the introduction of a rule providing that claims under verification in 
the context of insolvency proceedings have to derive from documents of certain date, or 




                                                 
 
921
 HComL, Article 586 (repealed). This rule was supported by a provision on the 
competence of the Juge-rapporteur to order the presentation (disclosure) of the 
creditors books or of an official excerpt thereof (HComL, Article 587, repealed), and by 
the provision of an obligation of each creditor whose claim was verified to take oath 
before a competent authority that his claim was true and guileless as to its verified 
amount, as a condition of his participation in insolvency proceedings (HComL, Article 
589, repealed).  
 
922
 Amendment by Article 6(18), indent 19, of Law 2479/1997, BGG, vol. A, no. 67.  
Law 2479/1997 entered into force on 6 May 1997. This rule was in force until the entry 
into force of the HIC. According to case-law, the relevant provision established as sole 
acceptable means of evidence of a claim by any creditor, submitted in the claim 
verification procedure under general insolvency law, private documents which have 
obtained a certain date (through attestation by a notary or other competent public 
official) as well as official commercial books of the bankrupt or the creditor; see 





The ratio of this strict rule on acceptable evidence for the purposes of creditors’ claim 
verification may be linked to requirements of legal certainty and predictability. 
However, in case of tort, and especially of fraud, committed by the bankrupt against 
creditors, such restrictive approach to evidence may have an adverse effect on the 
protection actually awarded to such creditors. In this regard, it has been ruled that the 
restriction of acceptable evidence to documents of certain date and official books is 
applicable only to the claim verification procedure by the organs of insolvency (the 
Juge-rapporteur and the receiver) and it does not affect the means of evidence that are 





Furthermore, it is not clear whether such strict rules on evidence apply to all claims 
irrespective of their causa.
924
 
                                                 
 
923
 Dodoni CCA 73/2007, Nomos 451297. It is not clear though, in our opinion, whether 
this case-law may be considered as established, and whether it may further be 
considered as applicable also in the context of the claim verification procedure under 
the HIC.  
 
924
 It has been ruled, that when claim verification is contested before the competent 
Court and such claim falls within the field of application of special labour law civil 
procedure (HCCP, Articles 633 et seq.) then proof of such claim will also be governed 
by the special labour law civil procedure (which allows for all means of evidence): see 
indicatively Thessaloniki CCA 195/2008, Nomos 463939, Harmen. (2008) 740, and 
further references therein; Athens CCA 146/2007, Nomos 434496, DEE (2007) 687; 
Athens CCA 4634/1997, Nomos 187287, Dikaiosyne (1998) 1657, NoV (1998) 71. It is 
not clear in our view which is the ratio of this differentiation with regard to labour 
claims (only): it may be that, for reasons of uniformity of application of the special 




Rules of HIC on the examination of the insolvency estate by the Receiver 
 
According to the rules of HIC on the duties of the Receiver, the latter “examines the 
commercial books and other data [i.e. not expressly documents] of the debtor and asks 
him to acknowledge their content, to attest their condition, to provide any useful 
information and to be present at the [closing] of the books”. 
925
 Further, if the debtor has 
not filed a balance sheet and fails to do so after relevant petition by the Receiver, the 
latter draws a special accounting sheet on the basis of the commercial books and data 




                                                                                                                                               
in the context of insolvency proceedings, should be governed by the same rules of 
evidence. However, it may also be supported that labour claim verification rules in 
insolvency proceedings are lex specialis with regard to general insolvency law and thus 
prevail over the latter. In both cases, it appears that a teleological approach would 
support that strict rules of evidence for the verification of labour claims would lead to 
the rejection of the majority of such claims; thus, perhaps for reasons of effectiveness of 
the protection awarded in the context of insolvency proceedings, evidence rules on 
claim verification are relaxed. In such a case, however, it is not evident why only labour 
claims should be allowed a special regime regarding evidence, whereas other unsecured 
creditors meriting protection (such as retail investors, in this case) should be subject to 
strict rules of evidence. This problematic is differentiated in the context of HIC 
proceedings, which provide for judicial review of claim verification by the competent 
Court according to non-adversarial procedure; supra, n 914.   
 
925
 HIC, Article 76 (1).  
 
926




These two rules clearly provide that the Receiver may, and even has an obligation, to 
take into account not only entries in the commercial books and other commercial 
documents of the debtor, but also any other “data” and piece of information that can be 
collected; the ratio of these rules is probably that the Receiver has to achieve a 
presentation of the insolvency estate as complete and accurate as possible.  
 
However, it is not clear whether all these means of proof are acceptable for creditor 
claim verification as well: Although Hellenic insolvency law has aimed at uniformity –
in which direction HIC was also introduced– there has been a degree of uncertainty as 
to whether general insolvency law provisions on creditors’ claim verification may also 
be applied in areas of special insolvency regimes as provided by Hellenic law. 
 
Rules on creditor claim verification in certain special insolvency regimes 
 
In the case of “problematic enterprises” (businesses in great financial difficulties) and 
special liquidation thereof, a sui generis regime applied according to Law 1892/1990 
which while similar in many aspects to common insolvency law it was considered not 
analogous to that of common insolvency law with regard to judicial review of claims; it 
was considered that since this special liquidation regime did not include a claim 
verification procedure then judicial protection appertaining specifically to such 




                                                 
 
927
 See indicatively Larissa CCA 904/2005, Nomos 417417, EpiskED (2006)1093; 




However, in the case of liquidation of insurance firms the opposite has been ruled: 
According to applicable Hellenic law, insurance firms having their license revoked 
entered into a special liquidation procedure aiming at the pro rata satisfaction of the 
creditors of the insurance firm;
 928
 taking into account the similarity of this procedure to 
the corresponding on in the context of insolvency law, it was ruled that for reasons of 
uniformity of reasoning certain rules applicable to insolvency had to be also applicable 





V.2.2 HELLENIC LAW ON THE LIQUIDATION OF SOCIÉTÉS ANONYMES 
 
The general provisions for the dissolution and liquidation of sociétés anonymes under 
Hellenic law are provided by CL 2190/1920, Articles 47 – 49.
930
 Beyond rules for the 
                                                 
 
928
 Mainly, LD 400/1970, BGG vol. A, no. 10.  
 
929




 As modified by Law 3604/2007, BGG vol. A, no. 189. For a translation in English 
see LAMBADARIOS LAW OFFICE (2007) Law 2190/1920, Nomiki Bibliothiki, 
Athens. For an overview see PERAKIS, E. (2007) The New Law of the Societé 
Anonyme. Law 2190/1920 as in force after Law 3604/2007*, Nomiki Bibliothiki; idem 
(ed) 2010 The Law of the Societé Anonyme, Interpretation of Law 2190/1920 per 






triggering and procedure of the dissolution of an S.A.,
931
 more important for the 
purposes of the present study are the rules of Article 49 of CL 2190/1920 on the method 
of conducting the liquidation, which again reveals in our view inconsistencies with the 





Article 49 of CL 2190/1920 inter alia provides that:  
“1. The liquidators appointed by the General Meeting [of the shareholders of the 
SA] must, upon assumption of their duties, draw up an inventory of the 
company’s assets and publish a balance sheet in the press and the [GG] […]. 2. 
The liquidators have the same obligation at the end of the liquidation procedure. 
3. The General Meeting of the shareholders retains its rights during the 
liquidation procedure. 4. The liquidators must conclude, without any delay, any 
pending matters of the company, liquidate its assets, pay its debts and collect its 
claims. They can also perform new acts if such acts serve the process of 
liquidation and the interest of the company. […] 5. The annual financial 
statements as well as the financial statements at the end of the liquidation 
procedure must be approved by the General Meeting. […] After the conclusion 
of conclusion of the liquidation procedure the liquidators draw up the final 
financial statements […] return to the shareholders their contributions, as well 
                                                                                                                                               
 
931
 Law 2190/1920, Articles 47, 47a, 48, 48a.  See in general HSCCJ 2192/2013, Nomos 
(616006); HSACJ 1827/2013, Nomos (611837); HSACJ 3143/2012, Nomos (581616); 
HSCCJ 30/2010, Nomos (517930), EEmpD (2010) 618. 
 
932
 See also MARINOS, M.(ed.) (2011) The Societé Anonyme between Corporate and 




as any above par amounts, that had been paid, and distribute the balance of the 
poceeds from the liquidation of the company’s assets to the shareholders, pro 
rata to their participation in the paid-up share capital. […] 7. The appointment 
of the liquidators results eo ipso to the cessation of the powers of the Board of 
Directors. The provisions regarding the [BoD] are applied mutatis mutandis to 
the liquidators. […] The General Meeting may appoint only one liquidator, if 
the Articles of Associations do not provide otherwise.” 
 
This procedure, although applicable to SAs in general, is only applicable to investment 
firms after the conclusion of the special liquidation procedure, while it is not applicable 





As a result, not only there are two different regimes regarding the liquidation of 
investment firms vis-à-vis credit institutions –which might for be regarded as reasonable 
on account of their different structure and function– but there is further differentiation in 
the treatment of retail depositors depending on whether the financial intermediary is an 
investment firm or a credit institution, which does not appear necessary nor efficient.  
 
                                                 
 
933
 Supra, Ch V.1.2. See HSCCJ 1007/2013, Nomos (610150); ROUSSIS, K. (2013) 
'‘The de Lege Lata Inoperation of the Corporate (ex Parte) Liquidation of CL 









Interim Concluding remarks 
 
The analysis of the special liquidation of investment firms regime vis-à-vis the special 
liquidation of credit institutions regime leads to the conclusion that while the latter is 
characterised to an important extent by inner consistency and coherence, the same is not 
evident in the case of the first –especially where claim verification in the context of 
special liquidation is connected to tort perpetrated against the retail investor.  
 
Overall, the two special liquidation regimes differ significantly while the relevant 
differences appear difficult to justify on objective grounds if Hellenic rules on retail 
investor protection are to be examined as a normative system.  
 
As a consequence, the rules on retail investor protection in the event of financial 
intermediary default and the effectiveness of the protection awarded will depend to a 
great extent on whether the intermediary is an investment firm or a credit institution.  
 
Moreover, following the completion of the special liquidation procedure, the 
continuation of liquidation according to common insolvency law leads to further 
unpredictability, as the rules on the relevant procedure –especially with regard to claim 
verification and relevant remedies– again differ importantly, indicating also in this 
context lack of coherence which further entails deficiencies in the protection awarded to 
retail investors by the applicable rules considered as a normative system.  
 
It is then necessary to examine in turn the rules of the Hellenic legal order on ex lege 
compensation of retail investors in the event of intermediary failure per se, as well as in 







CHAPTER VI.  PROTECTION OF RETAIL INVESTORS IN THE 




Together with the application of the special and common liquidation rules for the 
protection of retail investors as creditors following the failure of a financial 
intermediary, Hellenic law provides for the ex lege compensation of retail investors as 
financial market participants transposing relevant EU law with the double aim of 
protecting retail investors and thus their confidence in the financial system and of 
protecting stability of the financial market.  
 
As in the context of the Hellenic law on the special liquidation of financial 
intermediaries, also in the context of compensation of retail investors by relevant funds 
applicable substantive and procedural rules are differentiated on the basis of whether the 
failing financial intermediary is an investment firm or a credit institution: analysis will 
follow the relevant categorisation attempting to assess the two regimes, per se and in 






VI.1 RETAIL INVESTOR COMPENSATION WHEN THE FAILING 
INTERMEDIARY IS AN INVESTMENT FIRM  
 
 
The transposition of ICSD in the Hellenic legal order was effected by the setting up of 
the JGF. Before proceeding to the examination of the relevant law transposing ICSD, it 
will be useful to examine the earlier Hellenic law on retail investor protection in the 




VI.1.1 DEVELOPMENT OF HELLENIC LAW ON RETAIL INVESTOR 
COMPENSATION BEFORE THE TRANSPOSITION OF ICSD INTO THE HELLENIC 
LEGAL ORDER  
 
Before the transposition of ICSD into the Hellenic legal order, the mechanism on retail 
investor protection in the event of investment firm failure consisted of a combination of 
the applicable provisions of several legislative instruments, namely Law 3632/1928, 
Law 1818/1951, LD 3078/1954 and Law 1806/1988 (in its original form).  
 
Originally, the system of protection of investors in the event of a broker’s failure was 
based on Law 3632/1928 “On Securities Exchanges”.
934
 Law 3632/1928, referring to a 
                                                 
 
934
 BGG vol. A, 1928. See in general GEORGAKOPOULOS, L. (1961) ‘Stock Markets 
of Merchandise and Stock Exchange Legal Acts. General Principles of the Law and 
Practice of the Hellenic Stock Markets of Merchandise*’ EpiskED, p. 241; 
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period characterised to an important extent by financial market transactions concluded 
between natural persons,
935
 was characterised inter alia by the stipulation of sanctions 
against brokers failing to fulfil their financial obligations to their clients (investors) and 
other counterparties, and by the obligation of the broker and “Common Guarantee Fund 
for the Securing of Exchange Transactions”,
936
 to provide compensation to the broker’s 
creditors (clients and counterparties) in the event of failure. Specifically, each broker 
was obliged before commencing his professional activity to deposit as guarantee a sum 
of money in his name with a State-owned credit institution (the National Bank of 
Greece).
937
 This guarantee was to serve as collateral for claims of clients and 
counterparties of the broker in connection to transactions in financial instruments,
938
 i.e. 
in connection to claims rising not from the broker’s professional activity in general but 
only from transactions in the financial market. The guarantee was in principle not 
subject to attachment, and was not subject to assignment or to any claim irrelevant to 
the purpose it served.  
 
The compensation mechanism established by Law 3632/1928 had shortly as follows: 
Upon inability to fulfil his obligations, the broker was obliged to declare this in writing 
to the Government’s Overseer of the Stock Exchange, attaching to his declaration 
                                                                                                                                               
PAPADIMITRIOU, G. (1995) ‘The Legal Status of the Athens Stock Exchange*’ DEE, 
vol. 10, p. 841.  
 
935
 Law 3632/1928, Article 12.  
 
936
 Set up by LD 3078/1954, BGG vol. A, no. 245. 
 
937
 Law 3632/1928, Article 10 (1).  
 
938




copies, certified by himself, of the relevant documents (extracts from the book of 
securities, brokers and clients) for each unsatisfied claim, and to abstain from any 
further transaction in the Stock Exchange.
939
 In case the broker did not submit such a 
declaration, every creditor of the broker had the right to submit a declaration as to the 
broker’s default to the Overseer of the Stock Exchange.
940
 The Overseer, receiving such 
a declaration (either from the broker or from his creditors) was obliged to immediately 
(on the same day) notify the Stock Exchange Commission and to call all other brokers 
who had had transactions with the defaulting broker to submit to the Stock Exchange 
Commission, also on the same day of the call, copies certified by them of the accounts 
of the defaulting broker, as appearing in their broker books.
941
 On the basis of these 
copies, the Stock Exchange Commission drafted on the same day (and by the latest 
before the opening of the Stock Exchange on the following day) a record with all 
necessary information regarding the securities transacted by the defaulting broker.
942
 
Following a procedure for the satisfaction of outstanding claims against the defaulting 
broker on the basis mostly of set-off,
943
 the brokers who had still outstanding 
obligations were obliged to draft an index presenting in detail the outstanding amounts 
on a clearance per clearance basis.
944
 The debtors of the defaulting broker were then 
                                                 
 
939
 Ibid., Article 27 (1). 
 
940
 Ibid., Article 27 (2). 
 
941
 Ibid., Article 21 (3). 
 
942
 Ibid., Article 21 (4). 
 
943
 Ibid., Article 21 (5) – (7). 
 
944




obliged, on the basis of the results appearing on the table, to deposit with the cashier of 
the Stock Exchange all amounts due; the cashier then distributed immediately and 
proportionally the amount received to the creditor brokers.
945
 The Stock Exchange 
Commission was obliged to draft on the same day an index of the amounts still 
outstanding to brokers and to transmit a copy of it to the Overseer of the Stock 
Exchange.
946
 The Overseer of the Stock Exchange was then obliged, as soon as he 
received the Stock Exchange Commission index to call all brokers and other creditors of 
the defaulting broker to reach an out-of-Court settlement with the defaulting broker, 
with regard to any still outstanding amounts. In case the attempt was successful, the 
procedure was ended by the drafting of a relevant official document.
947
 In case the 
attempt was unsuccessful, the Overseer called all debtors of the defaulting broker by 
reason of transactions in the financial market to submit a declaration as to the amount 
due to them, as well as all relevant documents proving the claim, within ten days of the 
last announcement.
948
 Claims were not to taken into account but to the extent verified 
by the relevant documentation.
949
 After the expiration of the ten-day limit, the Overseer 
of the Stock Exchange and the Stock Exchange Commission examined the declarations 
(claims) submitted and decided which claimants could participate in the distribution of 
the amount of the guarantee of the defaulting broker, deducting expenses of the 
procedures and the financial transaction taxes for which the defaulting broker was 
                                                 
 
945
 Ibid., Article 21 (8). 
 
946
 Ibid., Article 21 (9).   
 
947
 Ibid., Article 21 (11).   
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 Ibid., Article 21 (13). 
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 To the amount of the guarantee was added any amount deposited with the 
cashier of the Stock Exchange by clients who had outstanding debts to the defaulting 
broker.
951
 The decision as to which claims were verifiable necessitated the positive 
opinion of at least four of the members of the Stock Exchange Commission and the 
agreement of the Overseer of the Stock Exchange.
952
 Any disagreement between the 
Stock Exchange Commission and the Overseer of the Stock Exchange was to be 
resolved by the competent Court.
953
 The final decision of the Stock Exchange 
Commission and the Overseer of the Stock Exchange was made public, was executed as 
soon as it made public in the Stock Exchange, and was not subject to any remedies.
954
  
The person executing the decision was exempted from all liability arising from the 
distribution of the guarantee.
955
 The persons participating in the procedure were also 
exempted from liability connected to the execution of their duties. The provisions of 
Law 3632/1928 were also applicable in case any person having a claim against the 
defaulting broker submitted an application to receive compensation, in connection to 
transactions in the financial market or recognised by the competent court. 
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Thus, in our view the mechanism initially established in the Hellenic legal order by Law 
3632/1928 for the compensation of investors (as creditors) in the event of financial 
intermediary failure had the following main characteristics:  
 
The commencement of the procedure was flexible in terms of the persons permitted to 
submit a relevant declaration for its commencement but strict in terms of applicable 
time limits which were very short, probably with a view to protect market stability. The 
claimant had the onus to provide the necessary documentation proving his claim and the 
amount of his claim. The only source of compensation was the guarantee deposited by 
the broker at the commencement of his professional activity, which could be increased 
by payment by third parties of debts to the broker. A priori there was no upper limit to 
the amount of compensation a creditor could claim and be paid in the context of this 
procedure; however, there was also no lower limit as well (minimum guaranteed 
amount) due to application of pro rata satisfaction of creditors. However, not all 
creditors could apply for such protection since the causa for their claim to be covered 
had to be the conclusion of transactions in financial instruments and in the financial 
market. The relevant procedure did not entail suspension of other, judicial, procedures 
for the verification of claims. The organs of the competent authorities conducting the 
compensation procedure were exempted from liability.  
 
In general, the mechanism for protection of retail investors under Law 3632/1928 was 
quite simple, and focused on the swift payment of compensation; however, it was also 





VI.1.2. TRANSPOSITION OF ICSD INTO THE HELLENIC LEGAL ORDER AND THE 
JGF 
 
The transposition of ICSD into the Hellenic legal order was effected by the introduction 
of Law 2533/1997 “Derivative Exchange [Market] and other provisions“.
956
 Law 
2533/1997 modified the already existing corpus of Hellenic legislation on investor 
compensation and restructured the already existing “Joint Guarantee Fund for the 
Securing of Exchange Transactions”,
957
 which was renamed “Joint Guarantee Fund for 






Law 2533/1997, which is still in force, states that its aim is the transfer of ICSD into the 
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 BGG vol. A, no. 288, 1997. See in general MITSOU, A. (2007) ‘The [Hellenic 
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 Supra, n 936. 
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 Law 2533/1997, Article 61 (1). 
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Law 2533/1997, as a national implementing measure has to be examined on its own 
merit and taking into account the aim of ICSD, the obligations it prescribes for MSs, the 
legal mechanism of protection it provides, as well as certain inconsistencies and 




According to Law 2533/1997, the JGF is a legal person of private law (of the public 
sector) and “of an insurance nature”,
962
 supervised by HCMC.
963
 Its purpose is “[…] the 
payment of compensation to clients and [ASE] members [as] counterparties in case of 
determining permanent or irreversible inability of an Investment Firm to fulfil its 
obligations which arise out of the provision of investment services covered [by this 
Law] and the support, in this way, of the stability and credibility in the functioning of 




All investment firms authorised in the Hellenic legal order have to be members of the 
JGF;
965
 the sanctions against investment firms contravening their obligations to the 
JGF
966
 may amount to authorization withdrawal by the HCMC.
967
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 Supra, Ch II.1.2.   
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 Law 2533/1997, Article 61 (2).  
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The payment of compensation procedure commences by "[...] (a) the provision of 
notification to the [JGF] by the [Depository S.A.] that [a] member has failed to fulfil in 
time [its] obligation to deliver financial instruments or money for the settlement of a 
Stock Exchange transaction, (b) the filing of a petition for compensation by a client, (c) 
the filing of a declaration by an [investment firm] to the [JGF] that it is unable to fulfil 
its obligations to [its] clients or (d) the issuing of a final bankruptcy [judicial] decision 
against an [investment firm], (e) the withdrawal of licensing for the setting up of the 




Following the triggering of the compensation procedure, the JGF calls all interested 
persons to announce their claims within a limited period of time.  
 
Claim verification by the JGF
969
 is not differentiated depending on the way (instances 
(a) – (e) above) the compensation procedure commences; furthermore, no rule is 
provided as to whether, and to which extent, relevant claim verification rules in the 
context of the JGF procedure are interconnected to relevant rules in the context of the 
special or common liquidation law.
970
 More specifically, a question which is pertinent 
in our view for the purposes of this study arises in this regard: whether the rules on 
claim verification by the JGF according to Law 2533/1997 are compatible with ICSD, 
                                                                                                                                               
 
967




 Ibid., Article 65 (1).  
 
969
 See ibid., Article 66 (1).  
 
970
 Supra, Ch V. 
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and furthermore whether they constitute a coherent system of rules of national law 
examined together with the relevant rules for claim verification under the special 
liquidation procedure.  
 
According to Law 2533/1997, “[i]n case of receipt by the [JGF] of a client’s application 
for compensation, the [JGF] will immediately notify the [investment firm which 
provided the investment] services [in connection to which] the claim is filed, of the 
existence of the relevant claim and will set a time limit for it to provide evidence and 
data with regard to the filed petition, as well as data of clients and counterparty 
members  [with regard to which] there may exist other outstanding claims”.
971
 Thus, it 
is provided that it is the investment firm that has to provide “evidence” and “data” 
relevant to the investor claim to the JGF, the nature or form of such “evidence” and 
“data” not being specified by the relevant provisions.  
 
Furthermore, it is provided that “[…] [i]n case of placing of an [investment firm] under 
the special liquidation [regime], the [JGF] provides compensation to investors for 
monetary claims which derive from covered investment services on the basis of all the 
documents [
972
] and other data which are at the disposal of the [investment firm] or of 
the [Central Depository of Securities] or are transmitted to it [i.e. to the JGF] by the 
Overseer [i.e. of the special liquidation procedure] and which the Overseer of the 




                                                 
 
971
 Law 2533/1997, Article 65 (3). 
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 Law 2533/1997, Article 65 (7). 
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With regard to claim verification in the context of the JGF procedure, this rule is 
important for the subject-matter under investigation, for the following reasons:  
 
Firstly, it refers to “all documents” and “other data” as a basis for verification of 
investor claims by the JGF and does not refer restrictively to the “books and records” of 
the investment firm; however, it indirectly demands for all such documents and other 
data to originate from a source other than the claimant investor. Taking into account that 
it is not specified whether, in the context the special liquidation procedure as organized 
by Laws 1806/1988 and 3606/2007, the claimant investor is allowed to present “any 
other evidence in writing”,
974
 it appears reasonable to assume that the JGF may also 
take into account written evidence (beyond entries in the books and records of the 
investment firm) forwarded to it by the investment firm under special liquidation, which 
was originally presented to the latter by the claimant investor. 
 
However, the same Law also provides that “[i]n any event, the existence of a claim 
against an [investment firm] regarding which [payment of] compensation is being 
examined by the [JGF] will be proven by the data which the [investment firm] issues 
according to existing finance law and regulation, while any other means of evidence is 
prohibited, including oath”.
975
 It appears difficult to reconcile this provision with the 
above rules of the same Law on claim verification;
976
 not only does it refer exclusively 
to data issued by the investment firm, which is problematic per se (especially in the case 
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 Supra, Ch  V.1.1. 
 
975
 Law 2533/1997, Article 67 (5).  
 
976
 Ibid., Article 65 (3) and (7).  
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where the failure of the investment firm is connected to fraud), but also it expressly 
prohibits all other means of evidence. Such means of evidence, which are prohibited, 




Taking the above observations into account, it appears that the rules on verification of 
investor claims by the JGF, as provided by Law 2533/1997, are per se unsatisfactory in 
terms of legal certainty, predictability, flexibility and effectiveness as they fail to 
produce a coherent and consistent system of rules on claim verification. For the same 
reason, they do not achieve effective transposition of ICSD in the Hellenic legal order, 
taking into consideration that ICSD aims also at the protection of retail investors in case 
of fraud. 
 
Moreover, the examination of the relevant provisions of Law 2533/1997 in conjunction 
with those of the law on the special liquidation of investment firms, as a whole, leads to 
the conclusion that relevant Hellenic law does not constitute a coherent and effective 
system of rules on claim verification in the event of investment firm failure: Law 
2533/1997 does note stipulate whether the conclusions reached by organs of special 
liquidation of an investment firm on the verification of investor claims (which are 
forwarded by them to the JGF)
978
 are binding for the JGF or not. Since the JGF is called 
to perform its own claim verification according to the rules provided by Law 
2533/1997, it may be argued that the JGF is not bound by any relevant decision of the 
                                                 
 
977
 See HCCP, Article 339. It is not clear in our opinion whether the restrictive rule of 








organs of special liquidation of the investment firm. While the purposes of the two 
procedures differ in that the special liquidation procedure relates to the protection of all 
creditors of the failed investment firm in general, while the JGF procedure relates to the 
payment of compensation to a specific subcategory of creditors, it is not evident in our 
opinion why claim verification rules should differ –this does not affect the question of 
whether a verified claim is also covered by the JGF law, since a verified claim of a 
creditor may not qualify also as a claim for the payment of compensation if it does not 
fall within the field of application of ICSD and the relevant transposing national law. 
This problematic brings to the fore the more general question as to the aim, scope and 
effectiveness of the two procedures, effected by the organs of the special liquidation and 
by the JGF (in both cases under the supervision of the HCMC), as a system of rules. 
  
After the verification of investor claims and the payment of compensation by the JGF, 
the relevant procedure is concluded and the file of investors claim is forwarded by the 




While actions may be filed by interested persons (such as claimant retail investors) 
against the JGF, yet according to an anachronistic in our opinion rule of Law 2533/1997 
interim measures may not be imposed against the JGF;
980
 beyond incompatibility with 
EU law issues emerging –if ICSD is considered as conferring rights upon individual 
investors claiming compensation, according to the Factortame case-law –this restriction 
                                                 
 
979
 Law 2533/1997, Article 66.  
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is in our view in any case incompatible with rules of the HCon and ECHR on effective 




In the context of the Hellenic legal order, the nature of the obligation of the JGF to 
compensate claimant investors (whose claims are verified and covered) is that of an ex 
lege obligation (stemming from Law 2533/1997 and from ICSD transposed by it) –its 
legal basis is neither contractual nor non-contractual liability (and therefore no  
causality issues arise), but a form of ex lege insurance liability in the context of which 
the JGF is responsible as principal debtor.  
 
One of the most controversial issues regarding the regime of investor compensation in 
the Hellenic legal order is the scope of protection awarded by the JGF. This issue is 
more specifically connected to the conditions necessary under to Law 2533/1997 for the 
ex lege obligation of the JGF to compensate investors to apply.
982
 According to Law 
2533/1997, the JGFis under the obligation to compensate investors in the event of 
investment firm’s inability to fulfil its obligations (i.e. to repay money or to return 
instruments) which “arise out of” the provision of “investment services covered by Law 
                                                 
 
981
 Article 20 of HCon and Articles 6 and 13 of ECHR. See indicatively 
PAPADIMITRIOU, C. (2002) The Influence of Community Law on the Judicial 




 The aim of the JGF, as stated by Law 2533/1997, is to compensate not only clients, 
i.e. investors, but also investment service providers as counterparties of the investment 
firm unable to fulfil its obligations. However, the relevant problematic has emerged in 
connection to retail investors claims to be compensated especially in cases the 
investment firms’ failure was connected to fraud and misappropriation of investors’ 
funds. See case-law cited in n 987 – 990. 
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2533/1997”, as such investment services are specifically and exclusively defined by 
Law 2533/1997 in numerous clausus; for the purposes of its application investment 
services covered by it are only:  
“the conclusion of transactions in [financial instruments]
983
 [by investment 
firms] in the ASE for the account of third [parties] or for their own account”, 
“the safekeeping and [circulation] of financial instruments in the ASE for the 
account of third [parties] [in order] to conclude transactions in the ASE or which 
are the product of [the] conclusion of transactions in the ASE”,  
“the holding of funds of third [parties] [in order] to conclude transactions in 
financial instruments in the ASE or which are the product of [the] conclusion of 
transactions in the ASE”, and  
“as of 26 September 1998 […] also the [investment] services [described] in 




Thus, it appears from the wording of the above provision of Law 2533/1997, that an 
obligation of an investment firm to an investor which is connected to “the holding of 
funds [belonging to the investor] [in order] to conclude transactions in financial 
instruments in the ASE […]” is an obligation connected to an investment service 
covered by Law 2533/1997 and, thus, activating the ex lege obligation of the JGF to 
compensate the investor in case of failure of the investment firm. However, this 
conclusion is has been disputed by the JGF, which considers that when no transactions 
                                                 
 
983
 Law 2533/1997, Article 1 (25), defines financial instruments as transferable 
securities of any kind negotiated in the ASE.  
 
984
 Law 2533/1997, Article 1 (12); for the investment services as per Article 2 (1) of 
Law 2396/1996 see supra, Ch II.1.3.   
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in securities are proven to have taken place by the investment firm for the claimant 
investor, its obligation to compensate the latter does not apply. These disputes on the 
field of application of the relevant protective rules and notion of “covered transactions” 
have led to issuing of interesting case-law in recent years. This case-law touches upon a 
core issue of finance law, that of the aim of financial law with regard to individual 
protection and consequently of the legal nature of retail investors vis-à-vis depositors.  
 
In particular, this recent case-law examined cases where retail investors had entrusted 
money to investment firms in order for investment services to be provided to them, 
mainly transactions in securities and portfolio management. Following the failure of 
such investment firms after withdrawal of their authorisation on the grounds of illegal 
operation, it was reveal that clients’ money had been misappropriated by the investment 
firms.
985
 However, the JGF refused payment of compensation arguing that entrusting of 
money with a view to conclude financial transactions is not a covered investment 
service and so, even in the event of tort committed by the intermediary against the retail 
investor, no compensation is payable by the JGF.  
 
The decisions of the competent civil courts
986
 on this matter have been divided. Certain 
rulings found that when entrusting or depositing of money with a view to enter into 
financial transactions, even where these have not taken place as a result of fraud against 
                                                 
 
985
 Many of relevant cases relate to Tetraktys and Astraia, and Worldwide Investment 
Services failures; see infra VII.2.2. 
 
986
 Civil courts are competent to adjudicate actions against the JGF since it is 




the client, compensation was payable by the JGF.
987
 However, other decisions ruled to 
the contrary.
988
 In an interesting distinguishing, the HSCCJ in 2011 ruled that while the 
holding of funds for the conclusion of transactions in securities constitutes a covered 
transaction for the purposes of JGF, the depositing of capital which is not in the context 





The same issue was faced the supreme civil court in subsequent cases, until it was 
referred to its plenary.
990
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 See indicatively, HSCCJ decision 533/2011 which ruled that ICSD protects also the 
depositing of funds in order to conclude financial transactions and that the field of 
application of  Law 2396/1996 is narrower than that of ICSD, and therefore that 
depositing of funds has to be protected (is covered); HSCCJ 631/2011, DEE (2011) p. 
1258,  by which it was ruled that according to ISD, the management of money does not 
constitute an investment service but also that ICSD, which aims at the protection of 
investors, protects money deposited by persons with a view to conclude transactions in 
the capital markets; Athens CCA 381/2013. The first decision in this direction was 
Athens CCA 1689/2007, DEE (2007) p. 812, Nomos; see also PAPADOPOULOU, R. 
E. (2008) 'The Greek Judge facing the obligation of interpretation of national law in 
conformity to Community law: at last the recognition of the self-evident - On the 
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The 11/2013 decision of the Hellenic Supreme Civil Court of Justice (Plenary) 
 
The Plenary Session of the HSCCJ considered the issue in the same direction as noted 
above, ruling inter alia that: 
 
 “[f]rom the juxtaposition and comparison of the provisions of Community and 
national law it emerges that the provision of Article 12(1) of Law 2533/1997 
provides (a priori) a lower degree of protection than that of Directive 97/9/EC 
and in consequence the interpretation of said provisions of national law must be 
effected under the light and the scope of the latter Directive, so as to ensure the 
principle of effectiveness of Community law, of which Directive 97/9/EC 
expressly comprises and protects also the depositing of funds for investment (in 
contradistinction to Directive 93/22/EEC, which refers only to instruments). 
Therefore, in correct interpretation of the provisions of internal law, it is not 
required that the management of investment capital of clients have as only 
content the provision of investment services, which shall have as object one or 
more of said instruments, but also the management of a clients’ investment 
portfolio which includes money which were provided with an order for 
investment services [to be concluded], independently of whether they were 
realized at the time of withdrawal of the operation license of the investment firm, 
where the obligation of the [JGF] for compensation is also created. On the 
contrary, and in harmony, in that, to the above Directive, the management of a 
clients’ investment capital which includes only money, the management of which 
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the investment firm undertakes, does not fall within covered services (i.e. those 
for which the obligation of the [JGF] for compensation is created in case inter 
alia of withdrawal of the license of an investment firm), where such management 
does not include the order to conclude, on [the clients’] behalf, transactions in 





This ruling is not only important for practical reasons but also interesting in the 
doctrinal analysis of the relevant law, as the court took into account EU law and further 
proceeded to an interpretation of ICSD with regard to ISD (applicable ratione temporis 
to the facts of the case) and to an interpretation of Law 2533/1997 under the light of EU 
law.  
 
The result attained by the reasoning of the plenary of the supreme civil court appears in 
our view to be allowing for the effective protection of retail investors in the event of 
investment firm failure as a result of tort, while not endorsing a very broad delineation 
of the field of application of the relevant protective rules which would go beyond what 
is required by EU law.  
 
At the same time, it could be argued that this case-law may in practice also entail 
difficulties for claimant retail investors, as the burden of proof of the nature of 
transactions concluded with the failed investment firm rests mainly on retail investors.  
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Even so, this case-law allows for much more comprehensive protection of retail 
investors in the Hellenic legal order, taking into account that according to earlier case-
law (in which ICSD and Law 2533/1997 were not applicable ratione temporis) the 
obligation of the JGF to compensate retail investor covered only claims arising out of “a 
concluded financial transaction” and not claims arising out of tort, undue enrichment, or 
from a contract of deposit, even if in the latter case the money were deposited in order 




Furthermore, the plenary avoided submitting a preliminary reference to the EJC on the 
interpretation of relevant Directives, although there is no EJC case-law on the matter 
and the issue under examination by the supreme national court certainly gave rise, in 
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 See indicatively HSCCJ 23/2006 DEE (2006) 399, ETrAxHrD 2006, p. 182; Nomos 
382280. In this ruling, the HSCCJ had applied earlier law (mainly LD 3078/1954 and 
Law 3632/1928). It has to be noted, though, that the investment firm in the case under 
examination in this decision had failed in August 1997, while ICSD entered into force 
on the date of its publication, i.e. on 26.03.1997 (see ISD, Article 17). The investment 
firm was placed under the special liquidation procedure provided by Hellenic law by 
applicable at the time (Article 27 of law 3632/1928 and Article 17 of LD 3078/1954). It 
could thus be argued, in our view, that since unavailability occurred while ICSD had 
entered into force, the national Supreme Court ought to have proceeded to interpretation 
of applicable national law in conformity with ICSD, or should have submitted a 





VI.2 RETAIL INVESTOR COMPENSATION WHEN THE FAILING 
INTERMEDIARY IS A CREDIT INSTITUTION 
 
 
The protection of retail investors in case of intermediary failure has been organised in 
the Hellenic legal order, as noted, by reference to the legal form of the intermediary: in 
case of investment services provided by investment firms, the JGF is competent to 
compensate retail investors; however, in case investment services have been provided 
by a credit institution, compensation is payable by a different scheme, the Hellenic 
Deposit and Investment Guarantee Fund (HIDGF), which succeeded the Hellenic 
Deposit Guarantee Fund (HDGF),
993
 covering both depositors and investors in case of 
bank failure.  
 
With a view to consider whether the applicable Hellenic legislation establishes a 
consistent and coherent system of rules protecting retail investors in case of 
intermediary failure, it is necessary to examine the development of the relevant rules 
and their interrelation with the rules on retail investor protection in case of investment 
firm failure.  
 
As the law on compensation of investors where the failing financial intermediary is a 
credit institution, by the HDICF, emerged from the modification of earlier law on the 
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 For the structure and operation of the HDGF see GORTSOS, C. (2001) The Hellenic 
Deposit Guarantee System*, 2
nd




HDGF, the development of the latter should be taken into account for the purposes of 
this study.  
 
VI.2.1 PROTECTION OF DEPOSITORS IN THE HELLENIC LEGAL ORDER BEFORE 
THE TRANSPOSITION OF DGSD  
 
Before the entry of Hellas into the EEC, and before the adoption and transposition of 
DGSD into the Hellenic legal order, in case of unavailability of funds protection was 
provided to depositors by Law 2114/1993, which established a system of deposit 
guarantee, repealing earlier legislation on the appointment of a provisional 




Law 2114/1993 established a national deposit guarantee system in order to protect 
depositors and stability in the banking system,
995
 with compulsory participation of all 
credit institutions licensed in Hellas,
996
 as well as branches of foreign credit institutions 
up to the amount covered by the Hellenic system, if their depositors were not covered 
for the same amount by the deposit guarantee system of the State of establishment.
997
   
 
                                                 
 
994
 I.e. Law 236/1975, BGG, vol. A, no. 283; cf. Law 1665/1951 on the operation and 
control of banks. See also HSCCJ (Plenary) 23/1998, Dikaiosyne (1998) 793. 
 
995
 Law 2114/1993, Article 1(1). 
 
996
 Except for certain credit institutions owned by the State; ibid., Article 1(2). 
 
997




Law 2114/1993 provided for the issuing of regulation (in the form of PDs) on all 
relevant matters, such as covered and exempted deposits, amount of coverage, 
obligations of credit institutions, the setting up, operation, and funding of a deposit 
guarantee fund, and the activation of the mechanism of compensating depositors etc.,
998
 




According to Law 2114/1993, such regulation should provide that the deposit guarantee 
system must ensure the payment of compensation “[…] to depositors who do not have 
the means to duly evaluate the financial policy of the credit institutions to which they 
entrust their deposits”,
1000
 that it must distinguish exactly the actions that take place 
before the liquidation of credit institutions from the compensations paid following the 
liquidation,
1001
 and that it must clearly define the criteria and the procedure for payment 
of compensation.
1002
 It further provided inter alia that the deposit guarantee fund shall 
be a legal person of public law.
1003
  
                                                 
 
998
 Ibid., Article 2(1).  
 
999
 It is not certain, in our view, that such general delegation may be considered in 
conformity with relevant constitutional rules and case-law of the HSACJ; supra n 19. 
However, no such regulation was issued to our knowledge. See also GORTSOS C., op. 
cit., pp. 93 et seq.  
 
1000
 Ibid., indent a.  
 
1001
 Ibid., indent b.  
 
1002
 Ibid., indent c.   
 
1003
 Ibid., Law 2114/1993 Article 2(1) Article 2(3). See also GORTSOS, C., op. cit., pp. 




It is interesting to note that this legislation, which was issued a short period of time 
before the adoption of DGSD, provided a rule connecting the payment of compensation 
(or “insurance”) to depositors to their ability to evaluate the financial policy of the bank 
they deposit their money.  Although this criterion was not specified by Law 2114/1993 
or by other instruments, it is important in our view in that it connects the right of 
depositors to be compensated to a qualitative criterion relating to their sophistication as 
financial market participants, in a sense not far from the relevant considerations which 
reverberate the emerging new European financial law post-Crisis. In this way, 
depositors were to be treated under Law 2114/1993 as investors (retail or not) to the 
extent that their choice of counterparty for the depositing of their money was considered 
as an investment decision  (an approach which perhaps related not only to financial or 
legal but also to moral hazard considerations). It is equally important in our opinion to 
note the abandonment of this criterion in the Hellenic legislation that was issued in 
transposition of DGSD.  
     
VI.2.2 TRANSPOSITION OF DGSD IN THE HELLENIC LEGAL ORDER – THE 
HDGF  
 
As noted, the transposition of the DGSD in the Hellenic legal order was initially 
effected through the adoption of the legislation on the HDGF, which concerned only the 
protection of depositors in the event of bank failure; however, following the 
introduction of relevant EU law,
1004
 the Hellenic legislation on the protection of banks’ 
                                                 
 
1004




clients in the event of failure was extended to cover investors as well, where investment 
services are provided by a credit institution, by  the introduction of the HDICF.  
 
The DGFD was set up Law 2324/1995 transposing DGSD into the Hellenic legal 
order.
1005
 The HDGF was set up as legal person of private law, its purpose being to 
provide insurance,
1006
 and operating under the supervision of the Minister of Economy. 
Later, the relevant provision was modified, explicitly stating that the HDGF “[…] shall 
not be a public entity and shall not belong to the broader public sector”.
1007
 Its aim was 
“the payment of compensation to depositors of credit institutions […] which are unable 
to fulfil their obligations to them, and the enhancement of the stability of the credit 
system”.
1008
 The majority of the BoD of the HDGF were appointed by the State.
1009
  
                                                 
 
1005
 BGG vol. A, no. 146. Codified and replaced by Law 2832/2000, BGG vol. A, no. 
141 / 13.06.2000. Law 2832/2000 brought only minor modifications to Law 2324/1995, 
of a rather technical nature. See also GORTSOS, C. (1996) 'The prudential supervision 
of banks regime and the guarantee of deposits in banks in Greece*', ETrHrAxHrDik, p. 
248; MOUSAS, N. (2007) 'Deposit Guarantee Fund', HreDik, p. 309; idem, (2007) 
'Deposit Guarantee Fund*', HreDik, p. 456; idem (2008) 'Deposit Guarantee Fund*', 
HreDik, p. 270.  
 
1006
 Law 2324/1995, Article 41(1); the exact wording of the provision refers to HDGF 
being “of insurance nature”.  
 
1007
 Law 2832/2000, Article 2(2). The exclusion of HDGF from the public sector has 
important consequences under Hellenic law, regarding inter alia the legal regime 
governing its administration, operation and financing, applicable employment 
legislation, as well as the rules on non-contractual liability.    
 
1008







The compensation or “insurance” payable by the HDGF covered all credit institutions 
licensed in Hellas (and optionally on request branches of credit institutions of other EU 
MSs, for supplementary cover).
1010
 According to Law 2324/1995, “[f]or the purposes of 
this Law, ‘deposit’ shall mean any credit balance which results from funds left in an 
account of from temporary situations deriving from normal banking transactions and 
which a credit institution must repay under the legal and contractual conditions 
applicable, and any debt evidenced by a certificate issued by a credit institution”.
1011
 
The exceptions from coverage follow the relevant rules of DGSD, although certain 
                                                                                                                                               
 
1009
 Three members were appointed by the Bank of Greece, one by the supervising 
Ministry, and three by the Hellenic Bank Association (which is a non-profit legal entity 
of private law established under Hellenic law and representing Hellenic and foreign 
credit institutions operating in Hellas; see www.hba.gr); Law 2324/1995, Article 41; 
and Law 2832/2000, Article 12. The initial capital of the HDGF was provided by the 
Bank of Greece (60%) and the Hellenic Bank Association (40%); Law 2324/1995, 
Article 41(3); and Law 2832/2000, Article 2(3). The funding of the HDFG is provided 
by the credit institutions participating in it and covered by it (Law 2832/2000, Articles 
3, 4 and 10) deriving from regular annual contributions levied from them, as well as 
from additional contributions (levied ex post, when its funds are insufficient to 
compensate depositors), donations, income generated from the management of its 
assets, and loans (Law 2832/2000, Articles 3 and 4). 
 
1010
 Law 2324/1995, Article 42, and Law 2832/2000, Article 3, referring to Law 
2076/1992, Article 2.  
 
1011
 Law 2324/1995, Article 44(1); same in Law 2832/2000, Article 5(1). Translation of 
the relevant provision from Law 2832/2000, English edition, as provided by 









The law on the setting up and operation of the HDGF did not provide specific rules on 
its relation and cooperation with competent national authorities, such as the Bank of 
Greece and the supervising Ministry.  
 
The mechanism of payment of compensation by the HDGF was activated by the 
unavailability of deposit (when it is due and payable but has not been paid under 
applicable statutory and contractual conditions), under condition that either the central 
Bank of Greece had determined the inability of the credit institution to repay the 
deposit, or a judicial authority has issued a ruling which is connected to the credit 





No specific rules were provided by applicable legislation on payment of compensation 
to depositors by the HDGF, beyond rules relating to time barring of relevant claims 
(being set at five years from the commencement of relevant procedure), to 
postponement of payment of compensation in case of suspicion for deposits being 
                                                 
 
1012
 Exceptions from coverage include inter alia deposits held by other credit 
institutions in their own name and for their own account, own funds, deposits by 
investment firms, the State, connected persons, as well as negotiable certificates of 
deposit (CDs), bonds issued by credit institutions and liabilities arising from own 
acceptances or promissory notes, and liabilities arising out of repos; see Law 
2324/1995, Article 50; and Law 2832/2000, Article 11.   
 
1013
 Law 2324/1995, Article 45; and Law 2832/2000, Article 6.  
 
 383 
connected to money laundering or other illegal activity (until a final judgment is issued 





In order to calculate the payable compensation, set off of the credit balance of deposit 
with any counterclaims of the credit institution against the depositor applied, according 
with the data supplied to the HDGF by the liquidator of the credit institution.
1015
 No 
specific rules were provided by the law on HDGF on the conclusion of the payment of 
compensation procedure, beyond the rules providing that is subrogated to the rights of 
depositors, and at the same class, for an amount equal to the compensation paid to them, 




In general, although the law on HDFG provided for the issuing of a PD specifying rules 
on its funding and operation, including coverage and exemption of deposits, no relevant 




                                                 
 
1014
 Law 2324/1995, Article 46; and Law 2832/2000, Article 7.  
 
1015
 Law 2324/1995, Article 44(3); Law 2832/2000, Article 5(3). Special rules applied 
with regard to payment of supplementary compensation to depositors of branches of 
credit institutions of other EU Member States; ibid., Articles 5(3) and 15.  
 
1016
 Law 2324/1995, Article 47; and Law 2832/2000, Article 8.  
 
1017
 PD 329/2000 (BGG vol. A, no. 269) which was issued on the basis of the delegation 
provided by Article 17 of Law 2832/2000 related only to the participation of credit 




VI.2.3 THE MODIFICATION OF HELLENIC LAW TRANSPOSING DGSD TO 
COVER INVESTORS – THE HDIGF  
 
Following the introduction of Law 3601/2007
1018
 transposing Directives 2006/48/EC 
and 2006/49/EC into the Hellenic legal order, and as the Crisis had reached Hellas, Law 
3746/2009
1019
 was adopted with a view to codify and supplement Hellenic law on 
deposit guarantee, by a single instrument setting up HDIGF as a successor to HDFG and 
also extending protection in cases investment services are provided to clients by credit 
institutions (and not by investment firms, in which case JGF remains competent to pay 
compensation).  
 
In this way, Hellenic law on investor protection in case of intermediary failure follows 
the relevant typical criterion introduced by EU law which differentiates the applicable 
set of rules on the basis of the legal form of the counterparty (credit institution 
providing investment services or investment firm) and not on the basis of a functional 
criterion (whether the services offered to the client relate to banking or investment).   
 
Law 3746/2009, which is currently in force, merits analysis per se and in conjunction 
with the Law 2533/1997 relating to the operation of the JGF.  
 
                                                 
 
1018
 BGG vol. A, no. 178.  
 
1019
 BGG vol. A, no. 27. See for an overview MOUSAS, N. (2009) 'Deposit guarantee, 




The HDIGF was set up by Law 3746/2009 as a legal person of private law, expressly 
falling out of the broader public sector.
1020
 Its purpose is to “[…] (a) pay compensation 
to depositors in the event that deposits in any of the credit institutions [participating in 
the HDIGF] become unavailable, (b) pay compensation to investors in the event that 
credit institutions [participating in the HDIGF] are unable to pay their obligations to 
investors stemming from guaranteed investment services […] with a view to ensuring 
stability in the credit system”.
1021
 Law 3746/2009 refers to the aim of HDIGF being to 
ensure stability in the market
1022





The terms “depositor” and “investor” are not defined in Law 3601/2007. The term 
“deposit” is defined in the same way as per previous legislation.
1024
  With regard to the 
term “investment”, reference is made to investments falling within the protective ambit 
                                                 
 
1020
 Law 3746/2009, Article 2(1); cf. supra n 1007. 
 
1021
 Ibid., Article 2(2).  
 
1022
 Ibid.  
 
1023
 While it could perhaps be argued that this omission is accidental, in our view it is 
not easy to support such an interpretation taking into account one the one hand that the 
protection of depositors and/or investors is noted as an aim of other instruments of 
Hellenic law and on the other that Law 3746/2009 was introduced with the purpose of 
“[…] codifying provisions regarding schemes for compensating depositors and 
investors/customers […] of credit institutions” (Law 3647/2009, Article 1) so that due 
care would have been taken in its drafting not least with regard to its aim.   
 
1024
 Supra, n 1011. For the categories of deposits excluded from coverage of Law 
3647/2009, see ibid., Article 11.  
 
 386 
of said Law: “guaranteed investment services” are defined for the purposes of Law 
3601/2007 the investment services “as per Article 4 of Law 3606/2007 paragraphs 1(a) 
– (d), (f) and (g), and the service specified in paragraph 2(a) of the same Article”.
1025
 It 
is noticeable that the definition and ambit of covered of investment services under Law 
3601/2007 does not coincide with that under Law 2533/1997 on investor compensation 
by the JGF.
1026
 Thus, it emerges that the ambit of protection awarded to (retail) 
investors is unduly differentiated depending on whether the financial intermediary is a 
credit institution or an investment firm. Such differentiation lacks any objective 
justification.  
 
Furthermore, Law 3647/2009 (or any other legal instrument) does not provide any clear 
rule as to how claims for compensation are to be classified by the HDIGF; on the 
contrary it allows for absolute discretion of the HDIGF without providing for the 
issuing of regulation to specify relevant criteria, procedure and remedies. According to 
the relevant provision of Law 3647/2009, “[…] if a customer has a claim against a 
credit institution and it is not possible to classify the claim as belonging clearly to either 
[payment of compensation to depositors or payment of compensation to investors]
1027
 
the HDIFG’s Board shall, in its judgment, classify it in whichever of the two cases it 




                                                 
 
1025
 See supra n 335. 
 
1026
 See supra n 335 and n 984. 
 
1027






Beyond secondary issues that arise from this provision, such as the reference to 
“customers” who are not defined, the provision is in our view characterized by lack of 
clarity: First, the reference to “impossibility” to classify a claim as relating “clearly” to 
banking or investment services is ambiguous as it does not specify what constitutes a 
claim impossible to classify and moreover what degree of exactitude or certainty is 
required for a classification to be clear. Secondly, and more important, it does not 
provide any substantive or procedural rules as to how the BoD of HDIFG is to proceed 
to such classification “in its judgment”.
1029
 Thirdly, it does not provide any rule as to 
what form does such decision of the HDIFG take and by which remedies and according 
to which procedures it may be judicially reviewed. Although any act or omission of the 
HDIFG as a private law entity may be reviewed by the competent civil courts of justice, 
the lack of more detailed rules leaves ground for ambiguity.
1030
 Fourthly, it does not 





                                                                                                                                               
 
1028
 Law 3647/2009, Article 2(3). Cf. ibid., Article 2(4) relating to coverage of deposits 




 Cf. the rule proposed in the context of the revision of DGSD according to which in 
dubio the higher protection will be awarded; supra, n 640. 
 
1030
 No relevant regulation has been issued, to our knowledge.  
 
1031




The emerging uncertainty of law and lack of predictability of applicable rules on the 
classification of claims by the HDIFG is not without consequences in practice, since 
claims for compensation of depositors receive a higher level of pecuniary protection vis-
à-vis claims for compensation of investors.
1032
 Moreover, it leads to further internal 
inconsistency of the rules on retail investor protection in the Hellenic legal order, such 
rules being examined in toto.  
 
The funding of the HDIGF according to Law 3647/2009 is provided by credit 
institutions which mandatorily participate in it
1033
 and is distinguished in assets relating 
to the coverage of deposits
1034
 and assets relating to the coverage of investment 
claims,
1035
 each category of assets allocated solely for the meeting of the corresponding 
claims.
1036
 Detailed rules are provided with regard to the calculation of relevant 
contributions by participating credit institutions, which to an extent reflect earlier law. 
Conditions for ex post extraordinary and supplementary contributions are also provided. 
 
The commencement of the HDIGF procedure for the provision of compensation to 
depositors and investors in case of credit institution failure reflect those of earlier 
                                                 
 
1032
 I.e. in current levels of protection EUR 100 000 vs. EUR 30 000, accordingly. See 
Law 3647/2009, Articles 9 and 10; cf. Law 2533/1997, Article 66 (1).  
 
1033
 Law 3647/2009, Article 3.  
 
1034
 Ibid., Articles 4, 4a, and 9. 
 
1035
 Ibid., Articles 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10.  
 
1036




relevant law on the activation of the HDGF procedure, which related only to deposit 
guarantee, i.e. following determination by the Bank of Greece or ruling of a judicial 
authority.
1037
 The rules provided by Law 3647/2009 for the activation of the 
compensation procedure regarding investment services do not reflect the corresponding 
provision of Law 2533/1997 for the operation of the JGF.
1038
 Specifically with regard to 
investors, following the relevant determination by the Bank of Greece or ruling of a 
judicial authority, and within a “reasonable period of time”
1039
 the HDIGF has to 
publish an invitation to all investors to make a written application stating their claims 
and has to “[…] specify the procedure and [time limit] by which applicants [have to] 
file their claims”.
1040
 No further rules are provided in this regard by Law 3647/2009, 
and the specification of the relevant procedure and criteria is left to HDIGF to determine 




Law 3647/2009 does not provide any specific rules as to the verification of investors’ 
claims either: it only states in this regard that “[i]n order to assess the [applications for 
compensation] the relevant units of the HDIFG and the Bank of Greece [
1042
] and the 
                                                 
 
1037
 Ibid., Article 13. Cf. Law 2832/2000, Article 6.  
 
1038
 See Law 2533/1997, Articles 65 - 66.  
 
1039
 Law 3647/2009, Article 15(1).  
 
1040
 Ibid.   
 
1041
 No relevant regulation has been issued, to our knowledge.  
 
1042
 The participation and competences of the Bank of Greece in the relevant procedure 
is not stated; beyond the competences of the Bank of Greece as (co)supervisor of credit 
 
 390 
capital markets experts [
1043
]: a) may request from the credit institution concerned the 
following: (i) to provide an opinion regarding the validity of the applications made, and 
(ii) in the event that the validity of an application is doubted, to provide the relevant 
supporting documentation; and b) shall consider the validity of an applications on the 





It emerges from the above provision, that the HDIFG in order to verify an investment 
claim may inter alia request the credit institution concerned to provide the “relevant 
supporting documentation”; no reference is made to the nature of such documentation. 
Furthermore, according to the same Law, with regard to investor claim verification the 
HDIGF has to take into account “[…] the books held by the credit institution concerned 
and the data supplied to the HDIGF by the said credit institution […] as well as the 




While these provisions appear to allow for any documentary evidence to be taken into 
account in determining the validity and evaluating investors’ claim for compensation by 
the HDIGF, they are not consistent with the corresponding rules regarding claim 
                                                                                                                                               
institutions, it is inter alia competent for controlling the data submitted to the HDIGF 
by its member credit institutions: see Law 3647/2009, Article 6 (15).   
 
1043
 The HDIGF may appoint experts to assist it; ibid., Article 16 (1).  
 
1044
 Law 3647/2009, Article 16.  
 
1045




verification in the context of the special liquidation of investment firms, and in the 




The above rules provided by Law 3647/2009 with regard to the documentary evidence 
for the purposes of the HIDGF verification procedure have to be interpreted in 
conjunction with the rule provided by the same Law, according to which “[t]he level of 
compensation to be paid to each investor is computed in accordance with the rules of 
law and the terms governing the contractual relationship of the investor with the credit 
institution, while observing the provisions regarding set-off […]”.
1047
 While this 
provision does not appear to be introducing any specific rule (since statutory and 
contractual rules would a priori be applicable) it is useful in that it clarifies indirectly 
that there is no limitation or specificity as to applicable rules.  
 
At the same time, the issue of intermediary failure as a result of tort (and in particular 
fraud) does not appear to be taken into account by Law 3647/2009 in determining the 
rules governing claim verification, although such a cause of failure is considered as 







                                                 
 
1046
 See Law 2533/1997 and supra Ch VI.1.2. 
  
1047
 Law 3647/2009, Article 17(2).  
 
1048





Interim Concluding Remarks  
 
Retail investor protection in the form of ex lege compensation awarded by the relevant 
funds in case of financial intermediary failure is fragmented in the Hellenic legal order 
depending on the form of the financial intermediary (as an investment firm or a credit 
institution providing investment services).  
 
Each set of rules, on the compensation of retail investors by the JGF and by the HDICF, 
examined separately is characterized by inner deficiencies especially with regard to 
claim verification when failure is connected to tort.  
 
Moreover, the two sets of rules do not offer equivalent protection, and do not constitute 
corresponding sub-systems of a larger consistent system of rules providing effective 
protection to retail investors in the event of intermediary failure –whether the 
intermediary is a credit institution or an investment firm.  
 
Instead, the conditions of protection available differ for reasons unconnected to the 
intrinsic characteristics of each type of financial intermediary but rather to historical 
circumstances relating to the incoherent development of the relevant rules.   
 
This is also related to the fragmentation of relevant EU law on retail participant 
protection in the event of intermediary default, which has led to the duality of the EU 
compensation regime depending on the legal form of the intermediary and not on a 




The fragmentation and incoherence of the EU law rules transposed into the Hellenic 
legal order, in conjunction with discrepancies in their transposition per se and also in 
conjunction with the lack of a consistent EU or national insolvency regime, leads to 
unsatisfactory results in terms of uniformity, predictability and at the end effectiveness 
of the applicable rules in toto.  
 
Certain of these problems have been considered by recent case-law on the protection of 
retail investors in case of investment firm failure, which has attempted to achieve a 
balance of the need to protect retail investors in particular in case of failure as a result of 
tort with the requirements of legal certainty and predictability. In this direction, the 
recent case-law by the HSCCJ has sought to safeguard the effet util of EU law in this 
area, as perceived by the supreme national court –which refrained though from 
submitting a preliminary reference to the ECJ.  
 
While this new case-law illustrates the potential of reaching effective legal solutions in 
the context of the Hellenic legal order, with a view to achieve protection in practice of 
retail investors in the event of intermediary failure, yet as a judicial decision it addresses 
specific issues and cannot by its nature cure the overall structural and substantive 
deficiencies of relevant national rules as a whole, establishing a uniform and predictable 
legal system. The latter would require legislative initiatives to simplify, specify, 
systematise and unify national rules in this area. The introduction of the revised DGSD, 
ICSD and the new recovery and resolution regime in the EU, if completed, will provide 









CHAPTER VII.  RETAIL INVESTOR PROTECTION AND 
COMPETENT AUTHORITIES’ LIABILITY IN TORT IN THE HELLENIC 
LEGAL ORDER  
 
 
Having examined the liquidation and ex lege compensation regimes operating in the 
Hellenic legal order in the area of financial intermediary failure, it is now necessary to 
address the problematic of the tortuous liability of national competent authorities, as 
developed in the Hellenic legal order.  
 
In this direction, and on the basis of long established case-law on the non-contractual 
liability of the State and public authorities according to Hellenic law, it will be 
interesting to examine recent developments especially with regard to non-contractual 
liability of the HCMC, legislative initiatives to provide it with immunity from liability 
and the judicial response, and the criteria for liability to attach developed by case-law, 






VII.1 THE ACQUIS ON INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION AND PUBLIC 




Hellenic law on non-contractual liability of the State and public authorities has been 
developed on the basis of the respective acquis in the area of civil law, regarding 
liability in tort of individuals (and private law persons), which has to be taken into 
account before examining the main features of State and public authorities’ liability in 
tort, and then the specific considerations relating to HCMC liability in tort.  
 
 
VII.1.1 LIABILITY IN TORT OF INDIVIDUALS  
 
According to the HCC, the conditions for liability of individuals in tort to occur are:
1049
 
damage, unlawfulness of act or omission, causal connection of unlawfulness of act or 
omission to damage, and culpability of the author of damage.
1050
  
                                                 
 
1049
 For an overview of Hellenic tort law, see among many BALIS, G. (2005) Law of 
Obligations, General Part*, 3
rd
 edition, Athens: Sakkoulas; FILIOS, P. (2004) Law of 
Obligations, General Part*, Athens: Sakkoulas; idem (2005) Law of Obligations, 
Special Part*, Athens: Sakkoulas;  GEORDIADIS, A. and STATHOPOULOS, M. (ed.) 
(1979-1982) Civil Code, Article-by-Article Commentary*, Athens: Sakkoulas; 
GEORGIADIS, A. (1999) The Law of Obligations, General Part*, Athens: Sakkoulas; 




Culpability is relevant to the notion of fault, as it refers to the subjective element of 
willful or negligent behaviour of the author of damage. The burden of proof for the 
fulfilment of these criteria rests on the injured person. In certain cases, Hellenic civil 
law provides for strict liability in tort.
1051
 In case several persons have committed a 
delict, or are responsible for the damage caused, they are liable to the injured person 
jointly and severally.
1052
 The injured person is entitled to claim reparations i.e. damages 
for pecuniary injury
1053
 and reparation in money for moral or non-pecuniary injury
1054
 
caused as a consequence of the unlawful act or omission. Moreover, compensation for 




                                                                                                                                               
K. and ROUSSOS, K. (1995) 'Confines and Limitation of Damages under Hellenic Law 
of Torts', RHDI, vol. 48, pp. 233 - 252; LIAKOPOULOS, T. and MENTIS, G. (1998) 
'Civil liability for pure economic loss in Hellas', RHDI, vol. 51, pp. 61 - 69; 
SPYRIDAKIS, I. (2004) The Law of Obligations, General Part*, Athens: Sakkoulas; 
STATHOPOULOS, M. (1995) Contract Law in Hellas, The Hague - London - Boston - 
Athens; idem (2004) General Law of Obligations*, Athens – Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas. 
 
1050
 HCC, Article 914. 
 
1051
 As in HCC Articles 922 and 924. 
 
1052
 HCC, Article 927. 
 
1053
 HCC, Articles 914, 919. 
 
1054
 HCC, Articles 57 – 59, 299, 932. 
 
1055




The issue of causality is central to the problematic of civil liability in tort, the theory of 




The prescriptive period for claims arising from liability in tort is five years from the 
time of knowledge by the injured party of the injury and the identity of the responsible 
person, and twenty years from the commission of the delict independently of such 





8.1.2 LIABILITY IN TORT OF THE HELLENIC STATE AND OF HELLENIC 
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES  
 
Liability in tort of the Hellenic State and Hellenic public authorities may arise on the 
ground of breach of EU law, or on the ground of breach of national law.
1058
   
 
Hellenic law provides specific rules on State and public authorities’ liability to 
                                                 
 
1056
 For a comparative survey of causality theories see VITSA, P. (2013) 'Causality and 
Possibility: A Judicial Policy Approach*', NoV, vol. 61, no. 4, p. 1111. 
 
1057
 HCC, Article 937. 
 
1058
 See among many GERONTAS, A., LYTRAS, S., PAVLOPOULOS, P., SIOUTI, 
G. and FLOGAITIS, S. (2004) Administrative Law*, Athens – Komotini: Sakkoulas; 
PAVLOPOULOS, P. (1986) Civil Liability of the State - I. General Perspective*, 
Athens – Komotini: Sakkoulas; idem (1989) Civil Liability of the State - II. According 




compensate individuals for damage unlawfully caused to them. According to Hellenic 
law on State liability in tort, “[fo]r illegal acts or omissions of the organs of the State in 
the exercise of the public power that has been assigned to them, the State is liable to 
[payment of] compensation, except if the act or omission was effected in breach of a 
provision which exists in the sake of the public interest. Together with the State is 
jointly liable the responsible person, subject to the special provisions for the 
responsibility of ministers”.
 1059
 The same rule is extended to cover liability in tort of 




The conditions for liability to attach on the basis of Articles 105 – 106 of Introductory 
Law to the HCC, as formulated by well-established case law, are: unlawful act or 
omission by an organ of the State or a public authority, damage suffered by the 
individual and causal link between the unlawful act or omission and the damage 
suffered by individuals. Fault (and thus culpability) is not a condition. These conditions 
necessitate further analysis:  
 
Regarding the notion of act or omission includes according to case-law not only 
regulatory administrative acts or individual administrative acts, but also material acts 
and omissions, if they are connected to the exercise of public power.
1061
 Such acts or 
                                                 
 
1059
 Article 105 of Introductory Law to the HCC, ComL 2783/1941, in force since 1946. 
See, indicatively, HSACJ (Plenary) 377/2014, Nomos 620416; HSACJ 167/2014, 
Nomos 620026; HSCAJ 201/2014, Nomos 620419; HSCAJ 523/2014, Nomos 620710. 
 
1060
 Article 106 of Introductory Law to the HCC. See, indicatively, HSACJ 528/2014, 





omissions may be positive (as in the issuing of a decision) or negative (as in the 
dismissal of an application), explicit or implicit, and may be enforceable or not – 
however, they must be directly linked to the exercise of public power (i.e. not when an 





Further, the State or public authorities may be responsible to compensate an individual 
when there is breach of a specific provision of law or regulation by the competent 
organs of the State or the public authority.
1063
 According to case-law, the requirement 
for unlawful act or omission is connected to the breach of a legal rule, by which an 
                                                                                                                                               
 
1061
 See, indicatively, HSACJ (Plenary) 3045/1992, Harmen. (1992) 1069; HSACJ 
395/2010; HSSCJ 10/2003, DDike (2004) 1174.  
 
1062
 In such case, liability is based on private law; see Article 104 of Introductory Law 
to HCC, HSCCJ 599/2013, Nomos 609887.  
 
1063
 The obligation of the State and public authorities to compensate individuals as a 
result of tort may further give rise to a claim by the State and public authorities against 
their responsible organs to cover the loss, by recourse. The question of whether the 
illegal behaviour of an organ of the State or a public authority also constitutes a criminal 
offense, as in the crime of “disloyalty by public servants” (Article 256 of HCrC) is also 
raised. L. 1608/1950 (BGG vol. A, no. 301), as in force, provides for incarceration (i.e. 
imprisonment of duration over five years; HCrimC, Articles 51 – 52) of persons having 
illegally received or attempted to receive financial gain or having illegally caused or 
risked to cause financial damage, of over EUR 120 000 to the detriment of the State or a 
public authority, by committing certain crimes. If the illegal gain or loss of the State or 
public authority is over EUR 150 000, or in case of aggravating circumstances, the 
sanction is imprisonment for life; ibid., Article 1. See, indicatively, HSCrCJ 108/2013, 
Nomos 602507; HSCrCJ 125/2013, Nomos 602707; HSCrimCJ 333/2013, Nomos 




individual right or legitimate interest is protected.
1064
 In this sense, there must be breach 
of the rule of law.
1065
 In the same direction, State liability in tort exists not only when 
there is breach of a specific provision, but also “[…] when the duties and obligations 
inherent to the specific public service, as stemming from legislation in general, the facts 
of common experience, and the principle of good faith, are infringed”.
1066
 In the same 
direction, it has been ruled on a number of cases, that an unlawful act or omission is 
committed not only “[…] when there is breach of a specific provision of law, but also 
when the actions inherent to the specific [public] service and stem from the general 
legislation in force and the facts of common experience, of scientific and professional 
training, and of good faith”.
1067
   
 
In this sense, there appears to be accepted by Hellenic case-law that public authorities 
have to operate effectively, in order to achieve the aim of the law in each case.  
 
However, it is intrinsically difficult to consider which is the “best execution” of the 
supervisory authorities’ duties, where the aim of the provisions at hand is not clear –or 
where such aim is considered to be only in the general interest.  
                                                 
 
1064
 See, indicatively, HSACJ 1141/1999, DDike (2000) 163. 
 
1065
 See among many, PAVLOPOULOS, P., Civil Liability of the State II, op. cit.  
 
1066




 See, indicatively, HSACJ 2692/2009, Nomos 503500; HSACJ 2727/2003, Nomos 
344099; HSACJ 3632/2001; HSACJ 347/1997, Epitheorese Dikaiou Koinonikes 





Thus, it has been supported that financial markets supervisory authorities’ duties 
constitute an “obligation de moyen”;
1068
 whether there has been breach of duty will be 
considered not according to the end result but on the basis of whether all necessary 
preemptive and enforcement supervisory action was taken on time –i.e. according to a 
criterion of effectiveness of the action taken. According to this reasoning, effectiveness 
in the exercise of the supervisory power may be assessed only on a case per case basis, 





 Furthermore, fault is not considered by case-law on the interpretation of relevant 
provisions as a condition for State or public authorities to attach; fault (i.e. dolus) is not 
a necessary condition for a damaging unlawful act or omission to occur, and vicarious 
liability of the State and public authorities is considered to exist in case of tort.
1070
 This 
                                                 
 
1068
 See FLOROS, N. (2012) The Liability of Supervisory Authorities in the Financial 
Sector*, Athens: Nomiki Bibliothiki, p. 222; KATSIGIANNIS, F. (2008) 'Limits of 
Obligations and Liability of the [HCMC] in the Context of its Controlling Competences 
in the Scope of Provisions of Articles 105 and 106 of the Introductory Law to the Civil 
Code*', DDike, vol. 5, p. 1119; TSIMPANOULIS, D. (2001) 'The scope of [HCMC] 
competence to supervise companies with securities listed in the Athens Stock Exchange 
(opinion) *', DEE, vol. 8-9, p. 843. 
 
1069
 Regarding exercise of supervision and the question of discretion see FLOROS, N. 
(2012), op. cit., pp. 229 - 232. 
 
1070
 See, indicatively, HSACJ 740/2001, Nomos 301765; HSCCJ 566/1995, EEmpD 
(1995) 666. The relevant case-law is in line with ECJ case-law for liability of MSs for 




approach has raised criticism, as it is considered that it is not compatible with the role 
and functioning of supervisory authorities in the modern financial markets and if further 




Such arguments in favour of introduction of fault as a condition for liability in tort to 
attach are further connected to the issue of whether, in the case of participation by 
individuals in the financial market, the participation per se entails even indirectly or 
tacitly acceptance by the retail participants of an enhanced decree of risk associated 




In our view, however, the non-introduction of fault as a condition for State and public 
authorities’ liability in tort to exist, as provided by the relevant provisions
1073
 and case-
law in the Hellenic legal order, is correct (in light of the stated protective purpose of 
relevant rules) and necessary in that it constitutes a balancing element to the evident 
asymmetry of information and powers between the individual market participant and the 
competent authorities.  
 
                                                 
 
1071
 See among others FLOROS, N. (2012) op. cit., p. 263; MITSOU, A. (2006) 'Civil 
Liability of Supervisory Authorities in the Sector of Capital Markets to Investors under 
the Scope of ECJ Decision in Case Peter Paul*', DEE, vol. 10, p. 999. 
 
1072
 Cf. FLOROS, N. (2012) op. cit., pp. 264 - 265.  
 
1073
 For the non-insertion of fault as a condition for non-contractual  liability of the State 
and public authorities according to Articles 105 and 106 of the Introductory Law to the 





Furthermore, in our view there is already an important factor to counter the lack of fault 
as a condition for liability in tort, operating in practice in favour of the competent 
authorities and rendering the admissibility in merit of actions against them very 
demanding for retail participants: the issue of causality. As noted, in the Hellenic tort 
law, it is accepted that causality exists when there is causa adequata,
1074
 i.e. when 
according to common knowledge and experience, the illegal behaviour of State or 
public authorities’ organs are objectively capable, in the usual course of events, without 




In the case of ineffective exercise of supervisory powers by the competent authorities, 
the retail participant incurs financial damage usually by an event directly concerning the 
financial intermediary and only indirectly connected to the behaviour of the competent 
authority.  
 
Thus, in case of failure of an investment firm for reasons connected to illegal behaviour, 
the retail investor incurs damage prima facie due to the collapse of the intermediary –in 
practice it may be difficult even to be informed of circumstances amounting to illegal 
behaviour of the supervisor which permitted for the damage to be sustained by the retail 
investor; and it will be even more difficult to prove that such behaviour constitutes 
causa adequata of the damage sustained by the retail investor. While similar problems 
                                                 
 
1074
 On the contrary, the causality theory of conditio sine qua non is not followed by 
case-law. See also MARGARITIS, M. (2000) 'The Causal Link in Compensation 
Law*', Kritike Epitheorese, vol. 2, p. 13. 
 
1075
 See, indicatively, HSACJ 1956/2009, Nomos  498835; HSCCJ (Plenary) 23/1988, 




in causality have been treated by Hellenic case-law on non-contractual liability of the 
State and public authorities,
1076
 the operation of financial markets appears to be 
presenting more perplexed causality issues.  
 
In our view, it would perhaps be more accurate to consider that the retail investor has 
been deprived of a chance to avoid or to mitigate his losses.
1077
 While such a 
construction has been criticized as leading to uncertainty of law as it equates the loss of 
opportunity to avoid damage to damage itself,
1078
 in our opinion it counteracts the 
                                                 
 
1076
 For instance, it has been ruled that in the case of unlawful omission by the personnel 
of a public hospital to examine blood to be transfused to a patient for the HIV virus, the 
public hospital was liable to compensate the individual patient affected; HSACJ 
2463/1998. In another case, a Customs Office was liable to compensate individuals for 
the destruction of goods stored in the Customs Office storage area, due to the failure of 
its personnel to take suitable measures in order to safely store the goods; HSACJ 
3027/1998; cf. HSACJ 1794/2001 Dioiketike Dike (2003) 234; HSACJ 2635/1996 
Dioiketike Dike (1997) 201; HSACJ 313/2003. Also, it has been ruled that in case of 
damage caused to the house and other property of a private individual, as a result of a 
flood caused by the faulty construction of a canal by the State, the latter was liable to 
compensate him; HACJ 3182/1998. Furthermore, in case of damage caused to the 
property of individuals as a result of violent rioting, the ability of public authorities to 
prevent damage was taken into account and it was ruled that where the possibility of 
such rioting and damaging of private properties is predictable (as in the case of 
anniversaries of politically important events) the police are able to predict and prevent 
such destruction by taking appropriate preventive measures, so that the State is liable to 
pay compensation if the police do not act effectively; HSACJ 28/2000. 
 
1077
 In the sense of the French causality theory of “perte de chance”; see FAIRGRIEVE, 
D. (2003) State Liability in Tort - A Comparative Law Study, Oxford: OUP; VAN 
DAM, C. (2006) European Tort Law, Oxford: OUP.  
 
1078
 See FLOROS, N. (2012) op. cit., p. 269. 
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unsurpassable difficulties which would otherwise be caused if the individual claimant 
had to support his action on the basis of the traditional causa adequata theory. In this 
way, the loss of opportunity causality theory may also alleviate the exceptional 
difficulties faced by an individual in terms of proving his case against the State or 
public authorities.  
 
However, in our view the choice of a causality theory as more relevant to the issue of 
competent authorities liability in tort reveals to a certain extent theoretical 
preoccupations, since a behaviour which according to “common knowledge and 
experience” is “objectively capable”, in the “usual course of events” to cause the 
damaging result (according to the causa adequata construction) may not in practice be 
completely different from a behaviour which deprived the injured individual of “a 
chance to avoid or to mitigate his losses” (according to loss of opportunity 
construction). In both cases, there are vague legal notions that will have to be specified 
on the basis of evidence for the court to consider that a causal link between illegal 
behaviour and damage exists. Thus behind the problematic of causality lies the central 
problem of evidence to support relevant claims.   
 
More specifically, in the case of action for compensation against competent authorities, 
the issue of proof becomes very complicated as ex hypothesi retail investors are unable 
to possess vital information at the time critical events take place, as to the exercise by 
the competent authority of its duties.  While fault is not a requirement under Hellenic 
law on State and public authorities’ liability in tort, still the claimant individuals have 
the burden to support and prove their claims.
1079
  







Furthermore, the difficulties faced by retail investors, in case of actions against 
competent authorities on the basis of non-contractual liability, are intensified by the 





On the issue of the damage incurred for which claimant individuals have to be 
compensated by the State or public authorities the relevant provisions on State and 
public authorities’ liability in tort
1081
 are interpreted and applied in conjunction with the 
general provisions of the HCC on compensation.
1082
 The compensation to be awarded 
must be full (covering all positive damage proved as well as lost future gains).
1083
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
1079
 Relevant rules in the Hellenic legal order are Articles 902 and 903 of the HCC, 
Articles 450 et seq. of the HCCP, and Article 174 of the HACP. Furthermore, Article 5 
of the Hellenic Administrative Procedure Code (Law 2690/1999, BGG vol. A, no 45, 
which relates to the operation of the public administration and not to judicial 
proceedings in administrative law cases) provides for the right of access of persons to 
administrative documents.  
 
1080
 HCC, Article 330. See Athens ACA 1151/2010, HreDik (2010) 96 in which it was 
ruled that the HCMC was liable to compensate retail investors but recognised a degree 
of 60% of concurrent fault of retail investors who had failed to show the diligence 
required in respect of the amount of their investment. For discussion of the case, see 
infra Ch VII.2.2, n 1148. 
 
1081
 I.e. Articles 105 and 106 of the Introductory Law to the HCC  
 
1082
 Mainly, Articles 914 et seq. of the HCC on non-contractual liability and Articles 










The court may set off the amount of the compensation payable against any profit the 
claimant has received in connection to the damaging event (according again to the 
causality theory of causa adequata),
1085
 such as in particular any amount of 
compensation paid to the claimant retail investor by the relevant guarantee funds and 
any amount received by him in the context of the special liquidation or insolvency 
proceedings of the credit institution (operating also as investment firm) or of the 
investment firm.  
 
In this respect, it has been supported that there is danger of (undue) profit of the 
claimant in case of payment of double compensations due to the parallel progress of 
insolvency proceedings and of actions for compensation against the competent 
authorities; and that this danger necessitates the introduction of a new rule obliging 
claimants to take legal action first against the (failed) financial intermediary and only 
                                                                                                                                               
 
1083
 See indicatively HSACJ 2705/2009, Nomos 503594; Punitive damages (as known in 
the English legal system) may not be imposed in the Hellenic legal order; there are 
however pecuniary sanctions which may be imposed with a view to achieve 
enforcement of a judicial decision (Articles 946 - 947 of the HCCP).  
 
1084
 This is not compensation stricto sensu as it does not cover damage to property but 
relates to the protection of the personality (Articles 57, 59, 932 of the HCC). See 
KARAKOSTAS, I. (2008) 'Moral damage pecuniary satisfaction in case of civil liability 
of the State', Epharmoges Astikou Dikaiou, p. 379. 
 
1085




then against the competent authorities.
1086
 In our view, however, such a development 
would not lead to satisfactory results as it does not take into account that insolvency 
proceedings are intertwined with special liquidation proceedings which are conducted 
under the supervision and control of the competent authorities,
1087
 and that insolvency 
proceedings invariably have a very long duration, so that the opening of judicial 
proceedings against the competent authorities after their conclusion would become 
disconnected from the allegedly damaging behaviour of the latter. This would further 
bring to the fore prescription issues, which would require a further new rule for the 
interruption of prescription, and which in our view would cause uncertainty as to the 
liability of the competent authorities for a particularly long time. More importantly, in 
our opinion it would negatively affect the confidence of retail investors in the financial 
system as competent authorities would appear as not in practice immune from liability.  
 
Another parameter relating to State or public authorities’ liability in tort in Hellenic law 
is that (as a negative condition) the rule breached must not be in the general interest.
1088
 
                                                 
 
1086
 See FLOROS, N. (2012), op. cit., p. 272.  
 
1087
 Supra, Ch V.1. 
 
1088
 The notion of the general interest in tantamount to that of the public interest, as also 
recognized by the case-law which uses both terms interchangeably; see indicatively 
from earlier theory STASINOPOULOS, M. (1950) Civil Liability of the State (of the 
Civil Servants and the Legal Persons of Public Law according to the Civil Code)*, 
Athens; TSATSOS, D. (1960) The Notion of Provision Existing in Favour of the 
General Interest according to Article 105 of the [Introductory Law to the HCC]*, 
Athens: To Nomikon; VEGLERIS, F. (1946) Judicial Control of the Administration, 
Part A, the Limits of the Competence of Regular Administrative Courts against the 
Administration*, Athens: Ant. N. Sakkoulas 1987. See further, DAGTOGLOU, P. 
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According to well established case-law, there is no liability in tort of the State or public 
authorities when the rule breached has been introduced “solely” in the public interest – 
but not when it has been introduced also in the public interest.
1089
 If both the public 
interest and individual rights are served by the relevant provision, State or public 
authorities’ liability in tort may a priori exist.
1090
 
                                                                                                                                               
(2004) General Administrative Law*, Athens-Komotini: Sakkoulas; 
MATHIOUDAKIS, I. (2006) Civil Liability of the State from Material Acts of its 
Organs (according to Articles 105-6 of the [Introductory Law to the HCC])*, ANION; 
VENIZELOS, E. (1990) The General Interest and the Limitation of Constitutional 
Rights*, Thessaloniki: Paratiritis. 
 
1089
 See indicatively HSACJ 1422/2006, NoV (2007) 197; HSACJ 3624/2001, Nomos 
314569; HSCCJ 426/1984; HSCCJ 1417/1977, NoV (1978) 1069. See also 
GEORGOUTSOU, E. (2008) 'The Approach by Jurisprudence of the Public Interest in 
the Context of Civil Liability of the State*', DDike, p. 13, 24; THEOHAROPOULOS, 
L. (1988) The Principle of Equality of Citizens in Public Obligations and the Civil 
Liability of the State*, Athens - Komotini: Ant. N. Sakkoulas.  
 
1090
 For example, it has been ruled that fixing of the highest permissible price for certain 
products by regulation is not only in the general good, but also aims at the protection of 
the rights of each enterprise, in the sense that such highest price may not be lower than 
production cost, but must also include a margin of gain for the enterprise; HSACJ 
3624/2001, Nomos 314569. Also, that the provisions of HCon providing that the 
number of members of Parliament elected in each electoral region is provided by PD on 
the basis of the most recent census, has been established not only in the general good 
i.e. for the smooth operation of representative democracy, but it also aims at the 
protection of the right of each citizen to participate in the electoral process, and 
specifically of the right of each citizen to be elected; HSACJ 2692/2001, Dioiketike 
Dike (2003) 525. Furthermore, it has been ruled that urban law provisions on the one 
hand set the general terms and conditions for building constructions, which serves the 
public interest in building according to health and safety requirements in favour not 




Taking the above into account, the Hellenic State and the HCMC may a priori be found 
liable to compensate retail investors, under conditions that the rule breached exists also 
in favour of the individual retail investors –and not only in the general (or public) 
interest.  
 
The relevant problematic, as presented especially in the case of HCMC liability in tort, 





VII.2 RETAIL INVESTOR PROTECTION AND COMPETENT 




Having examined the general context of State and public authorities’ liability in tort in 
the Hellenic legal order, it is further necessary to examine whether HCMC may be 
considered as exercising its competences only in the general interest, thus enjoying 
immunity from civil actions, and in the negative under which conditions the HCMC 
may be found liable in tort.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
each interested person to acquire as provided by law a construction license; HSACJ 





VII.2.1 THE HCMC AS A REGULATOR AND SUPERVISOR, AND THE 
QUESTION OF EX LEGE IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY 
 
The HCMC originated from a special Council, established by LD 3746/1957,
1091
 which 
was part of the public administration and was competent to authorise the issue of 
sovereign bonds and other financial instruments. This Council was replaced by the 
HCMC,
1092
 which was set up initially as a Commission of the Ministry of Coordination, 
having as main competence to authorise the issue of sovereign bonds and other 
instruments, to advise the Currency Committee and other competent authorities on 
capital markets issues, to supervise issuers and to study and provide opinions on the 
control of abrupt fluctuations in the Stock Exchange.
1093
 The BoD of HCMC were 
designated by the Minister of Finance, and consisted of eleven members, having mainly 




                                                 
 
1091
 BGG vol. A, no. 173 / 31.08.1957, 09.09.1957.       
 
1092
 By Article 12 of Law 148/1967 (BGG vol. A, no 173), which was modified by 
subsequent legislation and finally repealed in 01.11.2007 by Article 85 of Law 
3607/2007 (transposing MiFID).  
 
1093
 Ibid.  
 
1094
 These were (a) three public servants, (b) one member designated by the Bank of 
Greece, (c) two members chosen among persons proposed by Hellenic commercial and 
investment banks, (d) one member designated by ASE, and (e) four members 




HCMC was re-established by Law 1969/1991, as a legal person of public law, i.e. as a 
public authority having (autonomous) legal personality, supervised by the State (the 
Minister of Finance), and competent for controlling the application of investment 
services law:
1095
 all powers granted by law to it as established by Law 148/1967 were 
granted again,
1096
 and the Minister of Finance was granted authority to designate its 
BoD.
1097
 Further, wide regulatory and supervisory competences were granted to HCMC,
 




The HCMC was awarded very wide competence to regulate the provision of investment 
services: Law 1969/1991 granted power to HCMC to issue administrative acts on most 
                                                                                                                                               
Commerce and Industry, the Thessaloniki Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the 
Hellenic Chamber of Economy; Article 12(1) of Law 148/1967 as replaced by Article 
35 of Law 1806/1988.  
 
1095
 Law 1969/1991, Article 76(1), (2). 
 
1096
 Law 1969/1991, Article 76(3).  
 
1097
 Law 1969/1991, Article 77. Following amendment by Article 39 (8) of Law 
2324/1995, the designation of the President of the HCMC is governed by Article 49A of 
the Hellenic Parliament Regulation, which provides for hearing by a parliamentary 
committee and provision of opinion by said committee regarding suitability of persons 
proposed to direct public authorities. According to Article 77 of Law 1969/1991, the 
BoD of the HCMC consisted of seven members, out of which three (the President as 
designated by the Hellenic Parliament and the two Vice-Presidents) constitute the 
Executive Committee, as a separate executive instrument of the HCMC which refers 
matters to the BoD under certain conditions.   
 
1098




areas of investment services law (including the criteria for authorisation of investment 
firms), to provide and revoke investment firm authorisations, to provide opinions to the 
Minister of Finance on financial market issues, to supervise investment firms, and to 
enforce sanctions and disciplinary penalties as provided by law, and “[…] to regulate 
every issue that is connected to the smooth operation of the financial market, the 




Although such general and unconditional granting of competence by law to a public 
authority “to regulate every issue” relevant to the financial market could be considered 
problematic from a legal point of view (exercise of regulatory competence has to be 
based on specific authorisation by law),
1100
 it demonstrates the intention of the legislator 
to provide HCMC with as wide powers as possible in the area of financial market 
regulation.  
 
In transposition of the relevant ISD provisions, HCMC was empowered by Law 
2396/1996
1101
 to take appropriate measures to protect investors, in the context of the 
exercise of freedom of movement by investment firms; inter alia HCMC was granted 
power to prohibit the operation of branches of investment firms where it “[…] would 
endanger investors’ interests”,
1102
 to take measures, including to prohibit temporarily or 
                                                 
 
1099
 Law 1969/1991, Article 78.  
 
1100
 Supra, n 19. 
 
1101
 Articles 1 – 31 of Law 2396/1996 have been repealed since 01.11.2007, and 






permanently carrying out of activities by foreign investment firms in Hellas,
1103
 to 
proceed to adoption of temporary measures in urgency without following the procedure 
of cooperation with home-MS competent authorities,
1104
 “when delay in taking up the 
measures implies an immediate and unavoidable risk for investors’ interests and for the 
orderly operation of the capital market”.
1105
 Law 2396/1996 further provided that 
(subject to rules on supervision of credit institutions by the Bank of Greece and other 
competent authorities) HCMC was provided the general competence for supervising 
investment firms established in Hellas, as well as investment firms operating in Hellas 
“[…] aspiring to investors’ protection and to the protection of the general interest and 




Moreover, Law 2396/1996 made reference to the need for effective exercise of 
supervisory duties: “The Hellenic competent authorities responsible for the supervision 
of investment services firms may collaborate closely as for the exchange of confidential 
information, regarding investment services firms, with the purpose of effecting and 
                                                                                                                                               
 
1102
 Law 2396/1996, Article 12(3). Cf. same rule regarding establishment of a branch in 
a third (non-EU) state, in Article 12(6). Cf. Article 14(1) and (3) regarding provision of 
services in a third country without establishing a branch.  
 
1103
 Law 2396/1996, Article 17(1).  
 
1104
 Ibid., Article 17(3).  
 
1105
 Ibid., Article 17(4).  
 
1106









In the wake of the 1999 ASE crisis, Law 2836/2000 was passed,
1108
 providing inter alia 
that members and staff of the HCMC do not have any civil liability to any person for 
acts or omissions in the exercise of their duties, and especially with regard to the 
exercise of supervisory competence, except for abuse of information and breach of 
confidentiality.
1109
 Furthermore, the relevant immunity provision of Law 2836/2000 
was given retrospective effect, providing that such immunity covers also the period 
since the entry into force of Law 2533/1997, i.e. since 11.11.1997.
1110
 However, it did 
not provide immunity from liability in tort to the HCMC itself, as a public legal person 
having an autonomous legal personality under Hellenic law.  
 
                                                 
 
1107
 Ibid., Article 5(9). Regarding the exchange of information between competent 
authorities, including the Bank of Greece and the HCMC, and organs of insolvency and 
liquidation proceedings, no detailed rules were provided by Law 2396/1996; it was 
provided though that in the event of an investment firm failure, clients’ assets are to be 
separated by the firms’ assets and delivered to their owners, the HCMC having to draw 
up a table of relevant assets (of securities and money) which belong to the firms’ clients 
and to disclose it to the beneficiaries, the instruments of the liquidation proceedings and 
any other person having a legitimate interest; Law 2396/1996, Article 6(3). 
 
1108
 BGG, vol. A, no. 168.  
 
1109
 Law 2836/2000, Article 3(3).  
 
1110




The legal status of the HCMC was further defined in 2005, by a modification to Law 
1969/1991 effected through the introduction of a new Article 76A, according to which 
“the [HCMC] constitutes a legal person of public law with own resources, operating 
exclusively in the public interest and benefiting from functional independence and 
administrative autonomy”.
1111
 Furthermore, it was provided that the members of the 
BoD of the HCMC also have personal and functional independence in the exercise of 
their duties,
1112
 and that the HCMC submits a yearly activity report to the Hellenic 




It is noted that the provision by formal law that the HCMC operates “exclusively in the 
public interest” appears in our view directly connected to the filing at that period of 
actions against the HCMC requesting compensation to be paid to retail investors on the 
ground of liability in tort,
1114
 taking also into account the (negative) requirement 
according to Hellenic case-law that public authorities may be held liable in tort where 
their competence is not exercised solely in the public interest.
1115
 The introduction of 
Article 76A has been criticized by theory as aiming at providing total immunity to the 
HCMC, since it appears to be disallowing application of the provisions on liability of 
                                                 
 
1111
 Law 1969/1991, Article 76A(1), as introduced by Article 22 of Law 3371/2005, vol. 
A no. 178, 14.07.2005.   
 
1112
 Ibid., Article 76A(2). 
 
1113
 Ibid., Article 76A(3).  
 
1114
 As in the Tetraktys and Astraia and Worldwide Investment Services cases.  
 
1115




public authorities in tort in the case of the HCMC.
1116
 Such an outcome appears 
incompatible with the requirement of the Hellenic constitutional order for effective 
judicial protection,
1117
 in conjunction with the requirement for protection of private 
property,
1118
 as also recognised by the ECHR. Considerations as to the compatibility of 
this provision with EU law (an issue relating to whether EU law may be considered as 
conferring rights upon individual market participants) also arise.  
 
However, in our view the interpretation of the relevant provision not be confined to a 
literal approach, but must also take into account the aim of the law on the establishment 
of the HCMC, its regulatory and supervisory competences and its enforcement powers, 
in a teleological approach also. Taking into account the power of courts of law to 
authentically interpret the law,
1119
 it is probable in our view that case-law will not 
recognize such a total immunity from liability to exist in favour of the HCMC. In this 
direction, it is important to note that all relevant decisions on actions for compensation 
by retail investors against the HCMC have directly or indirectly dismissed the relevant 
arguments of the latter that it enjoys total immunity.
1120
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 See among many FLOROS, N. (2012), op. cit., pp. 329 – 344. See also PAGONIS, 




 HCon., Article 20.  
 
1118
 HCon., Article 17(1). 
 
1119
 See indicatively HSSC 3/2001, Dikaiosyne (2001) 368; HSCCJ (Plenary) 18/2006, 






Moreover, regarding the functional independence of the HCMC declared by same 
provision,
1121
 it is noted that this does not amount to full independence, as in the case of 
independent administrative authorities in the Hellenic legal order.
1122
 It refers to 
functional (or professional) independence in the exercise by HCMC of its competence, 
although it remains a legal person of public law, legally and administratively supervised 
by the Government, which also designates the members of its BoD.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
1120
 See infra, Ch VII.2.2. However, the relevant issue has not yet been treated by the 
HSACJ, to our knowledge. 
 
1121
 I.e. Article 76A of Law 1969/1991. 
 
1122
 The Hellenic Constitution provides for the establishment of certain independent 
administrative authorities, while others have been established on the basis of common 
legislation. As a major feature, independent administrative authorities are legal persons 
of public law whose operation is declared to be free of political supervision (by the 
executive), whose members (persons in their direction) are designated according to 
procedures involving decisions or consent of the Hellenic Parliament, and which are 
accountable to the Hellenic Parliament. In general with regard to independent 
administrative authorities in the Hellenic legal order see among many DELLIS, G. 
(2003) 'Judicial Review of the Sactioning Function of the Independent Authorities*', 
Dike International, p. 1281; KAMINIS, G. (2002) 'Independent Authorities between 
Independence and Parliamentary Control*', NoV, p. 95; COURAKIS, N. (2004) 'The 
Revealing of "Scandals" by Illegitimate Means and the Jurisdictional Function of 
Independent Authorities*', Poinikos Logos, p. 2061; PARARAS, A. (2006) 'The 
Independent Administrative Authorities Today*', EphemDD, vol. 1, p. 123; 
VENIZELOS, E. (2004) 'Independent Authorities after the Constitutional Reform in 




The transposition of MiFiD in the Hellenic legal order by Law 3606/2007 did not affect 
the legal nature, structure and competences of the HCMC, as provided by earlier law, 




Certain features of Law 3606/2007 relating to the competences of HCMC must be taken 
into account with a view to explore the extent of its powers which should reflect in our 
view also the extent of its responsibility and liability in relation to the exercise of its 
duties.  
 
In terms of specific supervision and enforcement powers of the HCMC in the context of 
illegal behaviour by an investment firm, Law 3606/2007 provides for the provisional 
suspension of an AEPEY authorisation in case of emergency,
1124





The provisional suspension of the authorisation of an investment firm by the HCMC is 
connected to “indications of violations of capital market legislation that makes its 
operation dangerous to investors and the smooth functioning of the market”,
1126
 may 
concern the license of the investment firm or only some of the investment services 
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 Inter alia Article 12 of Law 148/1967, Articles 60, 69, 71, 71A of Law 1969/1991, 




 Law 3606/2007, Article 20. 
 
1125
 Ibid., Article 21.  
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provided by it, is immediately effective and enforceable,
1127
 and may be complemented 
by setting of a time-frame for the investment firm to take necessary action and cease 
violations or eliminate their effects,
1128
 as well as by the appointment of a provisional 
administrator
1129
 of the AEPEY whose prior consent will be required for certain acts of 
the management of the AEPEY as determined by the relevant HCMC decision.  
 
The (definitive) withdrawal of authorisation of an investment firm by the HCMC may 
also be in whole or only with regard to certain investment services,
1130
 and follows a 
reasoned notification by the HCMC to the investment firm calling to express its views 
and to take necessary measures to cease infringements or eliminate their effects.
1131
 The 
authorisation is withdrawn when an investment firm inter alia has obtained it “by 
making false statements or by any other irregular means”,
1132
 no longer meets the 
conditions under which authorisation was granted
1133
 or the conditions regarding capital 
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 Ibid., Article 20(2).  
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 Ibid., Article 20(1). 
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 Ibid., Article 20(3).   
 
1130
 Ibid., Article 21(1). The HCMC may also temporarily suspend the functioning of 
investment firms if there is breach of financial law on their part which renders their 
functioning dangerous for investors and for the smooth operation of the financial 
market, according to the provision introduced by Article 7 of Law 2836/2000.  
 
1131
 Law 3606/2007, Article 21(2).  
 
1132








 or “has seriously and systematically infringed” capital markets 
legislation.
1135
   
 
It emerges from the legal framework on the competences of the HCMC that it has been 
entrusted by the Hellenic State with extensive competences and duties, on the one hand 
to regulate (having  wide authorisation to adopt regulations and decisions), and on the 
other to supervise and enforce (having a great array of procedures and instruments). 
Furthermore, HCMC as a legal person of public law has its own resources and 
infrastructure, in order to support its function and operations.  
 
It emerges therefore, in our opinion, that in view of the aim, competences and powers 
and means of the HCMC, relevant Hellenic law may not be interpreted in the direction 
that HCMC enjoys total immunity from liability in tort, as its aim according to national 
law is to protect the market and also market participants and further it is equipped with 
the competences, powers and means to pursue this double objective.  
 
As such an interpretation appears to be endorsed by relevant case-law, it is necessary to 
examine next which are the criteria formulated by case-law for HCMC to be found 
















VII.2.2 THE CRITERIA FOR HCMC TO BE LIABLE IN TORT TO 
COMPENSATE RETAIL INVESTORS  
 
 
In the recent past, two groups of landmark decisions considered the conditions under 
which HCMC may be liable in tort, the decision on the case of Tetraktys and Astraia, 
and the decisions on the case of Worldwide Investment Services. These merit closer 
examination. Furthermore, decisions on the Goldsmith Investment Fund case have also 
to be taken into account.  
 
 
The Tetraktys and Astraia case 
 
In Tetraktys and Astraia case, the HCMC was found liable in the first instance by the 
Athens ACFI to compensate two individual claimants, paying to them the full amount 




 The claimants had entrusted money to connected investment firms, Tetraktys and then 
Astraia, in order for investment services to be provided to them. The investment firms 
operated unlawfully and when administrative action was taken against them, they 
collapsed failing to return the funds, which had been misappropriated.  
 
                                                 
1136
 Athens MJ-ACFI 15526/2003, DEE (2004) 553.  




When Astraia collapsed in 2002, no record of depositing the claimant’s money was to 
be found in the (illegally kept) books and records of the investment firm.
1137
   
 
The action for compensation filed by the claimants against the HCMC for liability in 
tort claimed that the supervisory authority had breached its obligation to exercise its 
supervisory and enforcement competence in an effective way, both at the stage of initial 
authorisation of Astraia and on a continuous basis, which resulted in the persons in 
control of the firm being allowed to misappropriate their funds.
1138
   
                                                 
 
1137
 When the When the claimants announced their claims to the organs of the special 
liquidation of Astraia, which was conducted under the supervision of HCMC, their 
claims were rejected on the ground that they were not verified by the entries in the 
books and records of the firm. However, the claimants were in possession of other 
documents, such as bank certificates of deposit and contracts, proving that they had 
entrusted money to Tetraktys and then Astraia which had never been repaid: these 
documents were not accepted as verifying their claims. Their claims were equally 
rejected by the JGF, on the ground that there was no proof of “covered” investment 
services having been conducted for them by the defaulting investment firm. For relevant 
case-law see supra Ch VI.1.2.  
1138
 The facts of the case are revealing of the problematic of retail investor protection. 
As it emerges from the decision of the Athens ACFI, the claimants were retail investors 
who were contacted in 1999 by persons in the direction of “Tetraktys Pythagorean S.A.” 
(hereinafter, Tetraktys). Tetraktys was a Hellenic société anonyme established in 1996 
and having as purpose to provide, according to its articles of association, “[…] only the 
investment service of receipt and transmission of orders to conclude transactions in 
financial instruments” and “of investment advice to third parties”, therefore not 
requiring (at the time) licensing as an investment firm under Law 2396/1996, 
transposing ISD into the Hellenic legal order. The money entrusted by the claimants 
with Tetraktys was supposed to be invested in financial transactions through Tetraktys 
Wordlwide, a connected company having its registered office in Luxembourg, with 
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which they were also supposed to have entered into portfolio management agreements. 
For a long period of time, Tetraktys was marketing through the Press that it was 
providing investment services and invited the public to trust it as financial intermediary. 
In the meantime, the HCMC had already been notified, in 1997, of the marketing 
practices of Tetraktys, and had sent a letter to Tetraktys, informing it that special 
authorisation was required by law for the provision of investment services and that 
special provisions applied for the invitation of the public to proceed to investments. 
Further, the HCMC had asked Tetraktys to inform it as to the nature of investment 
services it provided and as to whether it held a relevant authorisation. Tetraktys had then 
replied that it was a company providing only the investment service of receipt and 
transmission of orders; and that due to organisational issues it had not had any financial 
activity from its setting up (in 1996) until that time (1997). Following a relevant request 
by the HCMC, Tetraktys published a relevant statement in the Press. However, in fact 
Tetraktys continued to attract clients claiming that it was successful in the provision of 
investment services, and clients regularly received notifications from Tetraktys showing 
that their portfolio was managed in a profitable way. In end-2001, they were advised by 
persons in the direction of the Tetraktys Croup of Companies to transfer their portfolio 
from Tetraktys and Tetraktys Worldwide to another member of the Group, “Astraia S.A. 
for the Provision of Investment Services” (hereinafter, Astraia), which they did. Astraia 
was a Hellenic société anonyme established in 1998, and had received authorisation by 
the HCMC to as an investment firm (AEPEY). Tetraktys Worldwide, Tetraktys and  
Astraia were connected companies. Following further complaints on the allegedly 
illegal activities of Tetraktys, HCMC proceeded to an on-the-site investigation of 
Astraia in end-2001. This investigation revealed inter alia that Tetraktys had been 
receiving on an ordinary basis and until as late as mid-2001 money belonging to its 
clients in its bank accounts, and that Tetraktys Worldwide was active in portfolio 
management in Hellas, without having any relevant authorisation (in fact, as it was later 
revealed, Tetraktys Worldwide was unknown to the supervisory authorities in 
Luxembourg, and was a “letterbox company”). Following this investigation of end-
2001, HCMC proceeded in the following months to issuing decisions on the prohibition 
of operation of Tetraktys (since there was no authorisation to be revoked), and on the 
imposition of fines on Tetraktys Worldwide (as an investment firm allegedly operating 
from Luxembourg). The relevant investigation on Astraia, which was also conducted in 




The action was accepted by the Athens ACFI, which found that HCMC was in breach 
of its legal obligations, having illegally omitted to perform its supervisory duties 
effectively, and that there was sufficient causal link between such illegal omission and 
the damage incurred by the claimants.  
 
The action for compensation had been based both on Hellenic law and on EU law; 
however, the Athens ACFI based its reasoning on national law only, and did not 
specifically refer to the grounds of alleged breach of EU law by the HCMC.  
 
The HCMC filed an appeal against the decision, claiming inter alia that the exercise of 
its competence is only in the public interest, and that no rights are conferred by 
applicable legislation to individual investors to seek compensation against it. 
Alternatively, that it had duly exercised its duties taking into consideration that in the 
case under examination there had been fraudulent behaviour by the firms concerned, 
which is beyond the scope of its field of competence.  
 
The Athens ACA accepted the appeal, ruling that the action of the claimant investors for 
compensation was unfounded on its merits, because the HCMC had promptly acted to 
                                                                                                                                               
hold accounts per client, nor was there any asset separation, that it was not taking any 
measures for the protection of investors and of assets belonging to them, that it kept 
financial books and records in an unlawful manner. HCMC proceeded to the provisional 
withdrawal of authorization of Astraia in end-2001, and then to the permanent 
withdrawal of authorization and the initiation of liquidation proceedings in 2002, 
finding that the operation of the investment firm was illegal and “[…] dangerous for 





investigate on Tetraktys and Astraia, as soon as it received information raising suspicion 




This decision of the Athens ACA is very important: First, the court of appeals implicitly 
–but clearly– rejected the argument that the competence of the HCMC is exercised only 
in the public interest. On the merits of the case, the court focused on the nature and 
timing of the information that the HCMC had received from the Press (when it 
commenced its investigations, in end-2001, without considering material the fact that 
HCMC had first received information on allegedly illegal operations of connected firms 
controlled by the same persons in previous years). For this reason, it considered that \ 
HCMC had duly and timely executed its supervisory duties and was not liable to 
compensate the claimant retail investors.  
 
These decisions of the Athens ACFI and of the Athens ACA in Tetraktys and Astraia 
case have been ground-breaking in the area of Hellenic law on tortuous liability of 
competent authorities:  
 
Despite the differentiation between the two decisions on the merits of the case, both 
decisions recognised that HCMC, as a public authority, may a priori be liable in tort, 
having to compensate retail investors for the financial loss they have suffered due to 
investment firm failure which is connected to failure of the supervisory authority to 
perform its duties effectively. No immunity from liability in the public interest was 
accepted to exist. The ruling of the Athens ACA was followed by subsequent decisions 
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 Athens ACA 1367/2008, EEmpD (2008) 628. There is no further ruling on the case 
by the HSACJ, to our knowledge.  
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The criteria formulated by the Athens ACA in Tetraktys and Astraia case were further 
applied and developed by the Athens ACFI in the case of Worldwide Investment 
Services, although in a strict direction, leading in our view to an excessive restriction in 
the effectiveness of judicial review –at least, if the rules on tortuous liability of 
competent authorities are to be meaningful in practice and to have useful effect.  
 
 
The Worldwide Investment Services case  
 
Worldwide Investment Services was set up in 1999 as an investment firm established 
under Hellenic law, with its seat in Athens.
1141
 Its purpose was to provide the main and 
secondary investment services as per Law 2396/1996 then in force (mainly portfolio 
management, also in the derivatives market). In June 2002 HCMC decided to 
investigate the firm, with regard of its administrative and organizational adequacy, the 
effectiveness of its internal control system and its accounting structure, following 
rumours in the market that the firm was concluding agreements of guaranteed returns 
                                                 
 
1140
 See Athens MJ-ACFI 2661/2013 (nyr); Athens MJ-ACFI 1150/2013 (nyr); Athens 
MJ-ACFI 7093/2013 (nyr).  
 
1141
 The factual background of the case as deriving from relevant court rulings: Athens 
MJ-ACFI 1150/2013 (nyr); Athens MJ-ACFI 8787/2012 (nyr); Athens MJ-ACFI 
8788/2012 (nyr); Athens MJ-ACFI 9672/2012 (nyr); Athens MJ-ACFI 9669/2012 (nyr); 
Athens MJ-ACFI 16904/2012 (nyr); Athens MJ-ACFI 11308/2012 (nyr). 
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with its clients. An interim report was issued on 09.08.2002 by the HCMC.
1142
 While 
the findings of the interim report signaled that the operation of the firm was unlawful 
and it was placing investors and other counterparties in danger, no measures were taken 
at this stage by the HCMC, which continued the investigation for another two months. 
On 15.10.2002 the final report on the investigation was issued by the HCMC, which 
confirmed the findings of the interim report and further concluded that the firm was in 




Following the alarming confirmation of the findings of the interim report by the final 
report, HCMC issued on 31.10.2002 –four months after the commencement of its 
investigation on Worldwide Investment Services– a decision by which it attested that the 
                                                 
 
1142
 The findings of the interim report were disturbing, as deficiencies were discovered 
in the accounting systems of the firm, in the invoicing of services to clients and in the 
internal audit system. Moreover, conflict of interests issues were identified. Further, 
certain transactions appeared incompatible with the agreements concluded between the 
firm and its clients, while losses in the funds managed by the firm exceeded the limit of 
acceptable losses as agreed between the firm and its clients.  
1143
 The final report of the HCMC found inter alia contraventions of the Conduct of 
Deontology of investment firms, serious deficiencies in the management of investors’ 
portfolios (including lack of any procedures of internal audit, no operation in practice of 
the investment committee of the firm, no assessment of the result of the management of 
investors’ portfolio by the firm, no control of withdrawals of funds by investors, 
deficiencies in the accounting system and on the data transmitted to HCMC), conflict of 
interests in the case of the person responsible for transactions in derivatives, lack of 
transparency of accounting records of transactions resulting to obstruction of control by 
the supervising authorities, serious breaches of the rules on keeping of books and 
records by the firm, and serious problems in the information technology systems of the 
firm, causing inability to define managed funds and incompatibility of the recording of 
investment transactions with general accounting rules.  
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firm was in serious and repeated breach of financial law which render its operation 
dangerous for investors and the smooth operation of the financial market (for the 
reasons stipulated in the relevant report).  
 
However, HCMC did not revoke the authorisation of the firm (the adaptation of such a 
measure requiring prior hearing of the firm by the HCMC) nor did it suspend its 
authorisation; the HCMC declared the commencement of the procedure to revoke the 
authorisation of the firm, and further decided that the firm had to immediately proceed 
to asset separation, placing all client funds with a third person as a custodian. HCMC 
also called the firm to be heard, submitting its views and objections with regard to the 
findings of the HCMC, and to proceed to curing all deficiencies and breaches attested 
by HCMC, within thirty (30) days of the servicing of said decision of the HCMC.  
 
The firm submitted its views and objections to the HCMC on the expiration of the 
relevant time limit, and only then did the HCMC decide to proceed to a new 
investigation on the firm, in order to find whether its decision of 31.10.2002 had been 
implemented by the firm. When the inspectors of the HCMC visited the offices of the 
firm on 17.01.2003, they found them abandoned.  
 
Following this development, HCMC issued on the same day a decision on the 
suspension of the authorisation of the firm –without having until then verified whether 
the firm had proceeded to asset separation and depositing of investors funds with a 
θεματοφύλακα.  
 
On 20.01.2003 a new report issued by the HCMC concluded inter alia that the firm had 
not observed said obligations; further, that the books and records of the firm were not 
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kept according to law, that clients were not informed as to the transactions concluded on 
their behalf, and on their profits and losses, while the accounting systems of the firm 
were not in a position to provide information on the position of its client and to evaluate 
open positions of clients in the derivate markets. On the next day, 21.01.2003, the 
HCMC revoked the authorisation of the firm and thus Worldwide Investment Services 




In the meanwhile, on 15.01.2003 the HCMC had received from ADECH a letter 
informing it that there were open positions of firms’ clients in the derivatives market 
which posed great risk, and that ADECH had proceeded to modifications in the 
methodology to determine the margin necessary to cover relevant transactions. Shortly 
before the collapse of Worldwide Investment Services, the open positions of the firms’ 
clients in the derivatives market were forced to close by financial intermediaries 
providing settlement services, due to nonpayment of the margin required by ADECH, 
with serious losses for the clients’ positions and leading to filing of actions against them 
for relevant amounts to be paid by them.
1145
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 In the context of the special liquidation procedure, it was revealed that the firm had 
many clients who had entrusted funds with a view to receive portfolio management 
services, who did not appear in the official books and records of the firm. These clients 
had concluded written agreements with the firm, for the provision of investment 
services, and received regularly by the firm information notices as to their investments 
and the value of their portfolio, as well as copies of transactions documents –which 
were revealed to have been falsified.  
1145
 Thus, retail investors had not only lost all the total of the funds they had entrusted to 
Worldwide Investment Services but many of them were faced with important claims 
against them as a result of the closing of their positions in the derivatives market at 




Many retail investors filed actions for compensation against not only the persons in the 
direction of the firm, and the JGF when it denied payment of compensation, but also 
against the HCMC, on the ground that it had manifestly breached its duties in the 
supervision of Worldwide Investment Services. They argued that HCMC was liable to 
compensate them, for a number of reasons connected to the initial authorisation of the 
firm by the HCMC (on the ground that the “fit and proper” condition for the 
management of the firm had not been satisfied, and that the firm did not possess the 
necessary administrative, organizational and technical means from the beginning), to the 
on-going supervision of the firm by the HCMC (in particular regarding the lack of 
internal audit mechanisms, the unlawful keeping of books and records by the firm, and 
the infringement of asset separation obligations and of CoB rules), and most important 
to the lack of effectiveness in the exercise by the HCMC of its duties in the context of 
the inspections of the firm (as the HCMC had not cross-examined documents issued by 
the firm on financial transactions with relevant data kept by ADECH and Athens 
Derivatives Exchange, had taken particularly long to complete the inspections of the 
firm and to reach conclusions, and had failed to make use of the findings of the 
inspections with a view to protect retail investors).  
 
                                                                                                                                               
records of the firm were not lawfully kept –and in many cases clients and transactions 
effected in their behalf did not appear in them at all, as there was cooking of the books 
and issuing of falsified evidence of transactions by the firm. This led to further 
difficulties for the retail investors, since even where their claims against the firm could 
be verified (as in the case e.g. of documents taken into account in the context of the 
special liquidation, such as cheques proving the depositing of funds with the firm) they 
were not considered to be covered by the JGF, since financial transactions had always 




Furthermore, retail investors argued that had manifestly breached its obligation to 
protect them, in particular by failing to proceed to the suspension of operation of the 
firm in due time (which it only decided four months after it had initiated inspections of 
the firm and while all evidence suggested from the beginning that the operation of the 
firm was illegal and dangerous) and that this omission by the HCMC was directly 
connected to the damage incurred by them. Also, retail investors argued that HCMC had 
manifestly breached its obligation to properly exercise its competences and to protect 
them in that it had not taken any action to enforce the measure it had taken, regarding 
asset separation and custodianship of clients assets, an omission which was directly 
linked to their financial loss.
1146
 Thus, retail investors claimed that the lack of 
effectiveness in the exercise by HCMC of its competences regarding supervision and 
enforcement led to their financial detriment, and in any event were denied of any 
opportunity to avert or mitigate their financial damage.  
 
Athens ACFI adjudicated several actions by retail investors against the HCMC on the 
ground of liability in tort for its actions and omissions in the Worldwide Investment 
Services case. The administrative courts of first instance confirmed the Tetraktys and 
Astraia case-law denying that HCMC enjoys ex lege immunity from liability in tort. 
However, in applying the tests developed by the Tetraktys and Astraia case-law, they 
considered that HCMC had not breached its obligations as a competent authority, 
                                                 
 
1146
 In particular the aggressive tactics of the firm in the derivatives market, as notified 
by ADECH to the HCMC, and which entailed rising of the margins, reached its peak in 
the period of December 2002 to January 2003 and while no measures were enforced on 
the firm.  
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considering that it had acted promptly and effectively under the light of the 




In our view, the relevant rulings of the administrative courts of first instance are 
incorrect: they appear to have repeated the reasoning in Tetraktys and Astraia case, 
without taking into account the particularities of the Worldwide Investment Services 
case which illustrate failure by the HCMC to exercise its duties effectively. Whereas in 
Tetraktys and Astraia evidentiary difficulties caused ambiguity as to the time HCMC 
had taken knowledge of the illegal operation of those firms, leading further to doubts as 
to whether it had breached its obligations as a supervisor, in Worldwide Investment 
Services certain knowledge by the HCMC can be pinpointed at the latest on 09.08.2002 
(when its interim report was issued following a two-month long inspection of the firm) 
–i.e. about five months before it suspended its operation, while the firm continued to 
disregard HCMC decisions on asset separation and custodianship.   
 
While the appeals against the rulings of the administrative courts of first instance in 
Worldwide Investment Services case are still pending before the Athens ACA, the 
dismissal of all actions (to our knowledge) against the HCMC in the first instance raises 
concerns, in our opinion, as to the effectiveness of relevant remedies and procedures. 
These rulings illustrate that even where retail investors are in a position to overcome 
evidentiary and causality issues which are intrinsic to actions on non-contractual 
liability of competent authorities, still the courts may prove very hesitant in finding the 
behaviour of the latter unlawful and damaging.  
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 See case law cited supra in n 1141. 
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Certainly, re-examination of the merits of Worldwide Investment Services case on 
appeal may alter the current position of case-law.  
 
A more balanced, in our view, and reasoned approach regarding the standard of exercise 
of supervision by HCMC and liability for failure to exercise its powers effectively was 
adopted in the Goldsmith Investment Fund case, which has also to be taken into account 
in this regard.  
 
The Goldsmith Investment Fund case  
 
In the Goldsmith Investment Fund case, Hedley Finance Ltd, an offshore company 
established in the UK Virgin Islands, operated in Hellas under specific license issued in 
1997 by the Hellenic State (according to CompL 89/1967, BGG vol. A, no 132). This 
license did not constitute an authorization to exercise business activities nor to provide 
investment services but only to promote its activities abroad. By an anonymous 
document transmitted to the HCMC and by publication in a newspaper in May 2001, 
HCMC was informed that the firm solicited retail investors (through OvB, a company 
acting as intermediary) to invest in the “Goldsmith Investment Fund”, a mutual fund 
promoted as having guaranteed returns and as managed by the offshore company. 
HCMC called OvB to abstain from offering units of the fund (an activity for which it 
was not authorised) and to proceed to disclosure of information as to its activity to the 
HCMC. The investigation carried out by the HCMC revealed unlawful operation of 
OvB, which claimed ignorance as to its obligation to receive authorisation in order to 
provide said services. HCMC proceeded in September 2001 to filing a criminal lawsuit 
against the persons responsible for the administration of OvB, and to imposing 
administrative sanctions for the unauthorized provision of investment services, while 
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also an announced was published in the Press by the HCMC with a view to protect 
investors.  
 
When informed of the matter by HCMC four months later, the Hellenic Ministry of 
Finance mandated the Hellenic Financial Crime Prosecution Agency (Soma Diokses 
Oikonomikou Egklematos, SDOE) to also investigate the case. The Report issued by 
SDOE on 15.12.2004 revealed that the whole operation was a scheme organised and 
directed by persons prosecuted in the US for fraud and other crimes, that no “Goldsmith 
Investment Fund” existed, and that the money entrusted by retail investors (on the basis 
of contracts providing for 9%-15% yearly guaranteed returns) was embezzled by the 
persons in control of the scheme and laundered through an international network. The 
fraud was so extensively organised that it included even the presentation to retail 
investors of Lloyd’s insurance contracts (which were falsified).  
 
Retail investors whose funds were embezzled in the context of the “Goldsmith 
Investment Fund” scheme filed in 2006 before the administrative courts of law an action 
for compensation against the Hellenic State and HCMC, for failure to duly exercise 
their duties. In this action, they claimed inter alia that the competent authority had not 
effected a true investigation of the firm in May 2001, but only a formalistic one, as the 
HCMC had not even reviewed the books and records of the firm to understand the 
nature of its operations. Also, that it failed to duly inform the public as to the dangers 
posed by the operation of the firm, omitting to proceed to a relevant public 
announcement for a long time, while the firm was free to continue soliciting investors. 
The decision of the Athens CFI
1148
 found HCMC liable in tort to partly compensate 





retail investors, taking into account their contributory negligence in failing to 
thoroughly scrutinize the firm in view of the important sums of money they entrusted 
with it. The Hellenic State was not found liable by the court, as the licensing of the 
offshore company (under ComL 89/1967) was not in causal connection to the unlawful 
provision of investment services, and said license was revoked by the State when the 
illegal activity of the firm was revealed following the SDOE investigation.  
 
The reasoning of the CFI regarding the breach by HCMC of its duties is based on its 
failure to conduct a comprehensive investigation when it was first informed in May 
2001 of the possibly illegal operation of the firm. According to the CFI, HCMC ignored 
the serious indications that the firm was de facto operating as an (unauthorised) 
investment firm, and avoided to conduct comprehensive investigation on the ground 
that the firm was licensed as an offshore company (under CompL 89/1967) and not as 
an investment firm. However, the SDOE investigation conducted later led to serious 
findings which HCMC could have reached had it investigated the case, so that the 
public could have been informed and thus protected in due time. Instead, according to 
the decision, the HCMC did not proceed to a comprehensive investigation of the case 
nor to a meaningful and timely information of the public; in its public announcement of 
September 2001 HCMC did not mention the name of the mutual fund and only four 
months later did it inform the Ministry of Finance of the issue.  
 
The court, referring to applicable EU and Hellenic law considered that HCMC had 
breached its supervisory duties, which it has to exercise effectively and not solely in the 
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public interest but also in order to protect investors. The decision of the ACFI was 




The Goldsmith Investment Fund case-law reveals in our view how public interest 
considerations and retail investor rights may be applied harmoniously, through the 
application of the acquis on non-contractual liability of public authorities in the area of 
investment services.  
 
 
Interim Concluding Remarks  
 
The issue of HCMC liability in tort has been examined by case-law on the basis of the 
acquis in the area of State and public authorities’ liability in tort, and further criteria 
have been specified by case-law for HCMC to be found liable to compensate retail 
investors.  
 
While case-law has not acknowledged that HCMC enjoys total immunity from liability 
–despite the introduction of a legislative provision stipulating that it operates solely in 
the public interest– yet has in general proven hesitant to consider unlawful the 
behaviour by HCMC even in some cases where its actions and omission appear 
manifestly ineffective to protect retail investors and the financial market. In other cases, 
it has found HCMC partly liable to compensate retail investors, recognising concurrent 
fault of the latter. 
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Thus, from the review of recent case-law in Hellas, in the Tetraktys and Astraia, 
Wordwide Investment Services, and Goldsmith Investment Fund cases, it emerges in our 
view that effective protection of retail investors may a priori be achieved in relation to 
tortuous liability of competent authorities, by recognising that the latter are obliged to 
timely and efficiently exercise their duties in the public interest (or general good) but 
also in order to protect individuals, and by applying strict liability rules in conjunction 
with (a) a not excessively strict application of causality criteria regarding the behaviour 
of the competent authorities (taking into account the complex nature of retail investor – 
intermediary – supervisor relation), (b) a determination of possible concurrent fault by 
the retail investors (following however relevant objection by the interested litigant), and 
(c) a useful implementation of rules on evidence according to the inquisitorial system 
applicable in administrative procedural law.  
 
As case-law on the matter stands, while courts do not recognize ex lege immunity of the 
HCMC, yet at the same time they appear very cautious in finding it liable to compensate 
retail investors.  
 
Under the criteria formulated by case-law on the issue of competent authorities’ 
tortuous liability, it appears that in practice a manifest breach of their duties must be 
diagnosed for liability to attach, as in the case of failure to take any measures after 








This study attempted to treat a question on the effectiveness of protection awarded by 
the Hellenic legal order to retail investors, in the event of intermediary failure, 
especially as a result of tortuous behaviour, under the light of EU law.   
  
The concern to primarily promote financial market integration and to avert systemic 
danger (traditionally understood to concern the banking sector) and the differentiation 
of financial law per sector of economic activity according to a criterion of risk, 
understood to be intrinsically associated with sectoral characteristics and activities, has 
led to retail market participant being perceived as a secondary aim of financial law.  
 
The legal definition of the status and the level of protection of depositors vis-à-vis retail 
investors has remained uncertain, while the minimum protection offered in the event of 
intermediary default in the form of ex lege compensation by national schemes under 
harmonized legislation has not been complemented by the harmonization of insolvency 
law.  
 
Following the Crisis, the new EU financial architecture and substantive law entails 
concentration of competence by the new EU regulatory and supervisory authorities 
together with a new approach to accountability and liability, more detailed EU financial 
regulation, and new structures in the area of intermediary failure, as the proposed 




The revision of EU law on minimum protection in the event of intermediary failure, as 
proposed, aspires to establish a more predictable and coherent system of EU rules, 
taking into account effectiveness issues caused by the fragmentation, uncertainty and 
lacunae which characterize the of the DGSD and ICSD mechanisms. However, 
ambiguity remains in many aspects, as to the legal status and rights of depositors and 
retail investors under the new regime, the interrelation of the two categories of market 
participants, and the legal consequences thereof.  
 
In the context of revision of EU finance law, and taking into consideration the enhanced 
powers of the new EU competent authorities, the interpretation provided by the ECJ in 
Peter Paul of EU law with regard to retail market participants status and rights in the 
European legal edifice, as it stood before the Crisis, does not appear applicable in the 
context of the new legal regime emerging from the Crisis –at least with regard to 
investment services and the protection of retail investors.  
 
On the national level, the main features of EU law relating to retail investor protection 
in the event of intermediary failure have exercised a major influence on the structure 
and content of the relevant rules in the Hellenic legal order. National rules of EU origin 
further interact with other rules not of EU origin, and form together the wider context in 
which legal protection is manifested in practice.  
 
In this framework, protection of retail investors in the event of intermediary failure, as 
awarded in the Hellenic legal order, is fragmented and inconsistent, depending on the 
form of the intermediary (as an investment firm or a credit institution providing 




The differentiation of procedural and substantive rules in the various sets of applicable 
rules (special and common liquidation of investment firms vs special liquidation of 
credit institutions, compensation by the JGF vs compensation by the HDICF) does not 
allow for the establishment of a coherent legal system for the protection of retail 
investors in the event of intermediary failure. Furthermore, inner deficiencies, 
inconsistencies and lacunae characterise each set of applicable rules, in particular with 
regard to claim verification, ultimately leading to lack of effectiveness in the protection 
awarded.  
 
Recent Hellenic case-law on the protection of retail investors in the form of ex lege 
compensation has attempted to achieve effective protection, taking into account the 
protective aim of EU law as perceived by the national courts, and the need to address 
the difficulties related to intermediary failure as a result of tort. Further, with regard to 
non-contractual liability of competent authorities, recent Hellenic case-law has proven 
constructive, applying the acquis in the area of State and public authorities’ liability in 
tort in light of the specificities of financial markets regulation and supervision.  
 
Not acknowledging total ex lege immunity of the HCMC from liability –and despite the 
introduction relevant legislative provisions– recent case-law has elaborated strict 
substantive criteria for liability to attach.  
 
Thus, it emerges that judicial effective protection of retail investors in the event of 
intermediary failure may a priori be achieved in the Hellenic legal order, under the light 
of EU law, and despite certain structural and normative deficiencies on the level of both 
EU and Hellenic law. For such judicial protection to be effected, certain conditions have 
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to be met. These include, on the level of protection in the form of ex lege compensation 
by the relevant schemes, the meaningful interpretation of rules on the notion and ambit 
of covered investment services, as well as of evidentiary rules, taking into account the 
particularities of intermediary failure as a result of tort. Furthermore, on the level of 
protection in the form of compensation by the competent authorities on the ground of 
tortuous liability, they include the non-application of immunity rules and the application 
of strict liability rules in conjunction with (a) a not excessively strict application of 
causality criteria regarding the behaviour of the competent authorities, (b) a 
determination of possible concurrent fault by the retail investors, and (c) a useful 
implementation of rules on evidence according to the inquisitorial system applicable in 
administrative procedural law.  
 
Certainly, legal certainty, predictability and coherence require for the improvement of 
existing national law, which may not be achieved only by judicial interpretation, but has 
to take also the form of wider legislative revision. Such revision should focus on 
simplification, clarity and uniformity of applicable rules –in particular where the 
relevant issues are of a technical or evidentiary nature and no wider policy questions are 
involved, as in the case of claim verification.  
 
The new, emerging and proposed EU finance law will offer the opportunity and should 
entail the ab initio re-assessment, revision and systematization of Hellenic finance law 
relating to intermediary failure, in order to achieve effectiveness of retail investor 
protection in practice.   
 
Such a protective outcome will be in line with the new and emerging EU finance law, 
and in harmony with the European acquis on effective individual protection, which 
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surpasses the current financial crisis and reflects the political, institutional and legal 
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